City of Phoenix, Arizona v. Michael Huerta ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued March 17, 2017               Decided August 29, 2017
    Reissued February 7, 2018
    No. 15-1158
    CITY OF PHOENIX, ARIZONA,
    PETITIONER
    v.
    MICHAEL P. HUERTA AND FEDERAL AVIATION
    ADMINISTRATION,
    RESPONDENTS
    Consolidated with 15-1247
    On Petitions for Review of a Decision
    by the Federal Aviation Administration
    John E. Putnam argued the cause for petitioner City of
    Phoenix, Arizona. With him on the briefs was Peter J. Kirsch.
    Matthew G. Adams, pro hac vice, argued the cause for
    petitioners Story Preservation Association, et al. With him on
    the briefs was Peter L. Gray.
    Lane N. McFadden, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was
    2
    John C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General at the time the
    brief was filed.
    Before: ROGERS and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and
    SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.
    Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    SENTELLE.
    GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: In September 2014, the Federal
    Aviation Administration changed longstanding flight routes in
    and out of Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport. The city
    of Phoenix and a historic neighborhood association both
    petitioned for review, alleging that the FAA’s action was
    arbitrary and capricious. We agree.
    I
    Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport is one of the
    nation’s busiest airports. To minimize the impact of the sound
    of aircraft on residents, the FAA historically has routed flights
    over industrial and agricultural parts of the City, and the City
    has used zoning to minimize impact on residential areas and
    either purchased or furnished with sound insulation the homes
    most affected by flight paths, at a cost of hundreds of millions
    of dollars.
    In response to a mandate from Congress to modernize the
    nation’s air-traffic control system, see FAA Modernization and
    Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
    §§ 101(a), 213(a)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 11, 47, the FAA sought to
    alter the flight routes in and out of Sky Harbor and to employ
    satellite technology to guide planes. For consultation on its
    3
    developing plans, the FAA formed the Phoenix Airspace Users
    Work Group with the City and others.
    One of the new flight paths the FAA devised would route
    planes over a major avenue and various public parks and
    historic neighborhoods. The new route would increase air
    traffic over these areas by 300%, with 85% of the increase
    coming from jets. The FAA consulted on the environmental
    impact of this and other proposed changes primarily with a
    low-level employee in Phoenix’s Aviation Department, who
    warned the FAA that he lacked the expertise and authority to
    discuss environmental matters on the City’s behalf. The FAA
    never conveyed the proposed route changes to senior officials
    in the City’s Aviation Department, local officials responsible
    for affected parks or historic districts, or elected city officials.
    As plans progressed, the FAA used computer software to
    model the noise impact of the proposed route changes. This
    modeling predicted that two areas in Phoenix, which included
    twenty-five historic properties and nineteen public parks,
    would experience an increase in noise large enough to be
    “potentially controversial.” But the agency concluded that
    these projected noise levels would not have a “[s]ignificant
    [environmental] impact” under FAA criteria. Joint Appendix
    333, 334. Based on this conclusion, the FAA issued a
    declaration categorically excluding the new flight routes from
    further environmental review. The FAA shared these
    conclusions with the State Historic Preservation Officer,
    predicting that the new noise levels would not disrupt
    conversation at a distance of three feet and would be no louder
    than the background noise of a commercial area. The State
    Officer concurred in this prediction.
    The FAA presented the finalized flight routes in an April
    2013 meeting attended by a low-level project manager of the
    4
    City’s Aviation Department. The agency also sent the proposed
    routes and maps showing affected areas to the other low-level
    Aviation Department employee, with the caveat that plans were
    “subject to change.” J.A. 302. In May 2014, the FAA notified
    the Phoenix Airspace Users Work Group that the new routes
    would take effect in September. The FAA did not share its
    environmental conclusions with Airport management until the
    day before the routes were to go into effect. Management asked
    the FAA to delay implementation so the public could be
    informed. The FAA refused.
    On September 18, 2014, the FAA published the new
    routes, and related procedures, and made them effective
    immediately. The public’s reaction was swift and severe: the
    planes supplied the sound, the public provided the fury. In the
    next two weeks, the Airport received more noise complaints
    than it had received in all of the previous year. 1 Residents
    complained that the flights overhead were too loud and
    frequent and rattled windows and doors in their homes. Some
    claimed that they had trouble sleeping uninterrupted, carrying
    on conversations outdoors, or feeling comfortable indoors
    without earmuffs to mute the noise. 2
    In response to the uproar, the FAA held a public meeting
    the next month that drew 400 attendees and hundreds of
    1
    See Brittany Hargrave, Phoenix Neighbors Protest Sky
    Harbor Flight-Path Change, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 30,
    2014 (updated Oct. 1, 2014), http://azc.cc/YQlwu5.
    2
    See Ashley Thompson, Neighbors Upset at FAA’s New Flight
    Patterns Hold Day of Protest, KNXV, Oct. 24, 2015,
    http://www.abc15.com/news/region-phoenix-metro/central-
    phoenix/neighbors-upset-at-faas-new-flight-patterns-hold-day-of-
    protest.
    5
    comments. 3 There the agency promised to review the noise
    issue and update the City’s Aviation Department. The FAA
    later claimed to have identified and corrected the problem:
    aircraft had been straying from the new routes. The agency said
    it was “teaming with the airport staff and industry experts” to
    see what more could be done about the noise levels. J.A. 609.
    But despite the FAA’s assurances, the City continued to receive
    record numbers of noise complaints. In early December, the
    City told the FAA that public concern remained high.
    That month the State Historic Preservation Officer also
    asked the FAA to reconsider the new routes in light of their
    impact on historic properties, which he said was far worse than
    he had been led to believe. He said he had originally concurred
    with the agency’s optimistic projections only out of deference
    to the FAA’s technical expertise.
    Around the same time, the FAA’s Regional Administrator
    met with Phoenix’s City Council and publicly admitted, “I
    think it’s clear that . . . [our pre-implementation procedures
    were] probably not enough because we didn’t anticipate this
    being as significant an impact as it has been, so I’m certainly
    not here to tell you that we’ve done everything right and
    everything we should have done.” J.A. 773.
    A week after this concession, the City asked the agency to
    reopen consultation and restore the old routes until the City and
    3
    See Miriam Wasser, Sound and Fury: Frustrated Phoenix
    Residents Are Roaring Ever Since the FAA Changed Sky Harbor
    Flight Paths, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Mar. 4, 2015,
    http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/sound-and-fury-frustrated-
    phoenix-residents-are-roaring-ever-since-the-faa-changed-sky-
    harbor-flight-paths-6654056; Caitlin McGlade, FAA Will Study
    Solution to Flight-Path Noise, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Oct. 16,
    2014 (updated Oct. 17, 2014), http://azc.cc/1waaUm9.
    6
    the agency could engage the public in discussions. In response,
    the FAA said it would work with the airport and airlines to
    investigate additional changes to the flight paths. To that end,
    the FAA promised to reconvene the original Working Group,
    assuring the City that it was “an important player in this
    process.” J.A. 750-51. But the agency also said it could not
    reinstate the routes in place before September 18, 2014,
    because that would require a time-consuming series of related
    changes to air-traffic control and aircraft automation systems,
    as well as additional safety and environmental reviews. The
    FAA also declined the Preservation Officer’s request to re-
    open environmental review of the new routes.
    In mid-February and again in early April the following
    year, the City submitted data to the FAA purporting to show
    that the agency’s assertions to the Preservation Officer
    regarding the noise impact of the new routes were “massive[ly]
    and material[ly]” incorrect. J.A. 814. The City also alleged that
    computer modeling the FAA was required to use under its own
    regulations showed that 40,000 additional residents would be
    exposed to noise loud enough to disrupt speech compared to
    before the new routes were implemented. And the City
    renewed its request that the FAA reopen a statutorily mandated
    consultation process with the State Preservation Office, in
    order to provide the City with data from the FAA’s modeling,
    conduct an environmental review of the route changes, and find
    ways to either minimize the noise impact of those changes or
    restore the old routes.
    In mid-April the FAA responded with a letter to the City
    that included the Working Group’s final report. The report
    evaluated alternative routes and amended some existing routes
    but reaffirmed the agency’s decision not to conduct further
    review of the new flight paths’ environmental impact. And
    though the accompanying letter expressed the FAA’s
    7
    frustration that the City had offered no alternative route
    proposals, the letter also conveyed the agency’s promise to
    consider further modifications as it “continue[d] to support a
    collaborative approach towards addressing the community’s
    concerns.” J.A. 1036. The letter did not address the City’s data,
    modeling, or requests. In fact, the accompanying documents
    disclosed that noise level reduction was not among the
    Working Group’s stated objectives.
    The City’s response expressed frustration that despite
    initial promises, the FAA had organized the Working Group so
    that it would not address the noise issue, and had even excluded
    the City from meetings for fear of confrontation between the
    City and the airlines. Indeed, the City was not listed as a
    Working Group member. The City also protested that it had
    provided an alternative plan to the FAA—namely, reinstating
    the original routes but continuing to use satellite technology—
    which the City claimed would eliminate the 69% increase in
    residents exposed to higher noise levels and cost airlines only
    $700,000 more per year in fuel compared to the new routes.
    In late May, the City met with the FAA and the airlines to
    again discuss ways to fix the noise issues. The FAA
    characterized these discussions as “productive” in a follow-up
    letter sent on June 1. J.A. 1109. The letter also listed short-term
    adjustments the agency could make within six months, as well
    as some “longer term” possibilities, which the agency could
    implement within a year following additional environmental
    review. 
    Id. The letter
    said nothing about the City’s data
    submissions, previous requests to reopen consultation and
    environmental review, proposal to return to the old routes while
    still using satellite technology, or exclusion from the Working
    Group.
    8
    Also on June 1, the City sought review in our court,
    characterizing the FAA’s last letter as a final order. The
    Historic Neighborhoods filed their own petition for review in
    late July. The FAA moved to dismiss these petitions as
    untimely.
    II
    We must first determine whether these petitions are
    untimely. A petition for review of an FAA order must be filed
    in the Court of Appeals “not later than 60 days after the order
    is issued.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a). The parties disagree over
    when this sixty-day clock began to run—i.e., when the FAA’s
    decision regarding the new flight routes crystallized into final
    agency action. The answer is relevant because only a final
    action can be a reviewable “order” within the meaning of
    section 46110’s sixty-day deadline. See Flytenow, Inc. v. FAA,
    
    808 F.3d 882
    , 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A final order is one that
    “mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking
    process” and that either determines “rights or obligations” or is
    a source of “legal consequences.” Friedman v. FAA, 
    841 F.3d 537
    , 541 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 
    520 U.S. 154
    , 177-78 (1997)).
    The FAA contends that its final “order” regarding the new
    routes issued on September 18, 2014, when the routes were
    formally published and put into effect. We agree. The
    September 2014 publication was a final order because it
    satisfies both prongs of the finality test.
    First, the September publication marked “the
    consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” 
    id., because it
    put the new routes into effect following extensive
    testing and evaluation intended to ensure that those routes
    would be safe and consistent with air traffic requirements, see
    9
    Fed. Aviation Admin., Order No. 7100.41, Performance Based
    Navigation Implementation Process §§ 2-3 to 2-6 (2014).
    Petitioners respond that although the new routes went into
    effect in September, the agency’s decisionmaking process
    regarding those routes had not yet concluded. See 
    Friedman, 841 F.3d at 541
    . Petitioners note that the FAA’s process for
    developing new routes actually has five steps, of which
    publication of the new routes was only the fourth. The fifth step
    provides for post-implementation monitoring and review,
    which, petitioners contend, could have led to further route
    changes.
    But this final step is not part of the agency’s
    “decisionmaking process.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Rather, it
    consists of “Monitoring and Evaluation” of decisions already
    “[i]mplement[ed],” see Order 7100.41, supra, § 2-7, “to
    ensure” that those decisions play out “as expected,” 
    id. To be
    sure, that monitoring might lead to adjustments to the new
    routes, but by then the primary development of those routes has
    already happened. Cf. 
    Friedman, 841 F.3d at 543
    (explaining
    that “a vague prospect of reconsideration” does not defeat a
    finding of finality).
    As for the second prong of the finality test, it was the
    September publication, and not the June 1 letter or any of the
    agency’s other reports or communications, that determined
    “rights [and] obligations” and produced “legal consequences.”
    
    Id. at 541.
    And it was the September publication that led to the
    effects petitioners now seek to reverse: increased noise in
    certain areas of Phoenix. We also note that the relief requested
    by petitioners is “vacat[ur] and remand [of the] FAA’s decision
    to implement the [new flight] routes”—that is, of the
    September order. Phoenix Br. 61. Thus, petitioners implicitly
    recognize that the September publication, and only that
    10
    publication, determined the legal consequences they wish to
    challenge. We therefore conclude that the September 18, 2014
    publication of the new flight routes was the relevant final
    “order.”
    The petitions thus came more than half a year too late. The
    review statute, however, provides that a court may allow a
    petition to be filed after the usual deadline “if there are
    reasonable grounds for not filing by the 60th day.” 49 U.S.C.
    § 46110(a). While we “rarely [find] ‘reasonable grounds’
    under section 46110(a),” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. FAA, 
    821 F.3d 39
    , 43 (D.C. Cir. 2016), we have done so in cases quite
    similar to this one.
    For instance, in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil
    Aeronautics Board, the Board promulgated a final rule but
    “explicitly left its rulemaking docket open in order to receive
    additional comments from the public.” 
    752 F.2d 694
    , 705 n.82
    (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Dep’t
    of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 
    477 U.S. 597
    (1986).
    “Aware that the rule might be undergoing modification, and
    unable to predict how extensive any modifications would be,
    petitioners elected to wait until the regulation was in final form
    before seeking review,” six months after the final rule had been
    published. 
    Id. We found
    that petitioners had shown “reasonable
    grounds” for late filing under a review statute materially the
    same as the one at issue here. 4 See 
    id. (citing 49
    U.S.C.
    § 1486(a) (1976)). In doing so, we observed that “[a]ny delay
    simply served properly to exhaust petitioners’ administrative
    4
    In Paralyzed Veterans, the petitioners had filed a petition for
    review within sixty days of an amended final order. But the
    Paralyzed Veterans court treated that fact as a distinct reason to
    review the petition, considering “[m]ore important[]” the fact that
    petitioners had shown reasonable grounds for delaying their petition
    for review of the original order. 
    See 752 F.2d at 705
    n.82.
    11
    remedies, and to conserve the resources of both the litigants
    and this court.” 
    Id. Similarly, in
    Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, after the FAA’s
    publication of an advisory circular establishing certain
    requirements for manufacturing products provoked a
    “significant uproar in the industry,” the FAA told the industry
    to ignore the existing order pending a revision. 
    509 F.3d 593
    ,
    603 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The petitioner, “[b]ased on these
    representations, and hoping to avoid litigation,” decided to wait
    and see if the agency would address the petitioner’s concerns
    voluntarily. 
    Id. As a
    result, we found reasonable grounds for
    the petitioner’s late filing. 
    Id. at 604.
    To be sure, in Safe Extensions the FAA had expressly
    directed the petitioner to ignore the final order, whereas here
    the FAA merely promised to look into possible modifications.
    But the key in Safe Extensions was that the agency left parties
    “with the impression that [it] would address their concerns” by
    replacing its original order with a revised one. 
    Id. at 596.
    There
    we were concerned that the agency’s comments “could have
    confused the petitioner and others.” 
    Id. at 603.
    Those same concerns are present here. The FAA
    repeatedly communicated—in an October public meeting, in a
    November letter, in a December public meeting, in a January
    letter, in a February decision to reconvene the Working Group,
    in an April letter, and in a May meeting with city officials—
    that the agency was looking into the noise problem, was open
    to fixing the issue, and wanted to work with the City and others
    to find a solution. This pattern would certainly have led
    reasonable observers to think the FAA might fix the noise
    problem without being forced to do so by a court. And given
    the FAA’s serial promises, petitioning for review soon after the
    September order might have shut down dialogue between the
    12
    petitioners and the agency. See Oral Arg. Tr. 58:8-13. We do
    not punish the petitioners for treating litigation as a last rather
    than a first resort when an agency behaves as the FAA did here.
    See Paralyzed 
    Veterans, 752 F.2d at 705
    n.82.
    While we rarely find a reasonable-grounds exception, this
    is such a rare case. We hold that petitioners had reasonable
    grounds for their delay in filing. To conclude otherwise would
    encourage the FAA to promise to fix a problem just long
    enough for sixty days to lapse and then to argue that the
    resulting petitions were untimely. We therefore reach the
    merits of the petitions.
    III
    The petitioners argue that the FAA’s approval of the new
    flight routes was arbitrary and capricious and violated the
    National Historic Preservation Act, the National
    Environmental Policy Act, the Department of Transportation
    Act, and the FAA’s Order 1050.1E. We agree. 5
    A
    Under the National Historic Preservation Act, federal
    agencies must “account [for] the effect of their actions on
    structures eligible for inclusion in the National Register of
    Historic Places.” Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. ICC, 
    848 F.2d 1246
    , 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In fulfilling this obligation,
    agencies must consult with certain stakeholders in the
    potentially affected areas, including representatives of local
    5
    Petitioners also claim that the FAA violated the agency’s own
    Order 7100.41 by excluding the City from the Working Group re-
    convened in the wake of the controversy over the new routes. We do
    not reach that argument, however, because our review is limited to
    the agency’s September order.
    13
    governments. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(a)(4), (c)(3). If an agency
    determines that no historic structures will be adversely
    affected, it still has to “notify all consulting parties”—
    including a representative of the local government—and give
    them any relevant documentation. 
    Id. § 800.5(c).
    Here the FAA failed to fulfill these obligations because it
    consulted only low-level employees in the City’s Aviation
    Department, whom the City had never designated as its
    representatives. True, the City never informed the FAA that
    low-level Aviation Department employees were inadequate
    points of contact, but that is irrelevant. Neither statute nor
    regulation imposes a duty on local governments to
    affirmatively inform the agency of their chosen representatives.
    Just the opposite: the agency must ask local governments who
    their authorized representatives are. See 
    id. § 800.3(f),
    (f)(1).
    The FAA never took that step here. And the FAA’s failure to
    notify and provide documentation to the City of the agency’s
    finding of no adverse impact violated regulations under the
    Preservation Act, and denied the City its right to participate in
    the process and object to the FAA’s findings. See 
    id. §§ 800.2(c)(3),
    800.5(c)(2).
    Additionally, unless confidential information is involved,
    agencies must “provide the public with information about an
    undertaking and its effects on historic properties and seek
    public comment and input.” 
    Id. § 800.2(d)(2)
    (emphasis
    added). The FAA admits, however, that it did not make “local
    citizens and community leaders” aware of the proposed new
    routes and procedures, J.A. 364, and it does not claim that any
    confidentiality concerns applied.
    Further, by keeping the public in the dark, the agency
    made it impossible for the public to submit views on the
    project’s potential effects—views that the FAA is required to
    14
    consider. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a); see also Am. Bird
    Conservancy v. FCC, 
    516 F.3d 1027
    , 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
    (“Interested persons cannot request an [environmental
    assessment] for actions they do not know about, much less for
    actions already completed.”).
    B
    Under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
    federal agencies must assess and disclose the environmental
    impacts of “major” actions prior to taking those actions. 42
    U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. This process
    “ensures” that before an agency acts, it will “have available”
    and “carefully consider[] detailed information concerning
    significant environmental impacts.” Robertson v. Methow
    Valley Citizens Council, 
    490 U.S. 332
    , 349 (1989). The process
    also “guarantees that the relevant information will be made
    available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both
    the decision-making process and the implementation of [the]
    decision.” 
    Id. NEPA’s requirements
    vary based on the type of agency
    action in question. Actions with significant environmental
    effects require a full environmental-impact statement. Actions
    with impacts that are not significant or are unknown require a
    briefer environmental assessment. And actions “which do not
    individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the
    human environment” can be categorically excluded from any
    environmental review. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
    However, the FAA may not categorically exclude an
    action from environmental review if “the Administrator
    determines that extraordinary circumstances” would counsel
    otherwise. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub.
    L. No. 112-95, § 213(c)(1), 126 Stat. 11, 49. Under the FAA’s
    15
    own regulations, extraordinary circumstances exist when an
    action’s effects “are likely to be highly controversial on
    environmental grounds.” Fed. Aviation Admin., Order No.
    1050.1E, Environmental Impacts: Policies and Procedures
    ¶ 304i (2004). Here, the FAA found that the new routes were
    “not likely to be highly controversial on environmental
    grounds,” and thus determined that no extraordinary
    circumstances existed. That determination was arbitrary and
    capricious.
    The FAA’s determination was arbitrary in light of the
    agency’s admitted failure to notify “local citizens and
    community leaders” of the proposed new routes before they
    went into effect. J.A. 364, 367. This failure made it impossible
    for the FAA to take into account “[o]pposition on
    environmental grounds by a . . . State, or local government
    agency or by . . . a substantial number of the persons affected
    by the [FAA’s] action.” Order 1050.1E, supra, ¶ 304i; cf. Am.
    Bird 
    Conservancy, 516 F.3d at 1035
    (faulting the agency for its
    lack of diligence in informing and involving the public since
    “[i]nterested persons cannot request an [environmental
    assessment] for actions they do not know about, much less for
    actions already completed”).
    The FAA argues that it was reasonable simply to assume
    that its proposal would not be controversial on environmental
    grounds, given that the agency had “confirmed that no
    significant noise impacts were anticipated at all, received the
    concurrence of the State Historic Preservation Officer[,] who
    expressed no concerns, and then further discussed the finding
    with the Airport Authority[,] [which] also expressed no
    concerns.” FAA Br. 80. Common sense reveals otherwise. As
    noted, the FAA’s proposal would increase by 300% the number
    of aircraft flying over twenty-five historic neighborhoods and
    buildings and nineteen public parks, with 85% of the new flight
    16
    traffic coming from jets. The idea that a change with these
    effects would not be highly controversial is “so implausible”
    that it could not reflect reasoned decisionmaking. See Motor
    Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
    
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983).
    The FAA also erred by deviating from its usual practice in
    assessing when new flight routes are likely to be highly
    controversial, without giving a “reasoned explanation for . . .
    treating similar situations differently.” W. Deptford Energy,
    LLC v. FERC, 
    766 F.3d 10
    , 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In assessing
    proposed route changes at airports in Boston, Northern
    California, Charlotte, and Atlanta, the FAA has relied on its
    general observation that a proposal is likely to be highly
    controversial if it would increase sound levels by five or more
    decibels in an area already experiencing average levels of 45-
    60 decibels. But here the agency said exactly the opposite and
    never explained its about-face. The FAA replies that “[e]ach
    airport is different and the potential effects of any changes at
    those airports will differ as well.” FAA Br. 81. But that does
    not explain how the Phoenix plan could be less likely to stir
    controversy than other plans that had the same projected
    impact. Thus, the agency acted arbitrarily in departing from its
    usual determinations regarding when a projected noise increase
    is likely to be highly controversial.
    In short, the FAA had several reasons to anticipate that the
    new flight routes would be highly controversial: The agency
    was changing routes that had been in place for a long time, on
    which the City had relied in setting its zoning policy and
    buying affected homes. The air traffic over some areas would
    increase by 300%—with 85% of that increase attributed to
    jets—when before only prop aircraft flew overhead. The FAA
    found a “potential [for] controversy” but did not notify local
    citizens and community leaders of the proposed changes as the
    17
    agency was obligated to, much less allow citizens and leaders
    to weigh in. 6 And the agency departed from its determinations
    in materially identical cases. Thus, the FAA acted arbitrarily in
    finding under Order 1050.1E that the new routes were unlikely
    to be highly controversial and could thus be categorically
    excluded from further environmental review.
    C
    Petitioners also raise two claims related to the
    Transportation Act’s section 4(f). First, they argue that the
    FAA violated its duty to consult with the City in assessing
    whether the new routes would substantially impair the City’s
    parks and historic sites. Second, petitioners claim that the FAA
    was wrong to find that the routes would not substantially impair
    these protected areas. We agree on both points.
    i
    Section 4(f) of the Transportation Act calls for “special
    effort[s] to preserve the natural beauty of . . . public park and
    recreation lands . . . and historic sites.” 49 U.S.C. § 303(a). To
    that end, the FAA’s regulations require it to consult “all
    appropriate . . . State[] and local officials having jurisdiction
    over the affected section 4(f)” areas when assessing whether a
    noise increase might substantially impair these areas. Order
    1050.1E, supra, ¶ 6.2e (emphases added). According to the
    6
    Although at times it may be difficult to identify precisely who
    must be notified, the FAA’s regulatory acknowledgment of its
    obligation has narrowed the field. Here, given the changes about to
    occur, it was unreasonable to ignore elected local officials once the
    FAA was on notice that the Aviation Department employee lacked
    authorization to speak for the City of Phoenix. See infra Part III.C
    (discussing FAA regulations under section 4(f) of the Transportation
    Act).
    18
    City, the agency violated this requirement by not consulting the
    proper city officials about the proposed flight routes in
    Phoenix. Cf. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm. v.
    FEC, 
    626 F.2d 953
    , 959 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Agencies are under
    an obligation to follow their own regulations, procedures, and
    precedents, or provide a rational explanation for their
    departures.”).
    The FAA responds that it did consult employees in the
    City’s Aviation Department, and that at the time the City didn’t
    tell the agency what the City now asserts: that those employees
    lacked authority to speak for the City regarding the new flight
    routes. Thus, the FAA contends, its failure to consult other
    local officials was not arbitrary.
    We are not persuaded. As noted, the FAA spoke mainly
    with one low-level employee in the City’s Aviation
    Department and occasionally with other low-ranking members
    of the department. But it was unreasonable for the agency
    simply to assume that low-level Aviation Department
    employees had jurisdiction over the historic sites and public
    parks protected by section 4(f), much less that these employees
    (along with the State Historic Preservation Officer) represented
    all the local officials with such jurisdiction, as the agency’s
    consultation duties required. Besides, the FAA cites no
    evidence that it consulted with these City officials on historic
    sites and public parks in particular. Thus, the FAA’s
    consultation process was arbitrarily confined.
    ii
    Section 4(f) also provides that a federal transportation
    project may “use” a public park or historic site only if “there is
    no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land.” 49
    U.S.C. § 303(c)(1). A project makes “constructive use” of a
    19
    protected area if the project would “substantially impair” that
    area. Order 1050.1E, supra, ¶ 6.2e. And a project substantially
    impairs an area if it “substantially diminish[es]” the “activities,
    features, or attributes . . . that contribute to its enjoyment.” 
    Id. ¶ 6.2f.
    For instance, a project would make constructive use of
    a park if it subjected the park to aircraft noise “at levels high
    enough to have negative consequences of a substantial nature
    that amount to a taking.” 
    Id. In that
    case, the project could
    lawfully proceed only if there was no prudent and feasible
    alternative to using the park.
    In determining whether a transportation project would
    substantially impair an area protected under section 4(f), the
    FAA may rely on guidelines set forth in 14 C.F.R. pt. 150 (the
    Part 150 guidelines), including the directive “to evaluate
    impacts on historic properties that are in use as residences.”
    Order 1050.1E, supra, ¶ 6.2h. But the Part 150 guidelines “may
    not be sufficient to determine the noise impact” on historic
    residences if “a quiet setting is a generally recognized purpose
    and attribute” of those residences. 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Here
    the FAA found that a quiet setting was not a recognized
    purpose of the affected historic homes, neighborhoods, and
    sites, so the agency relied only on the Part 150 guidelines in
    assessing the noise impact on those sites. And on that basis, it
    concluded that the increased noise would not substantially
    impair the historic buildings and areas in question.
    The City contends that it was unreasonable for the FAA to
    rely only on the Part 150 guidelines, because the agency didn’t
    have enough information to tell if the areas affected here were
    generally recognized as quiet settings. We agree.
    As evidence that these sites were not “generally
    recognized” as quiet settings, the FAA pointed to the sites’
    urban location. 
    Id. But that
    isn’t enough: even in the heart of a
    20
    city, some neighborhoods might be recognized as quiet oases.
    The agency also observed that planes were flying over the
    affected historic sites even before the new routes took effect.
    But those earlier flights involved propeller aircraft that flew far
    less often, so the homes beneath them might still have been
    generally recognized as “quiet setting[s].” 
    Id. Thus, it
    was unreasonable for the agency to rely only on
    the Part 150 guidelines in concluding that noise from the new
    flight routes would not substantially impair the affected historic
    sites. As a result, that conclusion lacks substantial supporting
    evidence. For both these reasons, we find that the agency’s
    substantial-impairment analysis was arbitrary and capricious.
    See BFI Waste Sys. of N. Am. v. FAA, 
    293 F.3d 527
    , 532 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002) (observing that an agency’s action is arbitrary and
    capricious if it is “‘not supported by substantial evidence’ in
    the record as a whole” (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
    U.S. v. Ruckelshaus, 
    719 F.2d 1159
    , 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1989)));
    see also State 
    Farm, 463 U.S. at 43
    (“We may not supply a
    reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has
    not given.” (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
    332 U.S. 194
    , 196
    (1947))).
    IV
    For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petitions, vacate
    the September 18, 2014 order implementing the new flight
    departure routes at Sky Harbor International Airport, and
    remand the matter to the FAA for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    So ordered.
    SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this
    case, not because I disagree with the merits but because I
    believe the court should not reach them. I therefore express no
    opinion on the merits and instead disembark at the question of
    timeliness.
    As the majority acknowledges, petitions for review of an
    FAA order must be filed “not later than 60 days after the order
    is issued.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a); see Maj. Op. at 8.
    Nevertheless, as my colleagues note, the petitions in this case
    were filed “more than half a year too late.” Maj. Op. at 10.
    Such late filing is excused “only if there are reasonable grounds
    for not filing” within the 60-day period. § 46110(a); see Maj.
    Op. at 10. The majority relies on two cases, Paralyzed
    Veterans of America v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 
    752 F.2d 694
    (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. U.S. Dep’t
    of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 
    477 U.S. 597
    (1986),
    and Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 
    509 F.3d 593
    (D.C. Cir.
    2007), for its conclusion that reasonable grounds exist in the
    present case. See Maj. Op. at 10-12. Both cases, however, are
    distinguishable.
    As my colleagues in the majority acknowledge, in
    Paralyzed Veterans, “the Board promulgated a final rule but
    ‘explicitly left its rulemaking docket open in order to receive
    additional comments from the public.’” Maj. Op. at 10 (citing
    Paralyzed 
    Veterans, 752 F.2d at 705
    n.82). This unusual
    circumstance, prompting the petitioners to wait for further
    changes to the rule before filing for review, constituted
    reasonable grounds within the meaning of § 46110(a). And,
    as the majority acknowledges in discussing Safe Extensions,
    that case involved the FAA instructing parties to ignore an
    order as it would be modified and revised. Safe 
    Extensions, 509 F.3d at 603
    ; Maj. Op. at 10-11. The petitioner accordingly
    waited to file and, given that unique context, we concluded
    2
    reasonable grounds existed for delayed filing. Safe 
    Extensions, 509 F.3d at 604
    . These factual contexts are distinguishable
    from the present case, in which the FAA never promised to
    suspend the existing order and explicitly had the new flight
    paths continue while it considered the possibility of future
    changes. Mere agency acknowledgment of the possibility of
    future modification is not a rare circumstance; Paralyzed
    Veterans and Safe Extensions are instead the truly rare
    circumstances of an agency explicitly inducing warranted
    delay by a putative petitioner. Agencies are often welcome to
    re-initiate the decision-making process at some future point and
    to follow the necessary procedures to change their minds —
    this mere possibility, or even the mention of it, cannot be
    enough to excuse a petitioner’s failure to file within the
    statutorily mandated 60-day period. Otherwise, the statutory
    limit would cease to have meaning.
    Instead, as we observed in Electronic Privacy Information
    Center v. FAA, 
    821 F.3d 39
    , 43 (D.C. Cir. 2016), “[w]e have
    rarely found ‘reasonable grounds’ under section 46110(a).”
    Safe Extensions (and, by comparison, Paralyzed Veterans) is
    the “rare instance[]” of such reasonable grounds, not the rule.
    Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
    827 F.3d 51
    ,
    57 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Because reasonable grounds are so
    infrequent, the onus is almost always on the petitioners to
    protect themselves and file within the 60-day timeframe. The
    FAA’s failure to act with perfect clarity is not sufficient to
    remove petitioners’ duty to protect themselves. See, e.g., Nat’l
    Fed’n of the 
    Blind, 827 F.3d at 57-58
    ; Elec. Privacy Info. 
    Ctr., 821 F.3d at 42-43
    ; Avia Dynamics, Inc. v. FAA, 
    641 F.3d 515
    ,
    521 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Mere confusion over where or when to
    file, lack of clarity by the FAA in its communications,
    ignorance, and lack of notice do not suffice, at least
    independently, to qualify as reasonable grounds for delay under
    § 46110(a) and our precedent. See Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind,
    
    3 827 F.3d at 57-58
    ; Elec. Privacy Info. 
    Ctr., 821 F.3d at 42-43
    ;
    Avia 
    Dynamics, 641 F.3d at 521
    . Such grounds are rare and
    found in unique circumstances, such as Safe Extensions and
    agency procurements of delay by promising a new order and
    instructing parties to ignore the prior one, or Paralyzed
    Veterans and an agency leaving its rulemaking docket open
    during the modification process, where delay “simply served
    properly to exhaust petitioners’ administrative 
    remedies,” 752 F.2d at 705
    n.82. No such unusual facts are in the present case.
    I would determine that petitioners lacked reasonable grounds
    for untimely filing.
    I note in passing the majority’s references to petitioners’
    notice and knowledge of the FAA’s proceedings having come
    through “low-level” employees. See Maj. Op. at 3-4, 13. I do
    not see that this can help establish reasonable grounds for any
    delay, let alone one stretching six months beyond the 60-day
    statutory provision. There was ample time for the higher-ups
    to gain and act on adequate knowledge.
    In concluding that petitioners did not have reasonable
    grounds for waiting six months to file for review, I do not
    contend that the FAA acted with perfect clarity at all times.
    However, the record does not suggest to me that petitioners had
    a clear reason, akin to those rare instances present in Paralyzed
    Veterans and Safe Extensions, to forego at the very least a
    protective filing. For this reason, I would decide this case on
    the question of timeliness, deny the petitions for review, and
    decline to reach the merits of their arguments.