United States v. Keith McGill , 815 F.3d 846 ( 2016 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 2, 2015             Decided March 1, 2016
    No. 06-3190
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    KEITH B. MCGILL,
    APPELLANT
    Consolidated with 06-3193, 07-3001, 07-3003, 07-3065,
    07-3124
    On Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 02cr00045-01)
    (No. 00cr00157-12)
    (No. 00cr00157-18)
    (No. 00cr00157-19)
    (No. 00cr00157-20)
    (No. 00cr00157-21)
    Gregory Stuart Smith, Dennis M. Hart, Richard K.
    Gilbert, Manuel J. Retureta, David B. Smith, and Mary E.
    Davis, all appointed by the court, argued the causes for
    2
    appellants. With them on the briefs was Kristen Grim
    Hughes, appointed by the court.
    Leslie A. Gerardo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
    cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C.
    Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time of the filing, and
    Elizabeth Trosman and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S.
    Attorneys. Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered
    an appearance.
    Before: SRINIVASAN and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and
    WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
    PER CURIAM: In November 2000, a grand jury returned a
    158-count superseding indictment against sixteen defendants.
    The indictment alleged that, during the late 1980s and
    throughout the 1990s, those defendants conspired to run a
    large-scale and violent narcotics-distribution business
    centered in Washington, D.C. The defendants were charged
    with an array of offenses including narcotics conspiracy and
    racketeering conspiracy, as well as numerous counts of first-
    degree murder, assault with intent to murder, tampering with
    a witness or informant by killing, continuing-criminal-
    enterprise murder, and violent crime in aid of racketeering
    conspiracy.
    Many of the indicted defendants pleaded guilty to the
    charges, while the others went to trial in two separate groups.
    “Group One” consisted of six defendants, including the
    conspiracy’s alleged leaders, Kevin Gray and Rodney Moore.
    The Group One trial culminated in guilty verdicts and
    substantial sentences for each defendant. We affirmed most
    of those verdicts and sentences in United States v. Moore, 651
    
    3 F.3d 30
    (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff’d in part sub nom. Smith v.
    United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 714
    (2013).
    “Group Two” consisted of five defendants from the
    November 2000 indictment: Deon Oliver, Franklin Seegers,
    Kenneth Simmons, James Alfred, and Ronald Alfred. Before
    their trial, the government obtained a separate six-count
    indictment against Keith McGill arising from his participation
    in the same conspiracy. The district court joined McGill for
    trial with the other Group Two defendants.
    On October 16, 2003, the Group Two trial commenced.
    Nearly six months later, on March 31, 2004, the jury began its
    deliberations. In April and May 2004, the jury found Oliver,
    Simmons, James Alfred, Ronald Alfred, and McGill guilty on
    all counts and found Seegers guilty on seven of the charged
    counts. After denying their posttrial motions, the district
    court sentenced all defendants to lengthy prison terms. Each
    received at least one term of life imprisonment, with the
    exception of Seegers, whose combined sentence of
    imprisonment amounted to forty years to life.
    The six Group Two defendants now appeal. Appellants
    challenge the sufficiency of the evidence against them on
    many of the charges. They also raise various claims
    concerning the conduct of the trial, including challenges to the
    district court’s dismissal of a juror during deliberations and to
    certain of the court’s evidentiary rulings. Appellants also
    allege prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of
    counsel, and one appellant (McGill) challenges his sentence.
    Upon review, we conclude that the evidence was
    sufficient to convict on all of the challenged counts. We also
    reject most of the claims of error or find that the alleged errors
    were harmless under the appropriate standard of review. We
    reverse the convictions on two counts against Seegers,
    4
    however, and we also remand to the district court to
    determine whether any of appellants’ conspiracy convictions
    must be vacated because of a Confrontation Clause violation.
    Certain of McGill’s sentencing arguments have merit,
    moreover, and we remand for examination of claims by
    Simmons and Ronald Alfred that they received ineffective
    assistance of counsel before the district court.
    Appellants’ consolidated briefing to this court is
    organized under discrete issue headings designated by Roman
    numerals. Our section headings conform to appellants’
    presentation of the issues (although we omit those section
    numbers denoting instances in which one appellant merely
    joined other appellants’ arguments). Detailed discussions of
    the facts, evidence, and proceedings will be set forth as
    necessary to address each issue appellants raise.
    We now proceed to address each issue raised by
    appellants. While certain of their arguments on each issue do
    not merit separate discussion, any arguments not directly
    addressed were fully considered and their disposition is so
    directly dictated by precedent as to not merit individualized
    discussion.
    I. Removal of Juror
    In their first joint argument, appellants challenge the
    district court’s dismissal of a juror for misconduct during
    deliberations. Appellants argue that the dismissed juror was
    inclined to vote for acquittal and that his dismissal violated
    their Sixth-Amendment right to conviction only by a
    unanimous jury. We find no error. We review the
    circumstances giving rise to the juror’s dismissal in some
    detail because the facts bear substantially on our review of the
    district court’s decision and our rejection of appellants’
    challenge.
    
    5 A. 1
    .
    The circumstances leading to the juror’s dismissal are as
    follows. On April 1, 2004, one day after its deliberations
    began, the jury sent a note to the district court indicating that
    it was experiencing some difficulties with one juror. The note
    reported that “[o]ne juror has stated categorically that he does
    not believe in any testimony from any of the cooperating
    witnesses.” J.A. 1049. That juror had also told the others
    “that there is no other evidence presented by the prosecution
    either direct, circumstantial, non-cooperating [witnesses],
    et[c]. that would likely lead to an unanimous decision.” 
    Id. The district
    court instructed the jury to continue its
    deliberations.
    After the next day of deliberations, the jury sent another
    note to the court relating to “one juror.” 
    Id. at 1052.
    That
    note relayed that the juror “ha[d] stated from the beginning of
    our deliberation that he does not believe any testimony of or
    by the prosecution, defense or any law enforcement witness.”
    
    Id. Once again,
    the district court told the jury to continue its
    deliberations.
    On April 8, the jury sent a third note to the court, stating
    that it had “had serious and productive discussion.” 
    Id. at 1064.
    The note further reported that “[o]ne juror continues to
    refuse to accept any evidence and discuss or consider any
    verdict but not guilty or not proven for any count or charge
    for any defendant.” 
    Id. In response,
    the court instructed the
    jury that, although “each juror is entitled to his or her
    opinions[,] [e]ach juror should . . . exchange views with his or
    her fellow jurors[,] . . . discuss and consider the evidence, . . .
    consult with one another, and . . . reach an agreement based
    solely and wholly on the evidence.” 
    Id. at 1076.
                                   6
    On April 14, the jury sent back two more notes in quick
    succession. The first note requested portions of the trial
    testimony. It also stated: “In addition, we have one juror #9,
    that refuses to participate in any and all deliberations for this
    trial.” 
    Id. at 1078.
    The second April 14 note raised a separate issue
    concerning the same juror (Juror #9). It stated:
    On April 13, 2004, I Juror [#12] observed
    Juror #9 throughout deliberations writing notes
    or things out of his jury book [with] all
    defendants[’] charges, then at (April 13) the
    end [of] deliberations he pull[ed] 3 pieces of
    paper from that tablet (yellow)[,] fold[ed] them
    in half and placed them in his eye glass case.
    
    Id. at 1079.
         Another paragraph followed in different
    handwriting:
    Note as Foreman [Juror #10] I am very
    disturb[ed] and concern[ed] by th[ese] actions
    on Juror #9. If an alternate is available that
    would make me feel safer.
    
    Id. The district
    judge read the notes aloud when defense and
    government counsel gathered in the courtroom that day. The
    judge also shared additional information about what had
    transpired the previous evening. The judge stated that, as the
    jurors exited the van that transported them to a secure location
    at the end of each day, the foreman, Juror #10, took aside the
    accompanying marshal and told him that Juror #12 had
    witnessed Juror #9 removing notes from the jury room.
    According to the judge, Juror #10 spoke with the marshal
    7
    because the jurors had received instructions to take nothing
    out of the jury room. Juror #10 suggested that the marshal
    search Juror #9, which the marshal declined to do. Later that
    night, Juror #10 called the marshal on his cell phone,
    expressing fear “[t]hat the jurors might be compromised by
    whatever it was that was taken out of the room.” 
    Id. at 5547-
    48.
    The court asked the two sides for their views on how to
    proceed. The government expressed concern about Juror #9’s
    potential misconduct in removing notes from the jury room
    and the fact that Juror #9 had apparently made the foreman
    “feel unsafe”; the government also worried that Juror #9 may
    have “given the impression to the jurors that their anonymity
    ha[d], perhaps, been compromised.” 
    Id. at 5539-40.
    The
    government suggested that the court conduct individual voir
    dires of the three jurors involved: Juror #12, who claimed to
    have witnessed Juror #9 writing and hiding the notes; Juror
    #10, whom Juror #12 had told about the incident; and Juror
    #9.    The government stressed the heightened security
    precautions the court had employed for the trial and explained
    that maintaining a “continued sense of safety, security, and
    anonymity . . . is all important as [the jurors] move forward in
    their deliberations.” 
    Id. at 5564.
    In addition, the government
    argued that the first April 14 note provided more evidence
    that one juror—most likely Juror #9—had continuously
    refused to deliberate with the others. But the government
    suggested that the court defer consideration of that issue for
    the time being and instead focus on Juror #9’s alleged
    removal of notes from the jury room.
    The defendants, for their part, moved for a mistrial. They
    argued that the jury’s notes had established that Juror #9 was
    a holdout for the defense on at least some charges. In
    addition, counsel for Simmons asked the district court
    8
    whether it had specifically instructed “the jurors not to take
    any paper out of the jury room.” 
    Id. at 5554.
    The court
    responded, “The marshals informed them they could not
    remove anything from the room.” 
    Id. The court
    further
    explained that “their own notes have to be sealed. The room
    is locked each night after they leave, and they are told they
    can’t take anything out,” including notes. 
    Id. Counsel asked,
    “That wasn’t an instruction given by the Court, that was
    something given by the marshals?” 
    Id. at 5554-55.
    The court
    answered, “Right. It’s a standard instruction from the
    marshals, don’t take anything out of the room.” 
    Id. at 5555.
    The district court decided to conduct individual voir dires
    of Jurors #12, #10, and #9. The court first questioned Juror
    #12. Juror #12 described witnessing Juror #9 “taking notes
    out of” and “copying stuff” from his juror notebook, which
    contained the indictments, the jury instructions, and the
    verdict forms. 
    Id. at 5572.
    Juror #12 recounted that, after the
    conclusion of deliberations for the day, Juror #9 took three
    pieces of paper from his notepad containing “whatever he
    wrote,” “folded them up,” and “slid them in his eyeglass
    case.” 
    Id. Juror #12
    admitted that he did not know what
    Juror #9 had written on those pieces of paper. But when the
    court asked whether Juror #9 may have written “a grocery list
    or something like that,” Juror #12 said he “d[id]n’t think it
    was,” because he had observed Juror #9 “going through . . .
    the middle of the [juror note]book, and he was just taking
    little segments out of the book and just jotting them down,
    taking little segments out of the book, jotting them down,
    taking little segments out of the book, jotting them down.” 
    Id. at 5576.
    Juror #12 also told the court that, when Juror #9 folded
    the pieces of paper and put them in his eyeglass case, he was
    “kind of looking out the side of his eye to see if anybody saw
    9
    him.” 
    Id. at 5578.
    “That’s what made me suspicious,” Juror
    #12 said, “because he concealed it.” 
    Id. Juror #12
    also stated
    that he was in the best position to observe Juror #9’s actions
    because Juror #12 was sitting beside Juror #9. Finally, Juror
    #12 mentioned that he reported Juror #9’s actions because
    they contravened the court’s “instructions that we were not
    supposed to take anything home.” 
    Id. at 5579.
    Next up was Juror #10, the foreman. The court asked
    Juror #10 to “walk [it] through” Juror #12’s statements to
    Juror #10 and the events leading up to the latest note. 
    Id. at 5580.
    After doing so, Juror #10 explained that he and Juror
    #12 had safety concerns because “[w]e don’t know what
    [Juror #9] [is] doing. He’s not participating.” 
    Id. at 5581.
    When the court pressed further on why Juror #9’s
    nonparticipation created a safety issue, Juror #10 responded,
    “Well, because he’s distant. He’s been very distant, and I
    don’t know what’s in his mind. He’s been kind of stand-
    offish, and, again, everybody, to a certain degree, I think,
    feeling for the rest of the ten jurors, they’re very uneasy
    because they don’t know what to expect from that individual.”
    
    Id. at 5582.
    Juror #10 added that he “didn’t sleep too well last
    night” and was “disturbed” by Juror #9’s removing his notes
    because the jurors received “firm instructions not to remove
    any of the evidence or our notes. If he’s taking notes and
    putting it in his eyeglass case, that’s a problem and that’s
    against the rules.” 
    Id. at 5585-86.
    “That brings a red flag to
    me,” Juror #10 continued, “and I’m concerned about, you
    know, the other jurors [and] myself as it relates to this case.
    We don’t know what he’s doing. We don’t know what his
    intentions are.” 
    Id. at 5586.
    The court next questioned Juror #9. Juror #9 readily
    admitted that he had put something from his juror notepad
    into his eyeglass case. He stated, however, that it was a single
    10
    sheet of paper containing a “grocery list.” 
    Id. at 5598.
    When
    asked about the list, Juror #9 said he had written “‘[m]ilk,
    eggs, bread’ and ‘fruit.’” 
    Id. at 5598-99.
    Juror #9 confirmed
    that he had been sitting at the back of the room and away
    from the juror table when he wrote the note, though he denied
    that he had been trying “to be secretive about it in any way.”
    
    Id. at 5604.
    When the court asked whether he still had the
    note, Juror #9 answered that he had thrown it away.
    The district court also told Juror #9 that there had been
    “some concern about the way deliberations are going” and
    asked whether Juror #9 wanted to disclose anything in that
    regard. 
    Id. at 5599-5600.
    The court made clear, however,
    that it did not want Juror #9 to discuss matters such as “guilty
    or not guilty, nothing like that.” 
    Id. at 5600.
    Juror #9 told the
    court that “whenever someone expresses an opinion that’s not
    the majority, they get shouted down. They don’t get a chance
    to express their opinion.” 
    Id. Juror #9
    also stated that he had
    been looking at the evidence and expressing his opinions
    about the case to the others, but that “[t]hey don’t want to
    hear it. . . . They don’t want to listen.” 
    Id. at 5605.
    After the court concluded its questioning of Juror #9, it
    again heard from both sides about how to proceed. Defense
    counsel renewed their requests for a mistrial. No one
    suggested that the court should voir dire additional jurors.
    2.
    The next day, on April 15, the court orally granted the
    government’s motion to remove Juror #9 for good cause
    under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b). The court,
    at the time, based its dismissal of Juror #9 solely on his
    refusal to deliberate. The court’s statement from the bench
    referenced our court’s decision in United States v. Brown, 
    823 F.2d 591
    (D.C. Cir. 1987), which held that the dismissal of a
    11
    juror on the basis of the juror’s views about the government’s
    evidentiary case had infringed the defendants’ Sixth-
    Amendment right to be convicted only by a unanimous
    verdict. The district court understood Brown to require it to
    make a factual finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Juror
    #9 had refused to consider the law and the evidence at all (as
    opposed to considering the evidence and forming a decision
    in favor of acquittal). Based on the facts reported in the jury’s
    notes and the jurors’ voir dire testimony, the court concluded
    that Juror #9 had been totally unwilling to consider the
    evidence or discuss the case with the others, in violation of his
    oath as a juror and the court’s instructions.
    The court also observed that its decision to remove Juror
    #9 was not based on his removal of notes from the jury room.
    The court stated that, while it found it “likely that [Juror #9]
    was writing some notes,” the court could not “resolve[]
    beyond a reasonable doubt” whether “it was a grocery list” or
    “something about the case.” J.A. 5623. The government
    asked the court to reconsider its decision, arguing that the
    note-removal incident afforded an independent basis to
    remove the juror for misconduct. The government also
    offered its understanding that the factual findings underlying
    that ground for dismissal need not be made beyond a
    reasonable doubt. The court responded, “If the standard is
    preponderance of the evidence, I would agree with you.” 
    Id. at 5625.
    But the court at the time was “not clear that that is
    the proper standard. If that’s the proper standard, then I think
    you’re right.” 
    Id. When the
    jury returned the next day, on April 16, the
    court informed the jurors that Juror #9 had been excused for
    reasons not relevant to their deliberations and that an alternate
    would be joining them. The court told the reconstituted jury
    to begin its deliberations anew.
    12
    One week later, on April 23, following a motion by the
    government, the court issued an order determining that Juror
    #9’s removal of notes from the jury room constituted an
    independent basis to remove the juror for good cause. While
    the court had previously been uncertain whether it needed to
    make findings supporting that ground for dismissal under a
    more stringent standard than a preponderance standard, it now
    “found by a preponderance of the evidence that Juror #9’s
    misconduct of removing notes” afforded a “basis to remove
    him for good cause.” 
    Id. at 1088.
    The court made factual findings concerning the note-
    removal incident in which it credited Juror #12’s
    “observations of the conduct of Juror #9.” 
    Id. at 1087.
    The
    court thus found, consistent with Juror #12’s account, that
    Juror #9 had “cop[ied] passages from his juror notebook onto
    his note pad” and had “then removed three pages from his
    note pad and placed them in his eyeglass case.” 
    Id. The court
    also credited Juror #12’s testimony that Juror #9 had acted in
    a “secretive, covert manner, attempting to avoid being seen by
    other jurors.” 
    Id. The court
    observed that it did “not believe”
    and did “not credit the testimony of Juror #9 regarding this
    incident.” 
    Id. at 1088.
    And the court stated that Juror #9’s
    actions were “a violation of the court’s instructions to the
    jurors that they must not remove anything from the jury
    room.” 
    Id. at 1087.
    The court noted that safety considerations also informed
    its finding of good cause to excuse Juror #9 based on his
    removal of notes from the jury room. “Needless to say,” the
    court explained, “the safety and security of the jurors are
    matters that are of the utmost importance in this case,”
    especially given the unique “security procedures that are in
    place in this trial and the nature of the charges.” 
    Id. at 1088.
    The court recounted Juror #10’s statement that “this incident
    13
    ‘disturb[ed]’ him” and his resulting request that Juror #9 be
    replaced with an alternate so that he would “feel safer.” 
    Id. The court
    concluded “that Juror #9’s misconduct of
    removing notes from the jury room constitutes an alternative
    and independent basis to remove him for good cause.” 
    Id. The court
    explained that “[t]his misconduct, standing alone,
    would have required his removal from the jury panel, even
    absent the evidence of his refusal to deliberate.” 
    Id. On April
    26, the reconstituted jury returned guilty
    verdicts on all counts for four of the defendants—Oliver,
    Simmons, James Alfred, and Ronald Alfred. On May 4 and
    10, the jury returned its verdicts for the remaining two
    defendants, McGill and Seegers, finding McGill guilty on all
    counts and Seegers guilty on six counts.
    B.
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b) provides that,
    “[a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the court may permit
    a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a
    stipulation by the parties, if the court finds good cause to
    excuse a juror.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3). Here, instead of
    proceeding with eleven jurors, the district court replaced Juror
    #9 with an alternate and instructed the reconstituted jury to
    begin its deliberations anew. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3) &
    advisory committee’s note to 1999 amendment. Appellants
    challenge the dismissal of Juror #9 as a violation of their
    Sixth-Amendment rights (but do not separately challenge the
    decision to replace him with an alternate rather than proceed
    with eleven jurors).
    A variety of issues that may arise in the course of jury
    deliberations can constitute “good cause” to excuse a juror
    under Rule 23(b), including illness, family emergency, or, as
    14
    here, jury misconduct. See United States v. Vartanian, 
    476 F.3d 1095
    , 1098 (9th Cir. 2007). “Jury misconduct” consists
    of “action by jurors that is contrary to their responsibilities.”
    6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.9(f) (4th
    ed. 2004). “Much of the jury behavior considered to be
    misconduct is prohibited specifically in preliminary
    instructions,” such as removing materials, discussing the
    merits of the case with a coworker or family member, giving
    false testimony during voir dire, or refusing to deliberate. 
    Id. “[A] district
    court, based on its unique perspective at the
    scene, is in a far superior position than [a court of appeals] to
    appropriately consider allegations of juror misconduct.”
    United States v. Boone, 
    458 F.3d 321
    , 329 (3d Cir. 2006); see
    United States v. Sobamowo, 
    892 F.2d 90
    , 95 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
    As a result, we review a district court’s decision to excuse a
    juror only for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Ginyard, 
    444 F.3d 648
    , 651 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
    In certain circumstances, the Sixth Amendment
    constrains the district court’s discretion to remove a juror
    under Rule 23(b). In United States v. Brown, we held that “a
    court may not dismiss a juror during deliberations if the
    [juror’s] request for [his or her own] discharge stems from
    doubts the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the
    government’s 
    evidence.” 823 F.2d at 596
    . Dismissal of a
    juror on grounds of her unwillingness to convict based on the
    evidence, we reasoned, would plainly violate a defendant’s
    Sixth-Amendment right to be convicted only by a unanimous
    jury. 
    Id. But we
    noted “the problem” that the precise reason
    for a juror’s request to be dismissed—or, equivalently, for one
    juror’s suggestion that another juror be dismissed, see United
    States v. Symington, 
    195 F.3d 1808
    , 1086 (9th Cir. 1999)—
    “will often be unclear.” 
    Brown, 823 F.2d at 596
    . The high
    premium our system puts on the secrecy of jury deliberations
    15
    precludes a trial court from “delv[ing] deeply into a juror’s
    motivations.” Id.; see 
    Symington, 195 F.3d at 1086
    . A court
    thus may “prove unable to establish conclusively the reasons
    underlying” a juror’s request to be dismissed. 
    Brown, 823 F.2d at 596
    .
    The Brown court adopted an approach erring on the side
    of Sixth-Amendment caution. “[I]f the record evidence
    discloses any possibility that the request to discharge stems
    from the juror’s view of the sufficiency of the government’s
    evidence,” we stated, “the [trial] court must deny the request.”
    
    Id. Applying that
    approach to the facts before us, we found
    that the record revealed a “substantial possibility” that the
    juror in question had “requested to be discharged because he
    believed that the evidence offered at trial was inadequate to
    support a conviction.” 
    Id. In light
    of that possibility, we
    concluded that the juror should not have been dismissed, and
    we reversed the convictions. And although Brown dealt
    specifically with a juror’s own request to be discharged, our
    court and other courts applying Brown’s approach (or a
    variant thereof) have adhered to the same analysis when a
    juror’s removal stems from another juror’s allegations or from
    circumstances that otherwise come to the court’s attention.
    See United States v. Carson, 
    455 F.3d 336
    , 352 (D.C. Cir.
    2006) (per curiam); 
    Symington, 195 F.3d at 1085-87
    ; United
    States v. Kemp, 
    500 F.3d 257
    , 304-05 (3d Cir. 2007); United
    States v. Abbell, 
    271 F.3d 1286
    , 1302 (11th Cir. 2001); United
    States v. Thomas, 
    116 F.3d 606
    , 622 (2d Cir. 1997).
    Appellants contend that Brown controls this case and
    mandates a new trial. They argue that, by the time of the
    jury’s April 14 notes to the district court—and certainly after
    the court completed its individual voir dires of Jurors #12,
    #10, and #9—the record revealed a likelihood that Juror #9
    was a holdout for the defense. They further submit that there
    16
    was a possibility that the other jurors’ allegations about Juror
    #9’s refusal to deliberate stemmed from Juror #9’s substantive
    view of the government’s case—that is, when the other jurors
    accused Juror #9 of nonparticipation in deliberations, they in
    fact were condemning him for his inclination to acquit based
    on the evidence. In those circumstances, appellants conclude,
    Brown obligated the district court either to keep Juror #9 or to
    declare a mistrial.
    The government, on the other hand, argues that Juror #9
    could be dismissed notwithstanding Brown because, rather
    than form a conclusion about the sufficiency of the
    government’s evidence, he refused to deliberate altogether.
    An outright refusal to deliberate, the government submits,
    constitutes a valid basis for dismissal notwithstanding Brown.
    In the alternative, the government contends that the dismissal
    of Juror #9 can be sustained based on what the district court
    explained was an “alternative and independent basis” for the
    juror’s discharge, J.A. 1088—viz., that Juror #9 had removed
    case-related notes from the jury room in violation of the
    court’s instructions.
    We agree with the latter argument and rest our decision
    exclusively on that ground. We therefore have no occasion to
    assess whether, had the district court based its good-cause
    dismissal solely on Juror #9’s refusal to deliberate, its
    decision would have run afoul of our decision in Brown.
    In resting our decision on the district court’s “alternative
    and independent” finding that Juror #9’s removal of case-
    related notes from the jury room constituted misconduct
    justifying his dismissal, we take guidance from our decision
    in United States v. Ginyard, 
    444 F.3d 648
    . Ginyard clarified
    that Brown does not stand in the way of dismissing a known
    17
    holdout juror for reasons independent of his views about the
    evidence. 
    Id. at 652.
    The jurors in Ginyard told the trial court that their
    deliberations had been “heated” and that they were
    “deadlocked.” 
    Id. at 650
    & n.1. One note asked the court
    how they should handle “a juror who has stated that they do
    not believe the testimony of several witnesses and does not
    offer reasons based on evidence.” 
    Id. The next
    day, Juror
    429 asked to be relieved from service to pursue a job
    opportunity through his rehabilitation program that might
    soon elapse. 
    Id. After briefly
    questioning Juror 429 about the
    employment issue, the court announced that it would dismiss
    Juror 429 for good cause—i.e., to assure preservation of his
    job opportunity. 
    Id. at 651.
    But before the court implemented
    the dismissal, it received information revealing that Juror 429
    was likely the holdout referenced in the earlier
    communications and might have doubts about the
    government’s evidentiary case. 
    Id. at 651-52.
    The court
    proceeded to dismiss him anyway, and the remaining jurors
    found the defendants guilty. 
    Id. On appeal,
    the government conceded that Juror 429’s
    dismissal was in error under Brown because the court
    discharged the juror despite learning that he may have been a
    holdout for the defense. Notwithstanding the government’s
    concession, we found that Brown “does not control.” 
    Id. at 652.
    We acknowledged that, by the time of Juror 429’s
    dismissal, the record revealed a “‘possibility that’ Juror 429
    believed that ‘the government had failed to present sufficient
    evidence to support a conviction.’” 
    Id. (quoting Brown,
    823
    F.3d at 597) (brackets omitted). We explained, however, that
    the Sixth-Amendment interests safeguarded by Brown do not
    always preclude a district court from exercising its discretion
    to dismiss a known holdout juror for good cause. “Were a
    18
    holdout juror to request dismissal because he was
    experiencing a heart attack,” for instance, “Brown would not
    prevent a district court from excusing that juror under Rule
    23(b) for good cause, even if the record suggested that the
    juror independently had doubts about the sufficiency of the
    evidence.” 
    Id. Instead, Brown
    bars a juror’s dismissal “only [in] those
    situations where the ‘request for discharge stems from doubts
    the juror harbors about the sufficiency of the government’s
    evidence.’” Id. (quoting 
    Brown, 823 F.2d at 596
    ). We found
    “no evidence that Juror 429 sought dismissal, or was
    dismissed, because of his doubts about the government’s
    evidence.” 
    Id. Rather, “the
    record indicate[d] that his request
    stemmed entirely from an employment-related need.” 
    Id. We nonetheless
    ultimately vacated the convictions because we
    concluded that the district court had conducted an inadequate
    inquiry into whether Juror 429’s employment needs in fact
    rendered him unable to continue. 
    Id. at 653-55.
    But what is
    critical for present purposes is our explanation that “Brown is
    not implicated” unless “there is some causal link between a
    juror’s holdout status and the juror’s dismissal.” 
    Id. at 652.
    Ginyard thus establishes that, even if a trial court knows
    a juror may harbor doubts about the government’s evidentiary
    case, the Sixth Amendment does not always insulate the juror
    from removal. See id.; accord United States v. Edwards, 
    303 F.3d 606
    , 634 (5th Cir. 2002). Rather, if the court forms an
    independent, good-cause justification for removing the juror
    that bears no “causal link” to the juror’s “holdout status,” the
    court may excuse the juror even if the juror “independently
    had doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence.” 
    Ginyard, 444 F.3d at 652
    . That understanding applies here.
    19
    Initially, the district court based Juror #9’s dismissal
    solely on his refusal to deliberate. Regardless of whether that
    ground would have involved the sort of “causal link between
    [the] juror’s holdout status and the juror’s dismissal” that
    would implicate Brown, 
    id., the court
    later found that Juror
    #9’s misconduct in taking notes from the jury room
    “constitute[d] an alternative and independent basis to remove
    him for good cause.” J.A. 1088. Because that distinct ground
    bore no “causal link” to Juror #9’s “holdout status,” the court
    could dismiss the juror on that basis even if he “independently
    had doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence.” 
    Ginyard, 444 F.3d at 652
    . As we explained in another juror-dismissal
    case, “[t]he judge plainly stated his reasons for the
    dismissal”—Juror #9’s secreting notes out of the jury room in
    violation of the court’s instructions—and those reasons “had
    nothing to do with the juror’s view of the case.” 
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 352
    .
    That kind of misconduct—unlike a juror’s refusal to
    deliberate or a juror’s intent to nullify—poses no inherent
    potential for confusion with a juror’s evidence-based
    inclination to acquit. Like the juror’s job-related availability
    at issue in 
    Ginyard, 444 F.3d at 562
    , or the juror’s mental
    condition and possible deception at issue in Carson, 
    see 455 F.3d at 350-52
    , the dismissal of Juror #9 for clandestinely
    taking case-related notes out of the jury room bears no
    connection to any ideas he might have formed about the
    strength of the government’s case. That misconduct instead
    “was a violation of the court’s instructions to the jurors,” and,
    the court noted, also raised safety concerns in the minds of the
    other jurors who knew about it. J.A. 1087-88. The court thus
    concluded that “[t]his misconduct” independently justified
    Juror #9’s “removal from the jury panel,” regardless of Juror
    #9’s refusal to deliberate with other jurors. 
    Id. at 1088.
                                   20
    Of course, if an ostensibly independent basis for a juror’s
    dismissal in fact amounts to a pretext, and the actual ground
    for dismissal involves the juror’s views about the adequacy of
    the government’s evidence, our decision in Brown would be
    directly implicated. See 
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 352
    (considering
    defendants’ argument that the district court’s good-cause
    finding was pretextual). Here, appellants suggest such a
    pretext by seeking to cast doubt on the district court’s reliance
    on Juror #9’s removal of notes from the jury room as a “post
    hoc rationalization.”      Appellants’ Br. 102.         We are
    unpersuaded.
    It is true that, when the court initially announced its
    decision to dismiss Juror #9 in an oral ruling from the bench,
    the court declined to rely on the note-removal ground, instead
    relying solely on Juror #9’s refusal to deliberate. But even at
    that time, the court indicated its inclination to “agree” with
    the government that Juror #9’s taking of notes provided an
    “independent” ground for “remov[ing] him from these
    deliberations.” J.A. 5625. The court observed that, if its
    factual findings supporting that ground for dismissal could be
    made by a “preponderance of the evidence,” it “would agree”
    that Juror “Number 12, over Number 9,” has the correct
    “version of the facts” and that Juror #9’s misconduct would
    justify his dismissal. 
    Id. But the
    court was “not clear” at that
    time whether it would need to choose Juror #12’s version of
    the incident over that of Juror #9 under a more stringent,
    “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, in which event the
    court could not definitively resolve the factual dispute in
    favor of Juror #12’s account. 
    Id. By the
    time of the court’s
    written ruling several days later, however, the court concluded
    that preponderance-based findings would be adequate,
    enabling it to make “additional findings” that “credit[ed] the
    testimony of Juror #12,” and ultimately to determine that
    “Juror #9’s misconduct of removing notes from the jury room
    21
    constitute[d] an alternative and independent basis to remove
    him for good cause.” 
    Id. at 1087-88.
    We see no basis for questioning the court’s determination
    in that regard—or its good faith in reaching that conclusion—
    based merely on the sequence of events. The court was
    plainly concerned about Juror #9’s alleged removal of notes
    from the outset—as soon as it first heard about the incident
    from the marshal and from the jury’s second April 14 note
    describing what Juror #9 had done. The allegations about
    Juror #9’s removal of notes, not his alleged nonparticipation
    in deliberations, provided the impetus for the court’s decision
    to conduct voir dires of the jurors aware of the incident. As in
    Ginyard, “there is no evidence that Juror [#9] . . . was
    dismissed” on this independent ground “because of his doubts
    about the government’s evidence.” 
    Ginyard, 444 F.3d at 652
    .
    “On the contrary, the record indicates that” this basis for Juror
    #9’s dismissal “stemmed entirely” from his removal of case-
    related notes from the jury room. 
    Id. The district
    court
    accordingly found that “[t]his misconduct, standing alone,”
    justified “his removal from the jury panel, even absent the
    evidence of his refusal to deliberate.” J.A. 1088 (emphasis
    added). That was because “[t]his misconduct”—entirely
    independent of his refusal to deliberate with the other jurors—
    amounted to “a violation of the court’s instructions to the
    jurors” and also raised safety concerns in the minds of those
    jurors who knew about it. 
    Id. at 1087-88.
    Nor do we think the district court erred in reaching its
    factual conclusions underlying that ground for dismissal—in
    particular, in crediting Juror #12’s account of the note-
    removal incident instead of Juror #9’s own version—under a
    preponderance standard.        Because our decisions have
    established no explicit standard-of-proof threshold for factual
    findings undergirding a court’s dismissal of a juror for
    22
    misconduct, the district court’s initial uncertainty is
    understandable. But the court was correct in ultimately
    concluding that it could find that Juror #9 had committed the
    misconduct of removing notes from the jury room under a
    preponderance standard rather than some more stringent
    standard. When a juror’s alleged misconduct justifying her
    dismissal is unconnected to her possible “doubts about the
    government’s evidence,” 
    Ginyard, 444 F.3d at 652
    —the only
    situation we have occasion to consider here—there is no
    cause for requiring the court to conclude that the misconduct
    occurred by any heightened evidentiary threshold beyond the
    usual preponderance standard. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United
    States, 
    483 U.S. 171
    , 175 (1987).
    To be sure, even in cases involving a potential ground for
    a juror’s dismissal that is fully independent of her known
    status as a possible holdout for the defense, the court must
    still conduct an adequate inquiry before finding the existence
    of the independent basis warranting her discharge. As we
    explained in Ginyard, while “[o]ur holding in Brown may not
    control the outcome” when there is no connection between the
    ground for dismissal and a juror’s “view of the evidence, the
    district court, upon having reason to believe the juror is a
    holdout, has an enhanced duty to determine the precise
    circumstances of the juror’s availability lest the action of the
    court interfere with a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
    unanimous 
    verdict.” 444 F.3d at 654
    (internal citation
    omitted). And in Ginyard, we ultimately reversed the
    convictions because the district court had “never determined”
    the “precise circumstances” of the juror’s potential inability to
    serve due to employment-related reasons—i.e., whether the
    juror in fact would relinquish an employment opportunity if
    he continued his service. 
    Id. We noted
    that the juror himself
    “had indicated that he might be able to serve several
    additional days without losing the job opportunity.” 
    Id. “Yet 23
    the district court made no attempt to ascertain whether or not
    this was true.” 
    Id. The court
    , we concluded, should have
    inquired into the matter further. 
    Id. at 654-55.
    Here, by contrast, the district court did not “rely on an
    unexamined state of uncertainty to draw the inference” that
    Juror #9 had committed disqualifying misconduct by
    removing case-related notes from the jury room. 
    Id. Rather, the
    court conducted a fully adequate factual inquiry. Upon
    receiving Juror #10’s (the foreman’s) written account of what
    had transpired, the district court questioned every juror with
    information about the incident. Juror #10 testified that he had
    no reason to believe any other juror saw what Juror #9 was
    doing, and nothing said by the other two jurors—Jurors #9
    and #12—called that assertion into doubt. Under those
    circumstances, the court reasonably decided against asking
    additional jurors about the episode. Any such inquiry ran the
    risk of fueling rumors or further unsettling or distracting the
    jury. Based on the court’s voir dire of the three jurors, it
    found that Juror #9 copied “passages from his juror notebook
    onto his note pad” and then removed those notes in a
    “secretive, covert manner, attempting to avoid being seen,” in
    “violation of the court’s instructions to the jurors that they
    must not remove anything from the jury room.” J.A. 1087.
    The court’s findings to that effect, by necessity, were
    based on its credibility determinations about the voir dire
    testimony of the three jurors. And we have emphasized that
    “[t]he district court, having observed the demeanor of [a]
    juror [during voir dire questioning], is in the best position to
    determine the credibility of” the juror’s statements. United
    States v. Gartmon, 
    146 F.3d 1015
    , 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1998). For
    that reason, we are highly reluctant “to second guess the
    conclusion of [an] experienced trial judge,” when, as here,
    that conclusion was “based in large measure upon personal
    24
    observations that cannot be captured on a paper record.”
    United States v. Ruggiero, 
    928 F.2d 1289
    , 1300 (2d Cir.
    1991).
    That is particularly so when nothing in that paper record
    calls the court’s credibility assessments into question. The
    district court was under no obligation to accept Juror #9’s
    account that he merely wrote down “[a] grocery list”
    containing only the words “[m]ilk, eggs, bread” and “fruit.”
    J.A. 5598-99. Juror #12 described Juror #9 as repeatedly
    copying down information for some period of time from his
    jury notebook and then removing three pieces of paper from
    his notepad while attempting to avoid detection, all of which
    would be inconsistent with merely jotting down a short,
    innocuous grocery list. That testimony directly conflicted
    with Juror #9’s statements that he wrote down just four
    words, removed but one piece of paper, and made no attempt
    to conceal what he was doing. Keeping in mind that the
    district judge was in a position to observe the jurors’
    demeanor, we cannot say that the judge was wrong to
    “credit[] the testimony of Juror #12 regarding his observations
    of the conduct of Juror #9,” and to “not credit the testimony
    of Juror #9 regarding this incident.” 
    Id. at 1087-88.
    Perhaps recognizing the difficulty of questioning the
    district court’s credibility determinations, appellants argue
    that, even if Juror #9 had furtively removed case-related
    notes from the jury room, that conduct should not have led to
    his dismissal. Appellants initially contend that the district
    court (as opposed to the marshals) never instructed the jurors
    that their notes must remain in the jury room. Assuming that
    a distinction between an instruction from the district court and
    one from the marshals should matter, it is true that the court,
    in an exchange with counsel immediately preceding its voir
    dire of the jurors, stated that the marshals were the ones to
    25
    instruct the jury that they could not remove materials from the
    jury room. But regardless of the court’s recollection at that
    moment, the court in fact had told the jury at the outset of trial
    that, “[a]t the end of each day, you will take [any notes] with
    you to the jury room and seal them” and that those items
    would be kept in the locked jury room overnight. 
    Id. at 1824-
    25. The instructions also explained that “[n]o one . . . will
    ever look at any of your notes” and that the materials would
    “be destroyed” following the jury’s delivery of the verdict, 
    id. at 1825—making
    all the more clear that the prohibition’s aim
    was to preserve the notes’ secrecy. Indeed, two other jurors
    shared their (unprompted) understanding that Juror #9’s
    removal of case-related notes violated the judge’s
    instructions.
    We are also unpersuaded by appellants’ contention that
    the prohibition itself was misguided because a juror’s removal
    of notes from the jury room is no different than her retention
    of her own memories of the evidence. A trial court can
    readily conclude that a juror’s removal of written material
    from the jury room carries a greater risk that the material
    could be inadvertently seen by—or intentionally shared
    with—someone else. Even assuming Juror #9 did nothing
    more than copy passages out of his juror notebook verbatim,
    “[a]llowing the jury to take home the indictment or the jury
    instructions ‘leaves the deliberative process needlessly
    vulnerable to a variety of potential problems’ by ‘increasing
    the chances that individual jurors may want to discuss these
    matters with family members or friends’ and by ‘making it
    easier for jurors to research legal issues on their own.’”
    United States v. Esso, 
    684 F.3d 347
    , 354 (2d Cir. 2012)
    (quoting State v. Morgan, 
    33 A.3d 527
    , 539 (N.J. Super. Ct.
    App. Div. 2011)). Moreover, appellants’ effort to challenge
    the need for a bar against removing notes from the jury room
    disregards that Juror #9 not only violated the court’s
    26
    instruction to that effect, but then compounded his
    misconduct by also giving false testimony about the incident
    under oath.
    Appellants further argue that, even if Juror #9 committed
    misconduct, the court should have re-instructed the jurors not
    to remove their notes rather than dismiss the juror
    straightaway. We are unable to conclude that the court
    abused its discretion under Rule 23(b) by choosing the latter
    course. A trial court’s zone of discretion under Rule 23(b)
    includes considerable leeway to determine the appropriate
    response to a finding of juror misconduct based on the court’s
    firsthand assessment of the nature and degree of misconduct
    and the effect on the trial proceedings.
    In that regard, the circumstances here are unlike those in
    Ginyard. There, we found fault in the district court’s failure
    to conduct a further inquiry before discharging the juror,
    especially given that the juror himself suggested that he could
    continue to serve without losing his job opportunity. 
    See 444 F.3d at 654-55
    . Whether he should be dismissed turned on a
    factual question warranting further examination—i.e.,
    whether the juror’s employment opportunity in fact would be
    relinquished if he were to continue to serve. Here, by
    contrast, whether Juror #9’s misconduct should lead to his
    dismissal did not turn on any such factual question warranting
    further inquiry. Instead, it turned on the district court’s
    contextual assessments about the gravity of the misconduct
    and the consequences of allowing him to continue to serve.
    We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination
    that, by removing jury notes in violation of the court’s
    instructions and then giving false testimony about the
    incident, Juror #9 committed misconduct warranting his
    dismissal. See, e.g., United States v. Vega, 
    72 F.3d 507
    , 512
    (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no abuse of discretion in a court’s
    27
    dismissing a juror who disobeyed instructions, including by
    removing notes from the jury room); United States v. Fryar,
    
    867 F.2d 850
    , 853 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding no abuse of
    discretion in a court’s dismissing a juror who lied to the judge
    under oath).
    Moreover, the court noted that its decision to discharge
    Juror #9 for good cause was additionally informed by the
    incident’s implications for the jurors’ sense of safety and
    security. As the court referenced in its written findings, the
    scale of the criminal enterprise and the nature of the charges
    against the defendants—including murder, attempts to
    intimidate potential witnesses through killings, and RICO
    conspiracy involving multiple acts of violence—caused the
    court to employ unusually stringent security measures to
    protect the jurors. The court had empaneled an anonymous
    jury, which entailed a conclusion that “there is a strong reason
    to believe the jury needs protection.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 48
    (quoting United States v. Edmond, 
    52 F.3d 1080
    , 1090 (D.C.
    Cir. 1995)). The jurors were seated behind a locked
    bulletproof wall during trial, and they were assembled and
    dropped off in private locations, escorted each way by the
    marshals. Even with those protections in place, some
    potential jurors expressed fear during jury selection about
    being picked for duty and worried that their anonymity could
    be compromised.
    Those concerns came to the fore once Juror #9’s
    misconduct came to light. Neither the district court nor the
    jurors knew exactly what Juror #9 had written down or what
    he had done with it. But Juror #12 observed that, whatever it
    was, Juror #9 had tried to hide it. And the district court
    credited the observation that Juror #9 had acted “in a
    secretive, covert manner, attempting to avoid” detection. J.A.
    1087. As a result of Juror #9’s behavior, Juror #10 felt
    28
    “disturbed” and expressed concerns for his and other jurors’
    anonymity and safety; he shared that he had lost sleep over
    the incident. 
    Id. at 5585-86.
    The court considered that testimony against the backdrop
    of prior incidents raising concerns about the security and
    independence of the jurors. Previously, the court had learned
    that the supervisor of one of the alternate jurors had been
    regularly attending the trial and maintaining contact with the
    alternate juror; the supervisor had grown up with one of the
    defendants, Ronald Alfred, knew him well, and was seen
    gesturing to Alfred during trial. The court dismissed that
    alternate juror. There was also a likely instance of witness
    intimidation (discussed in greater detail below) involving a
    defense witness’s receipt of a folder containing a photo of his
    murdered son shortly before the witness was to take the stand
    at trial. In that context, the district court understandably noted
    that “the safety and security of the jurors are matters that are
    of the utmost importance in this case” when it ruled that Juror
    #9’s removal of notes from the jury room warranted his
    dismissal. J.A. 1088.
    In the end, subject to constitutional limitations, a “trial
    court has a great deal of discretion in deciding to excuse a
    juror for cause,” and “[a]n appellate court ordinarily will not
    second-guess such a determination.” United States v. Essex,
    
    734 F.2d 832
    , 845 (D.C. Cir. 1984). We find that the district
    court’s alternative rationale for Juror #9’s dismissal based on
    his removal of jury notes amounted to a good-cause ground
    for his discharge. We thus perceive no abuse of discretion in
    the court’s dismissal of Juror #9 under Rule 23(b).
    II. Government Overview Testimony
    In reviewing the trial of the Group One defendants in
    Moore, we condemned the government’s use of an FBI agent
    29
    as an “overview witness.” 
    See 651 F.3d at 54-61
    . In
    appellants’ trial—which took place before we released our
    decision in Moore—the government used that same FBI agent
    in substantially the same manner. We reiterate Moore’s
    disapproval of such an overview witness and its conclusion
    that overview testimony might be, in certain circumstances,
    sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal of a defendant’s
    convictions. Those circumstances are absent here, however.
    Appellants forfeited their objections to the overview witness’s
    testimony by failing to raise them at trial, leaving us to review
    only for plain error. As in Moore, we discern no reversible
    error under that forgiving standard of review.
    A.
    As in the Group One trial reviewed in Moore, the
    government began its case-in-chief in the Group Two trial
    with the testimony of FBI Agent Daniel Sparks, the lead agent
    investigating the narcotics conspiracy at issue in both cases.
    Agent Sparks testified as an overview witness, presenting
    background information in support of the government’s case.
    Sparks highlighted the crucial role that cooperating
    witnesses can perform in unraveling a conspiracy. Narcotics
    conspiracies, Sparks explained, are in large part “based on
    everybody keeping quiet.” J.A. 1862. “[O]nce you penetrate
    that conspiracy” with cooperating witnesses, Sparks stated,
    “you get an inside[r] that can tell you what’s going on.” 
    Id. At that
    point, a conspiracy is “like a house of cards[.] [I]t
    begins to crumble.” 
    Id. Sparks also
    testified that, due to their
    value to the prosecution, cooperating witnesses may be
    threatened by their coconspirators and often require witness
    protection.
    A basic “ground rule[]” for cooperating witness
    testimony, Sparks explained, is that the cooperator must
    30
    provide “[t]ruthful information.” 
    Id. at 1866-67.
    Though
    cooperators are assured that any information provided will not
    be used against them—a rule designed to make them “feel
    comfortable to provide the information”—Sparks noted that
    law enforcement still works to vet any cooperating witness for
    truthfulness. 
    Id. at 1865,
    1867. Officers do not “take
    [information] at face value,” Sparks explained; rather, they
    work to “corroborate or verify” that information by cross-
    referencing it with police reports, historical homicide files,
    and testimony from other witnesses. 
    Id. at 1867-68.
    He then
    further described how cooperators may earn leniency in
    exchange for their cooperation, including via “5(K)” letters
    (requests for sentencing departures under U.S.S.G. § 5K).
    The sentencing judge would be the one to evaluate “the full
    extent” of a witness’s cooperation, Sparks observed. See 
    id. at 1874-76.
    At the close of his testimony, Sparks presented two
    exhibits designed to tie the facts of the case together for the
    jury. He first showed the jury an exhibit with pictures of
    twenty-two individuals under indictment for the alleged
    conspiracy and identified which individuals (i) were on trial
    in the instant proceeding; (ii) were on trial in separate
    proceedings; and (iii) had pleaded guilty and would serve as
    cooperating witnesses in the current trial. Finally, Sparks
    introduced a map of the District of Columbia showing the site
    of each murder and attempted murder allegedly connected to
    the conspiracy.
    B.
    In Moore, the government used Agent Sparks in
    essentially the same fashion. Sparks “testified as the first
    witness in the government’s case-in-chief,” and “[h]is
    testimony provided an overview of the government’s case,
    31
    setting forth for the jury the script of the testimony and
    evidence the jury could expect the government to present in
    its case-in-chief.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 54-55
    . “Further,
    [Sparks] expressed his opinion, based on his training and
    experience, about the nature of the investigation conducted in
    th[e] case.” 
    Id. at 55.
    Of particular relevance, Agent Sparks testified in the trial
    of the Group One defendants “that it was important, in his
    view, to use cooperating witnesses in this case because it was
    ‘the only way’ to gain ‘access to the inside information.’” 
    Id. at 59.
    While acknowledging that cooperating witnesses are
    “criminals,” he also testified that those witnesses “know
    what’s going on,” and that their testimony is “the only way to
    put these kinds of cases together.” 
    Id. (brackets omitted).
    Sparks further noted that cooperating witnesses were
    debriefed “to ‘get complete and truthful information,’” and
    that the FBI worked “to ‘try and verify’ the information ‘just
    to make sure the person is truthful.’” 
    Id. (brackets omitted).
    At trial and on appeal, the Moore defendants objected to
    Sparks’s testimony. They argued that his overview testimony
    “improperly permitted the government . . . to elicit FBI Agent
    Sparks’s opinions about the charged crimes, the reasons for
    appellants’ actions in various circumstances, the nature of the
    charged conspiracy and the relationships between co-
    conspirators, including the cooperating co-conspirators who
    testified as government witnesses, and the strength of the
    evidence—all before the government had presented such
    evidence.” 
    Id. at 55.
    We agreed. Sparks’s testimony, we found, “crossed the
    line in a number of instances.” 
    Id. at 59.
    While he “could
    properly describe, based on his personal knowledge, how the
    gang investigation in this case was initiated, what law
    32
    enforcement entities were involved, and what investigative
    techniques were used,” what “he could not do was present lay
    opinion testimony about investigative techniques in general,”
    “opine on what generally works and what does not,”
    “anticipate evidence that the government would hope to
    introduce at trial,” or “express an opinion, directly or
    indirectly, about the strength of that evidence or the
    credibility of any of the government’s potential witnesses,
    including the cooperating co-conspirators.” 
    Id. at 61.
    We
    noted that the “clear implication” of Sparks’s testimony “was
    that the government had selected only truthful co-conspirator
    witnesses for the pre-indictment investigation, from whom the
    jury would hear during the trial.” 
    Id. at 59-60.
    We found that result to be highly problematic, and we
    therefore joined the other courts of appeals “that have
    addressed the issue in condemning” the government’s use of
    overview witness testimony. 
    Id. at 60.
    We noted that there
    were several “obvious” problems posed by the government’s
    use of an overview witness. 
    Id. at 56.
    “First, the jury might
    treat the summary evidence” from the overview witness “as
    additional or corroborative evidence that unfairly strengthens
    the government’s case.” 
    Id. Second, the
    overview witness
    might serve as a conduit for the introduction of “otherwise
    inadmissible evidence.” 
    Id. And third,
    an overview witness
    “might permit the government to have an extra [opening]
    argument.” 
    Id. We also
    determined that the “[a]voidance of
    those dangers is largely beyond the ability of the district
    court, much less the defense.” 
    Id. at 60.
    Ultimately, however, we found no reversible error. We
    concluded that “the prejudice resulting from the admission of
    FBI Agent Sparks’s overview testimony, to the extent it was
    inappropriate, was ameliorated.” 
    Id. at 61.
    We noted several
    mitigating factors, including that “[e]ach instance of FBI
    33
    Agent Sparks’s improper testimony identified by appellants
    was later confirmed by admissible evidence at trial”; that the
    district court employed limiting instructions; and that the trial
    produced “overwhelming evidence of appellants’ guilt.” 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    concluded that “the error did not ‘affect the
    outcome of the district court proceeding,’ and hence
    appellants are not entitled to reversal of their convictions
    because of improper overview testimony by FBI Agent
    Sparks.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Sumlin, 
    271 F.3d 274
    ,
    281 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (internal citation and brackets omitted).
    In a subsequent decision, we again noted the problems
    associated with overview testimony (again by Agent Sparks),
    but we concluded that the admission of the testimony was
    harmless error due to the lack of prejudice. United States v.
    Bostick, 
    791 F.3d 127
    , 145-47 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
    C.
    Both parties agree that Moore establishes the appropriate
    framework for our review today. Given that appellants raise
    on appeal substantially the same objections made at trial in
    Moore, to what was substantially the same testimony by the
    same witness, we agree. In Moore, we recognized that
    challenges to overview witness testimony could be framed as
    objections to the introduction of otherwise-inadmissible
    evidence or as assertions of prosecutorial misconduct. 
    See 651 F.3d at 55
    . We assume that appellants make both claims,
    though—as in Moore—our conclusions are unaffected by any
    distinctions between the two. 
    Id. Our standard
    of review depends on whether appellants
    properly preserved any objections to Sparks’s overview
    testimony. Failure to raise an objection at trial results in the
    forfeiture of the objection, yielding review only under the
    more forgiving “plain error” standard. United States v.
    34
    Wilson, 
    605 F.3d 985
    , 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Appellants
    argue that they preserved their challenge to Sparks’s overview
    testimony by lodging a number of objections during the
    course of Sparks’s testimony. But the objections identified by
    appellants were not objections to Sparks’s testimony qua
    overview witness. They instead were objections to various
    discrete pieces of Sparks’s testimony—for instance, an
    objection to Sparks’s testimony about his military
    background. Accordingly, appellants’ objections at trial
    “gave ‘no indication to the judge that the defense was
    claiming that the entire line of questioning was improper.’”
    United States v. Ramirez-Fuentes, 
    703 F.3d 1038
    , 1042 (7th
    Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. McMahan, 
    495 F.3d 410
    ,
    418 (7th Cir. 2007)) (brackets omitted). Our review thus is
    for plain error only.
    The first two elements of the plain-error standard are
    met—i.e., that a “legal error” exists and that the error is
    “clear.” United States v. Brown, 
    508 F.3d 1066
    , 1071 (D.C.
    Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 
    451 F.3d 884
    ,
    892 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The key hallmarks of Sparks’s
    testimony—in particular, his opining on the truthfulness of
    cooperating witnesses as a whole—mirrored the testimony we
    condemned in Moore. But plain-error inquiry does not end
    there. To satisfy the third prong of the plain-error standard—
    i.e., that appellants’ “substantial rights” were violated—“the
    Supreme Court has indicated that ‘in most cases’” appellants
    must show that the error “affected the outcome of the district
    court proceedings.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734 (1993)). That inquiry hinges on “the centrality
    of the issue affected, the severity of the [error], the steps taken
    to mitigate the [error], and the closeness of the case.” 
    Id. (quoting United
    States v. Venable, 
    269 F.3d 1086
    , 1091 (D.C.
    Cir. 2001)). In Moore, we likewise asked whether the errors
    from Sparks’s testimony affected the outcome of the Group
    35
    One defendants’ 
    trial. 651 F.3d at 61
    . We concluded that it
    did not. We ask the same question today, and we reach the
    same conclusion.
    Initially, we note that several of appellants’ challenges to
    purportedly inadmissible evidence introduced via Sparks’s
    testimony were not, in fact, part of Sparks’s overview
    testimony. They instead came later in the trial, when Sparks
    testified about the execution of a specific search warrant. For
    example, appellants note that, “while explaining items seized
    during a search of R. Alfred’s apartment, [Sparks] testified,
    over objection, that he seized what he thought to be crack
    cocaine. . . . [T]he substance was never confirmed by the
    DEA to be narcotics.” Appellants’ Br. 112 (citing J.A. 4029-
    31). But in Moore, we of course did not condemn the
    government’s use of any testimony by FBI agents; rather, we
    cast doubt on the permissibility of such testimony only when
    presented as overview testimony raising the concerns we
    highlighted in our discussion. 
    See 651 F.3d at 60
    . Sparks’s
    testimony about the seizure of crack cocaine, given later in
    the trial and in connection with a specific search, was plainly
    not part of his overview testimony.
    Second, as in Moore, to the extent that appellants identify
    problematic parts of the actual overview testimony,
    admissible evidence later confirmed many of those portions of
    Sparks’s testimony. For example, appellants take issue with
    his assertion that law enforcement worked to “corroborate or
    verify” any information from cooperating witnesses. J.A.
    1867. Appellants argue that Sparks’s assertion amounted to
    impermissible vouching for the government’s witnesses. We
    too recognize the problem: those statements might well
    suggest that a “highly trained FBI agent had determined that
    the cooperating co-conspirators who would testify at trial
    were to be treated as credible witnesses.” 
    Moore, 561 F.3d at 36
    59. But the cooperating witnesses also testified that they were
    required to tell the truth in their FBI debriefings and detailed
    the government’s efforts to verify their testimony. For
    example, cooperating witness Omar Wazir agreed that law
    enforcement agents told him they “would investigate the
    information that [he] provided . . . [t]o find out if it was
    factual or not,” J.A. 2443-44, and further noted that “[t]hey
    did a good job investigating.” 
    Id. at 2419.
    Similar scenarios
    played out with many cooperating witnesses. Overview
    testimony can wrongly suggest to jurors that they should
    “place greater weight on evidence perceived to have the
    imprimatur of the government,” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 57
    (quoting United States v. Casas, 
    356 F.3d 104
    , 120 (1st Cir.
    2004)), but the testimony to the same end by the witnesses
    themselves mitigated much of that potential prejudice here.
    Finally, as in Moore, the jury was presented with
    overwhelming evidence of appellants’ guilt, some of which
    we outline below in assessing appellants’ challenges to the
    sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. See
    Parts XV, XX, XXII-XXV, XXVIII, XXX, infra. While
    appellants argue that “the government’s case, built as it was
    upon cooperating witnesses, could hardly be called
    ‘overwhelming,’” Appellants’ Br. 114, we must disagree. In
    Moore as well, the government’s case was built on an “almost
    exclusive reliance on co-conspirator cooperators’ 
    testimony.” 651 F.3d at 60
    . And in that case, we could not conclude that
    any error associated with Sparks’s overview testimony
    “affect[ed] the outcome of the district court proceeding.” 
    Id. at 61
    (quoting 
    Sumlin, 271 F.3d at 281
    ). We reach the same
    result today.
    Under plain-error review, we find that “appellants are not
    entitled to reversal of their convictions because of improper
    overview testimony by FBI Agent Sparks.” 
    Id. While an
                                    37
    overview witness might well trigger reversal in a future case
    presenting circumstances less favorable to the government, it
    does not do so here.
    III. The Admission of “Other Crimes” Evidence
    Convictions are supposed to rest on evidence relevant to
    the crime charged, not on evidence of other, unrelated bad
    acts suggesting nothing more than a tendency or propensity to
    engage in criminality. All six appellants in this case argue
    that the prosecution crossed that line by introducing extensive
    evidence of prior criminal activity, which is generally barred
    by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The bulk of the
    evidence to which appellants object, however, was admissible
    because it documented activities intrinsic to the charged
    conspiracy or proved “motive, opportunity, intent,
    preparation, plan, knowledge, [or] identity[.]” Fed. R. Evid.
    404(b)(2). But appellants are correct that some evidence of
    prior criminal conduct was wrongly admitted.             Those
    admissions, while erroneous, were harmless given the
    overwhelming weight of admissible evidence against
    appellants.1
    A.
    Rule 404(b) generally bars the admission of “[e]vidence
    of a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person’s
    character in order to show that on a particular occasion the
    person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid.
    1
    While Rule 404(b) applies to all manner of prior bad acts and not
    just prior crimes, this case largely involves evidence of prior
    criminal activity, and for that reason the opinion frequently uses
    “other crimes” evidence as a shorthand reference to Rule 404(b)’s
    operation.
    38
    404(b)(1). That same evidence, however, may “be admissible
    for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
    intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
    mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). That
    means that, in practice, Rule 404(b) “does not prohibit
    character evidence generally, only that which lacks any
    purpose but proving character.” United States v. Bowie, 
    232 F.3d 923
    , 930 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A prosecutor seeking to use
    evidence of other criminal or bad acts for one of those
    permitted purposes must, upon request, provide the defendant
    with reasonable notice, usually pretrial, of the anticipated
    evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
    A threshold question in determining the admissibility of
    evidence of other crimes and bad acts is whether the evidence,
    in actuality, relates to acts unconnected with those for which
    the defendant is charged, or instead is intertwined with the
    commission of charged crimes. Acts “extrinsic” to the crime
    charged are subject to Rule 404(b)’s limitations; acts
    “intrinsic” to the crime are not. See 
    Bowie, 232 F.3d at 927
    ;
    see also United States v. Mahdi, 
    598 F.3d 883
    , 891 (D.C. Cir.
    2010). In other words, Rule 404(b) only applies to truly
    “other” crimes and bad acts; it does not apply to “evidence
    . . . of an act that is part of the charged offense” or of
    “uncharged acts performed contemporaneously with the
    charged crime . . . if they facilitate the commission of the
    charged crime.” 
    Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929
    .
    In conspiracy prosecutions, the prosecution is “usually
    allowed considerable leeway in offering evidence of other
    offenses ‘to inform the jury of the background of the
    conspiracy charged . . . and to help explain to the jury how the
    illegal relationship between the participants in the crime
    developed.’” United States v. Mathis, 
    216 F.3d 18
    , 26 (D.C.
    Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Williams, 
    205 F.3d 23
    ,
    39
    33-34 (2d Cir. 2000)). In addition, “where the incident
    offered is a part of the conspiracy alleged[,] the evidence is
    admissible under Rule 404(b) because it is not an ‘other’
    crime.” United States v. Hemphill, 
    514 F.3d 1350
    , 1357
    (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mejia, 
    448 F.3d 436
    , 447 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). We have also permitted the
    introduction of “other acts” evidence in conspiracy cases (i) to
    link a defendant to other defendants and drug transactions for
    which the conspiracy was responsible, United States v.
    Gaviria, 
    116 F.3d 1498
    , 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1997); (ii) to show
    the nature of a conspiracy and “the kind of organizational
    control” a defendant exercised, 
    Mahdi, 598 F.3d at 891
    ; and
    (iii) to show the defendants’ intent to act in concert, 
    Mathis, 216 F.3d at 26
    ; see also United States v. Straker, 
    800 F.3d 570
    , 590 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (evidence of uncharged hostage
    takings was “relevant to . . . how those defendants started to
    work together as kidnappers”).
    However, in defining the contours of intrinsic evidence
    that is not subject to Rule 404(b), we have rejected the rule
    embraced by some of our sister circuits that evidence is
    intrinsic if it “complete[s] the story” of the charged crime.
    
    Bowie, 232 F.3d at 928
    (citing United States v. Hughes, 
    213 F.3d 323
    , 329 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Carboni, 
    204 F.3d 39
    , 44 (2d Cir. 2000)). That is because “all relevant
    prosecution evidence explains the crime or completes the
    story” to some extent, and the fact that “omitting some
    evidence would render a story slightly less complete cannot
    justify circumventing Rule 404(b) altogether.” 
    Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929
    . Instead, if the government wishes to introduce
    such “other crimes” evidence, we “see no reason to relieve the
    government and the district court from the obligation of
    selecting from the myriad of non-propensity purposes
    available to complete most any story.” 
    Id. 40 Beyond
    Rule 404(b)’s specific limitations on the
    admission of prior bad acts, Federal Rule of Evidence 403
    permits a court to exclude otherwise-relevant evidence “if its
    probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .
    unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
    undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
    cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. As relevant here,
    this court has recognized that “[e]vidence of other crimes or
    acts having a legitimate nonpropensity purpose,” and thus
    unaffected by Rule 404(b), may nevertheless “contain the
    seeds of a forbidden propensity inference.” 
    Bowie, 232 F.3d at 931
    . As a result, Rule 403’s balancing of prejudice and
    probativeness may still bar the introduction of evidence, even
    if Rule 404(b) by itself would not. Id.; see also 
    Mathis, 216 F.3d at 26
    .
    We review the district court’s admission of evidence
    under both Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) for an abuse of
    discretion. See United States v. Johnson, 
    519 F.3d 478
    , 483
    (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Rule 404(b)); United States v. Clarke, 
    24 F.3d 257
    , 265 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Rule 403). This court is
    “extremely wary of second-guessing the legitimate balancing
    of interests undertaken by the trial judge” in this context.
    United States v. Ring, 
    706 F.3d 460
    , 472 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
    (quoting Henderson v. George Washington Univ., 
    449 F.3d 127
    , 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). An erroneous admission of “other
    crimes” evidence must be disregarded as harmless error
    unless it had a “substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s
    verdict.” United States v. Clark, 
    747 F.3d 890
    , 896 (D.C. Cir.
    2014) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 750
    , 776
    (1946)) (ellipsis and brackets omitted).
    41
    B.
    Prior to trial, each Appellant filed a motion under Rule
    404(b)(2) seeking notice of any evidence of other crimes or
    prior bad acts that the government intended to introduce
    against them. In addition, the Alfreds filed motions in limine
    seeking to exclude evidence relating to the murder of Kairi
    Ball, a crime in which they had allegedly participated prior to
    joining the charged conspiracy. Ronald Alfred also moved to
    dismiss a portion of the indictment relating to a 1989 drug
    possession charge that preceded his entry into the conspiracy.2
    The district court denied the motions. With respect to
    Alfred’s preconspiracy possession charge, the court ruled that
    the preconspiracy timing was not dispositive, although the
    government would ultimately have to demonstrate the
    incident’s relevance. J.A. 863-64. The court also ruled that
    evidence relating to the Kairi Ball murder was admissible
    because the government argued that the crime was an impetus
    for the Alfreds’ entry into the conspiracy. 
    Id. at 874-75.
    Other than that, the government represented that it did not
    intend to introduce any evidence under Rule 404(b), but rather
    would introduce only evidence directly relating (intrinsic) to
    the conspiracy itself. 
    Id. at 873-74.
    The government subsequently filed its own motion in
    limine seeking permission to introduce evidence of Seegers’s
    preconspiracy conviction for possession of cocaine with intent
    to distribute.    The district court granted the motion,
    concluding that the conviction helped show both that Seegers
    was “able and ready to enter into the charged conspiracy,”
    2
    Additional objections to the treatment of this incident are
    addressed in Part III(C)(3), which addresses Ronald Alfred’s
    individual challenges.
    42
    and that he was geographically linked to locations at which
    alleged crimes in the conspiracy were committed. 
    Id. at 937.
    The conviction thus was admissible for a permissible Rule
    404(b) purpose: to show Seegers’s “intent, plan and
    knowledge as it related to the distribution of cocaine and other
    narcotics in a particular area of Washington, D.C.” 
    Id. at 939.
    In a separate order, the court denied Ronald Alfred’s motion
    to exclude evidence relating to a 1994 firearms charge. 
    Id. at 946.
    Ronald Alfred, Oliver, and Seegers each filed posttrial
    motions for a new trial arguing that, contrary to its pretrial
    representation, the government had introduced extensive
    “other crimes” evidence barred by Rule 404(b). The district
    court denied the motions, concluding in each case that the
    evidence either was direct evidence of the conspiracy and
    appellants’ entry into it, or was so inextricably intertwined
    with such direct evidence as to be “intrinsic” evidence of the
    charged offenses. United States v. Simmons, 
    431 F. Supp. 2d 38
    , 58, 63, 72 (D.D.C. 2006).
    C.
    The government’s representation that it did not intend to
    rely on any Rule 404(b) evidence and certain aspects of the
    district court’s rulings both relied on an overly capacious
    understanding of what can be introduced as intrinsic evidence.
    Nevertheless, even when viewed through the proper analytical
    lens, the bulk of the evidence was properly admitted, and the
    evidence that was wrongly admitted was harmless.3
    3
    We limit our review to those challenges actually identified by
    appellants on appeal, notwithstanding their efforts to claim that the
    objections presented are merely illustrative. Appellate judges are
    not bloodhounds who need only be put on the scent to go hunting
    43
    1. Direct Evidence of the Charged Crimes
    Much of the evidence to which appellants object did not
    trigger Rule 404(b) at all because it qualified as direct
    evidence of the crimes charged, including acts of violence
    committed or threatened by appellants during their
    participation in the conspiracy. As a general matter, “[w]hen
    [the] indictment contains a conspiracy charge, uncharged acts
    may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.”
    United States v. Thai, 
    29 F.3d 785
    , 812 (2d Cir. 1994). The
    conspiracy charged in this case had a broad scope that
    encompassed acts of violence for multiple purposes, such as
    enriching the conspiracy’s members, enhancing their
    reputations, safeguarding them from apprehension by law
    enforcement or prosecution, protecting them from violence
    threatened by third parties, collecting debts, and enforcing
    internal discipline.
    Admission of evidence bearing on such violence
    accordingly was admissible as direct evidence of the
    conspiracy, without Rule 404(b) coming into play. Properly
    admitted on that ground then was evidence that (i) James
    Alfred tried, with the aid of other conspiracy members, to
    shoot individuals who had been threatening him and his
    brother; (ii) McGill sought to enlist other conspiracy members
    to help him kill an individual to protect his reputation and to
    prevent interference with his drug dealing; (iii) Simmons
    attempted to have Oliver kill two individuals in retaliation for
    their involvement in the murder of Oliver’s brother; and (iv)
    Oliver asked other conspiracy members to kill different
    individuals, in at least one instance to forestall retaliation.
    for errors on their own. See United States v. Laureys, 
    653 F.3d 27
    ,
    32 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is not our duty to sift the trial record for
    novel arguments a defendant could have made but did not.”).
    44
    Simmons also objects to the introduction of evidence
    suggesting that he had attempted to have James Alfred killed
    because of an unpaid debt. While Simmons does not appear
    to have tried to enlist other conspiracy members in that
    attempt, it was not an abuse of discretion to admit the
    evidence because the use of violence to collect debts and
    enforce discipline was specifically alleged to be a goal of the
    conspiracy.
    Also admissible as intrinsic to the conspiracy itself was
    evidence of violence committed during the course of the
    conspiracy and involving multiple individuals linked to the
    conspiracy. That included evidence showing that Oliver
    purportedly had “somebody in the . . . trunk of [a] car,” J.A.
    3268, had his gun jam when he attempted to shoot someone,
    and offered to commit acts of violence for Walter Fleming, a
    coconspirator turned government cooperator.4
    Another goal of the charged conspiracy was the
    acquisition and distribution of cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin,
    and marijuana. Evidence relevant to such drug trafficking
    thus also fell outside Rule 404(b)’s operation. That includes
    evidence of preconspiracy drug dealing as long as it continued
    after appellants entered into the charged conspiracy, because
    such evidence became direct evidence of the drug dealing
    4
    To the extent that appellants’ objections turn on witnesses
    interpreting things that had been said to them or that they had
    overheard, a participant to a conversation may provide his or her
    own interpretation of that conversation if there is a nonspeculative
    basis for doing so. See United States v. Murphy, 
    768 F.2d 1518
    ,
    1535 (7th Cir. 1985); cf. 
    Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1026
    (lay witness
    testimony on terminology used in drug operations may be
    permissible where witness had firsthand experience with the drug-
    dealing group in question).
    45
    within the conspiracy. There was thus no Rule 404(b) bar to
    the admission of testimony suggesting that James Alfred
    supplied heroin to Omar Wazir, or that Simmons supplied
    crack cocaine to Bethlehem Ayele.
    Finally, while the Alfreds, Simmons, and McGill object
    to evidence of their failure to pay taxes during the course of
    the conspiracy, “[i]t is well settled that in narcotics
    prosecutions, a defendant’s possession and expenditure of
    large sums of money, as well as his or her failure to file tax
    returns, are relevant to establish that the defendant lacked a
    legitimate source of income and that, in all probability, the
    reason for the failure to report this income is due to the
    defendant’s participation in illegal activities.” United States
    v. Briscoe, 
    896 F.2d 1476
    , 1500 (7th Cir. 1990); see also
    United States v. Chandler, 
    326 F.3d 210
    , 215 (3d Cir. 2003)
    (same).
    That rationale holds true here. Simmons, McGill, and
    Ronald Alfred all suggested that they were operating a
    business or otherwise supporting themselves through
    legitimate means. Their failure to pay taxes thus was relevant
    to show that they were in fact getting income from illicit
    activities like drug trafficking that they assuredly did not want
    to report to the IRS. With respect to James Alfred, he failed
    to object to the tax-filing evidence in district court, and the
    court’s failure to sua sponte exclude that evidence of his lack
    of a licit income source while in the drug conspiracy was not
    plain error. See United States v. Spriggs, 
    102 F.3d 1245
    , 1257
    (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Because appellants did not make a timely
    objection to [admitting evidence], we review its admission for
    plain error.”).
    46
    2.   Evidence Admissible for a Nonpropensity Purpose
    Other evidence, while not direct evidence of the charged
    conspiracy, was nevertheless properly admitted for a
    nonpropensity purpose expressly permitted by Rule 404(b).
    a.   Evidence of the Kairi Ball murder
    The government offered evidence that Ronald Alfred,
    with the help of his brother James Alfred, orchestrated the
    killing of Kairi Ball for robbing Ronald Alfred’s store. Kevin
    Gray, an associate of Ball’s and a key participant in the
    charged conspiracy, then sought to retaliate against Ronald
    Alfred for his role in Ball’s killing. Evidence showed,
    however, that Gray and Ronald Alfred agreed to meet after
    the killing to sort out their differences, and out of that meeting
    came an agreement to deal drugs together. The government
    argues that this evidence was admissible because “[t]he
    murder of Kairi Ball in 1995 was the catalyst for the Alfreds’
    membership” in the drug conspiracy with Gray.
    The district court admitted the evidence of Kairi Ball’s
    murder as “intrinsic to the conspiracy, rather than extrinsic
    ‘other crimes’ evidence under 404(b).” That was error.
    Intrinsic evidence is limited to acts that are “part of the
    charged offense” itself or that are “performed
    contemporaneously with the charged crime . . . if they
    facilitate the commission of the charged crime.” 
    Bowie, 232 F.3d at 929
    . The Kairi Ball murder was not itself part of the
    charged conspiracy, and the murder occurred before the
    charged conspiracy began, not contemporaneously with it. To
    be sure, the murder may have some relevance to showing a
    conspiracy, but “it cannot be that all evidence tending to
    prove the crime is part of the crime.” 
    Id. 47 That
    mislabeling of the basis for admission is of no
    moment because the underlying rationale is sound: evidence
    of the murder was relevant for the nonpropensity purpose of
    showing the Alfreds’ motive for joining the conspiracy, which
    was to help heal the rift caused by the murder of Gray’s
    friend. Establishing motive has long been recognized as a
    permissible purpose for the introduction of “other crimes”
    evidence. See United States v. Edmonds, 
    69 F.3d 1172
    , 1175-
    76 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)
    (“proving motive” is a permissible nonpropensity purpose).
    The Kairi Ball murder was also relevant because it tied the
    Alfreds to the murder of Joseph Thomas, an act that occurred
    during the conspiracy and that was specifically charged in the
    indictment. Thomas was an associate of Ball who attempted
    to retaliate for his murder. The bad blood engendered by
    Ball’s murder thus provided motive evidence for the Thomas
    murder as well.
    To be sure, once appellants raised the objection, Federal
    Rule of Evidence 403 separately required the district court to
    balance the probativeness of the evidence of the Kairi Ball
    murder and the resulting Thomas feud against the risk of
    unfair prejudice to appellants. See United States v. Lavelle,
    
    751 F.2d 1266
    , 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (requiring a district
    court “to make an on-the-record determination” of whether
    the probative value of other-bad-acts evidence outweighs its
    prejudicial impact). The district court did not explicitly do so
    here. That failure, however, does not require reversal because
    “the factors upon which the probative value/prejudice
    evaluations were made are readily apparent from the record,
    and there is no substantial uncertainty about the correctness of
    the ruling.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). In
    particular, the direct causal relevance of the evidence of the
    Kairi Ball murder to the Alfreds’ decision to join the
    conspiracy and to murder Thomas outweighed any unfair
    48
    prejudice that may have resulted from its introduction. That
    is especially true because the trial already included admissible
    evidence of the Alfreds’ involvement in other acts of
    violence, thereby dissipating any prejudice associated
    specifically with this evidence.
    b.     Impeachment evidence
    “[O]ther crimes” evidence may properly be introduced to
    impeach a witness. See United States v. Brawner, 
    32 F.3d 602
    , 604 (D.C. Cir. 1994). During the cross-examination of
    defense witness Larry Steele, the government introduced
    evidence that Steele previously attempted to shoot someone
    on Simmons’s behalf. Simmons did not raise any Rule 404(b)
    challenge to that cross-examination. Since it is reasonable to
    think that a witness who conspired with a defendant to
    commit murder might be inclined to slant his testimony in that
    defendant’s favor, the court did not commit plain error in
    allowing the government to expose that potential bias. See
    United States v. Boone, 
    279 F.3d 163
    , 175 (3d Cir. 2002)
    (“Evidence that Moore and Weston had been drug dealing
    partners was relevant to Moore’s possible bias in favor of
    Weston.”).5
    c.        Preconspiracy drug dealing
    Much of the evidence of preconspiracy drug dealing by
    various appellants was properly admitted. Seegers’s previous
    conviction for possession of crack cocaine with the intent to
    distribute was admissible to show that, at least for the crack
    cocaine found on his person when he was arrested during the
    conspiracy, he intended to distribute it. See United States v.
    5
    McGill’s challenge to the use of “other acts” evidence to impeach
    him is addressed in Part X, infra.
    49
    Douglas, 
    482 F.3d 591
    , 597 (D.C. Cir. 2007).6 The past
    conviction was also relevant to rebut Seegers’s claim that
    drugs found in an area where he was sleeping belonged to his
    brother. See id.; see also United States v. Latney, 
    108 F.3d 1446
    , 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Given Latney’s involvement in
    the crack cocaine trade in May 1995, it was less likely that he
    was merely a bystander in the September 1994 transaction, as
    his counsel sought to persuade the jury.”). Given that
    evidentiary value, the district court’s decision that the
    probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial
    impact was not an abuse of discretion. Because we affirm on
    that basis, we need not decide whether the district court’s
    additional rationale for admitting this evidence—that it tied
    Seegers to a particular neighborhood—also represents a
    permissible nonpropensity purpose.
    We note, though, that the district court also concluded
    that this evidence was admissible to show Seegers’s
    “readiness and ability to join the conspiracy.” J.A. 1341.
    That, however, is just forbidden propensity evidence by
    another name. See United States v. Daniels, 
    770 F.2d 1111
    ,
    1116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Rule 404(b) “bar[s] the
    introduction of evidence of prior misconduct to prove that an
    accused was likely as a matter of disposition to have
    committed the offense for which he or she is on trial”)
    (emphasis added). Presumably that is why the government
    makes little effort to defend that basis for the district court’s
    ruling on appeal.
    6
    A similar rationale permits the admission of evidence that
    Oliver—who was arrested in 1997 with 75 ziplock bags of crack
    cocaine hidden on his person—was seen by witness Bethlehem
    Ayele making hand-to-hand drug sales in the early 1990s.
    50
    Evidence of preconspiracy drug dealing was also
    admissible for the nonpropensity purpose of proving the
    relationships among coconspirators. See, e.g., 
    Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1532
    (prior drug transactions relevant to “link” the
    defendant to other conspirators); see also United States v.
    Burwell, 
    642 F.3d 1062
    , 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
    granted, judgment vacated (Oct. 12, 2011), opinion reinstated
    and aff’d 
    690 F.3d 500
    (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Because evidence
    of the three carjackings, the stolen cars, the use of false
    names, and the marijuana cultivation and distribution was
    relevant to prove Appellants’ association, we see no error in
    admitting this evidence under Rule 404(b).”).
    That rationale supports the admission of evidence of
    Simmons’s drug-trafficking relationship with Walter Fleming,
    and James Alfred’s preconspiracy sales of crack cocaine to
    Frank Howard.7 It also includes the evidence of McGill’s
    drug dealing in the 1980s to the extent that it showed
    McGill’s relationships with his coconspirators.
    d.   Lack of advance notice
    Finally, for several pieces of evidence admissible under
    Rule 404(b), appellants fail to make any showing of prejudice
    resulting from the government’s failure to provide them with
    the requisite notice below. That eliminates any basis on
    which to predicate error. See United States v. Watson, 
    409 F.3d 458
    , 465 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Even assuming arguendo
    7
    Evidence of Simmons’s close relationship with Fleming also
    helped to establish Simmons’s motive for having Richard Simmons
    (no relation) killed. The evidence at trial indicated that Simmons
    commissioned that murder because he believed that Richard
    Simmons was spreading a rumor that Fleming was cooperating with
    the police.
    51
    that the prosecution failed to bear its Rule 404(b) notice
    obligation, . . . [the defendant] failed to show prejudice from
    the error.”).
    3.   Improperly Admitted “Other Acts” Evidence
    While much of the challenged evidence was admissible,
    we agree with appellants that, on a handful of occasions,
    “prior bad acts” evidence should have been excluded.
    First, the government has conceded that evidence of
    McGill’s involvement in the 1980s in a shooting into the
    home of a rival’s relative was wrongly admitted. The district
    court also erroneously allowed in some evidence of 1980s
    drug dealing and other misconduct by McGill that went far
    beyond what could plausibly be argued as demonstrating
    McGill’s intent, knowledge, or relationships with other
    conspiracy members. For instance, the district court wrongly
    admitted evidence that McGill “knew how to cook coke” in
    the “early eighties,” and was “out on 15th place in the late
    eighties” selling drugs.
    Similarly, some testimony regarding McGill’s
    preconspiracy interactions with other conspirators may have
    been admissible to establish their relationship at the time
    McGill joined the conspiracy. See, e.g., 
    Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1532
    . But the government makes no serious effort to defend
    testimony from a witness who had grown up with McGill
    stating that they had stolen things from a nearby shopping
    mall years before McGill joined the charged conspiracy.
    Given its inability to articulate any plausible defense for this
    evidence, the government had no business using it in the first
    instance.
    Second, the district court allowed in evidence of Ronald
    Alfred’s drug dealing that took place long before the
    52
    conspiracy, including both an alleged possession of a
    kilogram of cocaine in 1989 and a cocaine trafficking
    relationship with Alberto Martinez that ended in 1991. The
    government’s theory for admission was, in part, that Alfred
    “brought a lot to the table” entering the conspiracy as a drug
    supplier. But the evidence the government used showed at
    most that Alfred previously had access to a supply of cocaine,
    which came to an abrupt end when Martinez went to jail in
    1991, four years before Alfred’s alleged entry into the
    charged conspiracy. To contend that Alfred was a cocaine
    supplier in 1995 because he had cocaine dealings years earlier
    is precisely the type of naked propensity argument that Rule
    404(b) forbids.
    Third, the government also admitted evidence showing
    that Ronald Alfred had been convicted on firearms charges in
    1991 and 1994. As to the 1994 charge, the government’s
    theory was that Alfred had told his probation officer that he
    was carrying a gun to protect himself because of robberies at
    his place of business. The government argued that those
    robberies were linked to the Alfreds’ feud with Kairi Ball and
    his associates. And from that, the government surmised, the
    evidence of the 1994 firearms charge would somehow explain
    Alfred’s motive for murdering Ball and Thomas.
    That pushes the logical limits of what even our
    deferential abuse-of-discretion review can stomach. To make
    matters worse, the district court did not conduct any express
    balancing of the probativeness of that tangential evidence
    against its unfair prejudice, and we are hard-pressed to see
    how the balance could come out in favor of admission.
    The explanation for admitting the 1991 firearm charge
    fares still worse. It is hard to even discern what the
    government’s theory of admissibility is. The government
    53
    simply wraps the charge up with its discussion of Alfred’s
    1989 arrest in which he was found with a kilogram of cocaine.
    Beyond that, the government makes no effort to link the
    firearm charge with Alfred being a drug supplier in 1991,
    much less four years later when he was alleged to have
    entered the charged conspiracy. Nor does the government
    even hint that any hypothetically probative value of such stale
    and remote evidence could outweigh the unfair prejudice
    arising from a gun charge.
    Wrongly admitted evidence, however, does not always
    compel reversal. In evaluating the impact of those errors on a
    six-month trial, the test is “not whether evidence was
    sufficient to convict notwithstanding the error, but whether
    the court can say that the error did not affect the jury’s
    verdict.” United States v. Watson, 
    171 F.3d 695
    , 700 (D.C.
    Cir. 1999) (quoting 
    Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65
    ). If the
    record leaves a judge “in grave doubt as to the harmlessness
    of an error,” reversal is warranted. United States v. Smart, 
    98 F.3d 1379
    , 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting O’Neal v.
    McAninch, 
    513 U.S. 432
    , 437 (1995)).
    While we strongly disapprove of the government’s
    overreaching arguments and tactics under Rule 404(b), we are
    confident that the erroneously admitted evidence did not
    affect the jury’s verdict. “The most significant factor that
    negates the error’s impact is the weight and nature of the
    evidence against [the defendant].” United States v. Williams,
    
    212 F.3d 1305
    , 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Here, the wrongful
    admissions against McGill formed a small part of what was
    otherwise an overwhelming case against him, including
    extensive testimony from numerous cooperating witnesses of
    his involvement in the charged acts of violence and narcotics
    trafficking, as well as wiretap evidence linking McGill to drug
    transactions.
    54
    Though the improperly admitted evidence against Ronald
    Alfred was more substantial, the previously admitted,
    extensive, and powerful evidence against him overwhelmed
    those wrongful admissions. At least four separate witnesses
    linked Alfred to drug trafficking in significant quantities over
    the course of the conspiracy, while corroborating accounts
    from at least two cooperating witnesses linked Alfred to the
    three murders for which he was convicted. The record thus
    does not permit the conclusion that the jury’s judgment was
    “substantially swayed by the error” made in wrongfully
    admitting “other crimes” evidence. 
    Williams, 212 F.3d at 1310
    . But going forward the government would do well to
    step more carefully when introducing prior bad acts evidence.
    D.
    Appellants also object to the instructions explaining to
    the jury how it could permissibly use the “other crimes”
    evidence, as well as the use the government made of such
    evidence in its closing arguments.
    1.   Rule 404(b) Jury Instructions
    At numerous points over the course of the trial, the
    district court gave the jury a limiting instruction after the
    admission of “other crimes” evidence that told the jury to
    consider that evidence only for a purpose permitted by Rule
    404(b). For example, after one witness testified about prior
    bad conduct by McGill and the Alfreds, the district court told
    the jury that the testimony about “some of the defendants’
    alleged conduct prior to the time periods when they [we]re
    charged with joining the alleged conspiracy” was “admitted to
    explain why and how those defendants joined the alleged
    conspiracy and their relationships with other members of the
    alleged conspiracy.” J.A. 2318-19. The court then reminded
    the jurors that, to find appellants guilty of the alleged
    55
    conspiracy, they “must find that [the Defendants] participated
    in the conspiracy during the time period as charged in the
    indictment,” highlighting the relevant timeframe. 
    Id. at 2319.
    Similar instructions, occasionally referencing the specific
    “prior acts” evidence to which the judge was referring,
    followed the testimony of several other witnesses. Appellants
    did not object to those midtrial instructions.
    For the final jury instructions, Seegers (joined by McGill
    and both Alfreds) requested that, in cautioning the jury about
    permissible uses of the evidence, the instruction specifically
    catalogue the preconspiracy conduct that was at issue. The
    district court denied that request on the ground that such a
    listing would be unduly burdensome, and that a general
    instruction would suffice. The final jury instruction provided:
    You have heard testimony of criminal acts
    purportedly committed by one or more of the
    defendants with which they are not formally charged
    in these indictments. That evidence was admitted for
    various collateral purposes, such as to show the
    relationship between the defendants and others
    involved in their activities, or to show motive,
    opportunity,     intent,    preparation,  planning,
    knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
    accident with respect to those crimes with which a
    defendant is actually charged here.
    You are instructed that if you find that a
    defendant did engage in criminal activity not charged
    to him here, you are not to draw an inference from
    such a finding that the defendant is a person of bad
    character and that he must therefore be guilty of the
    crimes with which he is charged.
    56
    In other words, the fact that a defendant broke
    the law on other occasions not charged in these
    indictments is not by itself evidence that he
    committed any offense for which he is now on trial.
    J.A. 5451-52. The instruction then referenced several specific
    examples of other crimes evidence, including the Kairi Ball
    murder, Ronald Alfred’s two previous firearms convictions
    and 1989 drug possession charge, and Seegers’s pre-1996
    conduct. The final instruction explained that the evidence
    was introduced to help the jury determine whether the Alfreds
    became members of the charged conspiracy and to explain
    “how and why Mr. Seegers joined the alleged conspiracies.”
    
    Id. at 5452-53.
    In reviewing a challenge to jury instructions, the central
    question is “whether, taken as a whole, they accurately state
    the governing law and provide the jury with sufficient
    understanding of the issues and applicable standards.” United
    States v. Washington, 
    106 F.3d 983
    , 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A
    claim that the court improperly omitted an instruction is
    reviewed de novo, United States v. Hurt, 
    527 F.3d 1347
    , 1351
    (D.C. Cir. 2008), while a challenge to the language of an
    instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion, United States
    v. Dickerson, 
    163 F.3d 639
    , 641 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
    Finally, “[o]ur review of allegedly improper prosecutorial
    arguments is for substantial prejudice where the defendants
    lodged an objection, but we apply the plain error standard
    where they failed to object.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 50
    .
    With respect to Seegers’s and Ronald and James Alfred’s
    requests for a jury instruction that listed all of the Rule 404(b)
    evidence point by point, we find no reversible error. The
    court’s final instruction did specifically identify the majority
    of the Rule 404(b) evidence—including the most potentially
    57
    prejudicial evidence like the Kairi Ball murder. Taken as a
    whole, that instruction, combined with the midtrial
    instructions cautioning the jury as evidence was introduced,
    adequately guided the jury’s consideration. Cf. 
    Ring, 706 F.3d at 465
    (“In reviewing challenges to instructions, our task
    is to determine whether, taken as a whole, the instructions
    accurately state the governing law.”) (internal quotation
    marks omitted, alterations adopted).8
    McGill, however, does have more substantial grounds for
    complaint. While midtrial limiting instructions given after the
    testimony of Maurice Andrews and Frank Howard
    specifically referenced that testimony, the final instruction
    makes no mention at all of any of the preconspiracy conduct
    evidence introduced against him. That wholesale omission is
    troubling. Because the dividing line between direct or
    intrinsic conspiracy evidence and “other crimes” evidence
    was far from self-evident in this case, the selective
    identification of “other crimes” evidence pertaining to other
    appellants risked confusing the jury about Rule 404(b)’s
    limitations with respect specifically to the evidence
    introduced against McGill. Indeed, a “limiting instruction
    given for some but not other ‘bad acts’ evidence may enhance
    [the] latter’s influence on [the] jury.” 
    Williams, 212 F.3d at 1311
    (citing United States v. Spinner, 
    152 F.3d 950
    , 961-62
    (D.C. Cir. 1998)). We accordingly hold that the district court
    8
    While Simmons and Oliver claim to have made the same jury-
    instruction request, they cite nothing in the record to corroborate
    that claim. Because no circuit precedent mandated a point-by-point
    enumeration of all of the Rule 404(b) evidence employed in a case,
    we find no plain error in the court’s failure to sua sponte reference
    the evidence of their preconspiracy drug dealing in its jury
    instructions, given both the midtrial and final jury instructions.
    58
    abused its discretion in how it formulated this aspect of the
    Rule 404(b) instruction.
    That error, however, is not reversible error. Such an
    instructional error is harmless if it appears “beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
    contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v. California,
    
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 (1967). In this case, the “other crimes”
    evidence played a bit role in the powerful case against
    McGill. See Part 
    III(B)(3), supra
    . We thus have no doubt
    that the error did not sway the jury’s deliberations.
    The problems with the Rule 404(b) instruction did not
    stop there, unfortunately. The court’s final jury instruction
    identified a litany of potentially relevant purposes for the Rule
    404(b) evidence (such as absence of mistake or accident) that
    had never previously been mentioned and that were not at
    issue in the case. See J.A. 5451-52 (stating that this evidence
    could be used “to show the relationship between the
    defendants and others involved in their activities, or to show
    motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, planning, knowledge,
    identity or absence of mistake or accident with respect to
    those crimes with which a defendant is actually charged”).
    That inclusion of irrelevant purposes for Rule 404(b) evidence
    risked confusing the jury as to the proper purpose for which it
    might consider such evidence.            See United States v.
    Merriweather, 
    78 F.3d 1070
    , 1076-78 (6th Cir. 1996). For
    that reason, we have repeatedly noted with approval jury
    instructions that identify the specific purpose for which a
    particular piece of “other crimes” evidence has been admitted.
    See, e.g., 
    Douglas, 482 F.3d at 601
    ; United States v. Cassell,
    
    292 F.3d 788
    , 796 (D.C. Cir. 2002). As a general rule, then, a
    proper Rule 404(b) jury instruction should identify the
    evidence at issue and the particular purpose for which a jury
    could permissibly use it, rather than providing an incomplete
    59
    description of the evidence at issue and an undifferentiated
    laundry list of evidentiary uses that may confuse more than it
    instructs.
    Appellants, however, did not challenge this particular
    aspect of the jury instructions.        Because the midtrial
    instructions identified with more targeted specificity and
    relevance the uses to which the evidence could be put, and the
    final instructions admonished that the evidence could not be
    employed for propensity purposes, the wrongfulness of the
    instruction was not plain error. See 
    Clarke, 24 F.3d at 266
    (“To be sure, the court’s later substitution of ‘intent’ for
    ‘credibility’ as the purpose of allowing this testimony was
    confusing, but whatever error inhered in its handling of the
    matter was not so serious as to engender a miscarriage of
    justice or to seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the
    trial.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
    States v. Johnson, 
    46 F.3d 1166
    , 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (no
    error in failing to provide unrequested limiting instruction
    regarding permissible purpose for which evidence may be
    used).
    2.   Prosecution’s Use of Rule 404(b) Evidence in
    Closing Arguments
    In the government’s closing arguments, the prosecutors
    referenced several pieces of the “other crimes” evidence,
    including (i) drug dealing and acts of violence committed by
    McGill in the 1980s, (ii) Ronald Alfred’s involvement in the
    Kairi Ball murder and preconspiracy drug dealing and other
    criminal conduct, and (iii) Seegers’s earlier drug-related
    conviction. In so doing, the government highlighted the
    concededly improperly admitted evidence that McGill had
    been involved in shooting into a house in the 1980s. That was
    error.
    60
    The government also argued that Ronald Alfred’s
    preconspiracy drug dealing and Seegers’s preconspiracy
    conviction showed that those two appellants were “ready,
    willing, and able to join the conspiracy.” J.A. 5307-08. But
    the use of “other crimes” evidence to prove that appellants
    were “ready, willing, and able” to commit the charged crimes
    is a barefaced appeal to propensity-based decisionmaking,
    flatly forbidden by Rule 404(b). Indeed, the prosecution’s
    formulation echoes the phrasing used to prove predisposition
    when an entrapment defense is raised. See United States v.
    Burkley, 
    591 F.2d 903
    , 916 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (establishing
    predisposition requires showing that the defendant is
    “presently ready and willing to commit the crime”); see also
    
    id. at 922
    (“Admittedly, proving disposition to commit a
    crime is very close to proving ‘criminal propensity,’ the very
    type of prejudice against which the general prohibition on
    admission of evidence of other crimes is directed.”).
    The problem for appellants is that they did not raise this
    argument below, so it is reviewed under the exacting plain-
    error standard. Given (i) the district court’s specific direction
    to the jury that it could not use “other crimes” evidence as
    indicating a propensity to commit the charged crimes, (ii) the
    instruction that counsel’s arguments were not evidence, and
    (iii) the overwhelming weight of properly admitted and
    argued evidence establishing McGill’s, the Alfreds’, and
    Seegers’s roles and participation in the conspiracy, appellants
    cannot show that wrongfully allowing the government to
    reference the “other crimes” evidence affected the outcome of
    the proceedings.
    IV. Confrontation Clause Challenges
    The trial court admitted some drug analysis reports and
    autopsy reports accompanied only by testimony from
    61
    witnesses other than the reports’ authors—a Drug
    Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) chemist for the drug
    analyses and a medical examiner from the D.C. Office of the
    Chief Medical Examiner for the autopsy reports. Appellants
    argue that the admissions violated the Confrontation Clause of
    the Sixth Amendment, as construed in Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    (2004).
    At trial appellants objected on the basis of United States
    v. Smith, 
    964 F.2d 1221
    (D.C. Cir. 1992), a decision that long
    antedated Crawford and that approved the admission of
    somewhat similar testimony against a hearsay objection. 
    Id. at 1223.
    The government argues that, because appellants
    didn’t object on Confrontation Clause grounds, the court’s
    rulings are reviewable under plain-error standards, and
    appellants don’t contest that view. Plain error is thus the
    standard.
    On the merits, the government appears to “assum[e]” that
    the admissions clearly violated the Confrontation Clause,
    Appellee’s Br. 118, an assumption that seems sound in light
    of Moore, 
    651 F.3d 30
    . There, reviewing convictions of
    appellants’ coconspirators, we found Confrontation Clause
    violations in the admission of similar reports through the
    same DEA chemist and through a medical examiner who had
    not conducted the autopsies. 
    Id. at 69-74
    (citing Bullcoming
    v. New Mexico, 
    131 S. Ct. 2705
    (2011)). The government
    argues nonetheless that, except in one instance, appellants fall
    short of showing plain error in that they haven’t established
    that the reports “affected the outcome of the district court
    proceedings.” 
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 734
    .
    The exception acknowledged by the government is
    Seegers’s convictions for possessing with intent to distribute
    drugs found in his apartment. The government concedes that
    62
    those convictions depended on a specific quality and quantity
    of narcotics and that no evidence other than the drug analysis
    reports existed to establish the character and quantity of the
    substances in question. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 74
    . We
    therefore reverse Seegers’s convictions relating to the drugs
    found in his apartment.
    There is a second asserted Confrontation Clause violation
    that need not detain us. Seegers maintains that Dr. Gertrude
    Juste’s testimony about Diane Luther “improperly bolstered
    the credibility” of Lincoln Hunter, who witnessed Luther’s
    killing and was himself shot in the course of that incident.
    Appellants’ Br. 165. Dr. Gertrude Juste’s testimony about the
    report, which included a photograph of Luther’s hand with
    intact nails, agreed with Hunter’s testimony in a key detail—
    the view that Luther had not struggled before her murder. But
    the jury reached no verdict on the charges against Seegers for
    this murder. Accordingly, no prejudice resulted from the
    admission of the expert opinion or Dr. Juste’s
    characterizations of that opinion with regard to the Luther
    murder. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 
    90 F.3d 490
    ,
    502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that no prejudice resulted
    from evidence relating only to counts on which the defendants
    were acquitted).
    Seegers also suggests—obliquely in the opening brief and
    more clearly in the reply brief—that Dr. Juste’s testimony,
    despite referring to Luther’s death, also supported Hunter’s
    testimony that Seegers shot him. Seegers was convicted of
    two counts related to shooting Hunter, unlike the murder of
    Luther, so we cannot dismiss the testimony as not prejudicial
    on the same basis as above. At oral argument, however, the
    government represented that the photograph of Luther’s hand
    was independently authenticated by Luther’s daughter, Shelly
    Dabney, a representation Seegers has not contested. Thus,
    63
    even assuming the bolstering argument might have had
    traction across murder episodes, Seegers cannot meet the
    burden of showing that Dr. Juste’s testimony prejudiced him
    with respect to the Hunter shooting.
    Ronald Alfred and James Alfred similarly argue that the
    improperly admitted autopsy reports on Thomas and Walker,
    and the associated testimony of Dr. Juste, “bolstered the
    credibility” of the cooperating witnesses who linked
    appellants to the killings. Appellants’ Br. 165. But the
    defense in no way claimed that Thomas or Walker had died
    accidentally or otherwise than through homicide. Maurice
    Andrews testified that he witnessed Bernard Franklin
    (“Gangster”) shoot Thomas (“Froggy”) multiple times.
    Walker’s brother testified that he heard a gunshot and saw his
    brother lying dead on the floor, and an officer described
    seeing Walker lying on his back with a gunshot wound to his
    head. The evidence of appellants’ roles was of course sharply
    drawn into question by defense counsel. In some remote
    sense, of course, the autopsy reports and testimony “bolstered
    the credibility” of the cooperating witnesses: the persons
    described as having been murdered were indeed dead, and
    dead through gunfire. But these were not cases of the sort
    beloved by detective story writers, where outsiders are unsure
    whether there was a killing at all. The question was who did
    the killing, and on that the autopsies had nothing to say and
    the cooperating witnesses everything.
    Finally, appellants argue that the erroneous admission of
    the drug report evidence—consisting of “DEA-7” drug
    analysis reports, testimony regarding the analyses, and a chart
    showing drugs seized from members of the conspiracy—
    requires vacatur of their narcotics and RICO conspiracy
    convictions. Appellants contend that they “were prejudiced
    because the nature and quantity of the drugs were elements of
    64
    the charged conspiracies,” and, apart from the improperly
    admitted drug report evidence, “there was no tangible proof,
    other than testimony by highly impeached cooperating
    witnesses, as to the nature and scope of the conspiracies at
    all.” Appellants’ Br. 164.
    As we are reviewing for plain error, the question is
    whether appellants have demonstrated that the improperly
    admitted DEA reports violated their “substantial rights.”
    
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 734
    . The burden is on appellants to show
    “a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the
    result of the proceeding would have been different.” United
    States v. Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 82 (2004) (quoting
    United States v. Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 682 (1985)) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). See also 
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 734
    (in most cases, an error affected “substantial rights” if it was
    prejudicial, that is, if it “affected the outcome of the district
    court proceedings”).
    Appellants have not carried this burden as to any
    elements except (possibly) drug quantity. At trial cooperating
    witnesses testified to appellants’ participation in the
    conspiracy and drug dealing in depth and at length. For
    example, there was testimony that Simmons engaged in drug
    transactions with Moore, Gray, Deon Oliver, Fleming, and
    James Alfred; that Ronald Alfred supplied Gray with drugs
    and vice-versa; that Seegers was employed as PeeWee
    Oliver’s “overseer” or “bodyguard,” J.A. 2818; that Deon
    Oliver sold drugs he obtained from Simmons and Moore; and
    that McGill assisted Gray in cooking powder cocaine into
    crack cocaine. Appellants argue that these cooperators were
    “highly impeached,” Appellants’ Br. 164, as indeed they
    were. But unless the jurors believed the cooperators (in
    which case they would have had little choice but to convict),
    the inadmissible evidence would have seemed to them to have
    65
    come from another planet, unconnected to appellants.
    Further, given the nature of the behavior described by the
    cooperating witnesses, the jurors could not have believed that
    appellants were going through the elaborate transactions and
    precautions described, and exchanged the funds described, for
    any reason other than conspiracy to distribute and possess
    narcotics.
    However, we remand to the district court to determine
    whether the admission of the drug report evidence affected
    the jury’s findings as to the quantities of drugs involved in the
    charged conspiracies and, if so, which counts or quantity
    findings (if any) must be vacated with respect to each
    appellant. See United States v. Fields, 
    251 F.3d 1041
    , 1043
    (D.C. Cir. 2001) (under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000), drug quantity is an element of the offense where it
    triggers a higher statutory maximum sentence). Here, in
    addition to convicting appellants of conspiracy to distribute
    “detectable amounts” of various drugs, the jury attributed to
    appellants specific quantities of drugs triggering higher
    statutory maximum sentences. On remand the burden will be
    on appellants to show, perhaps through additional briefing,
    that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the
    improperly admitted evidence, the jury’s quantity findings
    would have been different. See Dominguez 
    Benitez, 542 U.S. at 82
    .
    In sum, we reverse Seegers’s two convictions for
    possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, and
    remand to the district court to determine whether appellants
    can demonstrate that the improperly admitted drug report
    evidence affected the jury’s drug quantity findings. We find
    that the Confrontation Clause violations were not prejudicial
    in any other respect. On remand, depending on which counts
    or quantity findings (if any) are vacated with respect to each
    66
    appellant, the district court shall determine in the first instance
    whether resentencing is appropriate.
    V. Stun Belt Revelation by McGill
    All of the appellants except McGill object to the district
    court’s handling of an incident in which, in the presence of
    the jury, McGill made reference to and displayed a stun belt
    that he was required to wear. We hold that if any error
    occurred at all, it was not reversible.9
    A.
    Prior to trial, the district court granted the prosecution’s
    request that appellants all be required to wear stun belts in
    court, given the heightened security concerns in the case.10
    The stun belts were worn under appellants’ clothes secretly
    and without incident for most of the trial.
    On March 29, 2004, McGill engaged in a verbal dispute
    with the judge in front of the jury. When the court ordered
    McGill’s removal from the courtroom, McGill lifted his shirt
    to reveal his stun belt and proclaimed:
    9
    A stun belt is a device worn under clothing around a defendant’s
    waist that allows a courtroom security officer to remotely deliver an
    electric shock to disable the defendant temporarily if his or her
    actions pose a security risk.
    10
    Among other things, appellants were involved in organized crime
    and acts of violence including multiple counts of murder and
    attempted murder; they were each facing sentences of up to life
    imprisonment if convicted; they had conspired to kill, attempted to
    kill, or participated in actually killing witnesses; and they had made
    belligerent comments and threats of physical violence to the U.S.
    Marshals.
    67
    Tell them I have a—I’m wearing a belt right here,
    50,000 watts—what they’re doing to us, illegal,
    that’s what I want. Six months, you never knew it,
    everyday I been here, everyday. . . . Six months y’all
    never knew that this belt everyday 50,000 Watts
    because you allow it. Don’t let them peoples keep
    lying on me. Lying, man.
    J.A. 5419. The district court immediately instructed the jury,
    “Don’t hold that outburst against any other defendant. That’s
    solely Mr. McGill. Consider misconduct only in connection
    with Mr. McGill, not any other defendant.” 
    Id. Following that
    incident, all of the appellants (except
    McGill) moved for a mistrial and severance from McGill’s
    case. The district court denied the motion. The next day,
    over objections from Ronald Alfred and Seegers, the district
    court instructed the jury that:
    Mr. McGill displayed and made reference to a
    security device that he was wearing. As you know,
    during the course of this trial, the Court has
    determined that it was necessary to take certain
    security precautions. However, the Court has never
    found it necessary to actually activate the device Mr.
    McGill was wearing.
    I instruct you that you are not to consider Mr.
    McGill’s outburst in any way as evidence in this
    case, either with respect to him or with respect to the
    other defendants. Further, the Court’s decision to
    adopt certain security precautions is not evidence in
    this case. You may not consider these measures at all
    in reaching your verdicts.
    
    Id. at 5454-55.
                                    68
    Seegers subsequently filed a motion for a new trial in
    part on the basis of this incident. See Simmons, 
    431 F. Supp. 2d
    at 71. The district court denied the motion, finding “no
    basis for defendant Seegers’s claim that the jury assumed he
    was wearing a stun belt, simply because they observed
    defendant McGill’s.” 
    Id. B. On
    appeal, appellants claim both that McGill’s outburst
    prejudicially revealed to the jury that each Appellant was
    wearing a stun belt and that the revelation amounted to
    structural error, or at the least an error so serious as to warrant
    a mistrial. We review the decision not to declare a mistrial
    and to deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion. See United
    States v. Foster, 
    557 F.3d 650
    , 654-55 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
    (denial of mistrial); United States v. Pettiford, 
    517 F.3d 584
    ,
    591 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (denial of new trial).
    In Deck v. Missouri, 
    544 U.S. 622
    (2005), the Supreme
    Court held that a defendant’s Fifth and Fourteenth
    Amendment rights to a fair trial “prohibit the use of physical
    restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination,
    in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a
    state interest specific to a particular trial.” 
    Id. at 629.
    In
    Moore, we recognized that the wearing of stun belts was the
    sort of inherently or actually prejudicial government practice
    that requires the district court to consider, for each individual
    defendant, whether the practice serves an essential interest in
    the trial. 
    See 651 F.3d at 45-46
    .
    Appellants argue that the feared revelation that they were
    wearing stun belts amounted to a “structural” error and thus is
    not subject to harmless error analysis. That is not correct. A
    structural error is a “structural defect[] in the constitution of
    the trial mechanism.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    ,
    69
    309 (1991). Where a defendant has suffered, for example, a
    total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial or a similar
    error “affecting the framework within which the trial
    proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process
    itself,” harmless error analysis is inappropriate. 
    Id. at 310.
    Structural error involves the type of “basic protections”
    without which “a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its
    function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence,
    and no criminal punishment may be regarded as
    fundamentally fair.” 
    Id. (quoting Rose
    v. Clark, 
    478 U.S. 570
    , 577-578 (1986)). By contrast, constitutional errors that
    do not require automatic reversal of a conviction constitute
    “‘trial error’—error which occurred during the presentation of
    the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively
    assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to
    determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” 
    Id. at 307-08.
    Appellants cite no case, and we are aware of none,
    holding that the disclosure of stun belts amounts to structural
    error. That is unsurprising. In Deck, even as the Supreme
    Court recognized that the use of visible restraints was an
    “inherently prejudicial” practice, it applied harmless error
    analysis under Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    (1967).
    
    Deck, 544 U.S. at 635
    . As a result, even if a restraint were
    visible to the jury and even if it had not been justified by a
    sufficient governmental interest, reversal would not be
    required as long as the government could demonstrate
    “beyond a reasonable doubt that the . . . error complained of
    did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” 
    Deck, 544 U.S. at 635
    (quoting 
    Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24
    ).
    Appellants do not challenge the district court’s initial
    decision to require the use of stun belts, which was premised
    on the assertion that the belts would not be visible to the jury.
    70
    See also United States v. Durham, 
    287 F.3d 1297
    , 1305 (11th
    Cir. 2002) (stun belts are “not readily visible to the jury,”
    although it is at least possible that they may be visible if they
    “protrude[] from the defendant’s back to a noticeable
    degree”).11 Appellants argue instead that McGill’s outburst
    and its supposed revelation that all the appellants were
    wearing stun belts changed the calculus. We disagree for
    three reasons.
    First, the argument fails at the starting gate because
    appellants offer no meaningful answer to—and certainly
    identify no clear error in—the district court’s factual finding
    that no such revelation occurred. See Simmons, 
    431 F. Supp. 2d
    at 71. The only suggestion in McGill’s outburst that all the
    appellants were wearing stun belts was an elliptical reference
    to “what they’re doing to us.” J.A. 5419. The district court’s
    instructions to the jury following the incident made specific
    reference only to McGill’s stun belt. The record thus does not
    clearly compel the factual conclusion that any juror was
    aware that the other appellants were also wearing stun belts.
    See United States v. Collins, 
    109 F.3d 1413
    , 1418 (9th Cir.
    1997) (no prejudice to due process rights where there was “no
    evidence the jury was aware that [the defendant] was shackled
    or restrained”).
    Second, and in any event, any potential prejudice arising
    from McGill’s fleeting reference was mitigated by the district
    court’s curative instructions. Those included both the
    immediate instruction to the jury following McGill’s outburst
    not to consider that conduct with respect to any other
    defendant, and a further instruction the following day that the
    11
    In the earlier Moore trial involving several of appellants’
    coconspirators, the district court acknowledged some risk that the
    stun belts would be visible. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 47
    .
    71
    jury should consider neither McGill’s conduct nor the fact
    that he was wearing a stun belt to be evidence in the case.
    The record provides no basis for concluding that those
    cautionary instructions were ineffective or that the jury was
    otherwise not able to make individualized determinations of
    guilt based on the evidence presented at trial. See United
    States v. Sheehan, 
    512 F.3d 621
    , 632 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (in
    undertaking harmless-error analysis, a reviewing court
    considers, among other things, whether “effective steps were
    taken to mitigate the effects of the error”) (quoting In re
    Sealed Case, 
    99 F.3d 1175
    , 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also
    United States v. Hall, 
    610 F.3d 727
    , 742 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
    (“The jury is presumed to follow the instructions.”).
    Third, the overwhelming weight of evidence against
    appellants reinforces the harmlessness of any error. See
    Wilson v. United States, 
    344 F.2d 166
    , 167 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
    (per curiam); see also United States v. Cazares, 
    788 F.3d 956
    ,
    966 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he unconstitutional shackling of
    a defendant results in prejudice only if the evidence of guilt is
    not overwhelming[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We thus conclude that, even assuming error occurred, it
    would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
    For those same reasons, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in declining to declare a mistrial. “A mistrial is a
    severe remedy—a step to be avoided whenever possible, and
    one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity
    therefor.” United States v. McLendon, 
    378 F.3d 1109
    , 1112
    (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting 
    Clarke, 24 F.3d at 270
    ). No
    mistrial would be warranted in the absence of unfair and
    irremediable prejudice. To make that determination, “we
    consider a number of factors, including the force of the
    unfairly prejudicial evidence, whether that force was
    mitigated by curative instructions, and the weight of the
    72
    admissible evidence that supports the verdict.’” 
    Id. Those factors
    foreclose any determination of material prejudice in
    this case, leaving us with the “fair assurance that the judgment
    was not substantially swayed by the error.” 
    Foster, 557 F.3d at 655
    (quoting 
    Spinner, 152 F.3d at 961
    ).
    VI. References to the Convictions of Nontestifying
    Former Codefendants
    Appellants argue that their convictions must be reversed
    because two government witnesses briefly referenced the
    convictions of codefendants that occurred in the earlier Moore
    trial. The government concedes error, but argues that the
    error was harmless. We agree. The two references to the
    outcome of the Moore trial should not have been made, but
    they were indirect and fleeting, and the government did not
    draw the jury’s attention to them. The district court also took
    prompt curative measures to mitigate any potential harm.
    Those measures, combined with the overwhelming evidence
    of appellants’ guilt, establish that the error was harmless
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    A.
    This trial commenced on October 16, 2003, and lasted
    nearly six months. Over fifty witnesses testified, and the
    transcripts of that testimony span nearly ten thousand pages.
    Appellants object to brief comments made by two government
    witnesses, Steve Graham and Frank Howard, during their
    testimony.12
    12
    The extent to which appellants sufficiently objected below is
    debated by the parties. For the appellants who did not object
    below, we review the statements only for plain error. However, in
    73
    Steve Graham was an associate of Gray’s who had
    previously been convicted of participating in a narcotics
    conspiracy in a separate trial. Following that conviction,
    Graham agreed to testify for the government under a
    cooperation agreement in the hope of reducing his sentence.
    During the government’s direct examination, the prosecutor
    questioned Graham about a shooting involving Graham, Gray,
    and John Raynor, another member of the conspiracy who was
    tried separately in the Moore proceeding. The following
    exchange occurred:
    Q. Okay. And just tell the ladies and gentlemen a
    little bit about the statement that you gave to John
    Raynor’s investigator about the shooting into the
    green Cadillac.
    ...
    A. When I came down – I was at the jail initially,
    and they moved me down to Lorton, to Center, in
    preparation to be moved to the federal system.
    Q. This is after you were convicted and sentenced?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Go ahead.
    A. And the indictment which Kevin and them was
    convicted on and John Raynor was convicted on had
    this case, the harmlessness of the error beyond a reasonable doubt
    resolves the issue regardless of the standard of review.
    74
    come out, or it had superseded, rather, and when it
    superseded, it charged the incident in there and it
    stated that on September 26th, A and B were in a
    vehicle, speaking about Kevin Gray, with an
    unindicted – with an unknown coconspirator – an
    unindicted coconspirator, and it charged them two
    with the September 26 event.
    Q. Them two meaning?
    A. Kevin and John.
    J.A. 3760-61. McGill’s counsel objected to the mention of
    the codefendants’ convictions. 
    Id. at 3762.
    The district court
    agreed that the reference was impermissible and asked
    counsel if she wanted the court to instruct the jury to
    disregard it. 
    Id. at 3763.
    Counsel declined that offer,
    reasoning that such an instruction would only highlight the
    reference for the jury. 
    Id. at 3763,
    3768. Counsel then moved
    for a mistrial, which the court denied. 
    Id. at 3768.
    The next day, at the end of Graham’s testimony and with
    the input of other defense counsel, the court issued the
    following curative instruction:
    All right ladies and gentlemen, at one point during
    Mr. Graham’s testimony he made a reference to the
    outcome of prior proceedings. The outcome of those
    proceedings has not been finally determined, and I
    instruct you to disregard that testimony by Mr.
    Graham. Motions and other proceedings still remain
    to be decided, so you should just ignore that
    testimony.
    
    Id. at 3826.
                                 75
    The second challenged reference to codefendant
    convictions occurred almost a month later during the
    testimony of Frank Howard. 
    Id. at 4174.
    Howard, a
    coconspirator, had been charged in the same indictment as
    appellants, but he pled guilty to RICO conspiracy and related
    offenses under a cooperation agreement with the government.
    During Howard’s cross-examination, defense counsel
    tried to expose Howard’s self-interested motive for testifying
    by pressing Howard about how his testimony could benefit
    him in an unrelated, pending criminal proceeding in Prince
    George’s County, Maryland. 
    Id. at 4168-74.
    The federal
    prosecutors had written a letter to the Maryland prosecutors
    describing Howard’s plea agreement and cooperation, and
    representing that the federal government would not be taking
    action for or against Howard in the Maryland case:
    Q. And [the letter] tells them that you are assisting
    law enforcement in the District of Columbia in a
    significant federal case, right?
    A. Right.
    Q. And we don’t know what is going to happen in
    Prince George’s County, the outcome of that case,
    right?
    A. Right.
    ...
    Q. You don’t think that if things don’t go well in
    Prince George’s County your defense lawyers are
    going to mention that?
    76
    A. I’m not even worried about Prince George’s
    County right now. I’m worried about this.
    Q. Right.
    A. I’m not worried about Prince George’s County.
    Q. Oh, I understand that. But we are talking about
    the outcomes in Prince George’s County.
    A. We talked about that during the whole trial.
    You all keep on asking me the same thing. I’m
    repeating the same thing. Just like they tried to use
    that in the first trial, repeating the same thing about
    the Maryland case.
    Mr. Daniel: Objection.
    The Witness: And look what happened in the first
    trial.
    
    Id. at 4172,
    4173-74. Defense counsel again objected and
    moved to strike Howard’s last comment. The district court
    ordered the comment to be struck from the record. 
    Id. at 4174.
    At the close of the trial, the court’s final jury instructions
    reminded jurors of their obligation to disregard testimony and
    other evidentiary matters for which the court had sustained an
    objection because such matters “are not evidence and you
    must not consider them.” 
    Id. at 5451.
                                    77
    B.
    The law is well-settled that a codefendant’s guilty plea or
    conviction may not be introduced as substantive evidence of
    another defendant’s guilt. See 
    Brown, 508 F.3d at 1073
    (quoting United States v. Tarantino, 
    846 F.2d 1384
    , 1404-05
    (D.C. Cir. 1988)).13 For good reason: Upon learning that one
    codefendant has admitted guilt or has been convicted, the jury
    “may possibly infer that the defendant on trial is more likely
    to be guilty, as well.” 
    Johnson, 26 F.3d at 677
    ; see 
    Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1260
    (“[I]ntroduction of such [information] raises
    the concern that a defendant might be convicted based upon
    the disposition of the charges against the co-defendants, rather
    than upon an individual assessment of the remaining
    defendant’s personal culpability.”). As a consequence,
    “courts and prosecutors generally are forbidden from
    mentioning that a co-defendant has either pled guilty or been
    convicted,” 
    Johnson, 26 F.3d at 677
    , unless the information is
    admitted for another strictly limited purpose, such as
    impeaching a testifying codefendant or aiding the jury in
    assessing the codefendant-witness’s credibility, see 
    DeLoach, 34 F.3d at 1003-04
    ; 
    Johnson, 26 F.3d at 677
    .
    Those reasons for preclusion compound when a
    nontestifying codefendant’s guilty plea is introduced because
    the defendant on trial lacks the ability to cross-examine the
    codefendant who entered the plea and to probe his
    motivations. That, in turn, undercuts the defendant’s right to
    have the jury’s verdict based only on evidence presented in
    13
    See also, e.g., United States v. DeLoach, 
    34 F.3d 1001
    , 1004
    (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Johnson, 
    26 F.3d 669
    , 677 (7th
    Cir. 1994); United States v. Blevins, 
    960 F.2d 1252
    , 1260 (4th Cir.
    1992); United States v. Leach, 
    918 F.2d 464
    , 467 (5th Cir. 1990),
    cert. denied, 
    501 U.S. 1207
    (1991).
    78
    open court, subject to the truth-testing crucible of cross-
    examination. See 
    Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1260
    .
    The parties agree that Graham’s and Howard’s references
    to the outcome of the Moore trial constituted error, and that
    this error was one “of constitutional dimension,” 
    Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1262
    ; accord 
    Johnson, 26 F.3d at 677
    -79. The
    question then is whether that error “was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” 
    Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24
    ; see 
    Johnson, 26 F.3d at 677
    (constitutional harmless error analysis applies
    to the erroneous admission of a guilty plea of a nontestifying
    codefendant); 
    Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1262
    (same). The error
    would not be harmless if there were a “reasonable possibility
    that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
    conviction.” 
    Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23
    ; see also 
    Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1263
    (“[W]e must ask whether it is clear beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned verdicts of
    guilty against appellants even if the evidence concerning the
    co-defendants’ [convictions] had not been introduced.”).
    There is no reasonable possibility that those two fleeting
    references contributed to the verdicts in this case. First, the
    content of Graham’s and Howard’s statements was oblique,
    leaving unsaid who was convicted of what. Howard did not
    even mention convictions; he just cryptically stated “look
    what happened in the first trial.” The jury thus never
    specifically heard that any former codefendants were
    convicted after trial on charges similar to those appellants
    faced. Nor did the government draw attention to the
    statements or attempt to use them in any way. Cf. United
    States v. Mitchell, 
    1 F.3d 235
    , 240 (4th Cir. 1993) (error was
    not harmless where “the prosecution made multiple references
    to [the coconspirator’s] conviction”).
    79
    Second, the two references were fleeting and isolated,
    occupying a few seconds and two dozen words in a nearly
    six-month marathon of a trial. See 
    Johnson, 26 F.3d at 679
    (references to codefendant’s guilty plea harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt because the forbidden references were
    “relatively innocuous in that they occurred solely during the
    opening statements of a trial that produced nearly 1500 pages
    of testimony”); 
    Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1260
    -65 (same
    conclusion where guilty pleas of six nontestifying
    codefendants were briefly referenced three times during a
    seven-day trial).
    Third, the district court timely responded to the improper
    statements, instructing the jury to disregard Graham’s
    statement the day after it happened (refraining from doing so
    earlier only at the request of defense counsel), and
    immediately striking Howard’s statement. See Carter v.
    United States, 
    281 F.2d 640
    , 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
    (reference to guilty plea of codefendant was harmless in part
    because the trial court immediately struck the remark and
    instructed the jury to disregard it). The court, moreover,
    reinforced those specific curative measures with a general
    instruction at the close of trial admonishing the jury to
    disregard stricken testimony in reaching its verdict. We
    presume that juries follow the court’s curative instructions
    unless there is reason to doubt compliance in a particular case.
    See Greer v. Miller, 
    483 U.S. 756
    , 766 n.8 (1987); 
    McLendon, 378 F.3d at 1114
    & n.6. There is no such reason here.
    Fourth and finally, given the strength and breadth of the
    evidence against appellants, it is implausible that those two
    obscure comments made in passing had any impact at all on
    the jury’s deliberations. See 
    Johnson, 26 F.3d at 677
    (The
    “general principle” that mention of a prior conviction is
    reversible error “gives way when the evidence against the
    80
    defendant(s) is so overwhelming that any error is rendered
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); 
    Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1264
    (finding harmless error where the evidence was
    overwhelming). Accordingly, “in light of the overwhelming
    evidence of guilt in this case, any prejudice which may have
    remained despite the judge’s admonition to the jury may be
    said to be harmless.” 
    Carter, 281 F.2d at 641
    .
    Appellants argue that the error could not have been
    harmless because it effectively established—and thus took
    from the jury—the element of the existence of a criminal
    enterprise headed by Gray and Moore. That element was
    necessary for all of the appellants’ RICO conspiracy
    convictions and for James and Ronald Alfred’s convictions
    for the continuing criminal enterprise murder of Joseph
    Thomas. In support of their argument, appellants point to the
    jury’s note during deliberations inquiring why, to convict the
    Alfreds of the continuing criminal enterprise murder, it
    needed to “determine” that Gray and Moore ran a continuing
    criminal enterprise. J.A. 5502. That note, appellants posit,
    meant that the jury was confused because it already knew that
    Gray and Moore had been convicted of running such an
    enterprise.
    That vastly overreads the note. Neither Graham nor
    Howard mentioned the crimes for which Gray and Moore had
    been convicted so the jury could not have been confused by
    something they knew nothing about.
    In short, Graham’s and Howard’s Delphic references to
    other convictions did nothing to relieve the government of its
    burden to prove the existence of the criminal enterprise and,
    on this record, those two testimonial missteps were harmless
    beyond a reasonable doubt.
    81
    VII. Right to Be Present (McGill)
    After the incident in which McGill, in front of the jury,
    displayed the stun belt he was required to wear, see Part 
    V, supra
    , the trial judge ordered that McGill be removed from
    the jury’s presence for the remainder of the trial. McGill
    argues that his continued exclusion compromised his right to
    be present at his trial. Our review is for abuse of discretion,
    and we find that the trial judge acted within his discretion in
    excluding McGill from the jury’s presence for the remainder
    of the trial.
    A.
    A defendant has a right to be present at many stages of
    his trial. That right springs from multiple sources: from the
    Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause when confronting
    witnesses, and from the Due Process Clauses in other
    situations. See United States v. Gagnon, 
    470 U.S. 522
    , 526
    (1985). It is also guaranteed by the Federal Rules of Criminal
    Procedure “at . . . every trial stage, including jury
    impanelment and the return of the verdict.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
    43(a)(2).
    That right, however, is subject to waiver. See 
    id. 43(c)(1). For
    example, a defendant may waive the right by
    disruptive courtroom behavior. See Illinois v. Allen, 
    397 U.S. 337
    , 343 (1970); Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(1)(C). The Federal
    Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that, should “the
    defendant waive[] the right to be present, the trial may
    proceed to completion, including the verdict’s return and
    sentencing, during the defendant’s absence.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
    43(c)(2). Waiver of the right to be present is not necessarily
    permanent: “Once lost, the right to be present can, of course,
    be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct
    himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in
    82
    the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.” 
    Allen, 397 U.S. at 343
    .
    After the incident in which McGill displayed his stun belt
    to the jury, the court immediately ordered him removed from
    the courtroom and the presence of the jury for the remainder
    of the trial. McGill challenges neither that initial exclusion
    nor his exclusion from closing arguments the following day.
    After closing arguments, however, McGill’s counsel asked
    that McGill be allowed to be present for the jury instructions
    that same day. Counsel represented she believed that McGill
    would “remain entirely quiet during the course of the
    instructions.” J.A. 5442. The court refused, stating, “I made
    the mistake of believing that before. I won’t believe it again.”
    
    Id. The court
    further observed that it “ha[d] never had a
    defendant in 16 years as a Judge pull what he pulled, and he’s
    not doing it again.” 
    Id. The following
    day, counsel renewed McGill’s request.
    The district court again denied the motion, noting that counsel
    was unable to give any “assurance” that McGill “won’t act
    improperly.” 
    Id. at 5478.
    Two weeks later, McGill’s counsel
    again asked that McGill be permitted to observe the
    individual voir dires of Jurors #9, #10, and #12. See Part 
    I, supra
    . The court again denied the request. After the court
    concluded the voir dires but before it dismissed Juror #9,
    McGill requested a brief audience with the judge to apologize
    for his previous outbursts. The judge responded that the
    apology could happen “at a later time,” as he had “enough on
    [his] plate for the moment” in dealing with the potential juror
    dismissal. 
    Id. at 5614.
    Nearly two weeks later, when the jury returned its
    verdicts for McGill’s codefendants, McGill’s counsel
    renewed her request for McGill’s return. The district court
    83
    summarily denied the motion. After another two weeks, the
    jury returned a verdict against McGill. McGill’s counsel
    moved for a mistrial due to his continued exclusion, and the
    district court denied the motion.
    B.
    McGill argues that, at each of those junctures, he
    “represented [that] he would restrain himself,” and that his
    continued exclusion therefore violated his constitutional right
    to be present. Appellants’ Br. 182. McGill’s counsel
    repeatedly objected to his continued exclusion, properly
    preserving the issue for our review. We review the district
    court’s decision to suspend a disruptive defendant’s right to
    be present for an abuse of discretion. See 
    Allen, 397 U.S. at 343
    . We find no abuse of discretion here.
    A district court has broad discretion to control trial
    proceedings and protect the “dignity, order, and decorum” of
    the court from “disruptive, contumacious, [and] stubbornly
    defiant defendants.” 
    Id. In exercising
    that discretion, the
    court may remove and exclude disruptive defendants as
    necessary. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(1)(C); accord 
    Allen, 397 U.S. at 344
    . While the court must allow an excluded
    defendant to return to the proceedings if he has “satisfactorily
    demonstrated that he would not be violent or disruptive” upon
    his return, that determination is committed to the court’s
    sound discretion. Jones v. Murphy, 
    694 F.3d 225
    , 240-41 (2d
    Cir. 2012); accord 
    Allen, 397 U.S. at 343
    . “[C]aution is
    appropriate in assessing the trial judge’s response to”
    disruptive outbursts, as “a cold transcript provides no insight
    into tone of voice, body language, or possible overtly
    threatening behavior that might cast mere spoken words in a
    different light.” 
    Jones, 694 F.3d at 238
    . Especially given that
    deference, we have little trouble concluding that the district
    84
    court acted within its discretion to exclude McGill for a
    relatively brief period at the close of the six-month trial.
    McGill argues that he is unaware of any prior case in
    which it was “one strike and you’re out.” Oral Arg. Tr. at
    135. But even assuming removal for “one strike” might
    amount to an abuse of discretion in certain circumstances,
    McGill engaged in a pattern of repeated disruptions. McGill
    himself concedes that the stun belt incident was not his only
    outburst in court. Appellants’ Br. 186. His own testimony in
    his defense was “characterized by . . . outbursts,” 
    id., and he
    engaged in repeated back-and-forths with the judge that
    required the court to issue corrective instructions. The
    prosecutor also informed the court that McGill “would be
    cussing” on “a number of occasions when the Court would
    leave the bench,” and that “this [wa]s a pattern that’s been
    ongoing throughout this trial with Mr. McGill openly and
    vigorously cursing at the Court [and] at the government.”
    J.A. 5638-39.
    The pattern continued even after the court ordered
    McGill removed for the stun belt incident. The court observed
    on the record that, when the marshals removed McGill from
    the courtroom, “he was making so much noise” in the holding
    cell behind the courtroom by “screaming and hollering” that
    “the Court next door was disrupted.” 
    Id. at 5445.
    And
    following the court’s ruling dismissing Juror #9—which came
    after counsel’s representation that McGill would “remain
    entirely quiet,” 
    id. at 5442—McGill
    created yet another
    disturbance: depending on the account, he either threw his
    chair and swore at the judge, or he knocked over his chair as
    he quickly stood up to complain about the unfairness of the
    trial. Neither would be consistent with the “dignity, order,
    and decorum” of the courtroom. 
    Allen, 397 U.S. at 343
    .
    85
    McGill also argues that the district court abused its
    discretion because “it did not afford him the opportunity to
    reclaim his right to be present by either accepting counsel’s
    representations” that he would behave or “directly inquiring
    as to his intentions.” Appellants’ Br. 188. We discern no
    error. McGill’s long pattern of misbehavior was sufficiently
    egregious to permit the district court to conclude that any
    apology or subsequent promise to behave would be of little
    value. See United States v. Munn, 
    507 F.2d 563
    , 568 (10th
    Cir. 1974). His actions throughout the trial indicated that he
    had little ability to control himself.
    Additionally, McGill’s behavior left the trial judge with
    no perfect options. Allowing McGill to return to the
    courtroom without reliable assurances of future good behavior
    could have risked a mistrial—indeed, his codefendants had
    already moved for a mistrial following the stun-belt
    revelation. See J.A. 5425-26. McGill’s conduct put the trial
    court in the position of having to balance the competing
    constitutional rights of McGill and his codefendants. We
    perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s resolution of
    that balance in favor of a continued suspension of McGill’s
    presence in the courtroom.
    VIII. Voice-Identification Expert (McGill)
    McGill argues that the district court erred by failing to
    conduct a Daubert hearing and make findings under Federal
    Rule of Evidence 702 before excluding McGill’s proffered
    voice-identification expert. We find no reversible error.
    A.
    The government introduced into evidence three
    wiretapped phone calls that, according to a government
    witness, contained McGill’s voice. During McGill’s defense
    86
    case, the district court was informed for the first time that
    McGill intended to call an expert in voice-spectrographic
    analysis to contradict the testimony identifying McGill’s
    voice as to two of the three calls. The government made clear
    its opposition to the use of voice-spectrographic analysis,
    arguing that such testimony would be inadmissible under our
    court’s decision in United States v. McDaniel, 
    538 F.2d 408
    ,
    413 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The judge asked counsel whether she
    had a “contrary cite” to counter the government’s reliance on
    McDaniel, to which counsel responded “not yet” and asked
    for “some time to check on the case law.” J.A. 4881.
    A few days later, the district court again brought up the
    subject of McGill’s proffered expert and asked McGill’s
    counsel to “[t]ell [him] more about what this is about.” 
    Id. at 4911.
    Counsel told the court that she had not had time to
    research the admissibility issue after the government’s
    objection the previous week, but that she would like to
    prepare the expert for a Daubert hearing. See Daubert v.
    Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
    (1993). In response
    to the judge’s questions, counsel outlined the expert’s
    credentials and requested a Daubert hearing because “it ha[d]
    been a very long time since [voice-spectographic] analysis
    ha[d] been examined in this jurisdiction.” 
    Id. at 4912-15.
    The government reiterated its view that any such testimony
    would be inadmissible in this circuit.
    Roughly three weeks later, on March 10, 2004, counsel
    for McGill asked the court when the expert should be ready to
    testify at a Daubert hearing. The court refused to hold a
    Daubert hearing and told counsel that it wanted a written
    proffer of the expert’s testimony by the next day, together
    with case law supporting its admissibility. The court
    explained its aversion to “stop[ping] a trial in the middle of it
    [to] have a Daubert hearing” “on something that’s been
    87
    settled for years,” 
    id. at 5096-97,
    adding that McGill’s
    counsel “has not given me [the expert’s] proposed testimony,
    . . . she has not given me anything. She just comes up and
    says I want a hearing. I don’t stop a trial for a hearing like
    that.” 
    Id. at 5098.
    Instead, the court stated, “Once [counsel]
    gives me something, I’ll look at it.” 
    Id. Counsel promised
    to
    file a written proffer.
    Five days later, on March 15—with one defense witness
    left to testify—McGill’s counsel told the court that she had
    filed a motion in limine that morning addressing the
    admissibility of voice-identification testimony. That motion
    is not in the appellate record. But defense counsel’s
    responses to the court’s questioning indicate that McGill’s
    filing contained no proffer of the substance of the expert’s
    testimony—counsel instead “t[ook] the position that the best
    person to articulate the [ins] and outs of the science is the
    expert,” and she said that the expert would “testify as to the
    methodology” at an in-court hearing. 
    Id. at 5125.
    The district
    court again expressed opposition to stopping the trial “to
    spend my time listening to [the expert] when she hasn’t even
    written it down,” especially because holding a hearing would
    require the court to “send the jury home and . . . waste all this
    time.” 
    Id. at 5126.
    The court denied McGill’s motion to
    admit the expert’s testimony. Counsel again promised to
    produce a written proffer, but the court said that it was “too
    late.” 
    Id. Two days
    later—after the government had
    concluded its rebuttal case—counsel filed a motion for
    reconsideration, this time containing a written proffer of the
    expert’s testimony. The court denied the motion.
    B.
    The district court has a gatekeeping responsibility to
    ensure that any expert testimony is based on “scientific
    88
    knowledge” that “will assist the trier of fact to understand or
    determine a fact in issue.” 
    Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592
    (quoting
    Fed. R. Evid. 702). When faced with a request to admit
    expert testimony, the court therefore must undertake “a
    preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
    methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
    and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
    applied to the facts in issue.” 
    Id. at 592-93.
    We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude
    expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
    Day, 
    524 F.3d 1361
    , 1367 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Courts have
    “considerable leeway . . . about how to determine reliability”
    and their “ultimate conclusion[s]” in that regard. Kumho Tire
    Co. v. Carmichael, 
    526 U.S. 137
    , 152 (1999); see Fed. R.
    Evid. 702, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment
    (Rule 702 imposes “no . . . procedural requirements for
    exercising the trial court’s gatekeeping function”). The
    proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden to
    establish the admissibility of the testimony and the
    qualifications of the expert. Meister v. Med. Eng’g Corp.,
    
    267 F.3d 1123
    , 1127 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    McGill argues that the district court erred in rejecting his
    expert’s testimony without conducting any hearing. But the
    court excluded McGill’s expert because defense counsel,
    despite the court’s clear request, failed to timely produce a
    written proffer of the expert’s testimony. See Simmons, 
    431 F. Supp. 2d
    at 74 (district court explaining that “McGill’s
    failure to make a proffer upon request of this Court itself
    justified denial of the testimony”).           In light of the
    government’s identification of circuit case law holding that
    voice-identification expert testimony was inadmissible, see
    
    McDaniel, 538 F.2d at 413
    , and the long duration of the trial
    to that point, the district court was understandably reluctant to
    89
    send the jury home and convene a hearing to explore an issue
    of questionable merit. The court acted well within its
    discretion in insisting on seeing a written proffer of the
    expert’s testimony and the legal basis for its admissibility
    before any hearing. When McGill failed to provide one, the
    court decided it would not consider the matter further. That is
    a trial-management decision that we are loathe to disturb on
    appeal.
    McGill’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
    First, he contends that the government did not disclose the
    existence of the calls containing McGill’s voice until after the
    trial commenced.           The government disputes that
    representation, maintaining that it provided all of the
    wiretapped recordings to the defense years before trial.
    Regardless, there is no dispute that McGill knew of the calls’
    existence at least as of October 2003. See J.A. 1817. Yet
    McGill told the court that he intended to offer expert
    testimony only months later, in mid-February, and even then
    only after the government brought the matter to the court’s
    attention. Although the district court appeared open to
    considering a proffer of the expert’s testimony even at that
    late date, McGill offered no written response to the
    government’s concerns about admissibility until mid-March
    and, even then, his motion failed to include a proffer. No
    proffer was filed until the district court had already ruled the
    expert’s testimony inadmissible and the government had
    completed its rebuttal. McGill’s failure to make a timely
    proffer thus cannot be excused on grounds that he was caught
    off guard. McGill notes that he put the government on notice
    that he intended to call the voice expert and passed along the
    expert’s reports to the government. But the fact that McGill
    made information about his expert available to the
    government is not determinative of whether he made an
    adequate and timely proffer to the court—and the court bears
    90
    responsibility to assure that the expert’s testimony is based on
    scientific knowledge and will assist the trier of fact.
    Even if we did not sustain the district court’s decision on
    those timeliness grounds, we can say with fair assurance that
    any error was harmless because it “did not have a ‘substantial
    and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
    verdict.’” United States v. Powell, 
    334 F.3d 42
    , 45 (D.C. Cir.
    2003) (quoting 
    Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776
    ). The government
    introduced three wiretapped calls purportedly containing
    McGill’s voice. While McGill took the stand and denied that
    he was speaking on two of the calls, he acknowledged that he
    was speaking on the remaining call. We therefore agree with
    the government that, in light of the undisputed identification
    of McGill’s voice on one call and the five days the jurors
    spent listening to McGill while he testified at trial, the jurors
    were in a very good position to determine for themselves
    whether McGill truthfully denied speaking on the other
    recordings. “Voice identification . . . does not depend on
    specialized expertise. Juries may listen to an audiotape of a
    voice and determine who is speaking even though the voice
    has been authenticated only by a lay witness rather than an
    expert.” Tyson v. Keane, 
    159 F.3d 732
    , 738 (2d Cir. 1998).
    The testimony of McGill’s expert also would have been
    subject to extensive cross-examination by the government
    about the science of voice-spectrographic analysis—as the
    government made clear during bench discussions of the
    subject—further diluting the testimony’s persuasive value.
    See United States v. Drones, 
    218 F.3d 496
    , 504 (5th Cir.
    2000).
    For those reasons, we reject McGill’s claim of reversible
    error based on the court’s exclusion of his voice-identification
    expert.
    91
    IX. Joinder (McGill)
    McGill next asserts that the district court erred in joining
    his case with the other five appellants for trial. We reject
    McGill’s argument.
    A.
    In November 2000, the grand jury returned the
    indictment charging seventeen individuals—including the five
    appellants here—with numerous offenses. The trial of the
    Group One defendants began on March 1, 2001. On January
    30, 2002, a defendant-turned-cooperator, Frank Howard,
    testified before the grand jury. Two days later, on February 1,
    2002, McGill was indicted for tampering with a witness by
    killing and felon in possession of a firearm. A superseding
    indictment filed on March 13, 2002, added further counts
    against McGill, including drug conspiracy, RICO conspiracy,
    and violent crime in aid of racketeering activity.
    The superseding indictment named Group One
    codefendants Kevin Gray and Rodney Moore as the heads of
    the RICO conspiracy in which McGill allegedly participated.
    The indictment also alleged that McGill joined the enterprise
    in 1996, distributed cocaine on Gray’s behalf, and committed
    acts of violence—including the attempted murder of a
    witness—in order to further the purposes of the enterprise.
    On March 18, the government moved to join McGill’s
    indictment with the broader indictment and to try McGill with
    the Group Two defendants (appellants here).              The
    government’s motion stated that the evidence at trial would
    show that “McGill was part of the identical drug and
    racketeering conspiracy as was engaged in by Gray and his
    co-defendants.” J.A. 700.
    92
    Meanwhile, the Group One trial continued. On July 17,
    2002, Howard testified in the Group One trial about McGill’s
    participation in the overarching conspiracy—specifically,
    about how Gray supplied McGill with cocaine between 1996
    and 1999 and how McGill shot a government witness (named
    Charles Shuler) because McGill believed Shuler was
    responsible for Gray’s arrest.      The government made
    Howard’s testimony available to the district court in
    responding to McGill’s opposition to joinder. On November
    8, 2002, after holding a hearing on the matter, the district
    court granted the government’s joinder motion.
    B.
    Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 13, a district
    court “may order that separate cases be tried together as
    though brought in a single indictment . . . if all offenses and
    all defendants could have been joined in a single indictment”
    pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8. Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 13; see 
    Burkley, 591 F.2d at 918-19
    . Rule 8(b), in
    turn, allows charging defendants together if “they are alleged
    to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the
    same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or
    offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). “Rule 13 is permissive
    rather than mandatory,” and in deciding whether to
    consolidate cases for trial, “the court should weigh the
    efficiency and convenience of a single trial against the risks of
    prejudice to the defendant from a single proceeding.” 1A
    Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §
    216, at 558-59 (4th ed. 2008); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.
    In determining whether joinder is appropriate, district
    courts in our circuit may consult the indictment along with
    any pretrial submissions offered by the government. United
    States v. Wilson, 
    26 F.3d 142
    , 153 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The
    93
    government therefore satisfied its Rule 8 burden by
    explaining, in its motion to join the indictments, that “McGill
    is a participant in the same narcotics and racketeering
    conspiracy” alleged in the broader indictment, J.A. 699, and
    by offering Howard’s testimony from the Group One trial.
    In objecting to the joinder, McGill relies heavily on the
    fact that the government did not indict him until after Howard
    testified before the grand jury. McGill claims that “he [wa]s
    shoehorned into a massive drug conspiracy at the last minute
    on the questionable claims of a desperate cooperator.”
    Appellants’ Br. 196. Howard’s credibility, however, is beside
    the point. “[T]he Government need merely allege, not prove,
    the facts necessary to sustain joinder.” United States v.
    Gooch, 
    665 F.3d 1318
    , 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2012). And in ruling
    on the motion pretrial, the district court must assume the truth
    of all the facts in the superseding indictment. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 69
    . Moreover, the Group Two trial began well over a
    year after the government moved to join McGill’s trial with
    the other defendants—his inclusion was hardly an eleventh-
    hour development. Because McGill offers no other reasons
    that prejudice concerns should have counseled against joinder,
    and because “[j]oint trials are favored in RICO cases,” United
    States v. Richardson, 
    167 F.3d 621
    , 624 (D.C. Cir. 1999), we
    uphold the district court’s decision to consolidate the trials.
    X. Impeachment with Prior Bad Acts (McGill)
    McGill took the stand at trial. He now argues that the
    district court erred by permitting the government to introduce
    evidence of prior instances of his misconduct to impeach him
    during cross-examination. Our review is for abuse of
    discretion. See United States v. Edwards, 
    388 F.3d 896
    , 899
    (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Baylor, 
    97 F.3d 542
    , 544
    (D.C. Cir. 1996). We find that any error was harmless.
    94
    McGill first takes issue with the government’s
    introduction of evidence relating to two prior Maryland
    convictions. Both cases involved robberies that took place in
    April 1989. The first case went to trial in 1989. McGill was
    found guilty of assault with intent to rob and use of a handgun
    in the commission of a felony, but he was acquitted of
    robbery with a deadly weapon. The second case went to trial
    in 1990. McGill was found guilty of theft and robbery with a
    deadly weapon, though he was acquitted of assault and battery
    of the robbery victim and attempted murder and assault of a
    police officer at the scene.
    McGill concedes that the government could cross-
    examine him about the fact that he had been convicted of the
    Maryland crimes under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which
    enables a party to introduce evidence of a witness’s prior
    conviction to attack the witness’s character for truthfulness.
    See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(B). But McGill argues that the
    government delved too deeply into the facts surrounding those
    earlier crimes. Specifically, he maintains that the government
    was wrongly permitted to introduce: (i) a statement by McGill
    denying any involvement in the first April 1989 robbery; (ii)
    witness testimony from a Prince George’s County police
    officer about a statement made by McGill’s accomplice,
    William Little, regarding the second April 1989 robbery;
    (iii) the entire transcript from the 1990 trial of the second
    robbery; and (iv) the Maryland Court of Appeals judgment
    affirming McGill’s 1990 conviction. Those admissions,
    McGill contends, contravened the understanding that, “when
    evidence of a prior conviction is admitted for purposes of
    impeachment, cross-examination is usually limited to the
    essential facts rather than the surrounding details of the
    conviction.” 
    Baylor, 97 F.3d at 544
    .
    95
    McGill is correct insofar as he argues that the prosecution
    may not dwell on the facts of a defendant’s prior unrelated
    convictions just for the sake of it. But “under certain
    circumstances details concerning a conviction may be
    elicited.” 
    Id. at 544.
    One such circumstance is when the
    defendant “open[s] the door” to impeachment about the
    details of his convictions “by attempting to minimize” his
    misconduct in his testimony. 
    Id. at 545;
    see United States v.
    Butler, 
    924 F.2d 1124
    , 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
    White, 
    222 F.3d 363
    , 370 (7th Cir. 2000).
    Here, the government offered each of the above items of
    evidence in order to contradict self-serving portions of
    McGill’s testimony. For instance, McGill testified that he had
    readily admitted his participation in the first April 1989
    robbery and pleaded guilty, but that the Maryland prosecutor
    refused to make a plea deal unless he also pleaded guilty to a
    second robbery. In response to McGill’s claim that he had
    admitted the first robbery, the government introduced his
    statement denying his involvement. McGill also told the jury
    that he did not participate in the second robbery, and his
    counsel emphasized his claims of innocence by asking McGill
    how he felt about being wrongly imprisoned for a crime he
    did not commit. In addition, McGill testified that he was
    implicated in the second robbery because the Maryland police
    officers tricked his codefendant, Little, into falsely confessing
    that McGill was his accomplice, and further testified that the
    Maryland prosecutor and the trial judge prevented Little from
    testifying as to McGill’s innocence. In response, the
    government introduced testimony from the Prince George’s
    County police officer about Little’s statement to establish that
    investigators had not, in fact, tricked Little into implicating
    McGill, and the government also introduced the transcript
    from the 1990 trial to show that McGill’s attorney never made
    that argument in McGill’s defense or attempted to call Little
    96
    to the stand. Similarly, because McGill claimed that the 1990
    trial court had made its ruling barring Little from testifying
    off the record, the government introduced the Maryland Court
    of Appeals judgment to demonstrate that McGill’s attorney
    never made an argument to that effect in appealing McGill’s
    convictions. McGill also testified that his 1990 robbery trial
    was a farce that lasted “twenty minutes,” with a transcript that
    was “like four sentences, three pages.” J.A. 4957; see 
    id. at 5040.
    The government then introduced the 1990 trial
    transcript to establish that the trial and jury deliberations had
    actually lasted three days.
    McGill next argues that the district court wrongly
    allowed the government to introduce extrinsic evidence of
    three other alleged incidents of wrongdoing for which McGill
    was not convicted. Specifically, the government inquired
    into, and offered extrinsic evidence of, McGill’s participation
    in two additional Maryland thefts—at a Walmart and a Zales
    jewelry store—in 2001. In addition, McGill challenges the
    government’s introduction of documents showing that he had
    been accused of forging his GED certificate while in prison in
    1994, including the certificate itself. He argues that Federal
    Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits a party from introducing
    extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior bad acts in order to
    attack the witness’s character for truthfulness, even if the
    witness denies the acts during questioning.
    McGill is right that, under Rule 608(b), the government
    could not resort to extrinsic evidence of specific instances of
    misconduct in order to attack McGill’s character for
    truthfulness. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). But Rule 608(b)’s bar
    against extrinsic evidence does not apply when the evidence
    is used to contradict a statement made by a witness during her
    testimony. See United States v. Fonseca, 
    435 F.3d 369
    , 374-
    75 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Such “impeachment by contradiction” is
    97
    subject only to the constraints of Federal Rules of Evidence
    401, 402, and 403. 
    Id. at 375;
    see Fed. R. Evid. 608, advisory
    committee’s note to 2003 amendment. “And evidence that
    would contradict [a witness’s] trial testimony, even on a
    collateral subject” is relevant under Rule 401 “because it
    would undermine her credibility as a witness regarding facts
    of consequence.” 
    Fonseca, 435 F.3d at 375
    . Accordingly, as
    long as the evidence was used to contradict McGill’s
    testimony, the only issue is whether the district court erred in
    determining that the probative value of the evidence of
    McGill’s alleged participation in the 2001 Maryland thefts
    and the GED forgery was not “substantially outweighed by a
    danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
    misleading the jury, undue delay, [or] wasting time.” Fed. R.
    Evid. 403; see 
    Fonseca, 435 F.3d at 375
    .
    The evidence at issue here was introduced in response to
    McGill’s contrary statements during his testimony. McGill
    testified at length about the college-level courses he took and
    the accreditations he acquired while in prison for the
    Maryland convictions. His counsel introduced several of
    McGill’s course certificates into evidence. McGill also
    testified about how he had been living a clean, hardworking,
    and generally commendable life since his release. The
    government introduced evidence of McGill’s multiple run-ins
    with the law in 2001 in order to contradict McGill’s testimony
    that he had been a model citizen since his release and had
    forsaken all criminal endeavors. And to mitigate McGill’s
    account of all the college courses he had taken while in
    prison, the government offered evidence that he was charged
    with a prison infraction for forging his GED certificate to take
    those courses.
    Some of the admitted evidence, however, pushed the
    limits of acceptability. “The open door does not give the
    98
    prosecution license to dwell on the details of the prior
    conviction and shift the focus of the current trial to the
    defendant’s prior bad acts,” and “the prosecution’s response
    must be tailored to the statements made by the defendant.”
    
    White, 222 F.3d at 370
    . In that regard, introducing the entire
    transcript from the second Maryland trial may have been
    overkill, especially because that trial also concerned conduct
    of which McGill was acquitted. And even the government
    admits that evidence about the GED-certificate forgery “did
    not contradict any specific statement” that McGill made
    during his direct testimony. Appellee’s Br. 173 n.145.
    Even if the government’s impeachment should have been
    kept within tighter bounds, however, we find that any error
    was harmless because it did not have a “substantial and
    injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
    verdict.” 
    Powell, 334 F.3d at 45
    (quoting 
    Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776
    ). McGill was an extremely difficult witness whose
    testimony proved more belligerent and incoherent than
    informative.     He persistently refused to answer the
    government’s questions, instead volunteering inadmissible
    information and accusing the government of illegality in
    rambling speeches. He similarly ignored the district court’s
    repeated admonitions to stop bringing up extraneous
    information and answer properly. In addition, he often
    contradicted himself from one sentence to the next, evaded
    giving answers to questions obviously designed to catch him
    in a contradiction, and generally used his time on the stand to
    fight with the prosecutor and the court rather than answer
    questions.
    We see no reasonable possibility that limiting the
    government’s impeachment of McGill regarding past
    misconduct could have caused the jury to think he was
    credible, especially considering that much of the evidence the
    99
    government used against him was unquestionably legitimate
    impeachment evidence. We therefore find no reversible error
    in the government’s cross-examination.
    XI. Sentencing (McGill)
    The district court sentenced McGill on the following six
    counts: (i) Count One, conspiracy to distribute narcotics; (ii)
    Count Two, RICO conspiracy; (iii) Count Three, assault with
    intent to commit murder; (iv) Count Four, violent crime in aid
    of racketeering; (v) Count Five, tampering with a witness or
    informant by killing; and (vi) Count Six, unlawful use of a
    firearm. The court sentenced McGill to four concurrent
    sentences of life imprisonment on Counts One, Two, Four,
    and Five; a concurrent term of thirty years to life on Count
    Three; and a consecutive term of ten years on Count Six.
    McGill lodges various challenges to those sentences.
    Because we find merit in certain of McGill’s challenges, we
    vacate his sentences on Counts One, Two, Four, and Five and
    remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. We
    note that other appellants summarily purport to join McGill’s
    sentencing arguments.        But those appellants give no
    indication in their opening brief of which arguments are
    applicable to them, include no explanation of how their
    individual sentences would be affected by McGill’s
    arguments, give no record citations concerning their
    sentences, and include no documents or transcripts pertaining
    to their sentences in the appellate record. Those appellants’
    woefully underdeveloped arguments are forfeited.          See
    
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 93
    .
    A.
    McGill first raises several challenges to the district
    court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Those
    100
    arguments affect his sentencing only as to Counts One, Two,
    Four, and Five. The Sentencing Guidelines did not affect
    McGill’s sentence on Count Three (assault with attempt to
    commit murder under the D.C. Code, a nonfederal offense).
    The Guidelines also did not affect his sentence on Count Six
    (unlawful discharge of a firearm), which carries a mandatory
    minimum term of ten years served consecutively to any other
    term. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The district court
    imposed the minimum sentence of ten years. Any errors in
    the application of the Guidelines would therefore be harmless
    as to his sentences on Counts Three and Six.
    With regard to the remaining counts, the Presentence
    Report (PSR) applied the 2000 edition of the Guidelines. No
    party challenges the PSR’s use of the 2000 Guidelines. And,
    while the record is unclear on the issue, all parties present
    their arguments under the assumption that the district court
    adopted the PSR’s Guidelines calculation. We therefore
    proceed on the understanding that the district court relied on
    the PSR in imposing McGill’s sentence. See United States v.
    Kennedy, 
    722 F.3d 439
    , 442 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
    The PSR calculated a combined base offense level of 32
    for Counts One, Two, Four, and Five. J.A. 1641-43. From
    that base level of 32, the PSR added two levels pursuant to
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2000), “because the defendant
    possessed a dangerous weapon” in the commission of the
    offense. J.A. 1643. The PSR then added another two levels
    for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2000),
    bringing McGill’s adjusted offense level to 36. The PSR then
    applied the career offender provisions set out in U.S.S.G.
    § 4B1.1 (2000), under which McGill qualified as a “career
    offender,” meaning that his total offense level was at least 37.
    
    Id. Using the
    career offender provisions, the PSR also
    assigned McGill a criminal history category of VI. J.A. 1644;
    101
    see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2000). Based on an offense level of 37
    and a criminal history category of VI, the Guidelines provided
    for an imprisonment range of 360 months to life on Counts
    One, Two, Four, and, Five. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 (2000), Pt. A.
    1.
    At sentencing, McGill asked the district court to depart
    from the Guidelines in its application of the drug quantity
    guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) (2000), and also to depart
    from the applicable career offender guidelines, U.S.S.G.
    § 4B1.1 (2000). He argued for a departure based on the
    disparity in sentencing for crack and powder cocaine and
    based on his objections to the application of career offender
    status. The district judge did not directly respond to either of
    those arguments. We find error.
    While “a court of appeals may apply a presumption of
    reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a
    proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines,” Rita v.
    United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 347 (2007), “[t]he [district]
    court, at the time of sentencing,” must “state in open court the
    reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(c). We do not “insist[] upon a full opinion in
    every” sentencing, but “[t]he appropriateness of brevity or
    length, conciseness or detail, when to write, [and] what to say,
    depends upon circumstances.” 
    Rita, 551 U.S. at 356
    .
    Although a court issuing a sentence within the Guidelines
    range need not give any “lengthy explanation,” it may be
    required to do more if a party “argues that the Guidelines
    reflect an unsound judgment . . . or argues for departure.” 
    Id. at 356-57.
    While our review is for abuse of discretion, based on the
    record here, we cannot tell that the district court “considered
    the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for
    102
    exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority,” or that it
    “listened to each argument” or “considered the supporting
    evidence.” 
    Id. at 356,
    358. That is not to say that the court
    did not, in fact, do so, but the government provides no record
    citations or arguments to that end on appeal. Accordingly, we
    agree with McGill that his sentences on Counts One, Two,
    Four, and Five should be vacated and remanded for
    resentencing.
    2.
    McGill additionally challenges the application of a two-
    level increase for firearms possession under U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(b)(1). He argues that he was already subject to a
    separate mandatory minimum sentence for use of the same
    firearm under Count Six and that such a double penalty runs
    afoul of the Guidelines. Because McGill failed to raise that
    objection at trial, our review is for plain error. See 
    Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1034
    .
    We agree with McGill that the application of the two-
    level increase constituted error. Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the
    Guidelines provides that, “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including
    a firearm) was possessed” during the commission of the
    offense, the offense level increases by two levels. U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2000). But Application Note 2 (Note 4 in the
    current version of the guidelines) of Guidelines Section 2K2.4
    (2000) further provides that, if a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(c) “is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an
    underlying offense,” the court is “not [to] apply any specific
    offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or
    discharge of an explosive or firearm when determining the
    sentence for the underlying offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.2
    (2000) (emphasis added). Application Note 2 aims to prevent
    double-counting, as § 924(c)’s special mandatory minimum
    103
    sentences—which run consecutively to the sentence for the
    underlying offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)—already
    “account[] for any explosive or weapon enhancement for the
    underlying offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 n.2 (2000).
    Here, the PSR added a two-level, specific-offense
    characteristic for firearms possession to the calculation of
    McGill’s offense level for Counts One, Two, Four, and Five.
    Because McGill was sentenced on Count Six—a § 924(c)
    firearms offense—at the same time and for the same conduct,
    Application Note 2 forbids that additional two-level
    enhancement.
    The government argues that the Count Six sentence was
    based on the underlying conduct embodied in Counts Four
    and Five only, whereas the two-level enhancement under
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for a dangerous weapon was imposed
    only in connection with Count One. That is incorrect. The
    PSR assigned a combined offense level for Counts One, Two,
    Four, and Five. While Count One, as the most serious
    offense, served as the starting point for that calculation, “[t]he
    other counts determine whether and how much to increase the
    offense level” from Count One. See U.S. Sentencing Comm.,
    An Overview of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines at 2.
    http://www.ussg.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/O
    verview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf.            So while
    Count One was the starting point, the offense-level
    calculation reflected Counts One, Two, Four, and Five in
    combination.
    The government further argues that any error was not
    “plain” for purposes of the plain-error standard. We disagree.
    The government contends that our court upheld the use of the
    § 2D1.1 enhancement in similar factual circumstances in
    United States v. Thomas, 
    114 F.3d 228
    (D.C. Cir. 1997). But
    104
    the defendant in that case—unlike McGill—was not
    convicted of a separate § 924(c) firearms offense. 
    Id. at 237,
    270. As we have observed elsewhere, “an enhancement under
    § 2D1.1(b)(1) and sentencing on a § 924(c) conviction are
    mutually exclusive.” United States v. Rhodes, 
    106 F.3d 429
    ,
    432 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
    Under the plain-error standard, an appellant must
    demonstrate prejudice to his “substantial rights,” and that the
    error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Bolla,
    
    346 F.3d 1148
    , 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting United States
    v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 631 (2002) (brackets omitted).
    “[O]ur application of plain error review in the sentencing
    context allows a somewhat relaxed standard for showing
    prejudice under the third prong of the plain error test.” 
    Id. (citing United
    States v. Saro, 
    24 F.3d 283
    , 288 (D.C. Cir.
    1994)). We have explained that “it is a miscarriage of justice
    to give a person an illegal sentence that increases his
    punishment, just as it is to convict an innocent person,” and
    that “leaving in place an error-infected sentence that would
    have been materially different absent error and that could be
    readily corrected would ‘seriously affect the fairness,
    integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’
    Indeed, it would seriously affect all three.” United States v.
    Coles, 
    403 F.3d 764
    , 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United
    States v. Paladino, 
    401 F.3d 471
    , 483 (7th Cir. 2005); United
    States v. Williams, 
    399 F.3d 450
    , 461 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal
    citations and brackets omitted).
    That understanding applies here. Following the two-level
    upward adjustment under § 2D1.1(b)(1) (and the two-level
    upward adjustment for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1), McGill’s adjusted offense level stood at 36. The
    PSR then applied the career offender provisions, which
    105
    stipulated that McGill’s adjusted offense level could be no
    less than 37. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2000). If the district
    court properly applied the career offender provisions, McGill
    then suffered no prejudice resulting from the erroneous, two-
    level upward adjustment based on § 2D1.1(b)(1)—his
    adjusted offense level would still be 37, regardless of that
    error. But we have already held that we must remand for the
    district court adequately to explain its decision to hew to the
    career offender provisions. While the district court might
    well continue to apply the career offender provisions—
    earning McGill an adjusted offense level of 37, regardless of
    the application of § 2D1.1(b)(1)—we can be confident that
    the court’s application of § 2D1.1(b)(1) did not prejudice
    McGill only if the court chooses to persist in applying the
    career offender provisions and adequately explains its
    decision. Accordingly, we find that McGill has shown a
    reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
    his sentencing, see 
    Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1032
    , and we remand
    for resentencing on Counts One, Two, Four and Five in a
    manner consistent with our decision.
    B.
    The district court sentenced McGill to life imprisonment
    on Counts Four and Five. As the government concedes,
    however, the maximum sentence available under Count Four
    is ten years, and, at the time of McGill’s sentence, the
    maximum sentence available under Count Five was 20 years.
    We have already vacated McGill’s sentence on Counts Four
    and Five. On remand, the district court can correct these
    errors as well.
    C.
    The district court sentenced McGill to a term of ten years
    on Count Six for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). That
    106
    provision mandates a five-year minimum sentence for
    carrying a firearm, but it increases the penalty to a ten-year
    mandatory minimum if the firearm is discharged in the
    commission of the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (iii).
    In Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    (2013), the
    Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the
    mandatory minimum” applicable to a crime “must be
    submitted to the jury.” 
    Id. at 2155.
    McGill argues on appeal
    that the district court’s ten-year sentence on Count Six ran
    afoul of Alleyne because the jury did not find that the firearm
    was, in fact, discharged. Because McGill failed to raise that
    Alleyne objection before the district court, our review again is
    for plain error.
    The verdict form represents the facts found by the jury,
    see United States v. Fields, 
    242 F.3d 393
    , 396, and those
    forms did not require the jury to find that McGill discharged a
    firearm. The language of the jury verdict asked the jury to
    find only that McGill had “use[d]” a firearm. J.A. 1151. We
    therefore agree with McGill that there was an Alleyne error.
    But to qualify for relief under the plain-error standard, that
    error must also have “seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
    or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1130
    .
    Our decision in United States v. Johnson, 
    331 F.3d 962
    (D.C. Cir. 2003) demonstrates that McGill cannot make that
    showing. In Johnson, the district court failed to submit an
    element of the offense—that the conspiracy involved at least
    50 grams of cocaine base—to the jury, in violation of the rule
    in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000). 
    Johnson, 331 F.3d at 966-67
    . Nevertheless, we explained, the appellant
    had “offered the jurors no scenario under which they could
    have convicted him of unlawful possession with intent to
    distribute cocaine base”—which they did—“yet found that the
    107
    quantity involved was less than 50 grams.” 
    Id. at 969.
    As a
    result, we found that any error did not affect the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process. 
    Id. at 968
    (citing 
    Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-33
    ).
    The same is true here. Count Four charged that
    McGill, “while armed with a firearm, attempted to murder
    Witness #6.” J.A. 695. Count Five alleged that McGill
    “attempt[ed] to kill Witness #6 by shooting Witness #6 with a
    firearm.” 
    Id. And Count
    Six charged that McGill “carr[ied]
    and possess[ed] a firearm” in connection with “Counts Four
    and Five.” 
    Id. at 696.
    Witness #6 (Charles Schuler) was shot,
    and McGill was convicted on Counts Four and Five in
    connection with that shooting. McGill offered no defense
    beyond, “I didn’t do it.” The logical implication of those
    facts is unavoidable: if the jury found McGill guilty on
    Counts Four and Five—which it did—the jury necessarily
    found that a firearm was discharged in connection with
    Counts Four and Five. McGill therefore is not entitled to
    relief from his sentence on Count Six under the plain-error
    standard. See 
    Johnson, 331 F.3d at 968
    ; accord United States
    v. Webb, 
    255 F.3d 890
    , 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
    D.
    By this point, we have vacated McGill’s sentences on
    Counts One, Two, Four, and Five, and we have identified
    errors in those sentences for correction on remand. Because
    McGill’s sentence is yet to be determined, we do not reach his
    challenges to the overall reasonableness of his sentence under
    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) at this time. Cf. United States v. Locke,
    
    664 F.3d 353
    , 357 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
    McGill urges us to instruct the district court that it should
    conduct its resentencing analysis on remand de novo.
    Consistent with our usual practice, we decline to issue that
    108
    instruction. See United States v. Whren, 
    111 F.3d 956
    , 959-
    60 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Taylor, 
    937 F.2d 676
    , 684 (D.C. Cir. 1991). “De novo resentencing is in
    essence a license for the parties to introduce issues,
    arguments, and evidence that they should have introduced at
    the original sentencing.” 
    Whren, 111 F.3d at 959
    . We
    therefore remand for the district court to “consider only such
    new arguments or new facts as are made newly relevant by
    [our] decision—whether by the reasoning or by the result,” 
    id. at 960,
    in addition to any “facts that did not exist at the time
    of the original sentencing,” United States v. Blackson, 
    709 F.3d 36
    , 40 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
    XIII. Cross-Examination (Oliver)
    Oliver claims that the district court erred in allowing the
    prosecution, on cross-examination, to read to him testimony
    of government witnesses and ask him for his position on the
    events recounted. Oliver’s theory is that the government’s
    procedure forced him to state that government witnesses were
    lying and to explain why they would lie, contrary to the rule
    that a prosecutor may not “induce a witness to testify that
    another witness, and in particular a government agent, has
    lied on the stand.” United States v. Boyd, 
    54 F.3d 868
    , 871
    (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Schmitz, 
    634 F.3d 1247
    , 1268 (11th Cir. 2011). Although courts have found
    such questions objectionable on several grounds, perhaps the
    most obvious are that they ask the defendant-witness to speak
    on a matter of which he has no personal knowledge and that
    they may put him in a position, unless he is verbally agile,
    where he must either call another witness a liar or be seen as
    accepting that witness’s account. See 
    id. at 1268-69.
    Oliver mischaracterizes the government’s line of
    questioning, and, to the extent that he did comment on other
    109
    witnesses’ veracity, he did so on his own initiative, in answers
    broader than what the government’s questions had invited.
    We therefore reject his challenge.
    The government did not pose “were-they-lying”
    questions of the type prohibited by Schmitz and Boyd, but
    instead read (or summarized) other witnesses’ accounts of
    events and asked for Oliver’s account. For example, a
    prosecutor summarized Cheryl Pinkard’s testimony that
    Oliver was present at the shooting of Richard Simmons, and
    then asked Oliver whether he was indeed at the scene; Oliver
    responded, “No, sir.” J.A. 4692. Similarly, the prosecutor
    summarized Frank Howard’s testimony that he and Kevin
    Gray had come over from Southeast Washington to Northeast
    to engage in drug dealing with Oliver and asked Oliver
    whether such a thing had happened, to which he responded,
    “No way.” 
    Id. at 4698.
    The questioning here falls on the permissible side of the
    line we and other courts have drawn. While we have held that
    asking a defendant “point-blank” why witnesses would
    “‘make up’ a story about him” is improper, we have
    distinguished such questioning from “unobjectionable”
    examination designed to compare the defendant’s factual
    account with other witnesses’ and allow jurors to draw their
    own conclusions. 
    Boyd, 54 F.3d at 871-72
    . It is likewise
    permissible to “focus a witness on the differences and
    similarities between his testimony and that of another
    witness,” so long as “he is not asked to testify as to the
    veracity of the other witness.” 
    Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1269
    .
    The government’s questioning met these standards.
    Insofar as Oliver did comment that certain witnesses
    were lying or speculate as to their motives, he did so
    spontaneously, of his own accord. For example, in response
    110
    to the government’s presentation of Pinkard’s testimony
    placing him at the scene of the Simmons shooting, the
    testimony of Walter Fleming (“Biggums”) that he shared a
    stash house with Simmons, and Victoria Robles’s testimony
    that Oliver and Timothy Handy had come into the apartment
    with guns, Oliver claimed they were all “lie[s].” J.A. 4747,
    4787-88, 4756. Oliver also volunteered a theory as to why
    Robles would lie—namely, that the government agreed, in
    exchange for her cooperation, not to prosecute her for killing
    her daughter.
    XIV. Evidence Regarding Murder of Green (Oliver)
    Deon Oliver (we’ll henceforth call him simply “Oliver,”
    reserving the complete given name and family name for his
    cousin Taron Oliver) argues that the government deceived the
    jury by telling it that certain evidence supported Oliver’s
    involvement in the Richard Simmons murder despite knowing
    that the evidence actually related to a different murder, that of
    Demetrius Green. Though framing the issue mainly as a
    matter of prosecutorial misconduct, the defense also indirectly
    claims district court error in admission of the evidence and
    failure to correct the misconduct.
    The evidence in question was Robles’s grand-jury
    testimony, introduced at trial during Robles’s direct
    examination. The government initially used the grand-jury
    testimony to refresh Robles’s recollection that she had
    testified about hearing Timothy Handy (“Dog”) and Oliver
    discuss a murder. When Robles said her recollection was not
    refreshed, the government then moved to admit the testimony.
    The defense objected, but evidently not on any ground other
    than illegitimate intermingling of the two murders, the issue
    we now address. (In a pre-Crawford case we said that “the
    Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a
    111
    declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is
    testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-
    examination.” 
    Powell, 334 F.3d at 45
    (quoting California v.
    Green, 
    399 U.S. 149
    , 158 (1970)).)
    Before the grand jury Robles said that she had overheard
    Handy and Oliver discuss Handy’s having shot and killed a
    “little boy” in front of his mother, and that Oliver had said,
    “You got to get her, too. Because she will snitch.” J.A. 1706-
    07. Robles also told the grand jury that the “little boy” was
    15 or 16 years old, and that the murder occurred on Forrester
    Street.
    If Robles’s account to the grand jury was a story of a
    single murder, it didn’t very well match the killing of
    Simmons, specifically as to the victim’s age and the site of the
    murder. First, Oliver testified that Simmons was “not a little
    boy,” J.A. 4805, and the government doesn’t contest defense
    counsel’s claim at trial that Simmons was “in his twenties or
    thirties,” Appellee’s Br. 197, and thus not a “little boy” in
    ordinary parlance, let alone a little boy of 15 or 16. Second,
    the government does not claim that the Simmons murder
    occurred on Forrester Street. In fact, Demetrius Green, a boy
    of 15 or 16, was murdered on Forrester Street, and Handy has
    been convicted for that murder. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 98
    .
    The trial court admitted the elements of Robles’s grand-
    jury testimony that were logically consistent with the
    Simmons murder but excluded those portions that were flatly
    at odds with that murder and in fact seemed to link Robles’s
    account to the Demetrius Green murder. Though on appeal
    Oliver does not highlight his objection at trial to the
    admission of this truncated testimony, that admission is of
    course temporally prior and logically necessary to the alleged
    later prosecutorial abuse.
    112
    The court initially questioned whether admitting the
    grand-jury testimony “would do anything other than confuse
    the jury.” J.A. 3367-68. But the government advanced a
    theory linking the testimony to the Simmons murder. The
    prosecutor candidly acknowledged that Robles “may very
    well be mixing a couple of different conversations” and that
    the reference to “Forrester Street” was incorrect (as to the
    Simmons murder).        
    Id. at 3368-69.
         The prosecutor
    nonetheless argued that the conversation must have related at
    least in part to the Simmons murder, because other than the
    street name, the evidence “smack[ed]” of that murder. 
    Id. at 3367.
    Specifically, the prosecutor said, Simmons’s mother
    had witnessed her son’s murder, consistent with Robles’s
    testimony. The parties agree that a mother was also present at
    the scene of the Green murder, though they dispute whether it
    was the victim’s mother or a bystander’s. Oliver testified that
    Green’s mother witnessed Green’s murder, but Oscar Veal
    testified that Scorpio Phillips and his mother Phyllis were
    witnesses to that murder. Additionally, Robles testified that
    Oliver had spoken as if he had been “actually present” at the
    murder, 
    id. at 3374,
    and Oliver does not suggest that he was
    involved in the Green murder.
    After the government explained its theory, the court
    agreed to change its ruling and admit a version of the grand-
    jury testimony omitting the references pointing to the Green
    murder (the victim’s age and the murder site). Given the
    court’s concern with jury confusion, it may be that it reasoned
    that the material specific to the Green murder was irrelevant.
    Of course, since Robles delivered that material as part of an
    integrated account of a single conversation that she said she
    overheard, its omission before the jury greatly enhanced the
    apparent force of the government’s theory.            The jury
    confusion of the sort that the trial court evidently feared
    113
    would have arisen from Robles’s apparent confusion between
    the two murders.
    The government’s inference was highly contestable and
    the admitted excerpt one-sided.        But Oliver had an
    opportunity to offer the missing portion of grand-jury
    testimony under the rule of completeness. See United States
    v. Washington, 
    12 F.3d 1128
    , 1137-38 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Why
    he failed to do so is unexplained. Introduction of only the
    inculpatory part of a statement is not error so long as the
    defendant is able to “present the allegedly exculpatory
    material during cross-examination,” United States v.
    Washington, 
    952 F.2d 1402
    , 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1991), as Oliver
    was here. Oliver’s counsel cross-examined Robles about the
    specifics of the conversation she had heard.          Robles
    acknowledged that she had heard from people she knew that a
    15- or 16-year-old had been killed and that his mother had
    witnessed the murder, but she claimed not to remember being
    told the location of the murder. Counsel did not confront her
    with the omitted grand-jury testimony.
    Oliver’s direct examination also put his theory before the
    jury: he testified that Robles, Handy, and Taron Oliver (Deon
    Oliver’s cousin) had all discussed (in Deon’s presence) a
    “little dude” named Demetrius Green who was 15 or 16 years
    old and who was murdered on Forrester Street with his
    mother as an eyewitness. J.A. 4807-08. Oliver said that this
    was the incident about which Robles had testified. Oliver
    also confirmed that Simmons was not a “little boy.” 
    Id. at 4805.
    Given Oliver’s opportunities to correct mistaken
    inferences from the partial submission, and the existence of a
    theory under which the Robles testimony was probative, we
    cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. See
    
    Mahdi, 598 F.3d at 891
    -92 (citing 
    Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1020
    ).
    114
    Oliver maintains that the government intentionally misled
    the jury: it knew that Robles had been referring to the Green
    murder and “tailor[ed]” the testimony to “leave out” the facts
    relevant only to Green and not to Simmons. J.A. 3368.
    Oliver sees the offense as compounded by the government’s
    argument in closing that Robles’s grand-jury testimony
    supported its claim that Oliver participated in the Simmons
    murder.
    A prosecutor’s failure to correct a witness’s
    misrepresentations during cross-examination may warrant a
    new trial, United States v. Iverson, 
    637 F.2d 799
    , 803 (D.C.
    Cir. 1980), and closing arguments must be confined to “facts
    which are in evidence and the reasonable inferences
    therefrom,” United States v. Jones, 
    482 F.2d 747
    , 753 (D.C.
    Cir. 1973). But the prosecutor may “draw inferences from
    evidence that support the government’s theory of the case so
    long as the prosecutor does not intentionally misrepresent the
    evidence.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 53
    . The government drew
    such an inference here.
    The government fully vetted the potential ambiguity,
    explained its reasoning before the district court, and suggested
    that the dispute would be an area “ripe for cross-examination
    and argument.” J.A. 3369. Its theory—that Robles overheard
    at least one conversation about the Simmons murder and
    confused two conversations when testifying before the grand
    jury—is not such a stretch as to support an inference of
    misrepresentation. We therefore find that the government’s
    behavior in cross-examination and closing was within bounds.
    A final note: during a break in summations, Oliver’s
    counsel protested that the jury had not heard anything about
    the Green murder, such that the jury was unequipped to
    decide which murder was the subject of Robles’s testimony.
    115
    As the district court responded, however, Oliver’s counsel had
    had the opportunity to put before the jury whatever he wanted
    to clarify that issue—in addition to what he had raised during
    Robles’s cross-examination and Oliver’s direct examination.
    Oliver has no answer to that.
    XV. Floyd Murder Conviction (Oliver)
    Oliver next claims that his conviction for the Floyd
    murder under the D.C. Code must be reversed because the
    evidence linking him to the murder—testimony that he
    provided the gun used by Raynor to kill Floyd—was
    insufficient. We review the evidence de novo and consider it
    in the light most favorable to the government, and we will
    affirm a guilty verdict where “any rational trier of fact could
    have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wahl, 
    290 F.3d 370
    , 375
    (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).
    Much of Oliver’s argument is directed at whether the
    evidence sufficed on an aiding-and-abetting theory of
    liability. But even assuming sufficiency of the evidence, the
    district court’s use of a “natural and probable consequence”
    instruction for aiding and abetting was plain error for a D.C.
    Code violation. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 91
    (quoting Wilson-
    Bey v. United States, 
    903 A.2d 818
    , 835-39 (D.C. 2006) (en
    banc)). The jury therefore was not entitled to convict Oliver
    of the Floyd murder on that theory.
    But the jury was also instructed on a Pinkerton theory,
    under which it was required to find that Raynor killed Floyd
    “in furtherance of the conspiracy” and that the murder was
    “reasonably foreseeable” to Oliver. Gordon v. United States,
    
    783 A.2d 575
    , 582 (D.C. 2001) (citing Pinkerton v. United
    States, 
    328 U.S. 640
    , 647-48 (1946)). On that basis, the
    evidence was adequate under D.C. law.
    116
    First, a rational jury could find that Floyd’s murder was
    “in furtherance of the conspiracy,” 
    Gordon, 783 A.2d at 582
    ,
    specifically the conspiracy’s goal—as charged in the
    indictment and shown through trial evidence—to promote and
    enhance the reputation and standing of the enterprise and its
    members. Floyd had challenged Raynor to fight; Raynor was
    angry and told Andrews and Gray that he wanted to kill Floyd
    because he was embarrassed that the much-younger Floyd had
    “chumped John [Raynor] up” in front of others, including
    drug dealers working for Raynor. J.A. 2101-02. The next
    day, Raynor murdered Floyd. Andrews testified that Raynor
    killed Floyd “because he [Raynor] said Little Willie [Floyd]
    disrespected him,” and that Raynor demonstrated to other
    members of the conspiracy that “nobody around there can
    mess with him [Raynor]. You mess with me, you get killed.
    That’s the reason he killed Little Willie [Floyd].” 
    Id. at 2300-
    01. This evidence—especially the evidence that Floyd had
    embarrassed Raynor before men who worked for him—
    supported the conclusion that Raynor murdered Floyd to
    protect his reputation and to further the conspiracy.
    Citing United States v. Roshko, 
    969 F.2d 1
    , 7 (2d Cir.
    1992), Oliver maintains that the murder did not further the
    conspiracy’s “principal objective,” which was narcotics
    trafficking and racketeering, not promoting Raynor’s image.
    But as in Moore, the indictment and evidence support a
    finding that “killing to enhance the conspiracy’s power [and]
    protect the reputation of the conspiracy and its members” was
    among the major purposes of the 
    conspiracy. 651 F.3d at 94
    (“[T]he superseding indictment and evidence at trial make
    clear that one of the principal goals of the drug conspiracy
    was. . . .”). In any event, all that D.C. law requires is that the
    act be “in furtherance of the conspiracy,” not necessarily of
    its principal objective. 
    Gordon, 783 A.2d at 582
    (emphasis
    added). Although Oliver points to Andrews’s testimony that
    117
    Floyd’s shooting was the result of personal pique rather than a
    benefit to Gray’s group, Andrews said of his associates, “All
    of us was one big family. . . . [I]f one of us had a problem, all
    of us had a problem.” J.A. 2108. Viewed in the light most
    favorable to the government, that evidence was enough to find
    that the shooting was in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
    
    Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375
    .
    On the second prong of Pinkerton, the evidence was also
    sufficient that Raynor’s shooting of Floyd was “reasonably
    foreseeable” to Oliver. 
    Gordon, 783 A.2d at 582
    . After the
    murder, Raynor told Andrews that Oliver had given Raynor
    the gun, and Oliver himself confirmed to Robles that he had
    given Raynor the gun; Oliver could thus have foreseen the use
    of that gun. Oliver could also have foreseen the specific
    crime: Robles testified that on the night of the murder Oliver
    told her that Raynor shot Floyd because
    A. . . . [T]he younger boys around there was playing
    with him [Raynor] and they wouldn’t stop playing
    with him.
    Q. Playing with him how?
    A. Like I guess disrespect, like when you tell
    somebody “Stop playing with me.”
    J.A. 3361-62. There was also testimony that Raynor watched
    Floyd (“Willy”) and his friend Albino Buck “for a few
    minutes” “ducking,” “flashing like they had something,” and
    “putting their hands down their pants, you know, like they
    was pulling guns out,” apparently at approximately the time
    that Oliver handed Raynor a gun. 
    Id. at 3728-29.
    To be
    sufficient, the evidence “need not exclude every reasonable
    hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every
    conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v. Maxwell,
    118
    
    920 F.2d 1028
    , 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990). A rational jury could
    thus infer that Oliver had seen these events and that the
    murder of Floyd was reasonably foreseeable to him when he
    gave Raynor the gun. (Although the “pulling guns out”
    testimony might have supported a claim that the killing was in
    self-defense, that possibility did not preclude the jury from
    finding a purpose to advance the conspiracy’s goal of
    promoting its reputation.)
    Oliver claims that reversal is nevertheless necessary since
    a verdict must “be set aside in cases where the verdict is
    supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is
    impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.” Yates v.
    United States, 
    354 U.S. 298
    , 312 (1957), overruled on other
    grounds, Burks v. United States, 
    437 U.S. 1
    (1978). Oliver
    contends that we cannot tell whether the jury convicted him
    by following the improper aiding-and-abetting instruction or
    by following the Pinkerton instruction, which he does not
    challenge. We need not address this argument, however,
    because Oliver forfeited it by raising it only in his reply brief.
    See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 93
    n.22 (dismissing the same Yates
    argument, which was raised there without citation in a
    footnote of the opening brief); United States v. Van Smith,
    
    530 F.3d 967
    , 973 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (dismissing an argument
    raised in the reply brief).
    XVII. Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing and
    Rebuttal Arguments
    Appellants claim that they are entitled to a new trial
    because of improper prosecutorial remarks during closing and
    rebuttal arguments. While we strongly disapprove of the
    prosecution’s theme in its rebuttal closing argument, we
    ultimately find no reversible error.
    119
    We review improper prosecutorial argument for
    substantial prejudice if defendants objected, and review only
    for plain error if they did not. See Moore, 
    651 F.3d 50
    .
    Under either standard, the question whether improper
    prosecutorial argument caused sufficient prejudice to warrant
    reversal turns on: “(1) the closeness of the case; (2) the
    centrality of the issue affected by the error; and (3) the steps
    taken to mitigate the error’s effects.” 
    Id. at 50-51
    (quoting
    United States v. Becton, 
    601 F.3d 588
    , 598 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).
    “When, as here, the alleged prosecutorial misconduct forms
    the basis for an unsuccessful motion for a mistrial, our review
    of the district court’s denial of that motion is for abuse of
    discretion.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 50
    .
    “The sole purpose of closing argument is to assist the
    jury in analyzing the evidence[.]” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 52
    (quoting United States v. Bailey, 
    123 F.3d 1381
    , 1400 (11th
    Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, counsel may not make factual
    assertions during closing argument if there is no evidentiary
    basis for them. See, e.g., United States v. Maddox, 
    156 F.3d 1280
    , 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]n closing argument counsel
    may not refer to, or rely upon, evidence unless the trial court
    has admitted it.”) (collecting similar cases).
    Counsel also may not offer personal opinions on which
    witnesses are telling the truth or on the defendants’ guilt or
    innocence; those matters are solely for the jury to determine
    from the evidence. See 
    Brown, 508 F.3d at 1075
    ; see also
    MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2013)
    (lawyers may not “allude to any matter that the lawyer does
    not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported
    by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in
    issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal
    opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a
    witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or
    120
    innocence of an accused”).       Nor may counsel “make
    comments designed to inflame the passions or prejudices of
    the jury.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 51
    (quoting United States v.
    Johnson, 
    231 F.3d 43
    , 47 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
    Appellants complain about numerous prosecutorial
    statements made during closing and rebuttal arguments. We
    find deeply troubling one significant aspect of the
    government’s rebuttal argument—what it dubs “the
    ‘playbook’ theme[.]” Appellee’s Br. 221. We find no merit
    to the other challenges that appellants raise.
    A.
    The prosecutor who presented the government’s closing
    rebuttal argument made up the “playbook theme” by referring
    to letters found in the cell of Patrick Andrews, a defense
    witness for Ronald Alfred. J.A. 5372, 5373. Those letters
    discussed ways to distort and falsify evidence in a criminal
    prosecution. The prosecutor implied that appellants, their
    counsel, and certain defense witnesses had consulted those
    letters—the “playbook”—to collude on presenting a false
    defense in this case:
    What [Andrews] showed you through his letters
    were a series of propositions that helped defendants
    put together false defenses, and I’m going to use this
    as a guide, and hopefully we’re going to talk about
    how it is a number of the defendants and some of the
    defense attorneys took advantage of Patrick
    Andrews’ playbook on how to put together a false
    defense.
    
    Id. at 5372.
                                   121
    After that aspersion of the defense’s entire courtroom
    effort, the prosecutor repeatedly read from more of Andrews’s
    letters, calling them “chapters” in appellants’ “playbook” that
    were purportedly manifested in the defense’s efforts.
    According to the prosecutor, those “chapters” covered, among
    other topics, intimidating witnesses, deliberately misleading
    the jurors, and following a false script. See, e.g., 
    id. at 5372
    (“Chapter one. . . . What’s the goal regarding you folks, the
    jurors? Well, the playbook tells us, ‘It’s all about convincing
    them twelve people that it could have been anybody but
    you.’”); 
    id. at 5373
    (“Chapter two. It’s about identifying who
    the cooperating witnesses are.”); 
    id. at 5374
    (“Here’s chapter
    three . . . [:] ‘I want you to know, if you cross me [by
    cooperating], it’s not ever going to be over. I’m warring with
    your family and my family is warring with you,’ close quote.
    That’s what you tell the cooperating witnesses.”); 
    id. at 5377
    (reading from the “playbook” and arguing that the playbook’s
    strategy was seen in this case); 
    id. at 5378
    (“false script”); 
    id. at 5380
    (“I pulled out this page from the playbook.”).
    The government’s rebuttal argument lasted three hours,
    circling back a number of times to the defendants-are-putting-
    on-a-false-defense narrative. 
    Id. at 5394-95
    (arguing about a
    witness memorizing a false script and pointing to a “circle of
    collusion” resulting from “[f]ollowing the play book”); 
    id. at 5401-02
    (arguing that a witness was following a script and
    stating: “Sort of brings us right to the play book doesn’t it,
    brings us right to the play book. . . . Right to the play book. .
    . . Talk about the play book.”); 
    id. at 5409
    (“Of course, Deon
    actually wrote his own chapter in the play book didn’t he.”);
    
    id. at 5414
    (“That’s Deon Oliver taking a chapter out of
    Patrick Andrews’ play book. . . . [T]aking Chapter III out of
    the play book, Patrick Andrews’ play book[.]”); 
    id. at 5416
    (“Tried that, tried to follow the play book, but again, lies are
    122
    easy to expose.”); 
    id. at 5417
    (“He took a page right out of the
    play book didn’t he.”).
    The government now concedes that the playbook theme’s
    implication “that appellants, their counsel, or the defense
    witnesses had consulted the letters seized from Andrews’ cell
    in formulating the defense strategy . . . was without any
    factual basis,” Appellee’s Br. 221-22, and the argument was
    “in some respects, ill-advised,” 
    id. at 221.
    “Ill-advised” indeed. The prosecution’s argument theme
    and statements were entirely improper, unprofessional, and
    wholly unbefitting of those who litigate in the name of the
    United States of America. There was no evidentiary basis for
    even inferring, let alone repeatedly trumpeting, that appellants
    knew anything about Andrews’s letters. See United States v.
    Valdez, 
    723 F.3d 206
    , 209 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (prosecutor’s
    remarks were improper where there was “no factual basis” for
    them). Worse still, under our Constitution, prosecutors have
    no business in gratuitously maligning as lies, falsehoods, and
    corruption, without any evidentiary basis, the defendants’
    exercise of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to present
    a defense in court. Cf. United States ex. rel. Macon v. Yeager,
    
    476 F.2d 613
    , 615 (3d Cir. 1973) (prosecutor may not seek to
    raise in the jurors’ mind an inference of guilt from the
    defendant’s exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights).
    Prosecutors “ha[ve] an obligation ‘to avoid making
    statements of fact to the jury not supported by proper
    evidence introduced during trial,’” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 51
    (quoting Gaither v. United States, 
    413 F.2d 1061
    , 1079 (D.C.
    Cir. 1969)), and this court expects prosecutors to litigate with
    the recognition that they represent “a sovereignty whose
    obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
    obligation to govern at all,” Berger v. United States, 
    295 U.S. 123
    78, 88 (1935). A just outcome obtained through a fair, even-
    handed, and reliable process should be the government’s goal;
    it is not to win at any cost.
    District courts, too, must remain vigilant. While counsel
    may be afforded a long leash in closing argument, they should
    not be given free rein. Courts must stand in the gap to protect
    defendants and the judicial process from abusive arguments
    like this. That did not happen here. Appellants repeatedly
    objected, and “[w]hy the district court refused to sustain the
    defense objection[s] is beyond us,” 
    Maddox, 156 F.3d at 1283
    . “When a prosecutor starts telling the jury” that the
    defendants, their lawyers, and some of their witnesses all
    consulted the same letters—a so-called playbook for a false
    defense—without any factual basis to support that argument,
    “it is time not merely to sustain an objection but to issue a
    stern rebuke and a curative instruction, or if there can be no
    cure, to entertain a motion for a mistrial.” 
    Id. Instead, the
    district court wrongly, and without explanation, denied
    appellants’ repeated objections to this blatantly impermissible
    closing argument.
    While we find the closing argument to be deeply
    troubling, we cannot conclude on the record of this case that it
    actually resulted in substantial prejudice. “[T]here was
    overwhelming evidence of appellants’ guilt,” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 53
    ; the “case was not close,” 
    Becton, 601 F.3d at 599
    .
    In addition, the playbook theme was not mentioned in the
    government’s initial closing argument, and was primarily
    confined to the first hour of the three hour rebuttal argument.
    The misconduct was thus limited “to relatively small portions
    of lengthy . . . closing [and rebuttal] arguments.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 54
    . Just as a short and simple trial can make a
    “prosecutor’s improper remarks all the more potent,”
    
    Maddox, 156 F.3d at 1283
    , here the length of the trial (nearly
    124
    six months) and the relatively cabined nature of the improper
    conduct mitigated any possible prejudice to appellants.
    Finally, the district court specifically instructed the jury
    right before it began deliberating that “[t]he opening
    statements and closing arguments of counsel are also not
    evidence,” J.A. 5450; see 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 53
    -54. Such an
    instruction “is usually a strong ameliorative consideration”
    when evaluating “prosecutorial misconduct during . . . closing
    argument[.]” 
    Id. at 54
    (citations omitted).
    B.
    Appellants challenge several other statements made
    during the government’s closing and rebuttal arguments.
    Those challenges fall into three general categories.14
    First, appellants point to several statements that they
    claim were designed to inflame the passions and prejudices of
    the jury. The prosecutor, for example, began closing
    argument by describing one alleged victim as having “his
    whole life ahead of him,” J.A. 5256, while another was
    unaware “that these are the last steps he will ever take,” 
    id. at 14
        Appellants objected to most, but not all, of the statements that
    they challenge on appeal. We would ordinarily review the
    unobjected-to statements only for plain error. But because
    prejudice is required to warrant reversal under either substantial-
    prejudice or plain-error review, and the absence of prejudice is
    dispositive here, we need not differentiate between those two
    standards to resolve this case. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 50
    –51
    (factors guiding prejudice inquiry under either standard are (i) the
    closeness of the case, (ii) the centrality of the issue affected by the
    error, and (iii) the steps taken to mitigate the error’s effects).
    125
    5257. Later in the closing argument, the prosecutor referred
    to the incalculable “devastation and grief” appellants had
    caused “[i]n their relentless pursuit of money and power,”
    including the “[k]ilos and kilos of poison being released onto
    the streets.” 
    Id. at 5311.
    Those “days of power and money,”
    the prosecutor declared, “are over[.]” 
    Id. Second, appellants
    contend that the prosecutors
    impermissibly opined on key issues by vouching for a witness
    and offering personal views on who actually shot Lincoln
    Hunter.     In particular, the prosecutor who gave the
    government’s closing argument commented on the credibility
    of Eugene “Weetie” Williams, a cooperating witness who
    testified against Seegers, by stating that “[y]ou know . . .
    Weetie was telling you the truth.” 
    Id. at 5272-73.
    And the
    prosecutor who gave the government’s rebuttal argument
    stated: “We all know . . . [w]ho shot Lincoln. Loud mouth
    knuckle head that he is Franklin Seegers.” 
    Id. at 54
    07.
    Third, appellants object to the prosecutor’s improper
    comments on defense tactics, such as the assertion during
    rebuttal that defense counsel’s vigorous cross-examination of
    cooperating witnesses evidenced appellants’ fear of those
    witnesses. 
    Id. at 5367-69.
    They also object to that same
    prosecutor’s statement that the PowerPoint slide show used
    during closing argument by Seegers’s counsel was a “slick”
    presentation designed to divert the jury’s attention from the
    evidence. 
    Id. at 54
    01.
    Even assuming all of those statements were improper,
    they do not warrant reversal even when viewed cumulatively
    alongside the improper playbook theme. Most of the
    statements were fleeting, and few touched on issues central to
    the case. The district court instructed the jury that the
    arguments of counsel are not evidence. 
    Id. at 54
    50. The
    126
    lengthy deliberations suggest that the jury took that
    instruction to heart and weighed the evidence, unswayed by
    whatever passions and prejudices the prosecutors’ statements
    might have attempted to stoke. And, as we have noted before,
    the evidentiary case against appellants was truly
    overwhelming. We are confident beyond any reasonable
    doubt that appellants did not suffer substantial prejudice from
    the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and for that reason, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their
    motion for a new trial.
    XVIII. Brady/Giglio Disclosures (Seegers)
    The Constitution’s “fair trial guarantee,” United States v.
    Ruiz, 
    536 U.S. 622
    , 628 (2002), requires the prosecution to
    timely turn over any information in the government’s
    possession that is materially favorable to a criminal
    defendant, Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963), including
    evidence that could be used to impeach government
    witnesses, Giglio v. United States, 
    405 U.S. 150
    (1972).
    Whether the government violated its obligations under Brady
    or Giglio is a question of law that we review de novo. See
    
    Johnson, 519 F.3d at 488
    (Brady); United States v. Celis, 
    608 F.3d 818
    , 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Giglio).
    Seegers requested pretrial that the government disclose
    all Brady/Giglio information. The government, however, did
    not disclose seventeen-year-old copies of a psychological
    evaluation and a prison disciplinary report for a key
    government witness, Lincoln Hunter. Hunter testified against
    Seegers for the crimes of assault with intent to murder Hunter
    and of murdering Diane Luther. Seegers discovered the
    records during the trial, but after Hunter had testified. In
    Seegers’s view, those undisclosed documents evidence that
    Hunter was a violent man and a threat to society. Seegers
    127
    argues that that information was important to the jury’s
    assessment of his defense that Hunter murdered Luther and
    that Seegers shot Hunter in self-defense while trying to break
    up that fight. Seegers contends that the government’s failure
    to disclose the impeachment evidence violated Brady and
    Giglio.
    The district court initially denied Seegers’s motions for a
    mistrial, to reopen Hunter’s cross-examination, and to call
    Hunter as a defense witness without any accompanying
    explanation. On Seegers’s motion for reconsideration, the
    district court explained that the documents were not
    admissible because the psychological report’s “probative
    value is totally outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,”
    and the dated disciplinary report was “not evidence of a trait
    or character; it’s just a specific instan[ce].” J.A. 4909-10.
    Accordingly, those reports “would not be admissible.” 
    Id. at 4910.
    To prevail, Seegers must demonstrate “a reasonable
    probability that an earlier disclosure” of the records “would
    have changed the trial’s result.” United States v. Bell, 
    795 F.3d 88
    , 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
    Andrews, 
    532 F.3d 900
    , 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Seegers has
    failed in that task for two reasons.
    First, the government’s failure to disclose the records
    could not have had any effect on the outcome of the criminal
    trial because the district court ruled that the records were
    inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Seegers
    has not challenged that evidentiary ruling on appeal or
    presented any argument that would demonstrate either an
    abuse of discretion or plain error in the district court’s
    determination that the reports were inadmissible. United
    128
    States v. Mejia, 
    597 F.3d 1329
    , 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“We
    review admissibility rulings for abuse of discretion.”).15
    Second and in any event, the nondisclosure could not
    have resulted in any cognizable prejudice. To begin with, the
    jury was unable to reach a verdict on Seegers’s alleged role in
    Luther’s murder, so there is no conviction to overturn for that
    charge. With respect to the charge of assault with intent to
    murder Hunter, the nearly two-decades-old reports were far
    too stale to have any probative bearing on the issue of
    Hunter’s aggressive character, J.A. 4909-10, and at best
    would have been “merely cumulative” of the more potent and
    contemporary evidence of Hunter’s jealous and violent
    character that Seegers did introduce, United States v. Brodie,
    
    524 F.3d 259
    , 269-70 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See United States v.
    Oruche, 
    484 F.3d 590
    , 599 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (same, where
    witness was “thoroughly impeached” at trial).
    XIX. Motions for Severance and Mistrial (Seegers, J.
    Alfred)
    Seegers argues that the district court erred in refusing
    before trial to sever his case from that of his codefendants.
    15
    At most, Seegers mentions in passing in his reply brief that the
    reports would have been admitted had they been disclosed earlier.
    Appellants’ Reply Br. 112. That will not suffice to preserve the
    argument for appellate review. See DiBacco v. United States Army,
    
    795 F.3d 178
    , 193 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“We do not ordinarily consider
    arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, and we see no
    good reason for doing so here.”); Payne v. District of Columbia
    Government, 
    722 F.3d 345
    , 354 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (mentioning the
    First Amendment in a brief’s table of authorities and argument
    heading, and in a single sentence describing claims in district court,
    did not preserve a First Amendment claim for review).
    129
    Together with James Alfred, Seegers also argues that the
    court erred in denying subsequent motions for severance filed
    during trial following the misbehavior of their codefendants.16
    A.
    Prior to trial, Seegers moved to sever his case from his
    codefendants, citing the allegedly limited nature of his
    participation in the charged conspiracy. While the district
    court denied severance, the court did divide appellants into
    two groups for trial, with the leaders of the conspiracy tried
    separately in the Moore proceeding. In the court’s view, that
    division was “a reasonable compromise between the
    competing interests.” United States v. Gray, 
    173 F. Supp. 2d 1
    , 18 (D.D.C. 2001).
    At trial, McGill, Simmons, Ronald Alfred, and Oliver all
    engaged in various courtroom conduct that Seegers and James
    Alfred cite as unfairly prejudicing them. That conduct
    included inappropriate comments before the jury, testimony
    and allegedly one-sided interactions suggesting that the other
    defendants knew Seegers and James, verbal disagreements
    with the district court’s rulings, alleged witness intimidation
    by Oliver, and the March 29th outburst that led to McGill’s
    16
    To the extent Seegers purports to adopt additional arguments
    made only in his district court briefs, we reject that effort and
    conclude that any such argument made on appeal without citations
    to the record or relevant authority is forfeited. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 97
    . For similar reasons, we reject the conclusory efforts by
    Simmons, Ronald Alfred, and Oliver to adopt Seegers’s and James
    Alfred’s severance and misjoinder arguments, particularly since the
    arguments addressed in this section rely on the specific charges
    brought and evidence presented against Seegers and James Alfred
    and their own nondisruptive behavior at trial.
    130
    forcible removal from the courtroom. Seegers and James
    Alfred both renewed their motions for severance at trial on
    multiple occasions, which the district court denied.
    In the final jury instructions, jurors were specifically
    directed not to consider McGill’s outburst in their
    deliberations. The district court also instructed them that:
    Unless I have instructed you otherwise, you should
    consider each instruction that the Court has given to
    apply separately and individually to each defendant
    on trial.     Likewise, you should give separate
    consideration and render separate verdicts with
    respect to each defendant. Each defendant is entitled
    to have his guilt or innocence of the crime for which
    he is on trial determined from his own conduct and
    from the evidence that applies to him, as if he were
    being tried alone. The guilt or innocence of any one
    defendant should not control or influence your
    verdict as to the other defendants. You may find any
    one or more of the defendants guilty or not guilty on
    any one or more of the counts in the indictment. At
    any time during your deliberations, you may return
    your verdict of guilty or not guilty with respect to
    any defendant on any charge, after which you will
    resume your deliberations as to the other remaining
    defendants and charges.
    J.A. 5456.
    The district court denied Seegers’s posttrial motion
    repeating his argument that a mistrial and severance should
    have been granted based on his codefendants’ misbehavior.
    The court held that its instructions cured any prejudice and
    further noted that ordering a new trial on such a basis would
    allow defendants, through their misbehavior, to prevent joint
    131
    trials from ever going forward. See Simmons, 
    431 F. Supp. 2d
    at 69-70.
    B.
    We review the denial of a motion for severance or a
    mistrial for abuse of discretion. 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 95
    ;
    
    McLendon, 378 F.3d at 1112
    . “The trial court has great
    discretion in severance matters,” though, “with the balance
    generally to be struck in favor of joint trials.” United States v.
    Slade, 
    627 F.2d 293
    , 309 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). The presumption in favor of joinder “is
    especially strong where the respective charges require
    presentation of much the same evidence, testimony of the
    same witnesses, and involve . . . defendants who are charged,
    inter alia, with participating in the same illegal acts.”
    
    Richardson, 167 F.3d at 624
    (quoting United States v. Ford,
    
    870 F.2d 729
    , 731 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (ellipses omitted). A
    district court’s refusal to grant a severance will “be affirmed
    even if the circumstances are such that a grant of severance
    would have been sustainable.’” United States v. Brown, 
    16 F.3d 423
    , 427 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
    No abuse of discretion occurred here. The Federal Rules,
    it bears noting, expressly countenance that joinder may result
    in some prejudice to a defendant; severance becomes
    mandatory only “where the failure to sever denies the
    defendant a fair trial.” United States v. Wright, 
    783 F.2d 1091
    , 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Severance may also be
    warranted when “there is a serious risk that a joint trial would
    compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or
    prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt
    or innocence.” 
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 374
    (quoting Zafiro v.
    United States, 
    506 U.S. 534
    , 539 (1993)).
    132
    Otherwise, “[a]bsent a dramatic disparity of evidence,
    any prejudice caused by joinder is best dealt with by
    instructions to the jury to give individual consideration to
    each defendant.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 95
    (quoting 
    Slade, 627 F.2d at 309
    ); see also 
    id. at 96
    (“[W]hen there is ‘substantial
    and independent evidence of each defendant’s significant
    involvement in the conspiracy,’ severance is not required.”)
    (brackets omitted) (quoting 
    Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1399
    ).
    Seegers first argues that the district court should have
    granted his pretrial motion for severance. We disagree.
    Seegers participated in the same narcotics and RICO
    conspiracies for which all six defendants were charged. In
    fact, the evidence presented at trial suggested that, for at least
    some time period in 1996, Seegers served as an “overseer”
    within the conspiracy. J.A. 2818. That active participation in
    the jointly charged conspiracy “functioned as the ‘connective
    tissue’” that made joinder appropriate. See 
    Richardson, 167 F.3d at 625
    . Seegers stresses the violent nature of the
    conspiracy generally. But that argument overlooks that
    Seegers himself was charged with murder and was convicted
    of attempted murder for his own actions within the
    conspiracy.
    In addition, much if not all of the evidence introduced in
    this case would also have been admissible even had Seegers
    been tried individually because it could have been used to
    demonstrate the nature of the conspiracy he joined. See
    United States v. Gbemisola, 
    225 F.3d 753
    , 761 (D.C. Cir.
    2000) (no prejudice resulting from joinder because “[a]ll of
    the evidence admitted at the joint trial could properly have
    been admitted at a separate trial to show the nature of the drug
    distribution scheme in which [the defendant] was an active
    participant”); see also 
    Mathis, 216 F.3d at 26
    (noting the
    “considerable leeway” the government has to offer evidence
    133
    of other offenses in conspiracy cases). As we explained in
    Moore, whatever the differential between the number of
    crimes Seegers was charged with and the extent of his
    involvement in the conspiracy, the disparity in the evidence
    was not so great as to mandate severance. 
    See 651 F.3d at 96
    .
    Furthermore, the district court gave the same instructions
    that we upheld in Moore, directing the jury to undertake an
    individualized consideration of the guilt of each defendant.
    See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 96
    ; see also 
    Mejia, 448 F.3d at 446
    (no abuse of discretion in denying severance where “jury
    could reasonably compartmentalize the evidence introduced
    against each individual defendant”) (quoting United States v.
    Halliman, 
    923 F.2d 873
    , 884 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). And the jury
    must have heeded that instruction because it did not convict
    Seegers of Diane Luther’s murder. Cf. United States v.
    Chandia, 
    514 F.3d 365
    , 375 (4th Cir. 2008) (verdict
    acquitting defendant on one substantive count “suggests that
    the jury conducted a rational evaluation of the evidence in
    reaching its verdict and was not misled by emotion”).
    Seegers and James Alfred also challenge the denial of
    severance or a mistrial as the case progressed and, in their
    view, as actual prejudice manifested itself. They are correct
    in arguing that, even if severance is properly denied pretrial,
    the district court has “a continuing duty at all stages of the
    trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear.” United
    States v. Perry, 
    731 F.2d 985
    , 992 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting
    Schaffer v. United States, 
    362 U.S. 511
    , 516 (1960)). But
    they are not correct that severance was later required in this
    case.
    To a large extent, Seegers’s and James Alfred’s
    arguments echo those made for a mistrial based on McGill’s
    conduct. But the “single most important consideration in
    134
    ruling on a motion for a mistrial is the extent to which the
    defendant was unfairly prejudiced.” 
    McLendon, 378 F.3d at 1112
    . The relevant factors include “the force of the unfairly
    prejudicial evidence, whether that force was mitigated by
    curative instructions, and the weight of the admissible
    evidence that supports the verdict.” 
    Id. Those factors
    favor
    the district court’s judgment here.
    Both the nature of McGill’s outburst and the prompt
    curative instructions dissipated any potential prejudice from
    that incident.     The other instances of misconduct by
    codefendants, such as speaking out of turn, were far less
    disruptive than McGill’s outburst and often were followed by
    an instruction to the jury to disregard the misconduct. In one
    instance, a codefendant’s testimony introduced inadmissible
    facts, including that some coconspirators were potentially
    facing the death penalty. The references, however, were
    fleeting. In any event, only McGill objected—and there
    certainly was no plain error as to Seegers and James Alfred.17
    Seegers and James Alfred also object to the impression of
    familiarity that Oliver’s one-sided interactions with them in
    front of the jury might have created. But severance is rarely
    required even when codefendants pursue conflicting defenses.
    See 
    Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538
    (“Mutually antagonistic defenses
    17
    To be clear, in some circumstances, a codefendant’s misbehavior
    could be so extreme as to give rise to prejudice that could not be
    mitigated by curative instructions, and then a mistrial or severance
    would be required. See United States v. Mannie, 
    509 F.3d 851
    , 857
    (7th Cir. 2007) (prejudice warranting mistrial resulted from a jury’s
    exposure to a codefendant “garbed in prison attire verbally
    assaulting his attorneys, a campaign of intimidation by members of
    the gallery, [and] a violent courtroom brawl”). Nothing so likely to
    produce incurable prejudice happened here.
    135
    are not prejudicial per se.”); see also 
    id. at 540
    (“A defendant
    normally would not be entitled to exclude the testimony of a
    former codefendant if the district court did sever their
    trials.”). So those conflicting atmospherics will not suffice
    either.
    Finally, Seegers and James Alfred argue that they were
    prejudiced by the introduction of evidence of Oliver’s
    attempts to intimidate a witness (Willie Fears) that Seegers
    had called at trial. Oliver’s unilateral misconduct, in other
    words, impeached one of Seegers’s witnesses. The problem
    with this argument is that, once the intimidation occurred, the
    witness’s testimony was impeachable on that basis no matter
    who presented it and in which trial. There is thus no basis for
    concluding that the impeachment would have been different
    had Seegers been tried separately.18
    In short, while their codefendants’ misbehavior was
    unfortunate, the incidents complained of were just a small part
    of a long trial, in which overwhelming evidence of James
    Alfred’s and Seegers’s guilt was presented. The addition of
    curative and limiting instructions prevented any remaining
    prejudice from rising to the high level required to warrant a
    mistrial or severance.
    18
    While Seegers and James Alfred add an objection to the
    “playbook themed” government rebuttal argument in their reply
    brief, that argument duplicates appellants’ joint challenge to the
    government’s closing argument. Any severance-specific dimension
    to the argument is forfeited by the failure to present it in the
    opening brief. See Van 
    Smith, 530 F.3d at 973
    .
    136
    XX. Conspiracy and Attempted Murder Convictions
    (Seegers)
    Seegers also argues that the evidence introduced at trial
    was insufficient to convict him of narcotics conspiracy, RICO
    conspiracy, and three charges relating to the attempted murder
    of Lincoln Hunter. We disagree.
    The parties have a preliminary argument over what
    evidence is relevant on the sufficiency issue.              The
    government, though conceding that evidence of drugs found
    in Seegers’s home was admitted in violation of the
    Confrontation Clause, nonetheless maintains that in reviewing
    sufficiency we must consider all admitted evidence,
    regardless of whether its admission was error. For this it cites
    United States v. Alexander, 
    331 F.3d 116
    , 128 (D.C. Cir.
    2003), which in turn cites Lockhart v. Nelson, 
    488 U.S. 33
    ,
    39-42 (1988). But the observation in Alexander was clearly
    dictum, as we expressly held that the evidence in question had
    been properly admitted. See 
    id. We do
    not, however, read Lockhart as addressing
    whether erroneously admitted evidence may be considered on
    a standalone insufficiency claim. It considered a nuance of
    jurisprudence under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court
    had already held that the clause permits retrial where a court
    of appeals has overturned a conviction for a garden-variety
    trial error such as mistakenly admitting evidence. United
    States v. Tateo, 
    377 U.S. 463
    , 466 (1964). In Burks v. United
    States, 
    437 U.S. 1
    (1978), the Court limited that principle,
    declining to allow retrial where the trial error was failure to
    grant a motion for judgment of acquittal for insufficiency of
    evidence. Lockhart considered whether, in drawing the line
    between these two situations, a case where the evidence
    would have been insufficient in the absence of erroneously
    137
    admitted evidence should be treated as an insufficiency case,
    where retrial would be impermissible. The Court held that it
    should not: even if the erroneously admitted evidence was
    essential to put the government over the top, retrial is allowed.
    
    Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 40-42
    . There was no discussion of
    whether in reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence we may
    consider erroneously admitted evidence.
    Here, disregard of the erroneously admitted evidence
    does not leave the prosecution’s case so weak that a jury
    could not reasonably convict. In such a case, the distinction
    drawn in Lockhart makes no difference. Accordingly we do
    not reach the issue. (We note, however, that if sufficiency is
    decided without the erroneously admitted evidence, then the
    two instances distinguished in Lockhart tend to merge: where
    disregard of erroneously admitted evidence leaves the
    government’s case insufficient, there has been both error and
    insufficiency.)
    Here, completely disregarding the material admitted in
    violation of the Confrontation Clause, we find the evidence
    sufficient to convict Seegers of the narcotics and RICO
    conspiracy charges. Seegers argues that the evidence linked
    him to the conspiracy only before 1996, whereas the
    indictment charged him with joining the conspiracies in 1996.
    For example, Williams testified that Seegers would come to
    Williams’s home to assist in dealing drugs in “late ’95.” J.A.
    2817-18. Other parts of Williams’s testimony, however,
    linked Seegers to the conspiracy in 1996. For instance,
    Williams testified that Seegers was serving as PeeWee
    Oliver’s “enforcer or overseer” when Luther was killed in
    “October or November” of 1996, 
    id. at 2820-21,
    and said that
    Seegers was selling drugs supplied by Moore after Luther’s
    murder. (Because this evidence placed Seegers in the
    conspiracy in the fall of 1996 and later, the parties’ dispute
    138
    over whether the evidence must reflect his membership in
    “1996” as in the indictment, 
    id. at 1832,
    or in “November
    1996” as in the jury instructions, 
    id. at 5453,
    is irrelevant.)
    We also find that a rational jury could convict Seegers of
    the charges relating to the attempted killing of Hunter.
    Hunter testified that Seegers shot him. Seegers provides what
    he says are reasons to doubt Hunter’s credibility, such as
    medical records supposedly contradicting Hunter’s testimony
    and Hunter’s grand-jury testimony absolving Seegers of
    responsibility for the Luther shooting. But it is the jury’s
    responsibility to determine credibility and weigh the evidence,
    not ours. United States v. Clark, 
    184 F.3d 858
    , 863 (D.C. Cir.
    1999). The jury here apparently credited Hunter’s testimony
    in convicting Seegers, and we do not disturb its finding.
    XXII. Narcotics Conspiracy Conviction (Simmons)
    Appellant Kenneth Simmons challenges his narcotics
    conspiracy conviction. (We will refer to appellant Simmons
    by his last name; when we mean to refer to one of the
    conspiracy’s victims, Richard Simmons, we will so specify.)
    Simmons argues that, although the indictment charged him
    with participation in a single, large narcotics conspiracy, the
    evidence at trial at most established the existence of multiple,
    ad hoc conspiracies rather than one overarching conspiracy.
    Whether the prosecution’s evidence at trial proves a
    single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies is a question of fact
    for the jury. 
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 375
    . Here, the jury
    concluded that a single conspiracy existed. Our role therefore
    is limited. We review the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the government and ask only whether “any rational trier of
    fact” could have found the elements of a single conspiracy
    beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Graham, 
    83 F.3d 139
    1466, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting 
    Washington, 12 F.3d at 1135
    ). We find that standard satisfied.
    The jury found Simmons guilty of narcotics conspiracy in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Simmons argues that, while
    “the indictment alleged a single overarching conspiracy in
    which [he] was claimed to have played a major role over a
    long period of time,” the evidence at trial instead “established
    multiple ad hoc conspiracies composed of different members
    playing different roles over different periods of time and with
    differing purposes.” Appellants’ Br. 253. According to
    Simmons, he was “sometime[s] a member of these varied
    conspiracies,” but “at other times he was a competitor.” 
    Id. To secure
    reversal of his conspiracy conviction under that line
    of argument, Simmons would need to show both (i) that the
    evidence introduced at trial established only multiple
    conspiracies rather than the one conspiracy alleged in the
    indictment, and (ii) “that because of the multiplicity of
    defendants and conspiracies, the jury was substantially likely
    to transfer evidence from one conspiracy to a defendant
    involved in another.” 
    Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1391
    . We reject
    Simmons’s challenge at the first step.
    “In determining whether a single conspiracy existed, as
    opposed to separate unrelated activities or multiple
    conspiracies, we look for several factors, including whether
    participants shared a common goal . . . ; interdependence
    between the alleged participants in the conspiracy; and,
    though less significant, overlap among alleged participants.”
    
    Graham, 83 F.3d at 1471
    . Considering those factors in this
    case, we conclude that the government introduced ample
    evidence from which the jury could infer the existence of the
    single, large conspiracy charged in the indictment.
    140
    As alleged in the indictment and supported by the
    evidence at trial, one purpose of the conspiracy was to “obtain
    money and other things of value” through the distribution of
    illegal drugs. J.A. 482. All of the allegedly “ad hoc”
    conspiracies Simmons identifies shared that same purpose:
    “possession and distribution of narcotics for profit,” 
    Graham, 83 F.3d at 1471
    (quoting 
    Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1393
    ). And
    the testimony at trial showed significant overlap and
    interdependence      among      those    ostensibly    separate
    conspiracies. Although Simmons argues that he and Fleming
    combined to form their own separate conspiracy, the jury
    heard evidence that Simmons engaged in an interlocking web
    of drug transactions geared toward the common purpose of
    possession and distribution of narcotics for profit with other
    key players. For example, at various times Simmons bought
    and sold drugs to or from Moore, Gray, James Alfred, and
    Oliver.    The government’s evidence also showed that
    Simmons owned a store that acted as a meeting place for the
    large conspiracy’s drug deals: Fleming testified that drug
    transactions occurred in the store “[b]asically every day,” and
    that “[e]verybody used to come through” the store, including
    Moore, Gray, Oliver, and Fleming. J.A. 2992-93. From that
    evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that those players
    and transactions were part of one larger conspiracy.
    Simmons argues, however, that the foregoing evidence
    indicates only that he was an occasional buyer or seller of
    controlled substances from the larger conspiracy, rather than a
    member of that conspiracy. Of course, an agreement to
    participate in the larger conspiracy is necessary to sustain
    Simmons’s conspiracy conviction, see 
    Graham, 83 F.3d at 1471
    , and “[t]he relationship of buyer and seller absent any
    prior or contemporaneous understanding beyond the mere
    sales agreement does not prove a conspiracy,” United States
    v. Kimmons, 
    917 F.2d 1011
    , 1016 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting
    141
    United States v. Mancillas, 
    580 F.2d 1301
    , 1307 (7th Cir.
    1978)). But the jury was presented with sufficient evidence
    from which to infer that Simmons agreed to join the large
    conspiracy, as opposed to engaging in a series of
    unconnected, ad hoc transactions.
    We have previously observed that evidence of two
    deliveries of wholesale quantities of drugs suffice to sustain a
    conspiracy conviction because the pattern “suggest[s] a
    continuity of relationship between [the buyer and seller] and
    support[s] the inference that [the defendant] knew that the
    organization to which he was delivering such a sizeable
    amount of drugs must involve a substantial distribution
    network.” United States v. Childress, 
    58 F.3d 693
    , 714 (D.C.
    Cir. 1995). That sort of evidence exists here. Fleming
    testified that Simmons served as his intermediary with Moore
    and frequently brokered transactions between Moore and
    Fleming. The evidence showed that those transactions
    involved wholesale quantities, with street values just shy of
    $30,000 apiece. Evidence that Simmons facilitated multiple
    transactions of wholesale drug quantities “permits an
    inference that [he] had knowledge of the conspiracy and
    intended to join.” United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 
    926 F.2d 172
    , 176 (2d Cir. 1991). That is enough to permit a rational
    jury to find a single conspiracy.
    XXIII. RICO Conspiracy Conviction (Simmons)
    Simmons also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting his RICO conspiracy conviction. “The RICO
    statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), makes it unlawful to conspire to
    violate § 1962(c), which, in turn, provides that it is unlawful
    for anyone ‘employed by or associated with any enterprise
    engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
    foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or
    142
    indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a
    pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
    debt.’” United States v. Eiland, 
    738 F.3d 338
    , 360 (D.C. Cir.
    2013) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
    Simmons raises two arguments for reversal of his RICO
    conspiracy conviction. First, he contends that the government
    failed to prove the existence of a RICO “enterprise.” Second,
    he argues that the government’s evidence failed to
    demonstrate the requisite “pattern of racketeering activity.”
    We ask only whether any rational trier of fact could have
    found those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. See
    
    Graham, 83 F.3d at 1471
    . Applying that standard, we
    conclude that neither of Simmons’s arguments has merit.
    A.
    A RICO conspiracy conviction requires the existence of
    an “enterprise,” defined by the statute to include “any union
    or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
    entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “An association-in-fact
    enterprise must have three structural features: ‘a purpose,
    relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and
    longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the
    enterprise’s purpose.’” 
    Eiland, 738 F.3d at 360
    (quoting
    Boyle v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 938
    , 946 (2009)).
    We understand Simmons to argue that the government
    produced insufficient evidence of the first two structural
    features—i.e., common purpose and relationships among the
    associated coconspirators. We disagree. We note that “the
    evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and
    the evidence establishing an enterprise ‘may in particular
    cases coalesce.’” 
    Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947
    (quoting United
    States v. Turkette, 
    452 U.S. 576
    , 583 (1981)). This is such a
    case.
    143
    1.
    With regard to common purpose, both economic and
    noneconomic motives may form the requisite common
    purpose for a RICO association-in-fact. See United States v.
    Perholtz, 
    842 F.2d 343
    , 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (economic
    motives sufficient); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,
    
    510 U.S. 249
    , 257-58 (1994) (noneconomic motives
    sufficient). The evidence at trial indicated both sorts of
    motives here.
    In terms of economic motive, the jury could readily
    conclude that one of the enterprise’s “purpose[s] was to
    distribute drugs for profit.” 
    Eiland, 738 F.3d at 360
    . The
    same interlocking web of drug transactions supporting
    Simmons’s narcotics conspiracy conviction, see Part XXII
    I, supra
    , also supports the jury’s finding of a RICO enterprise.
    In terms of noneconomic motive, as we have explained in
    sustaining Oliver’s convictions, see Part X
    V, supra
    , the
    evidence supports a finding that the conspiracy’s purposes
    included killing to preserve the conspiracy’s power and
    reputation and to protect its members. One witness testified
    that members of the enterprise were “like a real family. I
    mean, basically, if one of us had a problem, we all had a
    problem. You know, if one of us get [sic] into something, we
    all got in it. That’s how we dealt with each other.” J.A. 1951.
    That witness also stated that Kevin Gray’s reputation meant
    that people working with Gray “knew they had Kevin behind
    them, so basically they could do whatever they wanted to do
    and when they wanted to do it. It wasn’t going to be no
    problem [sic] because they knew we deal with Kevin.” 
    Id. When an
    individual joined the group, others thus became
    “more scared” of him and approached him with “more fear.”
    
    Id. That evidence
    allowed the jury to infer the alleged
    144
    common purpose of providing the mutual protection
    necessary to promote and enhance the reputation and standing
    of the enterprise and its members.
    2.
    We also have little trouble finding that there was
    sufficient evidence of the requisite relationships between the
    associated coconspirators. Individuals acting “independently
    and without coordination” do not form a RICO enterprise.
    United States v. Hosseini, 
    679 F.3d 544
    , 558 (7th Cir. 2012)
    (quoting 
    Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947
    n.4). But individuals form a
    RICO enterprise when they “organize[] themselves so each
    w[ill] carry out a separate role in the distribution chain, with
    [certain parties] overseeing the operation.” 
    Eiland, 738 F.3d at 360
    . There was considerable evidence of such an
    organization here.
    Witnesses testified that Moore was the “head man” of the
    organization and that Gray was the “second man.” J.A. 1952.
    Raynor served as Gray’s “lieutenant.” 
    Id. at 3691.
    Moore
    supplied Pee Wee Oliver, and Pee Wee Oliver employed
    Seegers as a bodyguard. Ronald Alfred supplied Gray, who
    in turn supplied James Alfred. Moore, Gray, and several
    associates were described as “one big family,” with Moore
    giving orders and Gray carrying them out. 
    Id. at 1951-52.
    Moore, Raynor, PeeWee Oliver, and Derrick Moore would
    “strategiz[e]” about “tak[ing] over the neighborhood.” 
    Id. at 2810.
    And Simmons acted as a supplier to Gray, served as
    broker for Moore, and hosted Moore and Gray (among others)
    at his store for their drug transactions. Indeed, while a group
    “need not have a hierarchical structure or a ‘chain of
    command’” to count as an association-in-fact, 
    Boyle, 556 U.S. at 948
    , the evidence here was suggestive of an organization
    approaching that sort of structure.
    145
    In light of the web of interconnectivity, we conclude that
    the government presented sufficient evidence of a RICO
    enterprise. Simmons makes no claim that the jury was
    improperly instructed, but he claims that there was
    insufficient evidence from which the jury could find an
    enterprise. But while Simmons argues that the structure could
    also resemble multiple enterprises instead of a single
    enterprise, it is not our function on appellate review to “parse
    the enterprise’s numerous and wide-ranging activities in an
    effort to decide whether we subjectively consider those
    activities to be more properly consistent with a finding of one,
    two, or three distinct enterprises.” 
    Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 355
    .
    Rather, especially when there is no claim that the jury was
    improperly charged, we must remain “mindful of the jury’s
    inquiry into the existence of the enterprise, and the deference
    to be accorded to the results of that inquiry,” 
    id., and ask
    only
    whether “substantial evidence, viewed most favorably to the
    prosecution,” 
    id., would allow
    a reasonable jury to conclude
    that appellants’ conduct “was neither independent nor lacking
    in coordination,” 
    Hosseini, 679 F.3d at 558
    . The answer to
    that question here is yes.
    B.
    A conviction under RICO also requires proof of
    the existence of a “pattern of racketeering activity.” 
    Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583
    ; see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Such a pattern
    requires “two or more related predicate acts of racketeering
    within a 10-year period.” United States v. Crosby, 
    20 F.3d 480
    , 481 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Alexander v. United
    States, 
    509 U.S. 544
    , 562 (1993)). There was sufficient
    evidence of such a pattern here.
    Simmons was charged with (and the jury found) three
    predicate racketeering acts: (i) the murder of Richard
    146
    Simmons; (ii) conspiracy to commit the murder of a man
    known as Rah-Rah; and (iii) conspiracy to commit the murder
    of Thomas Walker. Only two of those racketeering acts are
    necessary to sustain Simmons’s conviction, see 
    id., and we
    affirm based on the first and third.
    Simmons does not dispute that there was sufficient
    evidence that he solicited the murders of Richard Simmons
    and Thomas Walker. Instead, he characterizes those murders
    as isolated acts unconnected to the enterprise or to each other.
    It is true that isolated acts of racketeering do not constitute a
    “pattern” within the meaning of RICO. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
    Imrex Co., 
    473 U.S. 479
    , 496 n.14 (1985). But we find that
    the government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to
    infer the necessary connection to form a pattern.
    The murder of Richard Simmons and attempted murder
    of Walker were related to each other and to the enterprise.
    The jury heard evidence that Simmons solicited Richard
    Simmons’s murder because he thought that Richard Simmons
    was spreading rumors that Simmons’s business partner,
    Fleming, was cooperating with the police. Testimony
    indicated that a “rumor like that” would “affect [Simmons]
    and his business.” J.A. 3019. The jury thus could infer that
    Simmons solicited Richard Simmons’s murder in order to
    protect the profits of the narcotics enterprise. With regard to
    Walker’s attempted murder, the jury heard testimony that
    Simmons “wanted [Walker] dead” because Walker “beat
    [Simmons] up kind of bad” in an altercation. 
    Id. at 2012.
    Simmons then solicited Gray to murder Walker. That
    evidence, coupled with testimony establishing that members
    of Gray’s group were feared because they had Gray’s
    protection, would allow the jury to infer that Simmons’s
    solicitation of Walker’s murder related to the enterprise’s
    147
    noneconomic goals       of   mutual   protection   and    status
    enhancement.
    The jury could thus conclude the predicate acts were
    related by the “nature of the acts” (both murders), their
    “temporal proximity” (both occurring between 1997 and
    1999), and their common “purpose” (both to further the
    enterprise’s goals). 
    Eiland, 738 F.3d at 360
    -61. That
    constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.
    XXIV. Section 924(c) Firearms Conviction (Simmons)
    Simmons argues that there was insufficient evidence
    supporting his convictions on firearms charges under 18
    U.S.C. § 924(c), which makes it a crime to “use[] or carr[y] a
    firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence.”
    We find that a rational jury could have found Simmons guilty
    of that offense.
    The government obtained convictions under § 924(c)
    against Simmons in connection with the murder of Richard
    Simmons and the attempted murder of Walker. While both
    sides agree that Simmons was not the triggerman in either
    murder, the government introduced evidence that Simmons
    solicited the killings. To show a violation of § 924(c) for
    solicitation, the government must establish that the defendant
    “knew to a practical certainty” that those he solicited to
    commit the crime of violence would use a firearm in
    committing that crime. United States v. Powell, 
    929 F.2d 724
    , 729 (D.C. Cir. 1991); accord United States v.
    Harrington, 
    108 F.3d 1460
    , 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We find
    that the government produced sufficient evidence for the jury
    to make that finding.
    As we have explained, “evidence of the prevalence of
    guns in a particular context” is one factor allowing the jury to
    148
    make that inference. 
    Powell, 929 F.2d at 729
    . And here, the
    government introduced abundant evidence to that end.
    Testimony showed that Simmons and his associates regularly
    carried guns, and that shootings were the common modus
    operandi for the group’s murders. Indeed, the trial record is
    replete with shootings, and, as far as we can tell, contains no
    evidence of a murder committed or attempted in any other
    way. It was therefore reasonable for the jury to infer that,
    when Simmons solicited the murders of Richard Simmons
    and Walker, Simmons “knew to a practical certainty” that
    those crimes would involve the use of a firearm. 
    Id. We therefore
    sustain Simmons’s convictions under 18 U.S.C.
    § 924(c).
    XXV. Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering Conviction
    (Simmons)
    Simmons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting his two convictions for Violent Crime in Aid of
    Racketeering (VICAR) under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), in
    connection with the murder of Richard Simmons and the
    attempted murder of Walker. We again find that a rational
    jury could find Simmons guilty of those offenses.
    The VICAR statute applies to defendants who commit
    murder related to racketeering
    with one of three motives: (1) “as
    consideration for . . . anything of pecuniary
    value” from such an enterprise, (2) “as
    consideration for a promise . . . to pay”
    something of value from such an enterprise, or
    (3) “for the purpose of gaining entrance to or
    maintaining or increasing position in an
    enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.”
    149
    
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 369
    (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a))
    (alterations in original). At issue here is whether Simmons
    acted with the third of those motives. A jury can reasonably
    infer that a defendant acted to maintain his position in an
    enterprise when he “commits the crime ‘in furtherance of’
    enterprise membership or . . . ‘knew it was expected of him
    by reason of his membership in the enterprise.’” 
    Gooch, 665 F.3d at 1337-38
    (quoting 
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 369
    ).
    The jury could reasonably infer that Simmons, as a
    member of a violent narcotics enterprise with a track record of
    killing (or attempting to kill) those who threatened its
    business, was expected to solicit actions necessary to protect
    the enterprise’s profits. As noted, the evidence showed that
    Simmons solicited the murder of Richard Simmons after
    Richard Simmons spread a rumor that Fleming (Simmons’s
    friend and business partner) was cooperating with the police.
    Any such rumor would threaten the enterprise’s narcotics
    business, as “snitching clearly posed a threat to the gang.”
    J.A. 1338. The jury thus could infer that Simmons acted as
    would be expected of him—he sought to contain the threat.
    See id.; see also 
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 369
    -70; United States v.
    Dhinsa, 
    243 F.3d 635
    , 671-72 (2d Cir. 2001).
    Additionally, the jury could reasonably infer that each
    member of the enterprise was expected to solicit actions
    necessary to protect its reputation for violence, a reputation
    “essential to maintenance of the enterprise’s place in the drug-
    trafficking business.” 
    Carson, 455 F.3d at 370
    (quoting
    United States v. Tipton, 
    90 F.3d 861
    , 891 (4th Cir. 1996));
    accord 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 94
    . The evidence showed that
    Simmons solicited Walker’s murder after Walker had bested
    Simmons in an altercation. The jury thus could infer that
    Simmons solicited Walker’s murder because it was expected
    of him as part “of the enterprise’s policy of treating affronts to
    150
    any of its members as affronts to all, of reacting violently to
    them and of thereby furthering the [enterprise’s] reputation
    for violence.” 
    Tipton, 90 F.3d at 891
    ; see 
    Gooch, 665 F.3d at 1338
    .
    XXVI. Simmons’s Pro Se Trial Motions and Appellate
    Brief
    Simmons’s appellate counsel argues that the district court
    wrongly ignored Simmons’s posttrial pro se motions
    requesting substitution of counsel and raising ineffective-
    assistance-of-trial-counsel claims without holding an
    evidentiary hearing. Simmons has also filed his own pro se
    briefs in this court in which he argues he was denied the
    effective assistance of counsel at trial. Simmons asserts, inter
    alia, that his trial attorneys failed to call particular witnesses
    on his behalf, prevented him from taking the stand at trial, and
    often refused to sit with him at the defense table, and that one
    attorney physically struck him in the courtroom in the jury’s
    presence. (Simmons’s last allegation is corroborated by that
    attorney’s admission on the record. J.A. 3382-83.)
    We have no need to determine whether the district court
    erred in its handling of Simmons’s posttrial requests for
    substitution of counsel. Any error was effectively harmless,
    as Simmons received new counsel—before sentencing—once
    the district court granted his attorneys’ motions to withdraw.
    As for Simmons’s claims that his counsel rendered
    constitutionally ineffective assistance during the trial itself,
    we remand those claims for an evidentiary hearing before the
    district court, consistent with our usual practice. See United
    States v. Rashad, 
    331 F.3d 908
    , 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
    151
    XXVIII. Conspiracy Conviction (J. Alfred)
    James Alfred claims that insufficient evidence linked him
    to the murders of (1) Thomas, whom Franklin killed at the
    behest of Ronald Alfred, James’s brother, and (2) Cardoza,
    whom Veal killed at the behest of Gray.
    First we should explain why, if James Alfred’s conviction
    for the Thomas murder is valid, we need not discuss that of
    Cardoza. The indictment charged James with the Thomas
    murder as a predicate for the RICO conspiracy offense and
    also as the basis for substantive offenses. But it charged the
    Cardoza murder only as a RICO conspiracy predicate act.
    Only two predicate racketeering acts are necessary for a
    RICO conviction, and James makes no claim of insufficient
    evidence as to one of the ones charged—the narcotics
    conspiracy. Thus, if the evidence against James Alfred for the
    Thomas murder was sufficient (as we find below), we needn’t
    consider the evidence as to Cardoza.
    Under both federal and D.C. law, Pinkerton requires a
    jury finding that the Thomas murder was “in furtherance of
    the conspiracy” and “reasonably foreseeable” to James
    Alfred. 
    Washington, 106 F.3d at 1011
    (citing 
    Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647-48
    ); 
    Gordon, 783 A.2d at 582
    . The evidence
    against James Alfred met these standards.
    Thomas was “tight” with Kairi Ball, who had an ongoing
    conflict with Ronald Alfred. J.A. 1986. This conflict led to a
    decision to murder Ball, in which Ronald was involved.
    Ball’s associates, including Thomas, then began following
    Ronald and shooting at him in retaliation for Ball’s murder.
    Andrews testified that James was “involved in” the conflict
    between his brother and Ball’s associates. 
    Id. at 1977-78.
    Specifically, James Alfred would report to Ronald Alfred if
    he saw one of Ball’s associates, including Thomas, “trying to
    152
    get at” Ronald. 
    Id. Andrews testified
    that Ronald Alfred told
    his associates that he wanted to kill Thomas (“Froggy”) and
    would pay for the murder, though Andrews did not say that
    James was present for that statement. (Andrews did testify
    more generally that James participated in conversations about
    Thomas with Ronald, Andrews, and others.) After Thomas
    was killed, James gathered with others to discuss and
    celebrate the murder. Andrews testified that James was
    “smiling” and “happy” that Thomas had been killed, and that
    he asked for details of the murder. 
    Id. at 2004-05.
    Omar
    Wazir also testified that James later told him, “We got
    Gangster [Franklin] to hit Froggy [Thomas]” (emphasis
    added), and explained that he understood “we” to refer to both
    Alfred brothers. 
    Id. at 2385.
    This evidence supported the jury’s conviction on a
    Pinkerton theory. The jury could reasonably find that
    Thomas’s murder was committed “in furtherance of” the
    conspiracy’s goal to protect and promote its members’
    reputation and standing, because Ronald Alfred perceived
    Thomas as threatening retaliation against him for Ball’s
    murder. The jury could also find that the murder was
    “reasonably foreseeable” to James, as he reported to Ronald
    from time to time on the sighting of persons who needed to be
    dispatched in light of the killing of Ball.
    James Alfred complains that the government did not
    properly raise the Pinkerton theory of guilt, saying that the
    government did not raise it before appeal, and a theory
    “presented for the first time on appeal ordinarily will not be
    heard on appeal.” Jones v. Horne, 
    634 F.3d 588
    , 603 (D.C.
    Cir. 2011). But the district court gave the jury a proper
    Pinkerton instruction, whose language James does not
    contest.    That general instruction—though it does not
    explicitly refer to the Thomas incident, to the crime of
    153
    murder, or to any specific defendant—is enough to sustain the
    conviction. In Washington we approved an instruction that
    the jury “may find each defendant guilty of [a firearms
    offense] if any of their fellow co-conspirators committed this
    offense” in furtherance of the conspiracy, because each
    member is “responsible for any offense committed by a co-
    conspirator” that the defendant could have reasonably
    
    expected. 106 F.3d at 1011
    (emphasis added).
    In another critique of the relation between the evidence
    and instructions, James Alfred claims that the government’s
    argument to the jury was solely based on aiding and abetting;
    he assumes that the evidence was inadequate by those
    standards, a matter we address below. But the transcript
    pages he cites narrate the relevant facts without referring to a
    particular legal theory. And while the district court did say in
    its denial of James Alfred’s motion for acquittal that his
    liability was “based on aiding and abetting,” J.A. 1524, that
    ruling does not preclude the jury from finding the evidence
    sufficient on another theory. See 
    Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375
    (explaining that we affirm a guilty verdict where any rational
    factfinder could have found the essential elements of the
    crime). Insofar as affirming on Pinkerton grounds rather than
    aiding and abetting might pose a problem under 
    Yates, 354 U.S. at 312
    , James forfeited any such argument because he
    didn’t raise it until his reply brief. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 93
    n.22; Van 
    Smith, 530 F.3d at 973
    .
    In any event, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
    federal convictions—though not the D.C. Code conviction for
    first-degree murder—on an aiding-and-abetting theory. The
    district court gave the jury a “natural and probable
    consequence” instruction for an aiding-and-abetting theory of
    liability. This was plain error vis-à-vis the D.C. Code
    violation. See 
    Wilson-Bey, 903 A.2d at 835-39
    ; see also
    154
    
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 91
    (quoting Wilson-Bey). But for federal
    aiding-and-abetting offenses we have approved an instruction
    allowing the jury to hold a defendant responsible as an aider
    and abettor for the “natural and probable consequences” of
    the execution of a “common design” shared with the
    perpetrator. United States v. Walker, 
    99 F.3d 439
    , 443 n.2
    (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 
    549 U.S. 183
    , 190-91, 197 (2007) (citing Walker as indicating that
    the circuit adheres to the “natural and probable consequences”
    standard); 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 92
    . Thus, even with that
    instruction, the jury was entitled to convict James Alfred of
    the two federal offenses based on aiding and abetting the
    Thomas murder.
    The evidence was sufficient to convict James on that
    theory. Aiding and abetting requires (1) his specific intent to
    facilitate the commission of the crime; (2) his guilty
    knowledge (3) that someone else was committing the crime;
    and (4) his assisting or participating in committing the crime.
    
    Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1535
    ; see also 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 91
    (requiring “proof of some shared intent” between the
    defendant and the principal actor). James contends that no
    evidence shows that he knew that Ronald wanted to have
    Thomas killed, let alone that James intended to help bring
    about the murder. As we said in United States v. Teffera, 
    985 F.2d 1082
    (D.C. Cir. 1993), “general knowledge of
    criminality afoot” is not enough. 
    Id. at 1086-87.
    But viewed
    in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence
    described above—particularly James’s reports to his brother
    about Thomas’s whereabouts and his statement that “we” had
    Thomas killed—was sufficient.
    155
    XXX. Individual Challenges by Ronald Alfred
    Ronald Alfred raises a number of individual challenges,
    none of which succeeds.
    A.
    In addition to the general Rule 404(b) challenges pressed
    by appellants, see Part II
    I, supra
    , Ronald Alfred challenges
    the admission of evidence concerning two preconspiracy
    crimes that he was alleged to have committed and the limits
    placed on cross-examination with respect to one of those
    incidents. More specifically, the indictment in this case listed
    as overt acts of the charged conspiracy Alfred’s alleged
    possession in 1989 of approximately one kilogram of cocaine
    with intent to distribute and his possession in 1991 of a loaded
    firearm.
    1.
    At trial, the government called Richard Egan, a police
    officer involved in a 1989 traffic stop of Ronald Alfred. Egan
    testified that a sizeable amount of cocaine was found in
    Alfred’s car. During cross-examination, Alfred’s counsel
    attempted to elicit from Egan the fact that Alfred had been
    acquitted in the ensuing trial. The district court barred that
    line of inquiry, allowing Alfred’s counsel only to ask whether
    Egan had a “particular axe to grind” with Alfred. J.A. 2527.
    The government also presented testimony from George
    DeSilva, the officer involved in Alfred’s 1991 arrest, and a
    certified copy of the resulting firearms conviction.
    Following Egan’s testimony, the district court instructed
    the jury that:
    156
    Again, you heard evidence of one of the defendant’s
    alleged conduct prior to the time period with which
    he’s charged with joining the alleged conspiracy.
    Again, the testimony was admitted to explain why
    and how the defendants joined the alleged
    conspiracy and their relationships with other
    members of the alleged conspiracy. To find the
    defendant guilty of the charge[d] conspiracy, you
    must find that he participated in the conspiracy
    during the time period charged in the indictment.
    The conspiracy is alleged to have begun in 1988.
    The Defendant Ronald Alfred is alleged to have
    joined the conspiracy sometime after May 15th,
    1995. The Defendant Ronald Alfred is not charged
    in the indictment with the acts that allegedly
    occurred on or before May 15th, 1995; therefore, you
    will not be asked to return verdicts as to this act if
    you find that it occurred.
    
    Id. at 2531-32.19
    When giving the jury its final instructions and explaining
    how it might consider evidence of prior bad acts, the court
    specifically referenced the 1989 drug possession and the 1991
    firearm charges as examples of evidence that should be used
    only to help determine whether Alfred became a member of
    the charged conspiracy. The district court also noted that,
    while a section of Count One of the indictment was titled
    “Overt Acts,”
    [p]roof of an overt act is not an element of the charge
    of a narcotics conspiracy. The government is not
    19
    There is no indication in the record that Alfred requested a
    similar instruction following the testimony of DeSilva.
    157
    obliged to prove any particular one or more of the
    overt acts beyond a reasonable doubt, although it
    must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence
    of the conspiracy itself and a defendant’s knowing
    and wil[l]ful participation in it[.]
    
    Id. at 54
    61.
    At the same time, the court rejected a renewed effort by
    Alfred’s counsel to delete from the indictment the two
    paragraphs describing the 1989 drug possession and 1991
    firearm charges as overt acts of the conspiracy. The court
    then provided the indictment to the jury, instructing the jury
    that it was only providing them “those overt acts that directly
    relate to the charges against” appellants. 
    Id. at 1000.
    The
    district court underscored that “indictments are not evidence”
    and should not be used by the jurors “for any purpose other
    than informing [them]selves of the charges [they were] to
    consider.” 
    Id. at 54
    50.
    2.
    We review for an abuse of discretion the limits placed by
    the district court on cross-examination. See 
    Thomas, 114 F.3d at 249
    . The trial court’s decision whether to strike surplus
    language from the indictment is reviewed under the same
    standard. See 
    Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1112
    . We have noted,
    however, that “[t]he scope of a district court’s discretion to
    strike material from an indictment is narrow,” United States v.
    Oakar, 
    111 F.3d 146
    , 157 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and “[m]aterial
    that can fairly be described as ‘surplus’ may only be stricken
    if it is irrelevant and prejudicial,” 
    id. 158 3.
    As the district court correctly instructed the jury below,
    the government was not required to prove the occurrence of
    any overt act to convict a defendant of narcotics conspiracy
    under 21 U.S.C. § 846. See United States v. Shabani, 
    513 U.S. 10
    , 11, 15-17 (1994). The indictment’s listing of
    preconspiracy conduct as overt acts thus constituted nothing
    more than “excess allegations in an indictment that do not
    change the basic nature of the offense charged . . . and should
    be treated as mere surplusage,” United States v. Pumphrey,
    
    831 F.2d 307
    , 309 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
    The government concedes that the description of Ronald
    Alfred’s alleged conduct as overt acts of the conspiracy was
    inaccurate. And rightly so. Since the two incidents preceded
    Alfred’s entry into the conspiracy by several years, the
    government had no plausible basis for labeling them overt
    acts in furtherance of that conspiracy. Cf. United States v.
    Ortiz-Torres, 
    449 F.3d 61
    , 80 (1st Cir. 2006) (offenses
    committed prior to joining conspiracy properly treated as
    prior offenses for sentencing purposes rather than overt acts in
    furtherance of the charged conspiracy).
    The government contends, however, that the incidents
    were still relevant and admissible under Rule 404(b). The
    Second Circuit has previously approved the listing of a
    preconspiracy incident in the indictment as an overt act under
    similar circumstances. See United States v. Hernandez, 
    85 F.3d 1023
    , 1030 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Montour,
    
    944 F.2d 1019
    , 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1991).
    The problem for the government is that these two
    incidents were too remote in time to qualify as legitimate Rule
    404(b) evidence. They thus were irrelevant, serving only as
    forbidden propensity evidence. See Part 
    III(C)(3), supra
    .
    159
    But the offenses should only have been stricken if they
    were both irrelevant and prejudicial, and it is on that latter
    prong that Alfred’s argument founders. The district court
    repeatedly instructed the jury about the limited use permitted
    for the “prior bad acts” evidence, including through a midtrial
    jury instruction following Officer Egan’s traffic stop
    testimony. That instruction emphasized that Alfred was “not
    charged in the indictment with the acts that allegedly occurred
    on or before May 15th, 1995.” J.A. 2532. In addition, the
    court’s final jury instruction on the Rule 404(b) evidence
    specifically referenced the evidence of the 1989 cocaine
    possession charge and the 1991 firearms conviction as
    “admitted only for [the jury’s] consideration in determining
    whether Ronald Alfred . . . then became [a member] of the
    Kevin Gray-Rodney Moore drug distribution and RICO
    conspiracies.” 
    Id. at 54
    52. Finally, the district court
    instructed the jury that the indictment itself was not evidence
    and was offered simply to inform the jury of the charges
    against appellants.
    Alfred points out that, in providing the indictment to the
    jury, the district court said that the listed overt acts were those
    that “directly relate to the charges” against appellants. 
    Id. at 1000.
    The district court made that statement, however, to
    explain why several acts involving coconspirators who were
    not defendants in the case were omitted from the indictment
    provided to the jury. The cited language thus clarified for the
    jury that the listed acts were those that specifically involved
    Alfred and his codefendants.
    To be sure, some risk of prejudice remained, and it would
    have been well within the district court’s discretion to have
    stricken the acts from the indictment. We hold only that
    Alfred has not demonstrated the type of substantial prejudice
    required for reversal, given the offsetting jury instructions and
    160
    the overwhelming evidence of violence and criminal activities
    by Alfred. See 
    Edmond, 52 F.3d at 1112
    -13.20
    4.
    Ronald Alfred’s challenge to the district court’s
    limitation on cross-examination of Officer Egan fares no
    better. Alfred’s argument that he should have been able to
    introduce evidence that he was acquitted of the alleged prior
    bad act certainly has some logical appeal, but unfortunately
    for Alfred the case law is solidly against the argument. That
    is because, to consider the prior act as relevant evidence of the
    alleged crime, the jury need only reasonably conclude that it
    happened. The acquittal, on the other hand, just says that the
    act was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Dowling
    v. United States, 
    493 U.S. 342
    , 348-50 (1990). Accordingly,
    when prior-bad-act evidence is introduced, “[i]t is settled that
    a criminal defendant ordinarily may not introduce evidence at
    trial of his or her prior acquittal of other crimes,” and the
    “hearsay, relevance, and more-prejudicial-than-probative
    rules generally preclude the admission of evidence of such
    prior acquittals.” United States v. Williams, 
    784 F.3d 798
    ,
    20
    Alfred suggests in his reply brief that his RICO conspiracy
    conviction alters this analysis. That is because, to show the
    “pattern of racketeering activity” required for the RICO conviction,
    the government had to prove “at least two acts of racketeering
    activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); see also, e.g., United States v.
    Hoyle, 
    122 F.3d 48
    , 50 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But the incidents at issue
    here were not listed as racketeering acts in the indictment, and
    Alfred’s conviction on the RICO conspiracy count was predicated
    on the jury’s express finding that Alfred had committed four other
    actions that were described as racketeering acts in the indictment,
    including three first-degree murders.
    161
    803 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also 
    Thomas, 114 F.3d at 249
    -50
    (same).
    That rule, it bears noting, is not inflexible. If a jury
    might otherwise reasonably think that the defendant had been
    convicted of the alleged bad act, the defendant may be able to
    introduce evidence to rebut that inference. See 
    Williams, 784 F.3d at 803
    (citing United States v. Bailey, 
    319 F.3d 514
    , 518
    (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Alfred argues that the testimony regarding
    his 1989 arrest for cocaine possession could have given rise to
    just such speculation by the jury. But that risk was minimal
    because the jury had been presented with either a certified
    copy of the conviction or a transcript of the guilty plea for two
    of Alfred’s previous convictions. The absence of any such
    evidence of a cocaine-related conviction following the 1989
    arrest thus was notable.21
    In any event, any probative value associated with the
    evidence of acquittal would have been outweighed by the
    unfair prejudice resulting from “the risk that the jury might
    overread acquittal to signify innocence rather than merely
    failure of the government to show guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” 
    Bailey, 319 F.3d at 518
    .
    Alfred is also correct that this court left open the
    possibility in Thomas that evidence of acquittal could be
    relevant to establish a witness’s bias or motivation for
    testifying. The theory of bias—that the arresting officer was
    presenting biased testimony against Alfred in the instant trial
    21
    The jury was also aware that a previous trial had taken place in
    which the arresting officer had had the opportunity to identify
    Alfred. To the extent that fact may have increased jury speculation
    as to the outcome of that trial, we note that it was Alfred’s own
    counsel who drew out that information.
    162
    because Alfred beat the earlier charge—is decidedly strained.
    Indeed, Alfred does not dispute that the arrest happened or
    that Officer Egan testified consistently in the two trials, so it
    is hard to imagine how Egan’s testimony about that arrest
    could have been biased by an after-the-arrest acquittal over a
    decade earlier. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse
    its discretion in pretermitting this line of inquiry.22
    Moreover, the limitation on cross-examination was
    decidedly harmless even if viewed through the demanding
    lens of constitutional (Confrontation Clause) error. See
    
    Wilson, 605 F.3d at 1014
    (noting more stringent Chapman
    standard applies in assessing effect of a Confrontation Clause
    violation while Kotteakos applies to an evidentiary abuse of
    discretion under the Federal Rules of Evidence). Any link
    between Alfred’s acquittal and the truthfulness of an officer
    who had already testified as to the same facts before the
    supposedly bias-producing acquittal borders on implausible,
    and thus could not have outbalanced the overwhelming
    strength of the government’s case against Alfred.
    22
    Three other circuits have rejected similar bids to introduce such
    bias evidence. See United States v. Lyons, 
    403 F.3d 1248
    , 1256
    (11th Cir. 2005) (“exceedingly marginal” relevance in showing bias
    outweighed by prospect of jury confusion); United States v. Smith,
    
    145 F.3d 458
    , 462–463 (1st Cir. 1998) (defendant precluded from
    arguing that several witnesses were testifying against him only
    because they knew he had been acquitted in an earlier case and so
    was facing less harsh penalties, in part given the concern that “the
    jury would have had to sort through the meaning of a legal
    judgment of acquittal”); United States v. Kerley, 
    643 F.2d 299
    , 301
    (5th Cir. 1981) (any relevance of state court acquittal on charges
    arising out of the same incident was outweighed by the possibility
    of jury confusion given the charges’ different elements).
    163
    B.
    Ronald Alfred’s second argument is that the district court
    abused its discretion in admitting into evidence a photograph
    taken during the execution of a search warrant at his residence
    that showed a ziplock bag alleged to contain crack cocaine.
    We hold that any error in admission of the photograph was
    harmless.
    1.
    The photograph was introduced into evidence during the
    testimony of the agent who oversaw a search of Ronald
    Alfred’s home in July 2000. Alfred’s counsel objected when
    the officer was asked to highlight the “crack cocaine” or
    “suspected crack cocaine” in the picture. J.A. 4029. Counsel
    also moved to strike the photograph on the basis that there
    was no evidence that any chemical analysis had been
    conducted on the substance beyond a field test at the scene.
    The district court refused to strike the photograph, but did bar
    the government from asking the agent about the results of the
    field test.
    At the conclusion of evidence, Alfred again moved to
    strike evidence relating to the ziplock bag and to redact the
    photograph. The government agreed not to argue that there
    was crack cocaine in the ziplock bag and to stipulate that it
    had not been submitted to the DEA for analysis. The district
    court accepted the stipulation and, accordingly, rejected both
    Alfred’s motion to strike and his request for a jury instruction
    advising that the substance pictured in the bag should not be
    considered as evidence. The record does not reflect whether
    the jury actually received the government’s stipulation.
    164
    2.
    We ordinarily would review the district court’s
    evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See United
    States v. Whitmore, 
    359 F.3d 609
    , 616 (D.C. Cir. 2004). But
    in this case, we need not decide the propriety of the district
    court’s rulings because, even were the admission error, it was
    harmless, having no “substantial and injurious effect or
    influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” 
    Johnson, 519 F.3d at 483
    (quoting United States v. Linares, 
    367 F.3d 941
    ,
    952 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
    Ronald Alfred is wrong to assert that the government
    breached its agreement not to argue that the pictured ziplock
    bag contained crack cocaine. Alfred points to the testimony
    of a DEA chemist referenced in the government’s closing
    argument. But that testimony said only that those narcotics
    included on a chart provided to the jury—a list that did not
    include the substance in the ziplock bag—were found to be
    illegal substances. Alfred, moreover, did not object to that
    portion of the closing argument, and his counsel highlighted
    the absence of DEA testing of the ziplock bag’s contents in
    his own closing argument. Beyond that, whatever weight the
    jury might have given to a portion of a single photograph, we
    are confident beyond any reasonable doubt that it was far
    outweighed by the wealth of other testimonial evidence
    establishing Alfred’s guilt.
    C.
    Ronald Alfred next asserts that the district court violated
    Federal Rule of Evidence 610 and abused its discretion by
    permitting a government witness, Oscar Veal, to testify about
    his religious beliefs. We again hold that any error in the
    introduction of that evidence was harmless.
    165
    1.
    Veal was a significant witness in the government’s case
    against Alfred. He testified that Alfred provided material
    assistance in the murders of Carlos Cardoza, Jr. and Anthony
    Watkins, and discussed in detail Alfred’s role in those crimes.
    The jury found Alfred guilty of both murders. Near the
    beginning of Veal’s testimony—and over Alfred’s
    objection—the prosecutor prompted Veal to discuss his
    religious beliefs and, in particular, his recent conversion to
    Islam while in prison. Two days later, Veal returned to the
    subject, explaining that his decision to cooperate with the
    government was motivated in part by his conversion and the
    concomitant need for him to make amends for his past
    wrongdoing.
    2.
    Rule 610 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
    “[e]vidence of a witness’s religious beliefs or opinions is not
    admissible to attack or support the witness’s credibility.”
    Fed. R. Evid. 610. A 1972 Advisory Committee Note
    clarifies that, while Rule 610 “forecloses inquiry into the
    religious beliefs or opinions of a witness for the purpose of
    showing that his character for truthfulness is affected by their
    nature, an inquiry for the purpose of showing interest or bias
    because of them is not within the prohibition.” Fed. R. Evid.
    610 Advisory Committee Notes to 1972 Proposed Rules. We
    review the district court’s rulings applying Rule 610 for an
    abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sampol, 
    636 F.2d 621
    , 666 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
    3.
    The government argues that the testimony it elicited did
    not use religion to enhance Veal’s credibility, but to explain
    166
    Veal’s motivation for testifying and to rebut charges of bias
    based on Veal’s cooperation agreement with the government.
    In Moore, the government introduced the same evidence from
    the same witness. We left open the question of whether such
    testimony was properly admitted, finding that any error was
    harmless given the brevity of the testimony about Veal’s
    religion, the government’s omission of any reference to
    Veal’s religion from its opening and closing arguments, the
    absence of any urging that the jury credit Veal’s testimony
    because of his religious convictions, and the overwhelming
    evidence of guilt. See 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 76
    .
    That same answer governs here. As in Moore, the
    testimony regarding Veal’s religious conversion and beliefs
    took up only a few transcript pages during testimony that
    stretched over seven trial days. The government made no
    mention of this testimony in its opening or closing arguments,
    nor did it argue or even suggest to the jury that Veal’s
    religious beliefs bolstered his credibility.      Finally, the
    testimony implicating Alfred in the Cardoza and Watkins
    murders was fully corroborated by another cooperating
    witness, Maurice Andrews. We thus cannot conclude that any
    error in the admission of this evidence substantially swayed
    the jury’s verdict.
    D.
    Ronald Alfred also raises a number of claims of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that several of his
    attorneys below either had a conflict of interest in their
    representation of him or provided deficient representation.
    To present a viable claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel on direct appeal, “a defendant must present ‘factual
    allegations that, if true, would establish a violation of his
    Sixth Amendment right to counsel.’” 
    Williams, 784 F.3d at 167
    803 (quoting United States v. Mohammed, 
    693 F.3d 192
    , 202
    (D.C. Cir. 2012)). A plausible claim requires a showing of
    both deficient representation and prejudice. See 
    id. But if
    the
    defendant can show that his representation was infected by an
    actual conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed. 
    Thomas, 114 F.3d at 252
    .
    When a colorable claim of ineffectiveness is made, this
    court “remand[s] for an evidentiary hearing unless the ‘record
    alone conclusively shows that the defendant either is or is not
    entitled to relief.’” 
    Mohammed, 693 F.3d at 202
    (quoting
    United States v. Burroughs, 
    613 F.3d 233
    , 238 (D.C. Cir.
    2010)). As a result, while “we do not ‘reflexively remand,’
    we also do not ‘hesitate to remand when a trial record is
    insufficient to assess the full circumstances and rationales
    informing the strategic decisions of trial counsel.’” 
    Williams, 784 F.3d at 804
    (quoting 
    Mohammed, 693 F.3d at 202
    ).
    Alfred challenges on appeal the performance of his
    attorneys before trial, during trial, and at sentencing. We
    conclude that he has raised colorable claims of ineffective
    assistance concerning the performance of his counsel before
    and during trial and remand those claims to the district court.
    Alfred, however, has not made out a colorable claim of
    ineffective assistance at sentencing, and so we reject that
    claim on the merits.
    1.   Pretrial Counsel
    Thomas Abbenante was Alfred’s first attorney in this
    case, commencing his representation on July 28, 2000. Long
    before that (starting in early 1992), Abbenante took on the
    representation of Alberto Martinez, a cooperating witness
    who would ultimately testify against Alfred. Abbenante
    continued to represent Martinez through trial in this case. He
    168
    withdrew from representing Alfred on October 6, 2000, citing
    the potential conflict between the two representations.
    Prior to withdrawing as Alfred’s counsel, Abbenante
    arranged a meeting between Alfred and Omar Wazir, who
    was cooperating with the government and who ultimately
    testified against Alfred. Some details regarding that meeting
    were subsequently used against Alfred at trial. At trial, Alfred
    sought to bar Martinez from testifying on the basis of
    Abbenante’s initial dual representation. Alfred asserted that it
    was only after Abbenante had begun representing him that
    Martinez indicated to the government that he could provide
    information against Alfred. The government represented that
    this assertion was false and produced records purportedly
    showing that, by the early 1990s, Martinez had already named
    Alfred as someone to whom he had supplied cocaine. After
    examining those records and providing them to Alfred’s trial
    counsel, the district court rejected Alfred’s request to exclude
    Martinez’s testimony.
    Under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 
    446 U.S. 335
    (1980), one way
    a defendant can establish ineffective assistance of counsel is
    by demonstrating: “(1) that his lawyer acted under ‘an actual
    conflict of interest’ and (2) that the ‘conflict had some
    negative effect upon his defense (defined as “an actual lapse
    in representation”).’” 
    Thomas, 114 F.3d at 252
    (quoting
    United States v. Shark, 
    51 F.3d 1072
    , 1075-76 (D.C. Cir.
    1995)). The first prong requires a showing that counsel
    “actively represented conflicting interests.” 
    Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350
    . If an attorney’s joint representation of conflicting
    interests was unknowing, it does not give rise to a claim. See
    United States v. Taylor, 
    139 F.3d 924
    , 930 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
    Alfred has raised colorable factual questions about the
    timing of the dual representations, the timing of Abbenante’s
    169
    withdrawal, and whether Abbenante might have used
    information learned from Alfred in his representation of
    Martinez—questions that we cannot resolve on the existing
    record. See United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 
    215 F.3d 1312
    (Table), 
    2000 WL 231251
    , at *1 (1st Cir. Feb. 15, 2000)
    (declining to resolve “fact-intensive” ineffective assistance
    claim alleging, inter alia, a conflict of interest arising out of
    counsel’s previous representation of a cooperating witness on
    direct appeal).
    In addition, while there are indications that Abbenante’s
    decision to have Alfred meet with cooperating witness Wazir
    was a tactical one, see J.A. 4548, the fact that Abbenante at
    least potentially could have been laboring under a conflict of
    interest at that time calls into question whether the decision to
    set up the meeting can be described as just “a strategic choice
    by defense counsel.” United States v. Weaver, 
    281 F.3d 228
    ,
    234 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
    We accordingly remand this claim to the district court.
    2.   Trial Counsel
    During Ronald Alfred’s own defense case, his new trial
    counsel called eleven witnesses. His counsel tried to call
    others, some of whom, counsel asserted, had been belatedly
    identified by Alfred. Specifically, near the end of trial,
    Alfred’s counsel attempted to subpoena Darrell Darby, who
    allegedly would have been able to testify that Alfred had a
    legitimate income in 1996 and that he may have been in
    Atlanta at the time that Joseph Thomas was murdered in the
    District of Columbia. Another witness, Kimberly Rice, was
    expected to say that Alfred had been with her the night that
    Carlos Cardoza, Jr. was murdered. The district court
    170
    ultimately excluded the testimony of both witnesses because
    counsel was unable to effect timely service.23
    Alfred argues that his trial counsel’s failure to locate and
    present those and other witnesses amounted to ineffective
    representation.24 The record shows unequivocally that the
    failure to call those witnesses at trial was a failure of timing,
    and not a considered strategic decision by Alfred’s counsel.
    But the record casts no light on who was at fault for that
    belated timing, Alfred or his counsel.
    Given the ambiguities in the record, there is at least a
    colorable claim that trial counsel failed to obtain potentially
    important witness testimony in a timely fashion. See United
    States v. Mitchell, 
    216 F.3d 1126
    , 1130-33 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
    United States v. Debango, 
    780 F.2d 81
    , 423 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
    In addition, “[t]he current record . . . does not allow a
    conclusive determination that [the missing witnesses’]
    testimony was immaterial or cumulative such that it defeats a
    colorable prejudice claim.” 
    Moore, 651 F.3d at 88
    . For
    example, Alfred alleges that Darby and Rice each could have
    provided an important alibi, testifying that Alfred either was
    not in the District of Columbia or was with someone else the
    nights that Thomas and Cardoza were murdered. While that
    testimony would not necessarily foreclose the government’s
    argument that Alfred had commissioned the murder or aided
    23
    Alfred’s vague and conclusory assertion that another witness,
    Rodman David Lee, could have offered “a strong defense to the
    Narcotics conspiracy,” Appellants’ Br. 304, is far too thin a reed on
    which to hang a colorable claim of error or prejudice.
    24
    Near the end of his case, Alfred’s counsel informed the district
    court that he wished to secure testimony from at least twenty-six
    additional witnesses. See J.A. 4435-44, 4918-49, 5118.
    171
    in the search for the victim, the testimony (if delivered as
    Alfred predicts) could at least have cast doubt on aspects of
    the government’s case and could have undermined the
    testimony of government witnesses. The record thus supports
    a colorable claim of prejudice as well. We remand for further
    exploration of this claim.25
    3.    Sentencing Counsel
    At sentencing, Alfred was represented by yet another
    attorney. That new counsel requested a full sentencing
    hearing, but the district court denied the request. The attorney
    then reminded the court that Alfred’s trial counsel had raised
    several objections to Alfred’s presentence report, and the new
    attorney added one more objection. Counsel also conceded
    that Alfred faced three mandatory life sentences and stated
    that, as a result, he would not be making an argument for a
    reduced sentence based on the sentencing factors set out in 18
    U.S.C. § 3553, because it could have no practical effect.
    Alfred’s argument that sentencing counsel was
    ineffective does not get out of the starting gate. In particular,
    25
    Alfred separately argues that one of his trial attorneys—Idus
    Daniel—undertook conflicting representations. Specifically, Alfred
    argues that the docket in United States v. Wallace, No. 99-cr-215,
    shows that, in an earlier trial, Daniel represented Melvin Wallace,
    who then became a government witness in Alfred’s trial. That
    argument fails because the same docket sheet reflects that the entry
    to which Alfred refers was a clerical error. See Attorney
    Appearance, Dkt. No. 17, United States v. Wallace, No. 99-cr-215
    (D.D.C. filed Aug. 11, 1999). Daniel in fact represented a different
    defendant altogether in that proceeding. See Notice of Attorney
    Appearance, Dkt. No. 105, United States v. Wallace, No. 99-cr-215
    (D.D.C. filed Jan. 23, 2007).
    172
    Alfred fails to identify any prejudice that could have arisen
    from sentencing counsel’s alleged deficiencies.
    First, Alfred argues that his sentencing counsel failed to
    object to a sentence that was premised on the discharge of a
    firearm in the commission of murder even though there was
    no specific jury finding that the gun was discharged. That
    argument did not work for McGill, see Part 
    XI(C), supra
    , and
    it does not work here either. There was no prejudice because
    there is no conceivable factual scenario in which the jury
    could have convicted Alfred (as it did) of the first-degree
    murder of three individuals—each of whom was shot to
    death—without necessarily finding that the firearm was
    discharged. That Alfred was not the alleged shooter is beside
    the point because a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) may
    be premised on either an aiding-and-abetting or Pinkerton
    theory of liability, see Pinkerton, 
    328 U.S. 640
    , both of which
    the jury was instructed on here. See Part XX
    I, supra
    .
    Second, Alfred argues that counsel should not have
    conceded that he was subject to a mandatory life sentence for
    his murder in aid of racketeering charges and the particular
    RICO conspiracy and predicate offenses alleged. But
    Congress has explicitly mandated life sentences under 18
    U.S.C. §§ 1959(a) and 1963(a)(1) for those crimes. See
    United States v. Franklin, 
    663 F.3d 1289
    , 1289-90 (D.C. Cir.
    2011). No prejudice can arise from counsel’s failure to
    dispute what is legally indisputable.
    Finally, Alfred’s fleeting references to counsel’s failure
    (i) to challenge an allegedly above-Guidelines sentence on the
    narcotics conspiracy, (ii) to present mitigating factors under
    18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (iii) to object in some fashion to the
    government’s 21 U.S.C. § 851 notice regarding sentence
    enhancement, or (iv) to make other unidentified “obvious
    173
    objections,” are all presented in such a vague and conclusory
    fashion that they do not raise any colorable claim of error or
    prejudice. See United States v. Williams, 
    488 F.3d 1004
    ,
    1010 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“We ‘ha[ve] never held that any claim
    of ineffective assistance of counsel, no matter how conclusory
    or meritless, automatically entitles a party to an evidentiary
    remand,’ . . . and, accordingly, we need not remand here.”)
    (quoting United States v. Poston, 
    902 F.2d 90
    , 99 n.9 (D.C.
    Cir. 1990)).
    E.
    Alfred’s final objection is to the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support his convictions for (i) murdering a
    government witness, Carlos Cardoza, Jr., to prevent his
    further communication with law enforcement, (ii) conspiring
    to murder Andre Sanders, and (iii) participating in a crack-
    cocaine conspiracy. None of those objections succeeds.
    This court “reviews challenges to the sufficiency of the
    evidence ‘de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the government, and affirming a guilty verdict
    where any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
    elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” 
    Eiland, 738 F.3d at 356
    (quoting United States v. Littlejohn, 
    489 F.3d 1335
    , 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
    1.
    Alfred was convicted, among other things, of two
    conspiracy counts and several substantive counts relating to
    the murder of Carlos Cardoza, Jr., including an aiding-and-
    abetting conviction for killing a witness to prevent
    communication with law enforcement. See 
    Sampol, 636 F.2d at 676-77
    (affirming defendants’ “responsibility as principals
    in the murder . . . which flows from aiding and abetting that
    174
    crime”). To prove the murder of a witness to prevent
    communication with law enforcement under 18 U.S.C.
    § 1512(a)(1)(C), the government must show “(1) a killing or
    attempted killing, (2) committed with a particular intent . . .
    (a) to ‘prevent’ a ‘communication’ (b) about ‘the commission
    or possible commission of a Federal offense’ (c) to a federal
    ‘law enforcement officer or judge.’” Fowler v. United States,
    
    131 S. Ct. 2045
    , 2049 (2011).26 To establish aiding-and-
    abetting liability, the government must “prove: ‘(1) the
    specific intent to facilitate the commission of a crime by
    another; (2) guilty knowledge (3) that the other was
    committing an offense; and (4) assisting or participating in the
    commission of the offense.’” United States v. Wilson, 
    160 F.3d 732
    , 738 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting 
    Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1535
    ). The government does not dispute that, to prove aiding
    and abetting liability under Section 1512(a)(1)(C), the
    government must show knowledge both that a murder was
    planned and of the statutorily specified reason for the murder.
    Appellee’s Br. 308.
    Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that
    Alfred had the requisite intent and guilty knowledge to aid
    and abet the murder of Cardoza to prevent his communication
    with law enforcement about federal crimes. Lionel Nunn
    commissioned Cardoza’s murder precisely because Cardoza
    “was supposed to be cooperating with the law.” J.A. 2052.
    Evidence showed that Nunn solicited Kevin Gray to murder
    Cardoza and told Gray why. Additional evidence established
    that Gray told Ronald Alfred that he was looking for Cardoza
    26
    “[N]o state of mind need be proved with respect to the
    circumstance that . . . the law enforcement officer is an officer or
    employee of the Federal Government[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g)(2);
    see also United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 
    390 F.3d 1
    , 25 (1st
    Cir. 2004).
    175
    and was “out to kill” him. Alfred subsequently told Gray
    when he saw Cardoza and loaned him his van to search for
    Cardoza. Alfred also supplied Gray with the gun that was
    ultimately used to commit the murder.
    A jury could reasonably infer from that evidence that,
    before Alfred interjected himself into the search for and
    murder of Cardoza, he would have been told not just that
    Gray was looking to kill Cardoza, but also why. “A man just
    does not surrender to his friends possession of his gun, a
    deadly weapon, without taking more than a casual interest in
    its intended employment.” United States v. Harris, 
    435 F.2d 74
    , 89 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also 
    id. (“And the
    legitimate
    inference that appellant loaned his gun to the robbers tends at
    least slightly to support the further inference that appellant
    knew the purpose for which the gun would be used.”).
    2.
    We need not address Ronald Alfred’s challenge to his
    conviction for conspiracy to murder Andre Sanders. That is
    because Alfred was not convicted of any substantive counts
    associated with that conspiracy. Instead, participating in the
    conspiracy to murder Sanders was just part of one of the four
    racketeering acts that the jury specifically found Alfred had
    committed as predicate offenses for the RICO conspiracy
    charge. Those four racketeering acts are two more than what
    was required to sustain his RICO conspiracy conviction. See
    18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Accordingly, even if there had been
    error in the finding as to Sanders, it could not have had any
    effect on the RICO judgment because at least two
    unchallenged convictions for predicate acts remained
    regardless. See United States v. Simmons, 
    923 F.2d 934
    , 945
    (2d Cir. 1991) (evidentiary error affecting three counts of
    racketeering activity was harmless where each defendant was
    176
    also found to have committed at least two other acts of
    racketeering activity); United States v. Madrid, 
    842 F.2d 1090
    , 1097 (9th Cir. 1988) (jury instruction issue affecting
    one count was harmless where two other racketeering acts
    were also established).
    3.
    Finally, Alfred argues for an absolute requirement of “lab
    evidence” (Appellants’ Br. 307) to sustain a conviction for a
    narcotics conspiracy involving crack cocaine.          But he
    provides no authority for that proposition, and we have found
    none. Instead, laboratory analysis is just one of many ways in
    which involvement with narcotics can be proven;
    circumstantial evidence alone can also suffice. See United
    States v. Baugham, 
    449 F.3d 167
    , 171-72 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
    (testimony and recordings documenting crack cocaine
    transactions alone provided sufficient evidence to support
    conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine); see
    also United States v. Turner, 
    709 F.3d 1187
    , 1195 (7th Cir.
    2013) (similar), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 2660
    (2014).
    Here, sufficient evidence supported Alfred’s conviction
    even without lab analysis. Testimony was presented showing
    that Alfred’s close associates were involved in trafficking
    crack cocaine, including his brother James, who was said to
    be Ronald Alfred’s middleman in drug transactions.
    Evidence also showed that the conspiracy as a whole
    participated in crack cocaine transactions. Such evidence,
    along with the wealth of testimony regarding Alfred’s own
    drug trafficking, supports the jury’s attribution of 50 or more
    grams of trafficked crack cocaine to Ronald Alfred as a
    reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy he joined. See
    United States v. Law, 
    528 F.3d 888
    , 906 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
    (“Here, the conspiracy was dealing drugs, and thus the entire
    177
    sum of the drugs within the conspiracy constituted a single
    conspiracy violation.”).
    XXXI. Cumulative Error
    Finally, appellants argue that the cumulative effect of
    these errors requires reversal. It is true that even where
    individual errors are insufficiently prejudicial to warrant
    reversal, “the total effect of numerous small missteps may
    deprive a defendant of a fair trial,” provided that appellants
    can demonstrate prejudice resulting from the various errors
    taken together. 
    Celis, 608 F.3d at 847
    (citing Egan v. United
    States, 
    287 F. 958
    , 971 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
    With the few exceptions we have described, however, we
    have found no error at all. And appellants have not
    established that the cumulative effect of the few errors—
    including where the government has conceded prejudice (e.g.,
    the admission of the drug analysis reports against Seegers)—
    was sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. The
    government mounted a strong case based on overwhelming
    evidence and the district court used limiting instructions
    throughout the trial, both of which mitigated any cumulative
    prejudice caused by the errors. See 
    Brown, 508 F.3d at 1076
    .
    *    *    *    *   *
    We vacate McGill’s sentence and remand for the district
    court to resentence him. We remand for the district court to
    hold an evidentiary hearing on Simmons’s ineffective-
    assistance-of-counsel claim and Ronald Alfred’s ineffective-
    assistance-of-counsel claims concerning his counsel before
    and during trial. We also remand for the district court to
    determine whether the Confrontation Clause violations
    affected appellants’ substantial rights with regard to their
    conspiracy convictions, and to resentence them accordingly if
    178
    necessary. We reverse Seegers’s convictions for possession
    with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. In all other
    respects, we affirm.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-3190

Citation Numbers: 421 U.S. App. D.C. 280, 815 F.3d 846

Filed Date: 3/1/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

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