Saeed Hatim v. Barack Obama , 760 F.3d 54 ( 2014 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued December 9, 2013               Decided August 1, 2014
    No. 13-5218
    SAEED MOHAMMED SALEH HATIM, DETAINEE, CAMP DELTA,
    ET AL.,
    APPELLEES
    v.
    BARACK OBAMA, ET AL.,
    APPELLANTS
    Consolidated with 13-5220, 13-5221
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:12-mc-00398)
    (No. 1:05-cv-01429-UNA)
    (No. 1:06-cv-01766-RCL)
    (No. 1:07-cv-02338-RCL)
    Edward Himmelfarb, Attorney, U.S. Department of
    Justice, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the
    briefs were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, and
    Matthew M. Collette, Attorney. Ronald J. Whittle, II,
    Attorney, entered an appearance.
    2
    S. William Livingston argued the cause for appellees.
    With him on the brief were Brian E. Foster, David H. Remes,
    Brent Nelson Rushforth, and David Muraskin. Alan A.
    Pemberton entered an appearance.
    Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and
    GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.
    GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Guantanamo Bay detainees
    challenge two new policies they claim place an undue burden
    on their ability to meet with their lawyers. The district court
    upheld the detainees’ challenge, but we reverse, concluding
    that the new policies are reasonable security precautions.
    I
    The first challenged policy concerns where the detainees
    may meet with their lawyers. In the past, detainees at
    Guantanamo Bay would meet with visitors in nearby Camp
    Echo, to which they were driven in vans, or occasionally in
    Camps 5 and 6, the camps where most detainees are housed.
    Meetings in the housing camps would take place in small
    interview rooms with a guard posted outside the door. It is
    easier to monitor detainees’ meetings with visitors in Camp
    Echo. There is no need to post a guard outside each meeting
    because the interview rooms are equipped with video-
    monitoring equipment, and visitors can summon a guard at
    the touch of a button. The Camp Echo rooms are also larger
    than those in the housing camps and include restroom
    facilities and space for prayer, which means that guards need
    not move detainees to other rooms mid-meeting to use the
    bathroom or worship, as they must in the housing camps.
    3
    Citing the ability to provide more security with fewer guards
    at Camp Echo, in September 2012 the government
    implemented a new policy that required that all detainee
    meetings with visitors take place there instead of in the
    housing camps.
    The second challenged policy involves the search the
    detainees must undergo when meeting with their lawyers. It
    has long been Guantanamo policy that detainees are searched
    both before and after any meeting with a visitor. Standard
    protocol in military prisons calls for a non-invasive search of
    the genital area of a prisoner. In the past, searches at
    Guantanamo departed from that element of the protocol in an
    effort to accommodate the religious sensibilities of the
    detainees. Under the old policy, guards would grasp a
    detainee’s waistband and shake his pants in an attempt to
    dislodge any items that might be hidden, careful to avoid
    contact with a detainee’s genital area. Concerns arose that not
    searching the genital area was posing a security threat. Those
    concerns escalated with the suicide of a detainee who took an
    overdose of medication that he had smuggled into his cell and
    the discovery of shanks, a wrench, and other weapons in the
    housing camps that had evaded the searches.
    In May 2013 the government revised the search
    procedures for Guantanamo to conform to standard military
    prison procedure. According to the protocol, the guard places
    his hand as a “wedge between the scrotum and thigh, and
    us[es] the flat hand to press against the groin to detect
    anything foreign attached to the body. A flat hand is used to
    ensure no contraband is hidden between the buttocks.” The
    guard also passes a hand-held metal detector a few inches
    over the detainee’s body, including the area of his groin and
    4
    buttocks. At no time is the detainee’s groin visually exposed
    to the guard.
    Detainees challenged these two new policies in habeas
    corpus proceedings in district court, arguing that they have the
    purpose and effect of discouraging meetings with their
    counsel. The detainees claimed that their poor health made it
    difficult to make the trip by van to meet with their lawyers in
    Camp Echo and that their religious beliefs made it impossible
    to meet with counsel at all if genital searches were required to
    do so. The detainees sought an order permitting them to meet
    with counsel within the housing camps and without being
    subject to the new search procedures.
    The district court granted the detainees’ motion in part.
    The district court found that the new procedures were an
    exaggerated response to overstated security concerns,
    concluding that the rationales offered by the government were
    but a pretext for the real purpose, which was to restrict
    detainees’ access to counsel. The court entered an order
    barring use of the new search procedures when meeting with
    counsel. It also ordered that ill and injured detainees be
    allowed to meet with their lawyers in the housing camps
    instead of in Camp Echo. See In re Guantanamo Bay
    Detainee Litig., 
    953 F. Supp. 2d 40
    , 59-61 (D.D.C. 2013).
    The government appealed, and we stayed the district court’s
    order pending resolution of this appeal.
    II
    There is no doubt that we have jurisdiction over an appeal
    from a district court order granting injunctive relief, 28 U.S.C.
    § 1292(a)(1); see also Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of
    Columbia, 
    671 F.3d 1258
    , 1261-62 (D.C. Cir. 2012), but there
    5
    is a question in this case whether the district court had
    jurisdiction to issue that order in the first place. Congress has
    granted district courts jurisdiction to hear habeas claims. 28
    U.S.C. § 2241(a); see also Rasul v. Bush, 
    542 U.S. 466
    , 481
    (2004) (holding that § 2241 extends to Guantanamo
    detainees). But in the Military Commissions Act of 2006
    (MCA), Congress barred the federal courts from hearing the
    habeas claims of Guantanamo detainees. 28 U.S.C.
    § 2241(e)(1). The MCA also stripped the federal courts of
    jurisdiction over “any other action . . . relating to any aspect
    of [their] detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
    confinement.” 
    Id. § 2241(e)(2).
    In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court invalidated
    subsection (e)(1)’s ban on habeas claims of Guantanamo
    detainees, 
    553 U.S. 723
    , 792 (2008), but (e)(2) remains a bar
    to any “other action” by detainees, see Al-Zahrani v.
    Rodriguez, 
    669 F.3d 315
    , 319 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Thus, the
    district court has jurisdiction under § 2241(a) to hear the
    detainees’ habeas challenges, but is prohibited by (e)(2) from
    hearing any of their other claims. The government contends
    that the detainees’ claims in this matter do not sound in
    habeas and are therefore barred by (e)(2) because they relate
    to their “treatment” and “conditions of confinement.” The
    district court found jurisdiction, holding that the alleged
    interference with access to counsel infringed the right to
    habeas relief announced in Boumediene. See In re
    Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
    Litig., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 49-50
    .
    We need not determine whether the district court’s view
    of the scope of habeas is correct, for this challenge falls
    squarely within the jurisdiction we recognized recently in
    Aamer v. Obama, 
    742 F.3d 1023
    (D.C. Cir. 2014). In Aamer,
    we held that challenges to conditions of confinement can
    6
    properly “be raised in a federal habeas petition under section
    2241,” and when so raised are not barred by (e)(2)’s
    prohibition on non-habeas actions. 
    Id. at 1030,
    1038. The
    government has expressly conceded that the procedures
    challenged by these habeas petitions are “conditions of
    confinement.” Br. of Appellant at 17-19. The district court
    thus had jurisdiction under Aamer, and we need not address
    other jurisdictional theories.
    III
    We review constitutional challenges to prison policies
    under the test announced by the Supreme Court in Turner v.
    Safley, 
    482 U.S. 78
    , 89 (1987). This deferential standard
    applies to military detainees as well as prisoners. See
    Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington,
    
    132 S. Ct. 1510
    , 1518 (2012) (applying the Turner test in the
    context of pre-trial detention); United States v. White, 
    2014 WL 354661
    (N-M Ct. Crim. App. Jan. 31, 2014) (applying
    the Turner test to challenges to policies in a military prison);
    United States v. Phillips, 
    38 M.J. 641
    , 642-43 (A.C.M.R.
    1993) aff’d, 
    42 M.J. 346
    (C.A.A.F. 1995) (same); see also
    Amatel v. Reno, 
    156 F.3d 192
    , 196 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
    (observing that in the military context, the “government is
    permitted to balance constitutional rights against institutional
    efficiency” in a manner similar to the Turner test).
    In Turner, the Supreme Court explained that although
    incarcerated individuals do not completely lose their
    constitutional rights, “problems of prison administration”
    allow the government to restrict those rights in ways that
    would be unacceptable for persons not incarcerated. To
    prevent judicial overreaching into matters of prison
    administration, courts are to uphold prison regulations that
    7
    “impinge on inmates’ constitutional rights” as long as those
    regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological
    interests,” 
    id. at 84-85,
    89—a stark departure from the
    “inflexible strict scrutiny” analysis that normally applies
    when the government infringes on constitutional rights, 
    id. at 89.
    Here, however, the district court took the view that
    Turner’s deference to reasonable prison regulations does not
    apply to habeas claims, holding that “[s]ince the right to seek
    habeas relief is not limited or withdrawn in the prison context,
    neither may the Executive or the Legislature circumscribe the
    petitioners’ right.” In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
    Litig., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 53
    . Although there is some intuitive appeal
    to this novel reasoning, we are compelled to reject it because
    it directly contravenes Lewis v. Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    (1996).
    Lewis involved a class action alleging that inadequacies in the
    Arizona prison system deprived inmates of their constitutional
    right to access the courts by limiting the prisoners’ ability to
    bring various types of lawsuits, including habeas petitions.
    See 
    id. at 346,
    354-55. The Supreme Court held that
    “Turner’s principle of deference” applies to prison officials’
    interference with inmates’ attempts to bring their habeas
    claims, 
    id. at 350,
    361, foreclosing the district court’s
    suggestion that Turner does not govern a prisoner’s claim that
    his habeas rights have been abridged by prison officials. See
    also Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 
    591 F.2d 966
    , 974 (D.C.
    Cir. 1979) (applying a Turner-like test to prison regulations
    limiting access to paralegals); cf. Toolasprashad v. Bureau of
    Prisons, 
    286 F.3d 576
    , 584-85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying
    Turner to allow limitations on prisoners’ ability to file
    grievances against prison administrators). We therefore
    8
    proceed to consider the detainees’ claims under the Turner
    framework. 1
    IV
    We assume, without deciding, that the district court was
    correct in concluding that the detainees’ right to habeas
    includes the right to representation by counsel and that that
    right has been burdened by the policies that the detainees
    challenge. 2 See Overton v. Bazzetta, 
    539 U.S. 126
    , 131-32
    (2003) (declining to define the asserted right where, even if
    such a right existed and was violated, the regulations survived
    Turner). Turner requires that we look to four factors to
    determine if these new policies are reasonable: (1) whether
    there is a “valid, rational connection between the prison
    regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
    1
    Although the district court held that a test less deferential
    than Turner applies to regulations affecting habeas claims, it
    declined to specify the features of that test because it found that the
    challenged policies failed even under Turner.
    2
    Although the detainees claim that the new policies cut off
    their ability to meet with counsel, we note that the Guantanamo
    administrators have not done so directly. They have only required
    searches before meetings with any visitors, including counsel. In
    the face of those searches, which the detainees find objectionable
    on religious grounds, the detainees have made the decision that they
    will not meet with counsel. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
    482 U.S. 342
    , 351-52 (1987) (“While we in no way minimize the
    central importance of [religious beliefs] to respondents, we are
    unwilling to hold that prison officials are required by the
    Constitution to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to that
    end.”).
    9
    forward to justify it,” 
    Turner, 482 U.S. at 89
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted); (2) “whether there are alternative
    means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
    inmates,” 
    id. at 90;
    (3) “the impact accommodation of the
    asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
    inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally,”
    id.; and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives” to the
    regulation, 
    id. Although we
    examine each factor, the first is
    the most important. 
    Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196
    (“[T]he first
    factor looms especially large. Its rationality inquiry tends to
    encompass the remaining factors . . . .”); see also Beard v.
    Banks, 
    548 U.S. 521
    , 532 (2006) (plurality opinion).
    Prison security, the government’s asserted purpose for the
    challenged policies, is beyond cavil a legitimate governmental
    interest. See Bell v. Wolfish, 
    441 U.S. 520
    , 546-47 (1979).
    Turner teaches that, and common sense shouts it out. The
    only question for us is whether the new policies are rationally
    related to security. We have no trouble concluding that they
    are, in no small part because that is the government’s view of
    the matter. “The task of determining whether a policy is
    reasonably related to legitimate security interests is peculiarly
    within the province and professional expertise of corrections
    officials.” 
    Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517
    (internal quotation
    marks omitted). We must accord “[p]rison administrators . . .
    wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
    policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
    preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
    institutional security.” 
    Bell, 441 U.S. at 547
    (emphasis
    added); see 
    Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517
    ; cf. 
    Phillips, 591 F.2d at 972
    .
    The touchstone of our deference, of course, is whether the
    government’s assertion of a connection between prison
    10
    security and the challenged policy is reasonable. Here,
    Guantanamo officials explained that they adopted the new
    search policies to address the risk to security posed by
    hoarded medication and smuggled weapons. It stands to
    reason that enhancing the thoroughness of searches at
    Guantanamo in the way called for by standard Army prison
    protocol would enhance the effectiveness of the searches. See
    
    Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1516-17
    . The detainees make no claim
    to the contrary. Instead, they argue that more thorough
    searches are not needed during their visits with counsel
    because the government failed to provide evidence that the
    contraband was smuggled into the housing camps during
    these visits. But the authorities at Guantanamo do not know
    how or when detainees obtain contraband. Cf. Shaw v.
    Murphy, 
    532 U.S. 223
    , 231(2001) (“Prisoners have used legal
    correspondence as a means for passing contraband.”); Wolff v.
    McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 577 (1974) (“The possibility that
    contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from
    apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials’ opening
    the letters.”). In light of such uncertainty and the fact that
    smuggling takes place, we think administering a more
    thorough search in connection with attorney visits as well as
    with any other detainee movements or meetings is a
    reasonable response to a serious threat to security at
    Guantanamo.
    Likewise, it is reasonable to require that all meetings
    between detainees and their visitors, including counsel, take
    place in Camp Echo, which requires fewer guards than the
    housing camps. Each meeting room in Camp Echo, unlike
    those in the detainees’ housing camps, has a restroom and a
    space for prayer, which means that guards are not needed to
    transfer detainees mid-meeting. And the video monitoring in
    Camp Echo eliminates the need to post guards outside each
    11
    meeting room, as is necessary in Camps 5 and 6. Guards who
    would have to stand sentry if the visits took place in a housing
    camp are instead available for postings elsewhere at
    Guantanamo, enhancing the facility’s overall security.
    The district court failed to defer to the government’s
    justifications for the new policies, concluding that they were
    not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. The
    court required proof from the military that the old procedures
    were ineffective and in need of change and that the detainee
    who committed suicide had managed to repeatedly evade the
    search by hiding the hoarded medication in his groin area.
    The district court also dismissed the military’s expert
    judgment that some of the guards needed for monitoring visits
    with detainees in their housing camps could be better used for
    other security needs, substituting its own assessment that
    “allowing attorney-client meetings [in the housing camps]
    would divert a maximum of two to three guards in Camp 5
    and four to six guards in Camp 6. The Court is confident the
    [military] can spare these guards . . . .” In re Guantanamo Bay
    Detainee 
    Litig., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 61
    .
    This misapprehends something fundamental about
    challenges to prison administration: “The burden . . . is not on
    the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the
    prisoner to disprove it.” 
    Overton, 539 U.S. at 132
    ; see also
    O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 
    482 U.S. 342
    , 350 (1987) (“By
    placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the
    availability of alternatives, the approach articulated by the
    Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and deference that
    the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of
    prison administrators.”). The district court required no such
    showing of the detainees and erred by failing to defer to the
    12
    reasonable explanation of Guantanamo officials for decisions
    within their area of authority and expertise.
    Turner next requires that we consider whether the new
    policies leave the detainees with some other means to exercise
    their right to counsel. Detainees who forego visits with their
    lawyers to avoid the searches can still communicate with
    counsel via letter. Supreme Court precedent teaches that
    alternative means of exercising the claimed right “need not be
    ideal, however; they need only be available.” See 
    Overton, 539 U.S. at 135
    . But we need not decide whether letters are an
    adequate replacement for meetings in person, because even if
    we were to agree with the detainees that they are not, the lack
    of an alternative “is not conclusive of the reasonableness of
    the [regulation]” because the other factors must still be
    considered, 
    Beard, 548 U.S. at 532
    (plurality opinion)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Both of the remaining factors cover much of the same
    ground as the first and reinforce our conclusion that these
    policies are reasonable. See 
    Amatel, 156 F.3d at 196
    . As to the
    third factor, the impact of an accommodation, we have
    already concluded that the new search procedures promote the
    safety of the guards and inmates by more effectively
    preventing the hoarding of medication and the smuggling of
    dangerous contraband, and thus the accommodation the
    detainees seek would necessarily have a negative impact “on
    guards and other inmates.” See 
    Turner, 482 U.S. at 90
    ; 
    Beard, 548 U.S. at 532
    (plurality opinion). Allowing counsel
    meetings with detainees to take place in the housing camps
    instead of Camp Echo would burden “the allocation of prison
    resources.” See 
    Turner, 482 U.S. at 90
    .
    13
    Finally, the detainees have pointed to no “ready
    alternative[]” to the new policies. 
    Id. To be
    “ready,” a policy
    must be an “obvious regulatory alternative that fully
    accommodates the asserted right while not imposing more
    than a de minimis cost to the valid penological goal.” 
    Overton, 539 U.S. at 136
    . The detainees’ suggested alternative of
    reverting to the old policies does not meet this “high
    standard.” 
    Id. Having already
    determined that we defer to the
    military’s judgment that the old policies hinder the
    government’s interest in security, we can hardly say that they
    are nonetheless “ready alternatives.” In the considered and
    experienced judgment of Guantanamo administrators, the old
    policies contributed to the troubling lapses in security. We
    will not second-guess that determination. See id.; see also
    Thornburgh v. Abbott, 
    490 U.S. 401
    , 419 (1989) (“[W]hen
    prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected
    a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded
    fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in
    demonstrating that the alternative they in fact selected was not
    an ‘exaggerated response’ under Turner.”).
    The district court’s very different take on these reasonable
    changes to policy at Guantanamo appears to stem from its
    view that the changes in policy were pretextual and the result
    of the government’s plan to inhibit detainees’ access to
    counsel. It is unclear what role, if any, motive plays in the
    Turner inquiry. Compare Hammer v. Ashcroft, 
    570 F.3d 798
    ,
    803 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc), with Salahuddin v. Goord, 
    467 F.3d 263
    , 276-77 (2d Cir. 2006), and Quinn v. Nix, 
    983 F.2d 115
    , 118 (8th Cir. 1993). Even if some quantum of evidence
    of an unlawful motive can invalidate a policy that would
    otherwise survive the Turner test, the evidence of unlawful
    motive in this case is too insubstantial to do so. The district
    court drew inferences from past conduct by former
    14
    commanders and dismissed as unbelievable the sworn
    statements of military officials. We find such an approach
    unwarranted. Although we must not give prison
    administrators a free hand to disregard fundamental rights,
    this case is a far cry from instances where administrators have
    acknowledged their intent to extinguish prisoner rights and
    acted accordingly. Cf. 
    Hammer, 570 F.3d at 802-03
    . The
    tenuous evidence of an improper motive to obstruct access to
    counsel in this case cannot overcome the legitimate, rational
    connection between the security needs of Guantanamo Bay
    and thorough searches of detainees.
    V
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court
    is reversed.