Naun Rigoberto Sauceda Martinez v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2021 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 20-13961      Date Filed: 11/03/2021      Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-13961
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    NAUN RIGOBERTO SAUCEDA MARTINEZ,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ____________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A206-612-769
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 20-13961            Date Filed: 11/03/2021         Page: 2 of 8
    2                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13961
    Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Nuan Rigoberto Sauceda Martinez, a native and citizen of
    Honduras, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
    (“BIA”) final order adopting and affirming the Immigration
    Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for cancellation of removal
    on the ground that Sauceda Martinez did not show that his
    removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
    hardship to his U.S. citizen son. 1 Sauceda Martinez argues that
    the IJ and the BIA violated his due process rights and incorrectly
    applied the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard
    by requiring him to prove that the requisite hardship was
    1 The Attorney General may cancel the removal of an inadmissible or
    removable alien and adjust the status of the alien to that of a lawful
    permanent resident if the alien:
    (A) has been physically present in the United States for a
    continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately
    preceding the date of such application;
    (B) has been a person of good moral character during such
    period;
    (C) has not been convicted of [certain specified offenses]; and
    (D) establishes that removal would result in exceptional and
    extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or
    child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
    admitted for permanent residence.
    8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
    USCA11 Case: 20-13961             Date Filed: 11/03/2021         Page: 3 of 8
    20-13961                   Opinion of the Court                                3
    “unconscionable.” 2 After review, we dismiss the petition for lack
    of jurisdiction.
    I.        Background
    Sauceda Martinez entered the United States without
    inspection in December 2003. In 2014, the Department of
    Homeland Security served Sauceda Martinez with a notice to
    appear, charging him as removable for being an alien present in
    the United States without being admitted or paroled. Sauceda
    Martinez conceded removability and sought cancellation of
    removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). In his application, he
    asserted that his removal would result in exceptional and
    extremely unusual hardship to his minor son, Ever Sauceda
    Bardales, who is a U.S. citizen.
    In relevant part, at the merits hearing on his application for
    cancellation of removal, Sauceda Martinez testified that Ever,
    born in 2007, was his only child. Sauceda Martinez’s relationship
    with Ever’s mother ended in 2011, and Ever lives with his mother
    and his stepfather in Washington, D.C. Sauceda Martinez, who
    lives in Florida, visits Ever twice a year and calls him every day.
    Sauceda Martinez testified that he provides $350-400 in monthly
    child support for Ever, but he does so voluntarily and not
    pursuant to a court order. Sauceda Martinez explained that
    2Sauceda Martinez acknowledges in his petition for review that, under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i), we lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision as to
    whether to grant cancellation of removal.
    USCA11 Case: 20-13961       Date Filed: 11/03/2021    Page: 4 of 8
    4                     Opinion of the Court                20-13961
    Ever’s mother told him that she would not send Ever to visit if
    Sauceda Martinez were removed to Honduras “because it’s very
    dangerous” and Sauceda Martinez would have to wait for Ever to
    turn 18 and then Ever could make his own decision about visiting.
    Sauceda Martinez did not believe that he would be able to
    provide any monetary support for Ever if he were returned to
    Honduras because the pay is so low there. When Sauceda
    Martinez talked to Ever about Sauceda Martinez’s possible
    deportation, Ever stated he would “be very sad” and he would
    miss his father. Sauceda Martinez stated that if he were removed
    it would negatively affect his son emotionally and financially.
    Following the merits hearing, the IJ issued an oral decision
    denying the application for cancellation of removal. In his
    decision, the IJ explained that, for cancellation of removal
    purposes,
    [t]o establish exceptional and extremely unusual
    hardship, an applicant must demonstrate that a
    qualifying relative would suffer hardship that is
    substantially different from or beyond that which
    would ordinarily be expected to result from the
    alien’s deportation. However, he need not show
    that such hardship would be “unconscionable.”
    As to Sauceda Martinez’s showing of hardship, the IJ noted that
    because Sauceda Martinez was 37 years old, in good health, and
    had worked as a welder for 14 years, there was nothing to show
    that he would be unable to work and support his child from
    Honduras. The IJ further explained that the economic detriment
    USCA11 Case: 20-13961         Date Filed: 11/03/2021     Page: 5 of 8
    20-13961                Opinion of the Court                         5
    resulting from adverse conditions and the loss of, or difficulty
    finding, employment in Honduras were normal consequences of
    deportation and did not justify cancellation of removal. The IJ
    acknowledged that Ever’s separation from Sauceda Martinez
    would undoubtedly cause a hardship, but that this type of
    hardship was a normal result of deportation and Sauceda
    Martinez failed to provide evidence establishing “that his son
    would suffer hardship that is substantially different from or
    beyond that which would normally be expected from the
    deportation of an alien with close family members here.”
    Sauceda Martinez appealed to the BIA, arguing that he
    showed exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, that the IJ
    did not weigh properly all of the relevant factors, and that he was
    not required to show that the hardship would be
    “unconscionable.” The BIA adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision
    and dismissed the appeal, finding that the IJ properly considered
    the relevant factors related to hardship, and the BIA “agree[d] that
    the child’s hardship would not be substantially beyond that
    typically resulting from a family member’s removal.” The BIA
    noted that, “[a]s significant a hardship as it is, family separation in
    and of itself does not meet the high standard of exceptional and
    extremely unusual hardship.” Accordingly, the BIA dismissed the
    appeal. We now turn to the claim raised in Sauceda Martinez’s
    petition for review.
    USCA11 Case: 20-13961        Date Filed: 11/03/2021     Page: 6 of 8
    6                      Opinion of the Court                20-13961
    II.      Discussion
    Sauceda Martinez argues that the IJ and the BIA violated
    his due process rights and misapplied the exceptional and
    extremely unusual hardship standard by requiring him to show
    that the hardship would be unconscionable.
    We review only the decision of the BIA, except to the
    extent that it adopts the IJ’s decision or expressly agrees with the
    IJ’s reasoning. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    820 F.3d 399
    , 403
    (11th Cir. 2016). When the BIA explicitly agrees with the findings
    of the IJ, we will review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ as
    to those issues. Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    605 F.3d 941
    , 948 (11th
    Cir. 2010). “We review constitutional challenges, including
    alleged due process violations, de novo.” Alhuay v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    661 F.3d 534
    , 548 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
    As Sauceda Martinez concedes, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i)
    precludes our review of “any judgment regarding the granting of
    relief under . . . [8 U.S.C. §] 1229b”—including cancellation of
    removal. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i); see also Patel v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    971 F.3d 1258
    , 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), cert. granted,
    
    141 S. Ct. 2850
     (2021) (No. 20-979). Notwithstanding this
    jurisdictional bar, however, we retain jurisdiction to consider
    “constitutional claims or questions of law.”              
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B), (D). Constitutional claims or questions of law
    must be colorable, though, and “a party may not dress up a claim
    with legal or constitutional clothing to invoke [this Court’s]
    jurisdiction.” Patel, 971 F.3d at 1272 (en banc). Furthermore,
    USCA11 Case: 20-13961        Date Filed: 11/03/2021     Page: 7 of 8
    20-13961               Opinion of the Court                        7
    “[w]here a constitutional claim has no merit . . . we do not have
    jurisdiction.” See Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    321 F.3d 1331
    , 1333 (11th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by Patel,
    971 F.3d at 1275–78 (en banc).
    In order to establish exceptional and extremely unusual
    hardship to a qualifying relative for purposes of cancellation of
    removal, “the hardship to an alien’s relatives . . . must be
    substantially beyond the ordinary hardship that would be
    expected when a close family member leaves this country.” In re
    Monreal-Aguinaga, 
    23 I. & N. Dec. 56
    , 62 (BIA 2001) (quotation
    omitted). This standard requires that cancellation of removal be
    “limited to ‘truly exceptional’ situations.” 
    Id. at 62
    . Nevertheless,
    although the standard is high, it is “less than ‘unconscionable.’”
    
    Id. at 60
    .
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the IJ and
    the BIA identified and applied the correct legal standard in this
    case. The IJ identified the exceptional and extremely unusual
    hardship standard and cited to several BIA decisions applying that
    correct standard. The IJ also stated expressly that Sauceda
    Martinez “need not show that [the requisite] hardship would be
    ‘unconscionable.’” Nothing in the record supports Sauceda
    Martinez’s claim that the IJ erroneously required him to show
    that the hardship would be unconscionable. Rather, the record
    establishes that the IJ applied the correct standard, and the BIA
    adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision. Thus, because Sauceda
    Martinez’s constitutional due process claim has no merit, we lack
    USCA11 Case: 20-13961       Date Filed: 11/03/2021   Page: 8 of 8
    8                     Opinion of the Court               20-13961
    jurisdiction to review the petition. Gonzalez-Oropeza, 
    321 F.3d at 1333
    . Accordingly, we dismiss the petition.
    PETITION DISMISSED.