American Lung Ass'n v. Environmental Protection Agency , 134 F.3d 388 ( 1998 )


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  •                         United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 26, 1997               Decided January 30, 1998
    No. 96-1251
    American Lung Association, et al.,
    Petitioners
    v.
    Environmental Protection Agency and
    Carol M. Browner, Administrator, United States
    Environmental Protection Agency,
    Respondents
    Appalachian Power Company, et al.,
    Intervenors
    ---------
    Consolidated with
    No. 96-1255
    ---------
    On Petitions for Review of an Order of the
    Environmental Protection Agency
    ---------
    Robert E. Yuhnke argued the cause for petitioners.  With
    him on the briefs were Christine L. Shaver and Howard I.
    Fox.
    Karen L. Egbert, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for respondents.  With her on the brief
    were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, and Mi-
    chael L. Goo, Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency.
    Gerald K. Gleason, Counsel, entered an appearance.
    Andrea Bear Field, Henry V. Nickel, Linda C. Trees, and
    James R. Bieke were on the brief for intervenor Appalachian
    Power Company, et al.  Ross S. Antonson entered an appear-
    ance.
    Before:  Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Tatel,
    Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.
    Tatel, Circuit Judge:  On behalf of the nation's nearly nine
    million asthmatics, the American Lung Association and the
    Environmental Defense Fund challenge the Environmental
    Protection Agency's refusal to revise the primary national
    ambient air quality standards for sulfur dioxide
    (SO2).  Declining to promulgate a more stringent national
    standard, the EPA Administrator concluded that the substan-
    tial physical effects experienced by some asthmatics from
    exposure to short-term, high-level SO2 bursts do not amount
    to a public health problem.  Because the Administrator failed
    adequately to explain this conclusion, we remand for further
    elucidation.
    I
    Driven by its "deep concern for protection of the health of
    the American people," Sen. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 1 (1970)
    ("Senate Report"), Congress enacted the Clean Air Act
    Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)
    (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ss 7401-7671q (1994)),
    mandating a "massive attack on air pollution," Senate Report
    at 1.  As amended, the Clean Air Act erects a comprehensive
    system of national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS")
    to regulate health-threatening air pollutants.  The statute
    defines primary NAAQS as "ambient air quality standards
    the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of
    the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an
    adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public
    health."  42 U.S.C. s 7409(b)(1).
    Once the EPA Administrator concludes that a pollutant
    "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
    welfare" and that it comes from "numerous or diverse mobile
    or stationary sources," 
    id. s 7408(a)(1)(A)-(B),
    the Act re-
    quires the Administrator to produce "criteria," defined as the
    latest scientific data on "all identifiable effects on public
    health" caused by that pollutant.  
    Id. s 7408(a)(2).
     Based on
    these comprehensive criteria and taking account of the "pre-
    ventative" and "precautionary" nature of the act, Lead Indus-
    tries Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 
    647 F.2d 1130
    , 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
    the Administrator must then decide what margin of safety
    will protect the public health from the pollutant's adverse
    effects--not just known adverse effects, but those of scientific
    uncertainty or that "research has not yet uncovered."  
    Id. at 1153.
     Then, and without reference to cost or technological
    feasibility, the Administrator must promulgate national stan-
    dards that limit emissions sufficiently to establish that margin
    of safety.  See 42 U.S.C. s 7409(b)(1);  American Petroleum
    Inst. v. Costle, 
    665 F.2d 1176
    , 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
    (describing NAAQS promulgation procedure);  Lead Indus-
    
    tries, 647 F.2d at 1148-50
    (in establishing NAAQS, Congress
    deliberately subordinated economic and technological feasibil-
    ity concerns to the achievement of public health goals).
    States bear primary responsibility for attaining, maintaining,
    and enforcing these standards.  See 42 U.S.C. s 7410.
    In its effort to reduce air pollution, Congress defined public
    health broadly.  NAAQS must protect not only average
    healthy individuals, but also "sensitive citizens"--children, for
    example, or people with asthma, emphysema, or other condi-
    tions rendering them particularly vulnerable to air pollution.
    Senate Report at 10;  Lead 
    Industries, 647 F.2d at 1152
    .  If a
    pollutant adversely affects the health of these sensitive indi-
    viduals, EPA must strengthen the entire national standard.
    Lead 
    Industries, 647 F.2d at 1153
    (NAAQS "must be set at a
    level at which there is 'an absence of adverse effect' on [ ]
    sensitive individuals") (quoting Senate Report at 10).
    Sulfur Dioxide and Asthmatics
    A highly reactive colorless gas smelling like rotten eggs,
    sulfur dioxide derives primarily from fossil fuel combustion.
    Best known for causing "acid rain," at elevated concentrations
    in the ambient air, SO2 also directly impairs human health.
    As the Administrator explains in the Final Decision on review
    here, at concentrations above 2.0 parts per million ("ppm"),
    SO2 can affect healthy nonasthmatic individuals;  below 2.0
    ppm, it primarily affects people with asthma.  National Am-
    bient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Diox-
    ide)--Final Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 25,566, 25,570 (1996).
    Following the passage of the Clean Air Act, EPA promul-
    gated the SO2 NAAQS in effect today.  The primary stan-
    dards consist of a 24-hour standard (0.14 ppm averaged over
    24 hours not to be exceeded more than once a year) and an
    annual standard (0.03 ppm annual arithmetic mean).  
    Id. at 25,568.
     EPA also established a "secondary" three-hour stan-
    dard (0.50 ppm averaged over three hours not to be exceeded
    more than once a year), designed to protect the "public
    welfare" against non-health-related effects such as visibility
    impairment or environmental degradation, see 42 U.S.C.
    s 7409(b)(2).  Petitioners do not challenge these existing
    standards.
    Approximately four percent of the nation's population suf-
    fers from asthma.  Characterized by bronchoconstriction--
    shortness of breath, coughing, wheezing, chest tightness, and
    sputum production--asthma is triggered by many different
    stimuli, including cold or dry air, exercise or pollen as well as
    airborne pollutants.  The effects of bronchoconstriction can
    vary from short-term discomfort, such as an hour-long reac-
    tion with no lasting after-effects, to asthma attacks requiring
    medication or hospitalization.  Although rare, death can re-
    sult.
    Sulfur dioxide induces bronchoconstriction in asthmatics,
    but only under certain conditions.  To experience adverse
    effects from SO2 concentrations below 1.0 ppm, asthmatics
    must be exposed for five minutes or longer while breathing
    quickly and heavily through both nose and mouth, the sort of
    breathing induced by light exercise, shoveling snow, climbing
    several flights of stairs, or jogging to catch a bus.  At
    concentrations above 2.0 ppm, SO2 causes adverse effects
    even if the exposure lasts less than five minutes or the
    asthmatic breathes regularly.  See Second Addendum to Air
    Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter and Sulfur Oxides
    (1982):  Assessment of Newly Available Health Effects Infor-
    mation (1986).
    The Challenged Final Decision
    This case concerns the effect on asthmatics of what are
    known as high-level SO2 bursts, defined as emissions of 0.50
    ppm or more lasting at least five minutes.  Occurring sporad-
    ically and from specific sources, SO2 bursts come primarily
    from power utilities;  the rest come from nonutility sources
    such as industrial boilers, petroleum refineries, pulp and
    paper mills, sulfuric acid plants, and aluminum smelters.
    Citing the health concerns of asthmatics and relying on a
    1977 amendment to the Clean Air Act, in which Congress
    ordered the Agency to review and revise all criteria and
    NAAQS by 1980 and at five-year intervals thereafter, 42
    U.S.C. s 7409(d), petitioners urged EPA to issue a new
    NAAQS limiting short-term SO2 bursts.  Not until 1996, after
    petitioners sued twice to compel a decision, see Environmen-
    tal Defense Fund v. Thomas, 
    870 F.2d 892
    (2d Cir. 1989);
    American Lung Ass'n v. Browner, Civil Action No. 92-5316
    (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992), and after two rounds of public
    notice and comment, did EPA issue its final decision regard-
    ing SO2 NAAQS.  See NAAQS for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur
    Dioxide)--Reproposal, 59 Fed. Reg. 58,958 (1994);  Proposed
    Decision Not To Revise the National Ambient Air Quality
    Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxide), 53 Fed. Reg.
    14,926 (1988).  Rejecting petitioners' arguments, EPA con-
    cluded not only that the annual and 24-hour primary stan-
    dards needed no revision, but also that an additional five-
    minute standard was unnecessary to protect asthmatics.  See
    Final Decision at 25,575-76.
    In arriving at her final decision, the Administrator re-
    viewed a decade of data on the extent of high-level short-term
    SO2 bursts and their effects on public health.  See Review of
    the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Ox-
    ides:  Assessment of Scientific and Technical Information:
    Supplement to the 1986 OAQPS Staff Paper Addendum (Sept.
    1994);  Supplement to the Second Addendum (1986) to Air
    Quality Criteria for Particulate Matter and Sulfur Oxides
    (1982):  Assessment of New Findings on Sulfur Dioxide Acute
    Exposure Health Effects in Asthmatic Individuals (Aug.
    1994).  Based on clinical studies of mild to moderate asthmat-
    ics, she found that when such individuals breathe rapidly
    while exposed to SO2 concentrations of 0.60 ppm for five
    minutes, "substantial percentages (>= 25 percent)" experience
    effects "distinctly exceeding ... [the] typical daily variation in
    lung function" that asthmatics routinely experience.  Final
    Decision at 25,572.  The severity of these atypical effects, she
    found, "is likely to be of sufficient concern to cause disruption
    of ongoing activities, use of bronchodilator medication, and/or
    possible seeking of medical attention."  
    Id. The scientific
    community disagreed about the medical sig-
    nificance of these effects and whether they should be consid-
    ered "adverse."  Some experts took the position that such
    symptoms usually have no lasting impact, amounting at worst
    to a brief period of reversible discomfort;  others argued that
    even a one-hour disruption of activity can amount to a worri-
    some adverse health effect.  The Administrator left this
    dispute unresolved.  Instead, she discerned in the medical
    debate a consensus, which she adopted, that "repeated occur-
    rences of such effects should be regarded as significant from
    a public health standpoint."  
    Id. at 25,573
    (emphasis added).
    The Administrator then discussed the three exposure anal-
    yses on which the 1994 version of the proposed rule rested.
    These studies estimated that from 180,000 to 395,000 "expo-
    sure events"--defined as a heavily breathing asthmatic ex-
    posed to an SO2 burst--occur annually, affecting from 68,000
    to 166,000 asthmatic individuals.  
    Id. at 25,574.
     In view of
    the Administrator's previous finding, reiterated by agency
    counsel at oral argument, that at least 25 percent of asthmat-
    ics experience atypical effects from exposure events, these
    data suggest that as many as 41,500 (>= 25 percent of 166,000)
    asthmatics experience atypical effects from repeated SO2
    bursts each year.  At the same time, the Administrator
    acknowledged that subsequent industry studies of four nonu-
    tility sources suggest that the 1994 studies may have overesti-
    mated exposure for certain SO2 sources, 
    id., meaning that
    the
    number of affected asthmatics could be lower.  The Adminis-
    trator did not resolve the conflict between the studies.
    Armed with all these data, the Administrator concluded
    that "the likelihood that asthmatic individuals will be exposed
    ... is very low when viewed from a national perspective,"
    that "5-minute peak SO2 levels do not pose a broad public
    health problem when viewed from a national perspective,"
    and that "short-term peak concentrations of SO2 do not
    constitute the type of ubiquitous public health problem for
    which establishing a NAAQS would be appropriate."  
    Id. at 25,575.
     Describing SO2 bursts as "localized, infrequent and
    site-specific," she concluded that a new national standard was
    unnecessary.   
    Id. The Administrator
    nevertheless decided
    to encourage individual states to address short-term high-
    level SO2 emissions, initiating a rulemaking to provide appro-
    priate guidance.  Proposed Implementation Requirements for
    Reduction of Sulfur Oxide (Sulfur Dioxide) Emissions, 62
    Fed. Reg. 210 (Jan. 2, 1997) ("Proposed State Guidelines
    Rulemaking") (soliciting public comment on proposed guide-
    lines for state monitoring and regulation of five-minute peaks
    of SO2).
    Petitioners now challenge the Administrator's decision de-
    clining to promulgate a new NAAQS.  They assert that by
    failing to establish a five-minute NAAQS capping SO2 emis-
    sions at 0.60 ppm, EPA has violated its statutory responsibili-
    ty to protect the public health.  We review the Administra-
    tor's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s 7607(d)(9)(A)-(C)
    ("[C]ourt may reverse any such [agency] action found to be
    ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
    not in accordance with law;  ... [or] in excess of statutory ...
    authority, or limitations....").
    II
    Petitioners challenge much of the data the Administrator
    relied on, as well as the conclusions she drew.  Generally
    speaking, we will not second-guess EPA in its area of special
    expertise.  See Natural Resources Defense Council v. United
    States EPA, 
    824 F.2d 1146
    , 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc);
    American Petroleum 
    Institute, 665 F.2d at 1184
    .  Applying
    this deferential standard of review, we accept the Administra-
    tor's analysis of the exposure studies in the record, as well as
    the implication of her analysis--that thousands of asthmatics
    can be expected to react atypically to SO2 bursts each year.
    Petitioners contend that the Administrator's analysis
    amounts to a conclusive finding that SO2 bursts adversely
    affect asthmatics' health, thus triggering her duty to promul-
    gate a new NAAQS.   See Lead 
    Industries, 647 F.2d at 1153
    .
    At oral argument, counsel for EPA vigorously disputed peti-
    tioners' contention that the Administrator "found" an adverse
    health effect.  As we read the record, agency counsel appears
    to be correct:  The Administrator did not decide whether
    asthmatic reaction to SO2 bursts--"disruption of ongoing
    activities, use of bronchodilator medication, and/or possible
    seeking of medical attention"--amounts to an adverse health
    effect or merely, as some medical experts argued, run-of-the-
    mill asthma symptoms indistinguishable from bronchodilation
    due to cold air or exercise.  Final Decision at 25,572-73.
    Skipping this disputed question, the Administrator concluded
    that, regardless of the impact of single occurrences, "repeated
    occurrences of such effects should be regarded as significant
    from a public health standpoint."  
    Id. at 25,573
    .
    Disagreeing with this approach, petitioners argue that the
    Administrator had to answer the subsidiary "adverse effects"
    question, pointing to her warning to all states in the subse-
    quent rulemaking that "[a]lthough these episodes are few, it
    is clear that 5-minute SO2 ambient concentration peaks pose
    a health threat to sensitive exposed populations," Proposed
    State Guidelines Rulemaking at 211.  We need not decide
    that issue at this time, however, because we think the Admin-
    istrator has failed to explain the answer she did give, i.e., that
    SO2 bursts do not amount to a "public health" problem within
    the meaning of the Act.  The link between this conclusion and
    the factual record as interpreted by EPA--that "repeated"
    exposure is "significant" and that thousands of asthmatics are
    exposed more than once a year--is missing.  Why is the fact
    that thousands of asthmatics can be expected to suffer atypi-
    cal physical effects from repeated five-minute bursts of high-
    level sulfur dioxide not a public health problem?  Why are
    from 180,000 to 395,000 annual "exposure events" (the range
    indicated by the 1994 studies) or some fewer number (as
    suggested by the industry studies) so "infrequent" as to
    warrant no regulatory action?  Why are disruptions of ongo-
    ing activities, use of medication, and hospitalization not "ad-
    verse health effects" for asthmatics?  Answers to these ques-
    tions appear nowhere in the administrative record.
    In her only statement resembling an explanation for her
    conclusion that peak SO2 bursts present no public health
    hazard, the Administrator characterizes the bursts as "local-
    ized, infrequent and site-specific."  Final Decision at 25,575.
    But nothing in the Final Decision explains why "localized,"
    "site-specific" or even "infrequent" events might nevertheless
    create a public health problem, particularly since, in some
    sense, all pollution is local and site-specific, whether spewing
    from the tailpipes of millions of cars or a few offending smoke
    stacks.  From the record, we know that at least six communi-
    ties experience "repeated high 5-minute peaks greater than
    0.60 ppm SO2," 
    id., and agency
    counsel told us at oral
    argument that these so-called "hot spots" are not the only
    places where repeated exposure occurs.  Nowhere, however,
    does the Administrator explain why these data amount to no
    more than a "local" problem.
    Without answers to these questions, the Administrator
    cannot fulfill her responsibility under the Clean Air Act to
    establish NAAQS "requisite to protect the public health," 42
    U.S.C. s 7409(b)(1), nor can we review her decision.  Judicial
    deference to decisions of administrative agencies like EPA
    rests on the fundamental premise that agencies engage in
    reasoned decision-making.  See Vermont Yankee Nuclear
    Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
    435 U.S. 519
    , 524-25, 544-45, 558 (1978);  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
    332 U.S. 194
    , 209 (1947) (agency's experience, appreciation of
    complexities and policies, and responsible treatment of the
    facts "justifies the use of the administrative process").  With
    its delicate balance of thorough record scrutiny and deference
    to agency expertise, judicial review can occur only when
    agencies explain their decisions with precision, for "[i]t will
    not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory
    underlying the agency's action...."  SEC v. Chenery 
    Corp., 332 U.S. at 196-97
    .  Where, as here, Congress has delegated
    to an administrative agency the critical task of assessing the
    public health and the power to make decisions of national
    import in which individuals' lives and welfare hang in the
    balance, that agency has the heaviest of obligations to explain
    and expose every step of its reasoning.  For these compelling
    reasons, we have always required the Administrator to "co-
    gently explain why [she] has exercised [her] discretion in a
    given manner."  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
    Mut. Auto. Ins., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 48 (1983).
    In this case, the Administrator may well be within her
    authority to decide that 41,500 or some smaller number of
    exposed asthmatics do not amount to a public health problem
    warranting national protective regulation, or that three or six
    or twelve annual exposures present no cause for medical
    concern.  But unless she describes the standard under which
    she has arrived at this conclusion, supported by a "[ ]plausi-
    ble" explanation, 
    id. at 43,
    we have no basis for exercising our
    responsibility to determine whether her decision is "arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
    dance with law;  ... [or] in excess of statutory ... authority,
    or limitations...."  42 U.S.C. s 7607(d)(9)(A)-(C).
    Given the gaps in the Final Decision's reasoning, we must
    remand this case to permit the Administrator to explain her
    conclusions more fully.  We therefore need not resolve the
    debate between the parties over whether the Clean Air Act
    authorizes the Administrator to decline to protect an identifi-
    able group of asthmatics from a known adverse health effect.
    Although our cases make clear that the Administrator has
    broad discretion to establish an "adequate margin of safety"
    above and beyond what scientific certainty prescribes and to
    craft regulations that protect against unknown harms, see
    Lead 
    Industries, 647 F.2d at 1153
    -55 (Administrator must
    "err on the side of caution" when establishing the margin of
    safety, even where the "medical significance [of the effects] is
    a matter of disagreement"), they do not necessarily establish
    the converse proposition--that the Administrator may decline
    to establish a margin of safety in the face of documented
    adverse health effects.  Since in this case the Administrator
    has failed adequately to explain her conclusion that no public
    health threat exists, we can leave the issue of the scope of her
    authority for another day.
    We remand this case to the agency for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    So ordered.