United States v. Martinez-Maldonado , 790 F.3d 41 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 14-1089
14-1091
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JUAN BRAVO-FERNANDEZ and HECTOR MARTÍNEZ-MALDONADO,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Lipez, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Martin G. Weinberg, with whom David Z. Chesnoff, Chesnoff &
Schonfeld, and Kimberly Homan were on brief, for appellant Juan
Bravo-Fernandez.
Abbe David Lowell, with whom Christopher D. Man and Chadbourne
& Park LLP were on brief, for appellant Hector Martínez-Maldonado.
Vijay Shanker, United States Department of Justice, Criminal
Division, Appellate Section, with whom Leslie R. Caldwell,
Assistant Attorney General, David A. O'Neil, Acting Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, and Peter M. Koski, United States
Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section,
were on brief, for appellee.
June 15, 2015
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. This appeal raises important and,
in our Circuit, novel issues about when an acquittal in an earlier
trial may be deemed to bar, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a new
prosecution on a related offense. The legal issues arise in
connection with the federal bribery prosecutions of a former member
of the Puerto Rico Senate and of the former president of a Puerto
Rico private security firm.
We last considered these prosecutions two years ago
following a trial at which the defendants had been convicted of
federal program bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666. See United States
v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013). At that time, we vacated
the convictions because the jury had received improper instructions
about what constituted "bribery" under that statute. Id. at 18-27.
We thus remanded for a possible new trial based on a proper theory
of liability under § 666. Id.
In this appeal, the defendants contend that the new trial
may not begin because the renewed prosecutions violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause, which provides that "[n]o person [may] be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
U.S. Const. Amend. V. In pressing this contention, the defendants
make two arguments.
The defendants first argue that the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars the renewed prosecutions because the jury acquitted on
closely related offenses in the earlier trial and, in doing so,
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necessarily found that the government failed to prove issues that
the government would have to relitigate in the new prosecutions.
Separately, the defendants contend that the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars the renewed prosecutions because a line order that the
District Court issued and then corrected days after we issued our
mandate in the last appeal constituted a final and irrevocable
order of acquittal on the renewed § 666 charges.
The District Court rejected both double jeopardy
arguments, and so do we. We thus affirm the District Court.
I.
For purposes of the issues before us in this appeal, it
is the procedural history of the case that matters most. And so we
provide the relevant details of that history here.
The § 666 charges are based on a trip from Puerto Rico to
Las Vegas that defendant Juan Bravo-Fernandez took with defendant
Hector Martínez-Maldonado in May of 2005. The two men had traveled
to Las Vegas to see boxer "Tito" Trinidad fight boxer "Winky"
Wright. At the time, Bravo was the president of Ranger American,
a private security firm in Puerto Rico. Martínez was a member of
the Puerto Rico Senate.
A grand jury indicted the defendants in June of 2010,
finding probable cause for the government's allegations concerning
the connection between Bravo's payment for the trip and Martínez's
support for legislation beneficial to Bravo's company. The
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indictment contained a number of distinct counts. These counts
included violations of the federal program bribery statute, 18
U.S.C. § 666, violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952(a)(3)(A), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371.
The Travel Act prohibits travel in interstate commerce
for a criminal purpose, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A). In this
instance, the government alleged that the criminal purpose was both
to commit the bribery that § 666 prohibits and to violate Puerto
Rico bribery law.1 The predicate offenses for the conspiracy
counts were the Travel Act (in furtherance of, according to the
indictment, violations of § 666 and Puerto Rico bribery law) and
§ 666.
After a three week trial in 2011, the jury returned split
verdicts as to each defendant. The jury convicted each defendant
of federal program bribery under § 666. The jury acquitted each
defendant of conspiracy to violate § 666 and of violating the
Travel Act in furtherance of violating § 666. In addition, the
jury convicted Bravo of two other offenses: conspiring to violate
the Travel Act in furtherance of (according to the verdict form2)
unspecified "racketeering" activity, and violating the Travel Act
in furtherance of violating Puerto Rico bribery law. The jury
1
See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33 §§ 4360, 4363 (repealed 2005).
2
Unlike the indictment, the verdict form did not specify
§ 666 and Puerto Rico bribery law as the predicate offenses for the
conspiracy to violate the Travel Act charges.
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acquitted Martínez of those last two offenses. The defendants
appealed each of the convictions.
In Fernandez, we considered the defendants' appeal and
reversed or vacated all of the convictions. Fernandez, 722 F.3d at
39. We reversed those of Bravo's convictions that were based on
Puerto Rico bribery law as predicate offenses. We did so because
we held that those bribery laws had been repealed before Bravo had
committed the relevant acts underlying the convictions. Id. at 28-
34.
We also vacated Bravo's and Martínez's convictions on the
standalone § 666 counts. Id. at 27. Specifically, we concluded
that § 666 required the government to prove that Bravo had paid for
Martínez's trip to the boxing match "in exchange for" the future
actions that Martínez allegedly took with respect to the
legislation favoring Bravo's company. Id. at 19. We concluded,
however, that the jury instructions allowed the jury to find a
violation of § 666 even if the government failed to prove this
"exchange" theory and instead proved only what we called a
"gratuity" theory. Id. at 26-27. Under this improper gratuity
theory, the government needed only to prove that Bravo had given,
and Martínez had received, "a reward for" having already supported
the two bills that favored Bravo's company. Id. at 20.
After holding that the jury instructions were improper in
this respect, we further concluded that the evidence supported not
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only the correct exchange theory but also the improper gratuity
theory. Id. at 26-27. We thus held that the error in the jury
instructions was not harmless. Id. On that basis, we vacated the
convictions on the standalone § 666 counts. Id. at 27. We then
remanded for possible re-prosecution of the standalone § 666 counts
under that same indictment. Id. at 27-28. In doing so, we
explained that "[t]he government may not pursue a conviction" for
the § 666 counts on a gratuity theory "if [d]efendants are
retried." Id. at 28.
Our mandate in Fernandez issued on October 23, 2013. The
District Court assumed jurisdiction once again. Two days later, on
October 25, unprompted by any party, the District Court entered a
line order. That line order stated:
ORDER re 639 U.S.C.A. Judgment and 640
U.S.C.A. Judgment as to Juan Bravo-Fernandez
and Hector Martinez-Maldonado. The mandate
having been issued (Docket No. 641), in
accordance with the Judgments of the Court of
Appeals (Docket Nos. 639 and 640), a judgment
of acquittal shall be entered as to defendant
Martinez's conspiracy count, as to defendant
Bravo's conspiracy conviction, and as to both
defendants' section 666 convictions. Signed
by Judge Francisco A. Besosa on 10/25/2013.
Within hours, the government filed an emergency motion
"to clarify" the District Court's line order. The government
contended in that motion that the last clause of the line order was
mistaken. The government explained -- correctly, all parties to
this appeal agree -- that this Court's opinion in Fernandez, in
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vacating the standalone § 666 convictions, "did not order [the
District Court] to enter a judgment of acquittal on the § 666
convictions."
Less than three hours after entry of the initial line
order, and following the receipt of the government's motion, the
District Court vacated that order. The District Court's new order
specified that "[t]he defendants' section 666 convictions are
VACATED."
The defendants then moved to "reinstate" the by-then
vacated line order. The defendants argued that the line order
constituted a judgment of acquittal that, given the Double Jeopardy
Clause, could not be taken back. But the District Court disagreed
and denied the motion.
Shortly thereafter, the defendants filed a new motion for
acquittal on the standalone § 666 charges. In this motion, the
defendants focused on the split jury verdicts. The defendants
contended that, under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the acquittals of
the defendants for conspiracy to violate § 666 and for violating
the Travel Act in furtherance of a § 666 offense precluded any
renewed prosecution on the standalone § 666 counts. The District
Court denied that motion, too.
The defendants now appeal the District Court's denial of
the two acquittal motions. We have appellate jurisdiction under
our authority to review "pretrial orders rejecting claims" under
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the Double Jeopardy Clause. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,
662 (1977). We review the "constitutional questions" raised de
novo. United States v. Lanoue, 137 F.3d 656, 661 (1st Cir. 1998)
(citing United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 957 F.2d 18, 21 (1st
Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds, Yeager v. United States,
557 U.S. 110, 119 (2009)).
II.
We start by addressing the defendants' arguments about
the preclusive effect of the § 666-based Travel Act and conspiracy
acquittals.3 The defendants' arguments rely on "the rule of
collateral estoppel" that "is embodied in the Fifth Amendment
guarantee against double jeopardy." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
444-45 (1970). Before considering whether that rule applies in
this case, however, we need to say more about how the rule applies
generally.
This aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause ensures that
"when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid
and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
3
The government does not argue that the defendants waived
this challenge by failing to raise it in Fernandez. See United
States v. Medina-Villegas, 700 F.3d 580, 585 (1st Cir. 2012) ("The
law of the case doctrine 'bars a party from resurrecting issues
that either were, or could have been, decided on an earlier
appeal.'" (quoting United States v. Matthews, 643 F.3d 9, 12-13
(1st Cir. 2011))). We thus address the challenge, as the
defendants' failure to raise it in Fernandez does not affect our
jurisdiction to consider it. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d
155, 168 (1st Cir. 1996).
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the same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at 443. In Ashe, the
Supreme Court made clear that the rule "is not to be applied with
the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading
book." 397 U.S. at 444. The inquiry, instead, "'must be set in a
practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of
the proceedings.'" Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (quoting Sealfon v.
United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)).
To that end, Ashe instructs that we must "'examine the
record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the
pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and
conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict
upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to
foreclose from consideration.'" Id. (quoting Daniel K. Mayers &
Fletcher L. Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive
Prosecutions, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 38—39 (1960)). And, if a review
of all that material shows that a "rational jury," as a practical
matter, decided adversely to the government an issue to be
relitigated in the new prosecution, then the defendant gets the
benefit of collateral estoppel. See id. In other words, under the
rule, the government may not "relitigat[e] any issue that was
necessarily decided by a jury's acquittal in a prior trial," even
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in a trial for a different offense.4 Yeager 557 U.S. at 119(discussing Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46).
Ashe supplies a good example of what it means to "set in
a practical frame" the inquiry into what the jury necessarily
decided. Id. at 444 (quoting Sealfon, 332 U.S. at 579). There,
the jury had acquitted a defendant of the robbery of one victim in
the basement of a home in a case that involved the robbery of
multiple victims in that home at that same time. Id. at 437-38.
The new prosecution of that defendant focused on a different one of
the victims. Id. at 439-40. In that respect, the new prosecution
involved a distinct offense. But the Court still concluded that
the prior acquittal barred the government from going forward with
the new prosecution. Id. at 446.
To reach that conclusion, Ashe undertook a careful review
of the record in the first trial. See id. at 438-39. The review
4
Bravo contends that Ashe's instruction for us to "examine
the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the
pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter," 397 U.S.
at 444, applies only to acquittals based on a general verdict. And
Bravo points out that the defendants' trial involved a special
verdict form. But while we agree with Bravo that the "special
verdicts themselves must be considered" in undertaking the Ashe
inquiry, in this case, as we will explain, the special verdict form
alone does not provide enough information to resolve the
defendants' arguments. We therefore, for reasons provided below,
must consider the materials that Ashe identifies along with the
special verdict form to determine whether the acquittals the jury
recorded in the special verdict form necessarily decided an issue
adversely to the government that the government would have to
relitigate in the renewed prosecutions on the standalone § 666
counts.
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considered the evidence introduced, the arguments of counsel, and
the jury instructions. See id. The Court concluded from that
review that, in acquitting, the jury had necessarily decided that
the defendant was not present at the home where the victims had
been robbed. Id. at 445. The Court then concluded that the jury's
resolution of that issue adversely to the government was as
determinative of the government's ability to prove its case in the
second prosecution as in the first. See id. at 445-46. And so the
Court held that the second prosecution could not go forward even
though the named victim was different. Id.
There is, however, an important limitation on the
application of the rule of collateral estoppel that, Ashe held, the
Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates. And this limitation is of
potential relevance to the collateral estoppel effect that we
should accord to the acquittals on which the defendants rely here,
in light of the convictions on the standalone § 666 counts that
this same jury also rendered.
This limitation is set forth in the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984). There,
the Supreme Court explained that where "the same jury reached
inconsistent results . . . [,] principles of collateral estoppel --
which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted
rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict -- are
no longer useful." Id. at 68. Relying on its prior holding to the
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same effect in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932), Powell
gave the following reason for this rule: "[W]here truly
inconsistent verdicts have been reached, '[t]he most that can be
said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal
or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclusions,
but that does not show that they were not convinced of the
defendant's guilt.'" Powell, 469 U.S. at 64-65 (quoting Dunn, 284
U.S. at 393).
Powell acknowledged that it is, of course, possible that
an acquittal that is inconsistent with a conviction still reflects
a jury's finding of reasonable doubt as to guilt. Id. But Powell
explained that "[i]t is equally possible that the jury, convinced
of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the [convicted]
offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived
at an inconsistent conclusion on the [acquitted] offense." Id. at
65.
Powell for that reason rejected the argument that, under
Ashe, an acquittal could, via collateral estoppel, invalidate a
truly inconsistent conviction that was rendered by the same jury in
the same proceeding. Id. at 64. In such a case, Powell concluded,
there is no way to know without speculating which of the
inconsistent verdicts -- the acquittal or the conviction -- "the
jury 'really meant.'" Id. at 68. The government, of course,
cannot challenge the acquittals on that basis -- the acquittals
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must stand. See id. But the inconsistency makes the jury's
findings indecipherable. See id. at 65-68. And so "principles of
collateral estoppel" -- which require a determination of what the
jury necessarily decided -- are impossible to apply. Id. at 68.
Thus, in light of Powell, the defendants do not deny that
a true inconsistency in what the jury has done in acquitting on one
offense while convicting on another can make unanswerable Ashe's
question about what the jury necessarily decided in rendering the
acquittal. And so long as that question cannot be answered, the
acquittal cannot be given collateral estoppel effect such that it
would bar a prosecution for a related offense.
Against this legal background, the defendants admit they
need to show two things in order for their collateral estoppel
argument to succeed and bar the renewed prosecutions on the
standalone § 666 counts. The defendants need to show that the
acquittals on the Travel Act and conspiracy counts involving § 666
would, considered on their own, collaterally estop the renewed,
standalone § 666 prosecutions. The defendants further need to show
that, under Powell, the now-vacated convictions on those standalone
§ 666 counts do not strip the § 666-based Travel Act and conspiracy
acquittals of the collateral estoppel effect that they otherwise
might have. Although the defendants need to make both showings in
order to prevail, the arguments the defendants make with respect to
each showing are not unrelated to one another. In particular,
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understanding the defendants' arguments about what the acquittals
show on their own helps to set the stage for many of the
defendants' arguments about why those acquittals have collateral
estoppel effect notwithstanding the convictions that the jury also
rendered. We therefore consider each part of the defendants'
collateral estoppel argument in turn.
III.
We begin by setting to one side the convictions on the
standalone § 666 counts and examining whether the acquittals on the
conspiracy and Travel Act counts involving § 666 would, considered
on their own, support the defendants' collateral estoppel argument.
To make that argument, the defendants seek to demonstrate that the
jury, in acquitting on the conspiracy and Travel Act counts
involving § 666, necessarily decided that the government had failed
to prove that the defendants violated § 666. And the defendants
further contend that the jury's finding as to the failure of proof
concerned, in particular, the exchange theory of § 666 liability on
which the renewed prosecutions must depend. See Fernandez, 722
F.3d at 19-20, 28.
We start with the defendants' contention that the
acquittals show that the jury found a failure of proof as to § 666.
One obstacle the defendants face in making that showing arises from
the nature of the two offenses on which the jury acquitted. As to
each, § 666 was implicated only as a predicate offense. And so
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there is a question whether the jury's acquittals concerned the
predicate offense at all.
In the abstract, as the government points out, an
acquittal for conspiracy does not necessarily show that the jury
found that the government failed to prove that the defendant
committed the predicate offense. See, e.g., United States v.
Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 39 (1st Cir. 2002). Conspiracy requires proof
of elements independent of the predicate offense, including the
element that there be an agreement between "two or more persons."
See 18 U.S.C. § 371. It is thus possible that a jury's acquittal
on conspiracy reflects only that jury's finding that the government
failed to prove one of those independent elements -- such as the
element of agreement -- rather than that the government failed to
prove a violation of the predicate offense.
Similarly, the Travel Act requires proof of elements,
including interstate travel, that are independent of the predicate
offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952. And thus, in theory, as the
government also notes, an acquittal on that offense might rest only
on a jury's finding that the government failed to prove one of the
independent elements and not on a finding that the government had
failed to prove the predicate offense itself. See, e.g., United
States v. Stafford, 831 F.2d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
But the defendants argue -- and the government does not
contend otherwise -- that the independent elements of the
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conspiracy and Travel Act offenses are not material to the
collateral estoppel analysis here. In support of that argument,
the defendants point to the nature of the charged conduct for the
predicate § 666 offense for the conspiracy and Travel Act counts.
That conduct included a trip the defendants took from
Puerto Rico to Nevada to see a boxing match, in connection with
support for pending legislation. The defendants thus argue that
the charged conduct involved both travel and agreement. On that
basis, the defendants contend -- and, again, the government does
not argue to the contrary -- that the independent elements of
travel and agreement for the conspiracy and Travel Act counts
involving § 666 necessarily overlapped with elements of § 666
itself. Thus, the defendants argue, when the jury acquitted on
those counts, the jury necessarily rejected liability under § 666
itself, even though § 666 was only a predicate offense for the
conspiracy and Travel Act counts.
We next consider the defendants' contention that the
acquittals show that the jury rejected the exchange theory of § 666
liability in particular. Here, too, the defendants contend that
there is no problem. The defendants point out that the acquittals
show that the jury rejected every theory of § 666 liability that
the jury was given, including the exchange theory. In this way,
the defendants contend that the "record of the prior proceeding,"
Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (quoting Mayers & Yarbrough, supra), shows
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that the acquittals on the conspiracy and Travel Act counts for
which § 666 was the predicate offense do have collateral estoppel
effect on the renewed, standalone § 666 prosecutions.
But even if we were to accept each step in the
defendants' argument to this point, the defendants still would need
to show one more thing.5 The defendants would still need to show
that the conspiracy and Travel Act acquittals do not lose the
collateral estoppel effect that they otherwise might have in
consequence of the convictions that the jury also rendered on the
standalone § 666 counts. Accordingly, we now take up that issue.
IV.
The defendants offer two reasons for concluding that the
vacated convictions on the standalone § 666 convictions do not,
under Powell's limitation on the rule of collateral estoppel, strip
the acquittals on the conspiracy and Travel Act counts involving
§ 666 of collateral estoppel effect. Neither reason the defendants
offer, however, is persuasive.
5
The government does not argue that the acquittals the
defendants rely on rested on a rejection of the extra elements
involved in those offenses. But neither does the government
expressly concede that the acquittals did reject § 666 liability.
Instead, the government argues that the acquittals are "at most
inconsistent" with the convictions on the issue of § 666 liability.
As we find such an inconsistency, we need not decide whether the
acquittals did reject § 666 liability, or whether they instead
rested only on a rejection of some extra element.
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A.
The defendants' first reason is that the convictions on
the standalone § 666 counts have been vacated and are no longer
final. See Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 27. The defendants thus argue
that the acquittals alone should be considered in determining what
the jury necessarily decided under Ashe. And, the defendants
further contend, because the acquittals, considered on their own,
show that the jury did reject § 666 liability, the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars the renewed prosecutions on the standalone § 666
counts.
We do not agree, however, that we may not consider the
vacated convictions as part of our collateral estoppel inquiry,
under Ashe, into what the jury necessarily decided. Our reasoning
on this point follows in large part from Ashe itself.
There, the Court instructed that, for purposes of
determining the collateral estoppel effect of acquittals, we must
undertake a "practical" analysis based on the "record" of the prior
proceeding, and with "'an eye to all the circumstances of the
proceedings.'" Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (quoting Sealfon, 332 U.S. at
579). Like the acquittals on which the defendants rely, the
convictions in this case are part of what the jury decided at
trial. For that reason, Ashe's expansive instruction to consider
what happened in the prior proceeding points strongly in favor of
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taking account of not only the acquittals but also the convictions,
even though they have been vacated.
The fact that a vacated conviction has been "nullified,"
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442 (1981), moreover, does
not require a different conclusion. "When a court vacates a
conviction, it sets aside or nullifies the conviction and its
attendant legal disabilities; the court does not necessarily
attempt to erase the fact of the conviction." United States v.
Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2004). And it is the "fact of
the conviction," and not its "attendant legal disabilities," id.,that is relevant to the Ashe analysis of what the jury's verdicts
show that the jury necessarily decided.
In addition, the convictions at issue here were vacated
only for trial error. See Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 26-27. But a
"reversal for trial error . . . does not constitute a decision to
the effect that the government has failed to prove its case."
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978). Thus, for purposes
of deciding whether the jury necessarily decided that the
government failed to prove that the defendants violated § 666, the
fact the jury also convicted the defendants of violating § 666
would seem to be of quite obvious relevance, even though the
convictions were later vacated.
We also do not agree with the defendants that, in
conducting the Ashe analysis, we should disregard vacated
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convictions because they are not meaningfully different from hung
counts, which are counts on which the jury reached no verdict at
all. The defendants rely for their contention on the Supreme
Court's decision in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110.
In Yeager, the Court held that hung counts are, for
purposes of performing Ashe's collateral estoppel inquiry into what
a jury necessarily decided, "not a 'relevant' part of the 'record
of [the] prior proceeding.'" Id. at 121 (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at
444). In reaching that conclusion, Yeager explained that Powell
relied on the need to respect the finality of an otherwise valid
verdict in refusing to overturn a conviction that seemingly
conflicted with an acquittal. Yeager, 557 U.S. at 124. Yeager
reasoned in this regard that the same concern about respecting
final verdicts applied equally to respecting the finality of an
acquittal. See id. Yeager thus declined to allow a hung count --
which was not a final verdict -- to create a conflict with an
acquittal -- which was. Id.But we do not believe Yeager supports treating vacated
convictions like hung counts under Ashe. For while a vacated
conviction, like a hung count, is not a final jury verdict, Yeager
did not rely solely on a respect-for-finality rationale to explain
why hung counts should not be considered for Ashe purposes. Nor
did Yeager hold that a verdict that lacked finality could never
bear on an acquittal's collateral estoppel effect. Instead, in
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refusing to conclude that a hung count could create a "truly
inconsistent" verdict, Yeager also explained that "a jury speaks
only through its verdict," and that there was "no way to decipher
what a hung count represents" as a hung count represents not "a
jury's decision[]" but only "its failure[] to decide." Id. at 121-
122.
This line of reasoning in Yeager suggests that, under
Ashe, vacated counts should be treated differently from hung
counts. After all, vacated convictions, unlike hung counts, are
jury decisions, through which the jury has spoken. In other words,
vacated convictions are still part of what the jury did decide at
trial. For that reason, vacated convictions on some counts do
potentially bear on the question whether the jury, in acquitting on
other counts, necessarily decided an issue in a manner contrary to
what the government would have to prove in renewed prosecutions.
See Yeager, 557 U.S. at 115. And that is because Powell's "prudent
acknowledgment" that inconsistent verdicts make it impossible to
determine what a jury necessarily decided, 469 U.S. at 65, 68, is
not undermined by the mere fact that a potentially conflicting
conviction has been vacated. Rather, a vacated conviction may
still suggest that an acquittal with which that conviction
conflicts was the result of "mistake, compromise, or lenity." Id.
at 65. And so unless the inconsistency can be resolved,
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"principles of collateral estoppel . . . are no longer useful."
Id. at 68.
We thus conclude that vacated convictions, unlike hung
counts, are relevant to the Ashe inquiry into what a jury
necessarily decided when acquitting on counts related to the
vacated convictions.6 In doing so, we join the only other circuits
to have decided the issue, see United States v. Citron, 853 F.2d
1055, 1059 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Price, 750 F.2d 363,
366 (5th Cir. 1985),7 as well as the highest courts of New Jersey
and the District of Columbia, see State v. Kelly, 992 A.2d 776, 789
(N.J. 2010); Evans v. United States, 987 A.2d 1138, 1141-42 (D.C.
2010). And although a divided Michigan Supreme Court recently came
6
To be clear, although we conclude that the vacated
convictions might prevent the acquittals from collaterally
estopping the renewed prosecutions, the acquittals themselves
remain inviolate. They forever bar the United States from
prosecuting the defendants for conspiracy and Travel Act offenses
based on the charged conduct and § 666 as a predicate offense.
Likewise, our taking account of the vacated convictions does not
undermine the defendants' victory in getting those convictions set
aside. The defendants still get the benefit of their appellate
victory in Fernandez, as the convictions have been vacated, and the
government in a second prosecution cannot present the impermissible
gratuity theory.
7
Although Citron and Price predate Yeager, both the Second
and Fifth Circuits decided that vacated counts are relevant to the
Ashe analysis at a time when those circuits had already ruled that
hung counts should be disregarded for purposes of the Ashe inquiry.
See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 332, 335-36 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Nelson, 599 F.2d 714, 716-17 (5th Cir.
1979). And the Second Circuit has continued to follow Citron after
Yeager. See United States v. Bruno, 531 F. App'x 47, 49 (2d Cir.
2013) (unpublished).
-23-
to the opposite judgment, we find the dissenting opinion in that
case more persuasive on this point. See People v. Wilson, 852
N.W.2d 134 (2014); see also id. at 142 (Markman, J., dissenting).8
Thus, in undertaking our Ashe inquiry into the collateral
estoppel effect that must be given to the acquittals on the
conspiracy and Travel Act counts involving § 666, we must consider
the now vacated, standalone § 666 convictions. Contrary to the
defendants' contention, the fact that those convictions were
overturned for trial error provides no basis for excluding them
from the record that Ashe requires us to consider.
B.
The defendants do have a fallback position. They argue
that, even if the convictions must be considered as part of the
Ashe inquiry, the convictions do not deprive the acquittals of
collateral estoppel effect. That is because, the defendants
8
Martínez does cite an unreported decision of the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in which that court
referred to its "inclination to regard the counts on which [it] had
reversed the defendant's conviction . . . as a nullity, analogous
to a situation where there is a hung jury on certain counts."
State v. Hermalyn, No. 06-11-2085, 2012 WL 3000334, at *1 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. July 24, 2012) (per curium) (citing Yeager,
557 U.S. at 120). Hermalyn provides no explanation for that
"inclination," and it appears directly inconsistent with the New
Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Kelly, which Hermalyn did not
cite. See Kelly, 992 A.2d at 789. In Kelly, which like this case
(and like Hermalyn) involved the retrial of vacated convictions,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "Yeager has no application
to a case . . . involving an inconsistent verdict of acquittals and
convictions returned by the same jury," as opposed to hung counts.
Id. at 778, 789.
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contend, the trial record shows that the convictions on the
standalone § 666 counts are actually consistent with the acquittals
on those counts for which § 666 was a predicate offense. And,
further, the defendants contend that the verdicts on those counts
-- though involving both convictions and acquittals -- are
consistent in a way that shows that the acquittals did reject the
exchange theory of § 666 liability and thus should be given
collateral estoppel effect to bar the renewed standalone § 666
prosecutions. Thus, the defendants argue, the convictions do not
create "truly inconsistent" verdicts with respect to § 666 that
would implicate Powell's limitation on the collateral estoppel
rule. 469 U.S. at 64.
To show how the convictions and acquittals may be
reconciled in this way, Martínez explains that "[a] 'rational' jury
could conclude a defendant had not committed bribery [under an
exchange theory] . . . while at the same time convicting the same
defendant under a gratuity theory under Section 666." And so,
Martínez argues, "concluding that the jury found a gratuity and not
bribery [in convicting on the standalone § 666 counts] is the
logical way to reconcile the verdict." Or, as Bravo puts the point
in his brief, the "only logical conclusion is that the jury rested
its §[ ]666 convictions on a finding of gratuities, not §[ ]666
bribery [under the proper exchange theory], and that its verdicts
-25-
on the conspiracy and Travel Act counts necessarily rejected a
§[ ]666 bribery theory [under the proper exchange theory]."
In making this argument, the defendants rely solely on a
claim about how the jury was instructed.9 In particular, the
defendants contend that the District Court presented the improper
gratuity theory to the jury only as to the standalone § 666 counts.
The defendants thus contend that -- consistent with the jury
instructions -- the jury could have convicted on the standalone
§ 666 counts on the gratuity theory without having to consider (and
9
The defendants offer no other argument for how the jury
rationally could have acquitted on the conspiracy and Travel Act
counts that involved § 666 in a way that rejected only the exchange
theory of § 666 liability and not the gratuity theory as well.
Perhaps the defendants could have argued that a gratuity, unlike a
quid pro quo exchange, involves no agreement. If a gratuity need
not involve an agreement, then it could be argued that the § 666-
based conspiracy acquittals rejected only the exchange theory of
§ 666 liability. A gratuity theory of § 666 liability, by not
requiring that there be an agreement, would arguably not have
required the jury to find conspiracy liability. But the defendants
do not make such an argument for reconciling the verdicts, and so
we do not address whether there is any force to the argument.
The reason the defendants do not make that additional
argument, moreover, is readily apparent. The argument does not
help with respect to the separate, § 666-based Travel Act
acquittals. In this case, the allegedly unlawful payment took the
form of an all-expenses paid interstate trip. Whether that trip
was given as a gratuity or as a quid pro quo exchange, it would
still involve interstate travel. And thus, if the jury concluded
the trip violated § 666 then the jury should also have found a
§ 666-based Travel Act violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)
(prohibiting interstate travel to "promote, manage, establish,
carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment,
or carrying on, of any unlawful activity"). Yet the jury did not
do so. Thus, if the defendants' differential jury instructions
argument does not hold up, then they are left with verdicts on
§ 666 that are unavoidably inconsistent with each other.
-26-
thus reject) that same theory in acquitting on the conspiracy and
Travel Act counts that involved § 666. In this way, the defendants
argue, the verdicts concerning § 666 -- whether as a standalone or
predicate offense -- may be harmonized. The acquittals rejected
one theory of § 666 liability (the proper one) and the convictions
accepted another theory of § 666 liability (the improper one).
The Supreme Court in Powell -- in holding that an
acquittal lacks collateral estoppel effect when truly inconsistent
with an accompanying conviction -- did not directly confront an
argument like this one. The defendant in Powell was arguing that
the verdicts were inconsistent in order to compel the reversal of
a conviction in consequence of a supposedly contradictory
acquittal. 469 U.S. at 60. And the government, in defending the
conviction against such challenge, did "not dispute the
inconsistency." Id. at 69. The Supreme Court thus did not need to
address in Powell how courts should determine whether verdicts are
inconsistent when a defendant seeking to benefit from the
collateral estoppel effect of an acquittal denies that the
acquittal really is in conflict with a conviction that the jury
also rendered. See id. Nor has the Supreme Court had occasion to
address that issue in any subsequent case.
Because Ashe governs the defendants' underlying
collateral estoppel argument, however, we believe that Ashe's
instruction to consider the record in the prior proceeding in
-27-
determining what the jury necessarily decided is fully applicable
to this aspect of the collateral estoppel inquiry. Moreover, we
agree with the defendants that jury instructions are relevant to
the review of the record that Ashe requires. See 397 U.S. at 444(explaining that the inquiry should consider the "charge" to the
jury); United States v. Brown, 983 F.2d 201, 202 (11th Cir. 1993)
(listing "jury instructions" as among the "relevant matters" to be
considered in the Ashe inquiry); see also United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993) (describing "the almost invariable
assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions"
(quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987))). Relevant
as well to the Ashe inquiry are the parties' "closing arguments."
Brown, 983 F.2d at 202.
And so, to evaluate the defendants' fallback argument, we
review the trial record -- and, in particular, the jury
instructions and the arguments that the parties made to the jury
about the meaning of § 666 -- to determine whether the verdicts
involving § 666 may be reconciled in the way the defendants
propose. If it turns out from that review that the verdicts may be
reconciled by reference to the jury instructions and the arguments
of counsel, then the "assumption that the jury acted rationally and
found certain facts in reaching its verdict" will be restored, and
collateral estoppel principles will again be useful. See Powell,
-28-
469 U.S. at 68; Wilson, 852 N.W.2d at 151-52 n.12 (Markman, J.,
dissenting).
In taking up this inquiry, we are mindful that the
defendants bear the burden of showing that the jury necessarily
decided an issue adversely to the government that the government
needs to prove in order to convict on a related offense in a new
trial. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994). But we are
also mindful that, if "any reasonable assessment of the verdict"
would lead to a reconciliation of the apparent inconsistency
between the convictions and the acquittals involving § 666, we
might be required to adopt that account. Fernandez, 722 F.3d at
34. As we put it in Fernandez, "[w]e will not bend over backwards
to formulate some route" to allow the government to re-prosecute.
Id.
As we will explain, however, the record in this case
shows that the jury was offered the same theories of § 666
liability as to every count involving § 666, whether as a predicate
offense or a standalone crime. We therefore conclude that on this
record no reasonable assessment of the verdicts is available that
reconciles the verdicts in the way the defendants propose. And in
consequence of the inconsistency in those verdicts, we conclude
that, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Powell, the
defendants cannot meet their burden of showing that the acquittals
-29-
involving § 666 collaterally estop the renewed, standalone § 666
prosecutions.
1.
Consider the first pair of instructions that the jury
received regarding § 666. These were the ones that we held were
erroneous in Fernandez. 722 F.3d at 26-27. The District Court
began each erroneous instruction by explaining that "to find [each
defendant] guilty of bribery, you must be convinced that the
Government has proven each of the following things beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . ." (emphasis added). The instructions then
went on to define "bribery" in a way that included both the proper
exchange theory and the improper gratuity theory. See id.
Significantly, nothing in these instructions tied or
restricted that definition of "bribery" -- improper though it was
-- to the standalone § 666 counts in particular. And thus nothing
about these instructions suggests that the jury was offered the
gratuity theory only as to the standalone counts on which the jury
convicted, and not as to the other counts involving § 666, for
which § 666 was a predicate offense and on which the jury
acquitted.
The written version of these instructions, moreover, was
given to the jury under the heading "Bribery Concerning Programs
Receiving Federal Funds, 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)." That heading also
tied the definition of bribery to § 666 as an offense without tying
-30-
that definition to the standalone § 666 counts specifically. And
thus, on its face, the heading did not exclude the improper
gratuity theory from applying to the other counts involving § 666
as a predicate crime -- namely, the counts that resulted in the
acquittals.
An examination of the jury instructions with respect to
the Travel Act counts reinforces the point. The District Court
instructed the jury that the government had to prove "[f]irst, that
the Defendants travelled [sic] in interstate commerce; [and]
[s]econd, that they did so with the intent to promote, manage,
establish, carry on, or facilitate . . . an 'unlawful activity,'
here, a violation of Federal or Puerto Rico law regarding criminal
bribery." The District Court then explained that "[t]he elements
of bribery in violation of the bribery laws of the United States --
specifically, Title 18, United States Code, Section 666(a)(1)(B)
and 666(a)(2) -- are discussed elsewhere in these instructions."
In other words, the instructions on the Travel Act counts
explicitly incorporated by reference the later, erroneous
instructions on what was needed to convict the defendants of
"bribery" under § 666. Thus, contrary to the defendants'
contention, the jury had no basis for applying a different
"bribery" definition in the Travel Act counts for which § 666 was
a predicate offense -- and on which the jury acquitted -- from the
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"bribery" definition that the jury applied in the standalone § 666
counts -- on which the jury convicted.
The jury instructions on the conspiracy counts are no
different in this regard. The jury was told:
For you to find Defendants Bravo and Martinez
guilty of conspiracy, you must be convinced
that the Government has proven each of the
following beyond a reasonable doubt: First,
that the agreement specified in the
Indictment, and not some other agreement or
agreements, existed between at least two
people to: Commit bribery concerning federal
funds, pursuant to Title 18, United States
Code, Section 666, or; Travel in interstate
commerce in aid of racketeering, pursuant to
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952
. . . .
The District Court then provided instructions on the requirements
for finding an agreement, but said nothing at all at that time
about what "bribery concerning federal funds, pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section 666" meant. And so with respect to the
conspiracy counts involving § 666, the jury was not given any cause
to apply a different definition of "bribery" in the conspiracy
counts from that which the jury had been instructed to apply to the
standalone § 666 counts.
Nor did the parties' closing arguments suggest that
different theories of § 666 liability applied. In its closing
argument, the government did use, in connection with the standalone
§ 666 counts, the "intent to influence or reward" language that we
held in Fernandez had allowed the jury to consider the
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impermissible "gratuity" theory. See 722 F.3d at 18. But the
government, like the jury instructions, used that language in
defining what "bribery that involves federal funds" meant. The
government thus said nothing to suggest that the gratuity theory
was inapplicable to the Travel Act and conspiracy counts involving
§ 666.
In fact, when the government turned in its closing
argument to the Travel Act counts, the government said only as to
the meaning of bribery that the defendants must have traveled "with
the intent to commit a crime. And here, the crime's bribery."
Further, when the government turned to the conspiracy counts, the
government argued expressly that "the agreement has to be to commit
one of the two crimes we've already talked about: Federal program
bribery or interstate travel in aid of racketeering" (emphasis
added). The government's closing argument, therefore, did not
suggest that the definition of bribery discussed with respect to
the standalone § 666 counts applied exclusively to those counts.
Finally, Martínez's counsel in his closing argument
underscored the equivalence between "bribery" as used in the
standalone § 666 counts and as used in the conspiracy and Travel
Act counts involving § 666. Martínez's counsel argued that the
jury should apply only the exchange theory of bribery. But he made
that argument with respect to "Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, and 5" -- in
other words, with respect to all of the counts (conspiracy, Travel
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Act, and standalone) involving § 666. Nothing Martínez's counsel
said, therefore, suggested any difference between the definition of
"bribery" the jury was to use as to any of these counts, even
though the jury convicted on some and acquitted on others.10
We therefore conclude that the District Court instructed
the jury to consider the gratuity theory of § 666 liability not
only on the standalone § 666 counts, but also on the Travel Act and
conspiracy counts for which § 666 was a predicate offense. And
further, we conclude that the closing arguments by counsel accord
with this same understanding of how the jury was to be instructed.
2.
The defendants do seize on one bit of language from
Fernandez in support of their contention that the jury received
different instructions as to some of the counts involving § 666.
In Fernandez, we did observe that the jury received a correct
bribery instruction, which allowed only the exchange theory,
alongside the improper one that allowed both the exchange and the
gratuity theories. Id. at 20. In doing so, we explained that this
proper instruction "applied to both the Puerto Rico and federal
bribery counts," whereas the erroneous instructions setting forth
the gratuity theory were "instructions on the § 666 counts
themselves." Id.
10
Bravo's counsel also gave a closing argument, but his
argument did not address the definition of bribery.
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The defendants argue that this quoted language -- by
referring to the "§ 666 counts" -- shows that we held in Fernandez
that the jury received the improper gratuity instruction only for
the standalone § 666 counts, and not for those counts involving
§ 666 that resulted in acquittals, each of which involved § 666
only as a predicate offense. In this way, the defendants contend
that Fernandez supports their argument that the jury's apparently
inconsistent verdicts can be reconciled by reference to the
instructions the jury received.
But the defendants overread the quoted language.
Fernandez did not decide whether "the § 666 counts" to which we
said the erroneous instructions applied included only the
standalone § 666 counts. See id. In context, it seems clear that
by "the § 666 counts" we meant to distinguish those counts that
involved § 666 from those counts that involved Puerto Rico bribery
law. See id. We were not drawing a distinction among the "§ 666
counts," counts that in fact included the Travel Act and conspiracy
counts for which § 666 was a predicate offense.
Indeed, we had no occasion in Fernandez to consider
whether the erroneous instructions on the meaning of § 666 also
applied to the Travel Act and conspiracy counts for which § 666 was
a predicate offense. The acquittals on those counts were,
obviously, not under review in that appeal. See id. at 8.
-35-
Moreover, it is not surprising that the erroneous
instructions offering up the gratuity theory applied to all the
counts involving § 666, and not just to the standalone § 666
counts. As we explained in Fernandez, courts have divided with
respect to whether § 666 does or does not criminalize gratuities.
See id. at 23-27. And while we held in Fernandez that § 666 does
not criminalize gratuities, id. at 27, the District Court, in
giving the erroneous instructions over the defendants' objections,
evidently had determined that § 666 did criminalize gratuities. No
party argued to the District Court, however, that § 666
criminalizes gratuities when the defendant is prosecuted for § 666
violations themselves, but not when § 666 serves as a predicate
offense for conspiracy or Travel Act violations. Nor do the
defendants advance any such argument on appeal.
For that reason, it makes perfect sense that the District
Court's instructions on what § 666 prohibited were given as to all
counts involving that offense, both when § 666 served as a
predicate offense and when it stood alone. And, as we have just
explained, the record shows that the instructions setting forth the
erroneous gratuity theory of § 666 liability applied broadly to all
counts involving § 666. As discussed, explicit and implicit cross-
references in the jury instructions show that the erroneous
instructions on § 666 were given as to all the counts that involved
-36-
§ 666 as a predicate offense, including the counts involving § 666
on which the jury rendered acquittals.
3.
This fact about the counts to which the jury instructions
-- and the arguments of counsel -- applied is incompatible with the
defendants' account of what the jury did. If, as the defendants
contend, the jury based the now-vacated, standalone § 666
convictions solely on a gratuity theory, then the jury should have
considered that same gratuity theory and found the defendants
guilty when the jury issued its verdicts on at least the Travel Act
charges for which § 666 was a predicate offense.11 After all, the
instruction allowing the gratuity theory applied, by its terms, to
all § 666-related counts. And yet the jury found the defendants
not guilty on those § 666-based Travel Act charges. The verdicts
are thus inconsistent with respect to § 666 liability, even
11
In referring to the § 666-based Travel Act charges, we do
not include the conspiracy to violate the Travel Act charges. We
set those conspiracy charges, as well as the charges for conspiracy
to violate § 666, to one side even though, as noted above, supra
note 9, the defendants make no argument distinguishing the
conspiracy charges from the Travel Act charges in attempting to
reconcile the verdicts. We limit our focus in this way because,
even if the § 666-based conspiracy acquittals could be squared with
the standalone § 666 convictions on the ground that a gratuity-
theory § 666 violation need not have involved an agreement, see
id., the § 666-based Travel Act acquittals not involving conspiracy
are not subject to any such squaring. The result is that the
§ 666-based Travel Act acquittals suffice on their own to create
truly inconsistent verdicts concerning § 666 liability, and thus to
prevent the defendants from meeting their burden under Ashe to show
what the jury necessarily decided.
-37-
assuming, as the defendants contend, that the convictions on the
standalone § 666 counts relied only on the jury's acceptance of the
gratuity theory.
If, on the other hand, the jury interpreted the
instructions' conflicting definitions of "bribery" to allow for
only an exchange theory of § 666 liability, then the verdicts would
still be irreconcilable. And that is again because the same
instructions on the meaning of bribery in § 666 were given as to
all counts involving § 666. The convictions on the standalone
counts would thus show that the jury found the defendants guilty
under the proper, exchange theory of § 666. In contrast, the
acquittals on the Travel Act counts based on the § 666 predicate
offense would show that the jury found the defendants not guilty
under that same exchange theory of § 666. Once again, the
acquittals would be inconsistent with the convictions with respect
to the defendants' liability under § 666.
For that reason, the argument that we must read the
verdicts consistently if possible does not, on this record, help
the defendants meet their burden under Ashe. And that is because
no consistent reading of the verdicts is available -- given this
record -- that would support, under Ashe's practical inquiry, the
defendants' favored conclusion: namely, that the jury acquitted
the defendants on the exchange theory of § 666 and convicted the
defendants only on the gratuity theory.
-38-
Of course, it is possible that the jury did actually find
the defendants guilty on the standalone § 666 counts only on the
basis of a gratuity theory and not on the basis of an exchange
theory. And it is also possible that the jury considered (and
rejected) only the exchange theory in acquitting on the Travel Act
counts involving § 666. But it was equally possible in Powell that
the jury "really meant" to acquit rather than to convict, when the
jury did both, and yet that mere possibility did not lead the Court
to give the acquittal collateral estoppel effect. Powell, 469 U.S.
at 68.
So, too, here. Nothing about the instructions or the
record in the prior proceeding suggests that the jury did what the
defendants necessarily contend that the jury did -- depart from the
District Court's instructions and rely on different theories of
§ 666 liability in assessing the different counts involving that
offense. We could therefore come to such a conclusion only by
engaging in the sort of "pure speculation" or "inquiries into the
jury's deliberations" that Powell forbids. Id. at 66. And such a
speculative exercise could hardly suffice to satisfy the
defendants' burden under Ashe of showing that "the issue whose
relitigation [they] seek[] to foreclose was actually decided" in
the prior proceeding. Schiro, 510 U.S. at 233.
-39-
C.
The defendants do make one final argument on behalf of
their attempted reconciliation of the acquittals and the
convictions that involve § 666. The defendants point to this
Court's handling of a separate collateral estoppel issue in
Fernandez. See 722 F.3d at 29-33. The defendants argue that this
aspect of our decision in Fernandez supports the conclusion that
the jury's acquittals of the defendants on the counts for which
§ 666 is a predicate offense were consistent with the jury having
convicted the defendants on the standalone § 666 counts. See id.
But our analysis in Fernandez does not compel a finding
of collateral estoppel here. In fact, if anything, our analysis of
the collateral estoppel issue in Fernandez shows why, in light of
this record, a finding of collateral estoppel here would be
unwarranted given Powell's rule against speculating about what a
jury did in the case of truly inconsistent verdicts.
The collateral estoppel issue arose in Fernandez in the
following way. The jury had convicted Bravo of conspiring to
violate the Travel Act in furtherance of unspecified "racketeering"
activity. 722 F.3d at 34. We had vacated that conviction. Id.
We did so because of the possibility that the "racketeering"
activity the jury found had concerned violations of the Puerto Rico
bribery law -- a law that had been repealed before the relevant
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actions the defendants had undertaken -- rather than violations of
§ 666. Id.
Bravo then sought to foreclose his future prosecution for
conspiracy to violate the Travel Act in furtherance of § 666
violations specifically. See id. at 33. We interpreted Bravo's
argument against such a future prosecution as being based on the
collateral estoppel rule contained in Ashe. Id. at 33 & n.25.
Specifically, Bravo contended that his acquittals on the same
offenses on which the defendants now rely -- conspiracy to violate
§ 666 and a Travel Act violation based on § 666 -- barred his
future prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Travel Act in
furtherance of a § 666 violation. See id. at 33-34.
To resolve Bravo's collateral estoppel argument, we
decided we needed to determine what "racketeering" activity the
jury had decided Bravo engaged in when the jury convicted him of
conspiracy to violate the Travel Act. Id. at 34. And the two
possibilities we identified were a § 666 violation and a violation
of Puerto Rico bribery law. Id. at 29. Only if the unspecified
"racketeering" activity underlying the conviction had been based on
a violation of Puerto Rico bribery law rather than of § 666 could
Bravo succeed in pressing his collateral estoppel argument against
being retried for conspiring to violate the Travel Act in
furtherance of a § 666 violation. See id. at 34.
-41-
Our inquiry into which of those offenses was the
"racketeering" activity on which the vacated conspiracy conviction
rested turned out to be an easy one. The jury had acquitted Bravo
on the charge that he had conspired to violate § 666 and on the
charge that he had violated the Travel Act in furtherance of a
§ 666 violation. Id. In contrast, the jury had convicted Bravo on
the charge of violating the Travel Act in furtherance of a
violation of Puerto Rico bribery law. Id.
Taking a "practical, realistic view" of the verdicts, we
concluded from these other verdicts that Bravo's (facially
ambiguous) conspiracy to violate the Travel Act conviction had been
based on Puerto Rico bribery law violations, and not § 666. Only
that conclusion, we explained, harmonized the verdicts without
creating any inconsistency among them. Id. at 34. And, in
consequence of that conclusion about what the jury had done, we
concluded that the conspiracy to violate the Travel Act conviction
-- at least if we assumed the jury had acted rationally -- did not
contradict the acquittal on the Travel Act and conspiracy charges
that had § 666 as a predicate offense. Id. We then held that the
latter acquittals did collaterally estop Bravo's renewed
prosecution for conspiring to violate the Travel Act in furtherance
of violating § 666. Id.
Fernandez does show that the defendants' approach of
using acquittals on separate counts to clarify the basis for an
-42-
ambiguous conviction has potential force. But the parties in
Fernandez did not raise, and so Fernandez did not address, the
question that is the crucial one in this appeal: whether the
conspiracy and Travel Act acquittals based on § 666 may be given
any collateral estoppel effect at all given their inconsistency
with the standalone § 666 convictions.
The government made no such argument in Fernandez.
Rather, the government's sole Powell-based argument in Fernandez
was the contention that Powell showed that Bravo's conviction for
conspiracy to violate the Travel Act was still valid even if that
conviction was inconsistent with other verdicts. And so, in
concluding that the § 666-based conspiracy and Travel Act
acquittals precluded a future prosecution for conspiracy to violate
the Travel Act, our analysis did not address the standalone § 666
convictions, or their relevance to the collateral estoppel effect
that the § 666-based Travel Act and conspiracy acquittals should be
given.
In this case, by contrast, the government squarely raises
the argument that, under Powell, the convictions on the standalone
§ 666 counts are inconsistent with the acquittals on the § 666-
based conspiracy and Travel Act charges, and thus deprive those
acquittals of the collateral estoppel effect that the defendants
ask us to give them. And so we have been obliged to consider the
effect of the standalone § 666 convictions. As we have explained,
-43-
however, those convictions, unlike the conviction for conspiracy to
violate the Travel Act based on unspecified "racketeering" activity
at issue in Fernandez, cannot be reconciled with the jury's
decision to acquit on at least the § 666-based Travel Act offense.
Our earlier discussion of the jury instructions and the parties'
arguments shows why.
In consequence of this conflict in the verdicts, we may
not speculate that the facially inconsistent verdicts nonetheless
necessarily reflect a rejection of § 666 exchange-theory liability,
when they equally could reflect a finding of such liability. See
Powell, 469 U.S. at 66. Our consideration of the convictions
therefore prevents us from concluding that there is an available
consistent reading of all of the jury's verdicts that would lead us
to give the collateral estoppel effect to the Travel Act and
conspiracy acquittals based on § 666 that the defendants now seek
in this appeal. We therefore affirm the District Court's denial of
the defendants' motion for a judgment of acquittal.
V.
That brings us to the defendants' final, separate double
jeopardy argument. This argument relies on the District Court's
October 25, 2013, line order. The District Court entered that line
order two days after this Court's mandate in Fernandez issued. The
line order directed entry of a judgment of acquittal on the
standalone § 666 counts. The defendants thus contend that this
-44-
line order constituted an irreversible acquittal of the defendants
of those counts under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The defendants base this challenge on the well-
established rule that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial
following a court-decreed acquittal, even if the acquittal is
'based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation.'" Evans v.
Michigan, 133 S. Ct. 1069, 1074 (2013) (quoting Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)). And that rule, the Supreme
Court has held, prohibits even the court that entered a judgment of
acquittal from reconsidering that judgment under at least some
circumstances. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 469-75
(2005).
Whether an order counts as an "acquittal," however, is a
question of substance and not of name.12 See Evans, 133 S. Ct. at
1078. The determinative question is thus "whether the ruling of
the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution,
correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the
offense charged." United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
12
The government does not argue in this case that the October
25 order lacked double jeopardy effect because that order was
entered before a new jury had been sworn following this Court's
remand. Cf. United States v. Tobin, 552 F.3d 29, 31 (1st Cir.
2009) ("[J]eopardy (here, after a vacatur of a conviction and a
remand) does not attach until a jury has been sworn."). We
therefore do not address that issue.
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Here, the District Court's October 25 line order is not
an acquittal under the substantive test that Evans and Martin Linen
require that we apply. In Martin Linen, the Supreme Court found an
acquittal where the district court ruled for the defendant on a
motion for judgment of acquittal that the defendant made under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). 430 U.S. at 571-72. The
district court had "plainly granted the Rule 29(c) motion on the
view that the Government had not proved facts constituting criminal
contempt." Id. at 572. It was thus "plain that the District Court
. . . evaluated the Government's evidence and determined that it
was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction." Id.No such evaluation by the District Court is "plain," or
even hinted at, by the record in this case. The line order itself
states that it was entered "in accordance with" this Court's
mandate. That statement suggests that the line order was merely
intended as a ministerial act to carry out this Court's
instructions -- whatever they may have been -- and not an
application of law to fact regarding the defendants' "lack of
criminal culpability." Evans, 133 S. Ct. at 1077 (quoting United
States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 (1978)). For that reason, the
line order does not amount to a substantive acquittal by the
District Court under Evans and Martin Linen.
The District Court confirmed as much in its opinion
denying the defendants' motion to reinstate that order. The
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District Court characterized the line order's reference to
acquittals -- in carrying out this Court's mandate -- as "an error
of transcription, not an error of law." The District Court further
explained that "[t]he very use of a line order, which contained no
analysis and indicated the Court's mere intent to follow the First
Circuit Court of Appeals' directives, exemplifies that the
[District] Court did not intend to sua sponte acquit defendants of
the section 666 charges." And the circumstances of the order --
which came immediately after this Court's mandate, and unprompted
by any party and thus not in response to an acquittal motion -- are
consistent with the District Court's characterization of its line
order.13 We thus conclude that the District Court's line order did
not constitute an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and
13
We note that the defendants do not identify any action they
took in their cases in reliance on the District Court's order
before the District Court vacated it. See Smith, 543 U.S. at 474("Double-jeopardy principles have never been thought to bar the
immediate repair of a genuine error in the announcement of an
acquittal, even one rendered by a jury."); United States v. Hill,
643 F.3d 807, 867 (11th Cir. 2011) (reconsideration permitted where
"[n]othing was done, or could have been done, in reliance on the
acquittal ruling between the time that ruling was announced and the
time it was rescinded"); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 338
(5th Cir. 2008) (no double jeopardy violation where the district
court granted acquittals and then, after a weekend recess, changed
its mind, as reconsideration came "before the trial progressed any
further"). Nor could the defendants possibly do so, as nothing
happened in the District Court in the interim. We also need not
consider here whether a concrete showing of reliance unconnected to
the proceedings themselves could be relevant to our analysis, as
the defendants have not made any such showing here.
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thus the Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent the District Court
from reconsidering it.14
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's denials
of the defendants' motions to "reinstate" the October 23 line order
and to enter a judgment of acquittal on the standalone § 666 counts
are affirmed.
14
The defendants contend that the District Court lacked
authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to reconsider
its line order. That Rule allows courts to correct "at any time
. . . a clerical error . . . arising from oversight or omission."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. But whether or not Rule 36 applied in this
context, district courts have the inherent authority to reconsider
their interlocutory orders outside the sentencing context. See,
e.g., United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[D]istrict courts generally have 'inherent authority' to decide
motions for reconsideration and rehearing of orders in criminal
proceedings." (quoting United States v. Barragan-Mendoza, 174 F.3d
1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 1999))). In any event, the defendants' Rule
36 argument is not grounded in the Double Jeopardy Clause, and so
we lack appellate jurisdiction to address that argument in this
appeal. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977); see
also United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 n.7 (1978)
("Admittedly, there is value -- to all but the most unusual
litigant -- in triumphing before trial, rather than after it,
regardless of the substance of the winning claim. But this truism
is not to be confused with the quite distinct proposition that
certain claims (because of the substance of the rights entailed,
rather than the advantage to a litigant in winning his claim
sooner) should be resolved before trial.").
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