Prime Healthcare Services- Encino LLC v. NLRB , 890 F.3d 286 ( 2018 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 6, 2018                        May 18, 2018
    No. 16-1370
    PRIME HEALTHCARE SERVICES - ENCINO LLC, D/B/A ENCINO
    HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER
    PETITIONER
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    RESPONDENT
    SEIU LOCAL 121RN,
    INTERVENOR
    Consolidated with 16-1423
    On Petition for Review and Cross-Application
    for Enforcement of an Order of
    the National Labor Relations Board
    Jamie M. Konn argued the cause for petitioner. With him
    on the brief were Joseph A. Turzi and Jonathan S. Batten.
    Gregoire Sauter, Attorney, National Labor Relations
    Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief
    were Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, John H.
    Ferguson, Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy
    2
    Associate General Counsel, and Kira Dellinger Vol,
    Supervisory Attorney.
    Lisa C. Demidovich argued the cause for intervenor SEIU
    Local 121RN. With her on the brief was Ira L. Gottlieb.
    Before: GRIFFITH and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    EDWARDS.
    EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: The National Labor
    Relations Act (“Act” or “NLRA”) imposes on employers a
    general duty to bargain in good faith with their employees’
    representatives over “wages, hours, and other terms and
    conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d).
    Pursuant to this duty to bargain, “an employer commits an
    unfair labor practice if, without bargaining to impasse, it effects
    a unilateral change of an existing term or condition of
    employment.” Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 
    501 U.S. 190
    ,
    198 (1991) (citing NLRB v. Katz, 
    369 U.S. 736
    (1962)). This
    “[unilateral change] doctrine has been extended as well to cases
    where . . . an existing agreement has expired and negotiations
    on a new one have yet to be completed.” 
    Id. The duty
    to bargain
    also requires an employer “to provide relevant information
    needed by a labor union for the proper performance of its duties
    as the employees’ bargaining representative.” Detroit Edison
    Co. v. NLRB, 
    440 U.S. 301
    , 303 (1979). A failure to comply
    with either obligation is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
    of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (1).
    In this case, the National Labor Relations Board (“Board”)
    found that the Petitioner, Prime Healthcare Services and its
    subsidiary hospitals (together “Prime”), violated both the
    3
    unilateral change doctrine and the duty to provide relevant
    information during negotiations with its employees’ bargaining
    representatives, Service Employees International Union
    (“SEIU”) Local 121RN (“121RN”) and SEIU United
    Healthcare Workers-West (“UHW”) (collectively, “the
    Unions”). Prime Healthcare Servs., 364 NLRB No. 128, slip
    op. at 1–3 (Oct. 17, 2016). The Board concluded that Prime
    unilaterally discontinued anniversary step increases due to unit
    employees after its collective bargaining agreements with
    121RN and UHW had expired. 
    Id. at 10.
    The Board also
    determined that Prime wrongfully refused to provide
    information about employee health care programs in response
    to requests from 121RN and UHW. 
    Id. at 13,
    16. The Board
    ordered Prime to, inter alia, resume granting step increases to
    eligible employees; make whole eligible employees for any
    loss of earnings resulting from the employer’s failure to grant
    anniversary step increases; and furnish 121RN and UHW the
    requested information. 
    Id. at 2–3.
    After the parties filed their opening briefs, the complaints
    relating to UHW’s unfair labor practice charges were settled.
    The only matters that are still in issue here are those relating to
    the unfair labor practice charges filed by 121RN. Prime has
    raised a number of challenges to the Board’s disposition of the
    121RN charges. We find no merit in these challenges, however.
    Accordingly, we deny the petition for review and grant the
    Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    Prime Healthcare Services, Inc., and its affiliate Prime
    Healthcare Foundation, Inc., own and operate numerous
    hospitals in various states. In June 2008, Prime acquired two
    hospitals in California—Encino Hospital Medical Center
    (“Encino”) and Garden Grove Hospital & Medical Center
    4
    (“Garden Grove”). It adopted three collective bargaining
    agreements then in force between the hospitals’ prior owner
    and their employees. The first agreement was with 121RN, a
    union representing a unit of registered nurses at Encino. The
    second and third agreements were with UHW, a union
    representing two units of service and technical employees at
    Encino and Garden Grove. All three agreements were effective
    from January 1, 2007, through March 31, 2011.
    A. Negotiations Over New Collective Bargaining Agreements
    In late 2010 and early 2011, Prime commenced
    negotiations with 121RN and UHW over new collective
    bargaining agreements. Although the Unions represented
    different bargaining units, both are affiliated with the Service
    Employees International Union. Mary Schottmiller was the
    hospitals’ principal representative in the negotiations with
    121RN and UHW. The existing contracts covering all three
    units expired on March 31, 2011, without the parties having
    reached any new agreements.
    In addition to serving as the bargaining agent for
    employees at Prime, UHW also represented employees at
    hospitals owned by Kaiser and was a member of the National
    Coalition of Kaiser-Permanente Unions. Kaiser and the union
    coalition had reached an arrangement in 1997 pursuant to
    which the unions agreed to assist Kaiser in maintaining and
    improving its position in the marketplace. Part of the agreement
    required the unions to “focus . . . on real external threats” to
    Kaiser, including “competition.” Prime Healthcare Servs., 364
    NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 6. Prime is among Kaiser’s
    competitors. During the course of the negotiations between
    Prime and UHW, officials at Prime expressed concerns that
    bargaining between Prime and UHW had been compromised
    because of the Union’s relationship with Kaiser.
    5
    In 2010, UHW conducted a “corporate accountability
    campaign” against Prime. 
    Id. at 7.
    It publicized labor disputes
    with a Prime facility and criticized the company for reducing
    wages and benefits, and limiting access to medical care. It also
    published several reports questioning the quality of care
    provided at Prime hospitals, including allegations of unusually
    high rates of septicemia among Medicare patients.
    UHW’s corporate accountability campaign caused
    officials at Prime to suspect that the Union might be working
    with Kaiser to exclude Prime from the California health care
    market. Nonetheless, Prime continued to pursue collective
    bargaining negotiations with both UHW and 121RN
    throughout 2011.
    B. Anniversary Step Increases
    The UHW and 121RN collective bargaining agreements in
    force at the time when Prime acquired the hospitals contained
    identical provisions covering wage increases for unit
    employees. One provision granted annual increases on specific
    dates each year when the contract was in effect, from 2007 to
    2010. Another provision granted step increases on the
    anniversary of an employee’s hiring date. The contracts further
    capped unit employees’ total wage increases to no greater than
    9.25% in any twelve-month period. The relevant provisions
    read as follows:
    3. Annual Hospital Wide Increases:
    All members of the bargaining unit shall receive the
    following increases . . . [setting forth specific increases
    to take effect at contract ratification, on July 1, 2008,
    July 1, 2009, and July 1, 2010] . . . . No bargaining unit
    6
    member will receive a wage increase greater than
    9.25% in any twelve (12) month period. . . .
    5. Annual Increases/Advancing Through the Steps:
    In addition to the above hospital-wide annual increases,
    beginning July 1, 2008, individual employees shall
    receive Anniversary Step Increases in accordance with
    the wage scales in the following manner:
    . . . Employees who are at or below the scale on the
    anniversary date of their most recent date of hire shall
    advance to the next step on the wage scale on that
    anniversary date, subject to the annual caps provided in
    Section 3 above, which limit the maximum increase any
    employee may receive in any twelve (12) month period.
    Employees . . . who are less than one full step above
    scale shall advance to the next step on their anniversary
    date, again subject to the annual caps provided in
    Section 3 above.
    Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 151–53.
    At the parties’ first bargaining session after the contracts
    had expired, Schottmiller agreed with the Unions’
    representatives that the employees’ anniversary step increases
    under Section 5 would continue. For several months, Encino
    continued to approve anniversary step increases for eligible
    employees in the 121RN unit without any issues. In late 2011,
    however, Schottmiller decided that the step increases under
    Section 5 did not survive the contract expiration because
    Section 5 referred to Section 3 and the annual increases under
    Section 3 concededly did not extend beyond the expiration of
    the contracts. In November 2011, Encino discontinued paying
    7
    step increases to unit employees. The Unions then filed unfair
    labor practice charges with the Board.
    C. Union Information Requests
    On January 1, 2010, the employees represented by UHW
    and 121RN began to receive health care benefits under Prime’s
    exclusive provider organization (“EPO”) and preferred
    provider organization (“PPO”) medical plans. Under the EPO
    plan, employees could obtain services at Prime facilities or
    from doctors affiliated with Prime hospitals under a fee-for-
    service arrangement. Under the PPO plan, employees could
    join outside insurance networks.
    121RN anticipated that Prime would seek to implement
    significant changes to health care benefits under the new
    collective bargaining agreements, including increases in
    employee copays, deductibles, and premiums. Therefore, in
    April 2011, 121RN’s research director submitted a written
    request to Schottmiller for certain information relating to the
    EPO and PPO plans. Specifically, she requested information
    about employer costs for care, employee access to care, and the
    quality of care at Prime facilities, including lists of in-patient
    discharges organized by Medicare diagnostic code. The request
    explained that the Union needed the information to prepare its
    bargaining proposals.
    Schottmiller responded to the 121RN request by letter,
    seeking information from 121RN regarding the Union’s
    planned proposals and how the requested information was
    relevant to them. She noted that Encino was “not agreeable to
    any health care plan other than the EPO and PPO plans already
    implemented and agreed to” and was “not inclined to change
    . . . coverage regardless of the cost issues that you raise.” J.A.
    213–14. Schottmiller’s letter also contested the relevance of the
    8
    information about employees’ access to care in the Prime
    facilities.
    The parties subsequently exchanged a series of letters.
    121RN explained to Prime that the Union had not yet
    determined what proposals it would make regarding the
    existing health plans and stated that it sought the information
    to facilitate its consideration of bargaining proposals. The
    Union described why the requested information was necessary
    to evaluate the existing plans and determine whether to propose
    changes. Schottmiller continued to refuse to provide the
    requested information, rejecting the Union’s explanations as
    “conclusory,” J.A. 219, asserting that the information sought
    appeared to violate the collective bargaining privilege, 
    id., and accusing
    the Union of “engag[ing] in a fishing expedition in an
    attempt to create a problem where none exists,” J.A. 225.
    During the same period, UHW submitted an information
    request similar to 121RN’s and Schottmiller refused to provide
    the requested data. Both Unions filed unfair labor practice
    charges with the Board in September 2011. While those
    charges were pending, the parties continued to bargain over
    health care. Encino proposed continuing the current plans with
    an increase in employee premiums. 121RN, in turn, raised
    concerns about cost, access, and quality of care under Encino’s
    proposal.
    D. Procedural History
    The Board’s Acting General Counsel investigated the
    Unions’ unfair labor practice charges and issued a consolidated
    complaint against Prime on January 31, 2013. The complaint
    alleged that Prime had violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
    Act by ceasing to grant step increases and by failing to furnish
    relevant, necessary information requested by the Unions.
    9
    Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
    issued a recommended decision and order finding that Prime
    had violated the Act.
    On October 17, 2016, the Board issued a Decision and
    Order adopting the ALJ’s findings and conclusions. Prime
    Healthcare Servs., 364 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 1. It directed
    Prime to furnish the information requested by the Unions,
    resume granting step increases to eligible employees,
    compensate employees for their losses, post a remedial notice,
    and cease and desist from refusing to bargain in good faith with
    the Unions. 
    Id. at 1–3.
    Prime filed a petition for review with this court on October
    27, 2016. It challenged the Board’s findings and asserted that
    UHW’s charges should have been dismissed because the Union
    had a disabling conflict of interest. The NLRB filed a cross-
    application for enforcement of its order, the Unions intervened,
    and the cases were consolidated.
    After the parties filed their opening briefs, Encino, Garden
    Grove, and UHW reached a settlement with the Board. Those
    parties filed a motion with the court seeking severance and
    dismissal of the portion of the consolidated proceeding
    stemming from UHW’s charges. On July 11, 2017, the court
    granted the motion. The only claims now remaining for our
    review are those involving Encino and 121RN.
    II.     ANALYSIS
    A. Standard of Review
    Our review of the Board’s judgment is limited. Wilkes-
    Barre Hosp. Co., LLC v. NLRB, 
    857 F.3d 364
    , 372 (D.C. Cir.
    2017). We will overturn the Board’s decision only if,
    10
    “reviewing the record as a whole, it appears that the Board’s
    factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or
    that the Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying
    established law to the facts at issue.” S. Nuclear Operating Co.
    v. NLRB, 
    524 F.3d 1350
    , 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
    Although the Board is authorized to interpret a collective
    bargaining agreement to resolve unfair labor practice charges,
    we owe “no deference to the Board’s interpretation.” NLRB v.
    U.S. Postal Serv., 
    8 F.3d 832
    , 837 (D.C. Cir. 1993). We
    therefore interpret the collective bargaining agreement
    between 121RN and Encino de novo. See 
    Wilkes-Barre, 857 F.3d at 373
    .
    B. Unilateral Cessation of Wage Increases
    Under the unilateral change doctrine, an employer may not
    change a term or condition of employment unless the employer
    and the employees’ bargaining agent reach a new agreement or
    bargain to impasse. As we explained in Honeywell
    International, Inc. v. NRLB, 
    253 F.3d 125
    (D.C. Cir. 2001),
    the . . . doctrine is premised on a statutory right. . . . The
    right may be waived by contract and it may be vitiated if
    the parties reach an impasse in collective bargaining. And
    it applies only with respect to mandatory subjects of
    bargaining, excluding certain categorical exceptions
    recognized by the courts and the Board. See, e.g., 
    Litton, 501 U.S. at 199
    –200[;] Acme Die Casting v. NLRB, 
    93 F.3d 854
    , 857 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Beyond these conditions,
    however, the [unilateral change doctrine] is an inviolate
    principle of collective bargaining.
    
    Id. at 131.
                                  11
    Prime does not dispute that an anniversary step increase
    provision is a mandatory subject of bargaining and that it was
    an established term of employment under the agreement
    covering the employees represented by 121RN. And Prime
    does not claim that the parties reached an impasse in
    negotiations over the anniversary step increase provision, that
    the parties executed a new agreement on the subject, or that the
    Union waived its right to bargain over the subject. Rather,
    Prime contends that the anniversary step increase provision
    terminated with the expiration of the parties’ collective
    bargaining agreement. In support of this position, Prime argues
    as follows: anniversary step increases were inexorably tied to
    annual increases under the parties’ expired agreement; annual
    increases indisputably terminated with the expiration of the
    agreement; therefore, step increases terminated as well. We
    disagree.
    “To avoid running afoul of the unilateral change doctrine,
    an employer must maintain the status quo as to terms and
    conditions of employment after the expiration of a collective
    bargaining agreement.” 
    Wilkes-Barre, 857 F.3d at 373
    –74. It is
    well established that, pursuant to the duty to bargain under the
    NLRA, many terms of an expired collective bargaining
    agreement extend beyond the contract’s termination date and
    continue to “define the status quo.” 
    Litton, 501 U.S. at 206
    .
    Therefore, in order to determine whether Prime violated its
    duty to bargain in this case, we must determine whether the
    disputed step increase provision was a part of the status quo.
    And to do this, “we look to the substantive terms” of the
    expired collective bargain agreement. 
    Wilkes-Barre, 857 F.3d at 374
    .
    As noted above, Prime contends that step increases under
    Section 5 of the parties’ expired contract were “inexorably
    linked” to the annual increases under Section 3, because
    12
    Section 5 referenced the total increase cap under Section 3.
    Pet’r Reply Br. 4. This argument is unconvincing. The step
    increase provision in Section 5 did not by its terms provide for
    the cessation of the benefit at the expiration of the agreement.
    Employees’ anniversary dates continue for as long as they are
    with the employer. By contrast, it is clear from the terms of the
    annual increase provision under Section 3 that such increases
    were due only in the years indicated in the contract.
    In the absence of language in the collective bargaining
    agreement providing otherwise, anniversary step increases are
    part of the status quo and continue post-expiration.
    Furthermore, anniversary step increases and annual increases
    are “distinct rights that operate independently of each other.”
    
    Wilkes-Barre, 857 F.3d at 377
    . Thus, language tying annual
    increases to the term of the contract has no bearing on whether
    the anniversary step increases also expired. Wilkes-Barre
    instead instructs us to assess each contractual provision on its
    own terms. Where one of two wage increase provisions in a
    collective bargaining agreement includes explicit language
    making clear that it will not continue as part of the status quo
    post-expiration, and the other increase provision in the contract
    does not include such explicit language, the second increase
    provision remains part of the status quo and is subject to the
    unilateral change doctrine. Under this rule, only the Section 3
    increases terminated with the contract. Prime’s Section 5
    obligations continued as part of the status quo after the
    agreement expired.
    Nothing in the agreement between Encino and 121RN
    limited the duration of the anniversary step increases. Section
    3 provided for annual increases to take effect on four specific
    dates prior to the expiration of the contract. J.A. 151–52.
    Section 5, in turn, provided for step increases to occur on the
    anniversary date of an employee’s hiring “beginning July 1,
    13
    2008.” J.A. 152. Unlike Section 3, Section 5 provided no date
    certain for the increases to end. In these circumstances, our
    decision in Wilkes-Barre is controlling, and Prime’s attempts
    to distinguish that decision are unavailing.
    It is also noteworthy that Section 5 of the parties’
    agreement referred to Section 3 to indicate only that the step
    increases would be provided “[i]n addition” to the Section 3
    annual increases and that step increases were subject to a
    9.25% total annual increase cap. J.A. 152. The clear
    implication of these contract terms was that anniversary step
    increases would be due (subject to the cap) without regard to
    whether an employee received an annual increase. The cap on
    the total increase level in a 12-month period merely indicated
    the maximum increase that an employee could receive in a
    year, not whether step increases would continue after the
    expiration of the agreement. As in Wilkes-Barre, the disputed
    wage increase provisions in this case were plainly “distinct”
    and “operate[d] independently of each 
    other.” 857 F.3d at 377
    .
    On the record at hand, we agree with the Board that Prime
    breached its duty to bargain when it unilaterally terminated
    employee anniversary step increases after the expiration of the
    parties’ agreement.
    C. Refusal to Provide Requested Information
    Prime also challenges the Board’s determination that
    Encino was required to provide 121RN with the information it
    requested. Because the Board’s decision was consistent with
    established precedent and is supported by substantial evidence,
    we have no cause to disturb it.
    An employer’s statutory duty to bargain in good faith
    “includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by a
    14
    labor union for the proper performance of its duties.” Detroit
    Edison 
    Co., 440 U.S. at 303
    . Refusing to provide relevant
    information upon request is a violation of the Act. Country
    Ford Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    229 F.3d 1184
    , 1191 (D.C. Cir.
    2000). Information related to employee benefits is
    presumptively relevant, 
    id., and an
    employer must produce
    presumptively relevant information unless it rebuts the
    presumption or asserts a valid countervailing interest, see Oil,
    Chem. & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 
    711 F.2d 348
    , 359–60 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In order to withhold
    presumptively relevant information, an employer must “prove
    either lack of relevance or . . . provide adequate reasons why it
    cannot, in good faith, supply the information.” Hondo, Inc.,
    
    311 N.L.R.B. 424
    , 425 (1993).
    Prime first contends that the information 121RN requested
    was “facially irrelevant” to bargaining and, therefore, the
    hospital had no duty to produce it. Pet’r Reply Br. 9. According
    to Prime, because Encino had made clear that it was not going
    to purchase insurance from a competitor regardless of what
    cost issues the Union raised, cost of care was not at issue. This
    is a specious claim. Prime’s preference to provide health care
    itself surely did not nullify the Union’s right to bargain over
    the subject. See 
    Katz, 369 U.S. at 743
    (“A refusal to negotiate
    . . . as to any subject which is within § 8(d) . . . violates
    § 8(a)(5).”). Health care benefits are a mandatory subject of
    bargaining. Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    855 F.3d 436
    , 438 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Therefore, the Union had a right to
    seek the relevant data. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic 
    Workers, 711 F.2d at 359
    . Indeed, in this case, Prime put the issue of cost in
    play when, during contract negotiations, it raised the possibility
    of increasing health care costs for the employees. See J.A. 815–
    16. In any event, it appears that Prime abandoned this argument
    before the Board. See Prime Healthcare Servs., 364 NLRB No.
    128, slip op. at 13, n.25. Therefore, we need not address it for
    15
    lack of jurisdiction. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); Alden Leeds, Inc.
    v. NLRB, 
    812 F.3d 159
    , 166–67 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
    Prime also contends that even if the requested information
    was presumptively relevant, the presumption of relevance was
    rebutted by Encino’s concern that 121RN’s requests for
    information were for illegitimate purposes. Encino points out
    that 121RN sought the same type of coding information that
    UHW had requested. And, as noted above, Encino was
    concerned that UHW’s requests were improper in light of
    UHW’s relationship with Kaiser. Relying on the Board’s
    opinion in Hondo, Inc., 
    311 N.L.R.B. 424
    , Prime claims that,
    given its legitimate competitive concerns, the Union was
    obliged to better explain its need for the disputed information.
    In Hondo, Inc., the Board held that, where it was obvious
    that a union was seeking information for an improper purpose,
    the union was required to “do more than provide general
    avowals of relevance in order to establish its need for the
    information.” 
    Id. at 426.
    In such a situation, the union was
    obligated to “articulate how it would use the information to
    fulfill its duties.” 
    Id. Prime contends
    that, because it raised
    legitimate concerns about the Union’s purpose in making the
    information requests at issue in this case, the Union was
    required to demonstrate more precisely the relevance of the
    data that it sought. Prime asserts that the Union’s explanations
    were too conclusory to meet the standard enunciated in Hondo,
    Inc.
    In rejecting Prime’s claims, the Board adopted the ALJ’s
    finding that “[t]here was nothing unusual about [121RN]’s
    request for information,” and “the mere fact that UHW had
    used similar . . . data to issue critical reports about Prime was
    insufficient to rebut [the] presumption [that the union acts in
    good faith in requesting information] or justify [Prime’s]
    16
    failure to provide the information to 121RN.” Prime
    Healthcare Servs., 364 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 13–14.
    Accordingly, the Board concluded that 121RN had no duty to
    provide any further explanation to justify the relevance of its
    information requests. 
    Id. at 13.
    The Board’s conclusion is perfectly consistent with
    established precedent, and it is supported by substantial
    evidence in the record. The disputed information pertained to
    the costs and quality of care at Prime facilities, which were
    “obviously relevant given that the employees were required
    under the Prime EPO plan to obtain medical treatment at Prime
    facilities,” 
    id., and because
    the health plans were a likely
    subject of bargaining. Like 121RN, UHW was in the midst of
    negotiations with the hospital about health care issues. The
    Board thus reasonably concluded that the mere similarity in the
    information requested by the two Unions was insufficient to
    rebut the presumption that the information was relevant to
    bargaining, or to suggest that it was requested for an improper
    purpose. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. NLRB, 
    288 F.3d 434
    ,
    443 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that relevant information requests
    are presumed to have been made in good faith “until the
    company demonstrates otherwise”); Country Ford 
    Trucks, 229 F.3d at 1192
    (explaining that “[v]ague allegations of a union’s
    bad faith” do not affect the employer’s obligation to turn over
    presumptively relevant information). Therefore, Prime had a
    statutory duty to comply with 121RN’s requests.
    Finally, Prime vaguely suggests that the disputed cost-of-
    care information might be privileged, confidential financial
    information. Pet’r Br. 49. However, Prime did not expressly
    press this argument in response to 121RN’s (as distinguished
    from UHW’s) requests for information. Therefore, Prime’s
    passing references to “privilege” and “proprietary
    information,” 
    id., are insufficient
    to merit our review. See Am.
    17
    Wildlands v. Kempthorne, 
    530 F.3d 991
    , 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
    (collecting cases in which this court has refused to consider
    arguments only cursorily mentioned in the briefs).
    Moreover, if the information was somehow privileged or
    confidential, Prime would have been required to provide the
    Union with a reasonable accommodation to ensure it received
    the information it needed to perform its duties. See, e.g., U.S.
    Testing Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 
    160 F.3d 14
    , 20–21 (D.C. Cir.
    1998); Tritac Corp., 
    286 N.L.R.B. 522
    , 522 (1987). Therefore,
    we reject Prime’s challenge to the Board’s determination
    regarding the requested information.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the reasons explained above, we hereby deny the
    petition for review and grant the Board’s cross-application for
    enforcement of its order.
    So ordered.