Air Line Pilots Association v. Elaine Chao , 889 F.3d 785 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued February 23, 2018              Decided May 11, 2018
    No. 17-1012
    AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL, ET AL.,
    PETITIONERS
    v.
    ELAINE L. CHAO, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
    RESPONDENT
    NORWEGIAN AIR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED,
    INTERVENOR
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    United States Department of Transportation
    R. Russell Bailey argued the cause for petitioners. With
    him on the briefs were Jonathan A. Cohen, David M.
    Semanchik, Edward J. Gilmartin, James P. Clark, Jonathan
    Elifson, and Stella Dulanya.
    Sharon Swingle, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was
    Michael S. Raab, Attorney.
    2
    Thomas G. Allen and Kevin M. Fong were on the brief for
    intervenor Norwegian Air International Limited in support of
    respondent.
    Before: ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges, and
    SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
    Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
    Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge
    SENTELLE.
    TATEL, Circuit Judge: Four airline-employee unions
    challenge the Secretary of Transportation’s award of a foreign
    air carrier permit to Norwegian Air International Limited,
    arguing that the airline’s business model and labor practices are
    not in the public interest. Though the unions have Article III
    standing to challenge the Secretary’s decision, their petition
    fails on the merits as neither federal law nor international
    agreement requires the Secretary to deny a permit on
    freestanding public-interest grounds where, as here, an
    applicant satisfies the requirements for obtaining a permit.
    I.
    A foreign airline seeking to fly to or from the United States
    must secure a permit from the Secretary of Transportation. See
    49 U.S.C. § 41301. The Secretary is authorized by 49 U.S.C.
    § 41302 to issue a permit where an applicant is “fit, willing,
    and able,” and either (A) “is qualified, and has been
    designated” to provide the air service by its home country
    under an international agreement or (B) will provide service
    that is in the “public interest.” We shall explore the text of this
    3
    provision and, in particular, its public-interest component
    much more closely below.
    The Air Transport Agreement between the United States
    and the European Union countries also governs issuance of
    permits to those nations’ airlines. See Air Transport
    Agreement, June 16–21, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L 283) 3
    (incorporating an earlier version of the Agreement, see Air
    Transport Agreement Between the United States and the
    European Community and Its Member States, Apr. 25–30,
    2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 (“2007 Agreement”), and its subsequent
    amendment, see Protocol to Amend the Air Transport
    Agreement Between the United States of America and the
    European Community and Its Member States, June 24, 2010,
    2010 O.J. (L 223) 3 (“2010 Protocol”)). Article 4 requires that
    the United States grant a permit to a covered European carrier
    “with minimum procedural delay,” provided the applicant
    satisfies certain citizenship and fitness criteria and maintains
    safety and security requirements detailed elsewhere. 2007
    Agreement art. 4. Under Article 6 bis—“bis” means “second”
    and describes a new provision inserted after an existing one—
    the United States must, absent “specific reason for concern,”
    recognize fitness and citizenship determinations made by an
    airline’s home nation “as if such a determination had been
    made by its own aeronautical authorities.” 2010 Protocol art. 2
    (adding Article 6 bis to the 2007 Agreement). Lastly for our
    purposes, Article 17 bis, titled “Social Dimension”—whose
    text we shall also explore below—expresses the “importance
    of the social dimension of the Agreement” and recognizes “the
    benefits that arise when open markets are accompanied by high
    labour standards.” 2010 Protocol art. 4 (adding Article 17 bis).
    On December 2, 2013, Norwegian Air International
    Limited (“Norwegian”)—an airline that, despite its name, is
    based in Ireland—applied to the Secretary of Transportation for
    4
    a foreign-carrier permit. See Application of Norwegian Air
    International Limited for an Exemption and Foreign Air Carrier
    Permit, Docket No. DOT-OST-2013-0204-0001 (Dec. 2,
    2013), Joint Appendix (J.A.) 1. Shortly thereafter, Norwegian
    received an Air Operator Certificate and operating licenses
    from the Irish authorities authorizing it to provide service under
    the Air Transport Agreement. See Letter from Leo Varadkar,
    Minister, Ireland Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport,
    to Anthony R. Foxx, Secretary, U.S. Department of
    Transportation (Feb. 13, 2014), J.A. 254.
    Airline-employee unions and others from the United States
    and Europe, including petitioners here—Air Line Pilots
    Association, International; Association of Flight Attendants-
    CWA; Allied Pilots Association; and Southwest Airlines
    Pilots’ Association (the “Unions”)—opposed Norwegian’s
    application. In their comments, these opponents claimed that
    Norwegian, a subsidiary of Norway’s flag carrier, used Ireland
    as a “flag of convenience” by “establish[ing] itself in Ireland to
    evade the social laws of Norway in order to lower the wages
    and working conditions of its air crew,” including by hiring
    pilots and cabin crew from a Singaporean third-party
    contractor. Order to Show Cause, Docket No. DOT-OST-
    2013-0204-0223, at 3 (Apr. 15, 2016), J.A. 417.
    On April 15, 2016, the Secretary issued an order
    tentatively approving Norwegian’s application for a permit.
    Acknowledging that Norwegian’s application and, in
    particular, its labor practices “present[ed] novel and complex
    issues,” the Secretary nonetheless concluded that neither
    Article 17 bis nor section 41302 allowed the denial of a permit
    on public-interest grounds where the applicant was qualified,
    as was Norwegian, and the Secretary was obligated under the
    Air Transport Agreement to grant the permit “with minimum
    procedural delay.” 
    Id. at 7,
    J.A. 421. In interpreting the Air
    5
    Transport Agreement, the Secretary solicited the views of the
    State Department and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal
    Counsel (OLC), both of which concluded—as had the
    Department of Transportation’s General Counsel—that Article
    17 bis provides no independent basis for rejecting an otherwise
    qualified applicant. 
    Id. And section
    41302, the Secretary
    explained, allows permit issuance for service that is either
    authorized under an international agreement or in the public
    interest. Because the Air Transport Agreement required the
    United States to grant Norwegian’s permit, the Secretary found
    the former condition satisfied and did not consider the latter.
    
    Id. at 6–8,
    J.A. 420–22.
    Several months later, the Secretary issued, over the
    Unions’ objection, a final order awarding Norwegian a foreign
    air carrier permit. Final Order, Docket No. DOT-OST-2013-
    0204-15123 (Dec. 2, 2016) (“Final Order”), J.A. 569.
    Reiterating that Norwegian’s application was “among the most
    novel and complex [cases] ever undertaken,” the Secretary
    again concluded that “the law and [the United States’] bilateral
    obligations leave [the Secretary] no avenue to reject
    [Norwegian’s] application.” 
    Id. at 3–4,
    J.A. 571–72. The
    Unions petitioned for review, and Norwegian intervened on the
    Secretary’s behalf. Before evaluating the merits of the Unions’
    petition, we must consider the Secretary’s argument that they
    lack Article III standing.
    II.
    The “‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing
    consists of three elements”: “[t]he plaintiff must have (1)
    suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
    challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
    redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v.
    Robins, 
    136 S. Ct. 1540
    , 1547 (2016) (quoting Lujan v.
    Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560 (1992)). This court,
    6
    relying on a well-established principle of competitor-standing
    doctrine that “when [government action] illegally structure[s]
    a competitive environment . . . parties defending concrete
    interests . . . in that environment suffer legal harm under Article
    III,” Shays v. Federal Election Commission, 
    414 F.3d 76
    , 87
    (D.C. Cir. 2005), has consistently held that union members
    have standing to challenge agency action authorizing
    competitive entry into their employers’ markets. In our most
    recent case, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
    Department of Transportation, 
    724 F.3d 206
    (D.C. Cir. 2013),
    we held that truck-drivers’ associations had standing to
    challenge a Department of Transportation program allowing
    Mexico-domiciled trucking companies to operate in the United
    States, because “absent the . . . program, members of these
    groups would not be subject to increased competition from
    Mexico-domiciled trucks operating throughout the United
    States,” 
    id. at 211–12;
    see also Clifford v. Peña, 
    77 F.3d 1414
    ,
    1416–17 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that maritime unions had
    standing to challenge a Maritime Administration decision
    permitting an American carrier to operate foreign-flag vessels);
    Autolog Corp. v. Regan, 
    731 F.2d 25
    , 30–31 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
    (holding that a seamen’s union crewing American-flag vessels
    had standing to seek an injunction against a new foreign cruise
    line competing on the American vessels’ route).
    This long line of cases confirms that the Unions have
    standing here. The Secretary’s authorization of Norwegian’s
    entry harms the Unions’ members by exposing them to
    potential job loss, wage and hour cuts, and other competitive
    pressures. To paraphrase our prior decisions: “[A]bsent [the
    Secretary’s grant of Norwegian’s permit], members of [the
    Unions] would not be subject to increased competition from [a
    foreign airline] operating [in] the United States.” International
    Brotherhood of 
    Teamsters, 724 F.3d at 212
    . “[T]he potential
    loss of [Union] jobs [is] a sufficient injury to confer standing,
    7
    . . . the injury [is] traceable to [Norwegian]’s expansion, and
    . . . [the requested relief] would redress the injury.” 
    Clifford, 77 F.3d at 1416
    (citing 
    Autolog, 731 F.2d at 31
    ).
    Challenging the Unions’ standing, the Secretary relies
    primarily on one case, Association of Flight Attendants–CWA,
    AFL–CIO v. Department of Transportation, 
    564 F.3d 462
    (D.C. Cir. 2009), in which this court held that an airline-
    employee union lacked standing to challenge the Secretary’s
    award of an air-carrier certificate. But the court did not hold
    that airline-employee unions could never have standing in such
    a case nor did it consider our competitor-standing decisions.
    Rather, the court concluded only that the union had failed to
    connect the airline’s entry to the narrow injury upon which it
    sought to ground standing, i.e. an involuntary furlough, finding
    that it “[could not] accept [the union’s] statements as anything
    other than conclusory and therefore inadequate.” 
    Id. at 469.
    Though arising in a similar context, Flight Attendants thus
    poses no barrier to the Unions’ competitor-standing claim here,
    which relies on a theory of injury and causation well
    established in our competitor standing case law.
    III.
    The Unions challenge the Secretary’s grant of
    Norwegian’s permit as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C.
    § 706(2)(A), arguing that it was incompatible with Article 17
    bis of the Air Transport Agreement and section 41302.
    Questions of textual interpretation sometimes require courts to
    struggle with ambiguous language, conflicting context,
    equivocal history, and elusive purpose. Not so here.
    A.
    Starting with the Air Transport Agreement, the Unions
    argue that Article 17 bis provides an independent basis for
    8
    denying Norwegian’s permit. Our analysis begins—and
    ends—with the Agreement’s text. See Medellín v. Texas, 
    552 U.S. 491
    , 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the
    interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”); Air Canada v.
    Department of Transportation, 
    843 F.2d 1483
    , 1486 (D.C. Cir.
    1988) (“[W]e interpret [international agreements] according to
    the principles applicable to treaties . . . .”).
    Titled “Social Dimension,” Article 17 bis provides in full:
    1. The Parties recognise the importance of the
    social dimension of the Agreement and the
    benefits that arise when open markets are
    accompanied by high labour standards. The
    opportunities created by the Agreement are not
    intended to undermine labour standards or the
    labour-related rights and principles contained in
    the Parties’ respective laws.
    2. The principles in paragraph 1 shall guide the
    Parties as they implement the Agreement,
    including regular consideration by [a] Joint
    Committee . . . of the social effects of the
    Agreement and the development of appropriate
    responses to concerns found to be legitimate.
    2010 Protocol art. 4 (emphasis added).
    Article 17 bis imposes no specific obligations on the
    Secretary when considering a permit application. The article’s
    first paragraph sets out a statement of principles—it explains
    what the parties “recognise” and what the Agreement is
    “intended” to do—that requires no concrete action from the
    parties. The second paragraph operationalizes those
    “principles,” doing so by providing that the social dimension
    of the Agreement “shall guide” the parties, prescribing
    9
    committee consideration as the only necessary action. The
    Unions remind us that the word “shall” imposes a mandatory
    directive. They fail to acknowledge, however, that it also
    matters what, specifically, the Agreement requires shall be
    done, namely, that the principles “shall guide the [p]arties.”
    Nothing in Article 17 bis requires the denial of a permit that
    conflicts with the first paragraph’s broad statement of
    principles.
    Contrast Article 17 bis with other portions of the
    Agreement. Article 4, for example, provides that “[o]n receipt
    of applications from an airline . . . [a] Party shall grant
    appropriate authorizations and permissions with minimum
    procedural delay, provided” that certain conditions are
    satisfied. 2007 Agreement art. 4 (emphasis added). And Article
    6 bis requires that, subject to an exception not relevant here,
    “[u]pon receipt of an application for operating authorisation . . .
    from an air carrier of one Party, the aeronautical authorities of
    the other Party shall recognize any fitness and/or citizenship
    determination made by . . . the first Party.” 2010 Protocol art.
    2. Not only does the language of Articles 4 and 6 bis contrast
    sharply with the aspirational principles of Article 17 bis, it
    directly requires the United States to grant Norwegian’s permit
    “with minimum procedural delay.” And Article 4’s
    requirement that before a permit is awarded “the provisions set
    forth in Article 8 (Safety) and Article 9 (Security) [be]
    maintained and administered” makes clear that the Agreement
    can and does require compliance with certain provisions—but
    notably not Article 17 bis—as a precondition to permit
    issuance.
    The government agencies charged with negotiating and
    interpreting the Agreement agree with us that Article 17 bis
    provides no basis for denying a permit. Cf. Water Splash, Inc.
    v. Menon, 
    137 S. Ct. 1504
    , 1512 (2017) (noting that courts give
    10
    “great weight” to Executive Branch treaty interpretations and
    “considerable weight” to the views of treaty counterparties).
    OLC considered the text, amendment history, and purposes of
    the Agreement, and concluded that “if an air carrier of a Party
    to the Agreement is otherwise qualified to receive a permit,
    Article 17 bis does not provide an independent basis upon
    which the United States may deny the carrier’s application for
    a permit.” Interpretation of Article 17 bis of the US-EU Air
    Transport Agreement, 
    40 Op. O.L.C. 1
    , 2 (2016). Although
    OLC found, as have we, the issue sufficiently clear to obviate
    the need to consider negotiating history, 
    id. at 10
    n.6, the State
    Department, “which led the U.S. delegation that negotiated the
    Agreement,” concluded that the relevant history likewise
    supports our interpretation. Letter from Brian J. Egan, Legal
    Adviser, Department of State, to Karl Thompson, Principal
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC, at 4 (Apr. 13, 2016),
    J.A. 471. Finally, for good measure, the Secretary consulted the
    European Commission’s Directorate General for Mobility and
    Transport, whose Director of Aviation confirmed that “if a
    party has a concern about Article 17 bis as a general matter, the
    only mechanism available under the Agreement is to raise the
    issue for consideration by the Joint Committee,” because
    Article 17 bis “cannot be referred to unilaterally by a Party to
    refuse an authorization under Article 4 of the Agreement.”
    Notice, Application of Norwegian Air International Limited,
    Docket No. DOT-OST-2013-0204, at 2–3 (Aug. 4, 2014), J.A.
    338–39.
    B.
    The Unions next argue that section 41302 allows the
    Secretary to grant Norwegian's permit only if it is in the public
    interest. But here, too, the Unions’ argument falters in the face
    of unambiguous text.
    11
    Section 41302 describes the conditions under which the
    Secretary may issue permits to foreign air carriers. We
    emphasize the key word:
    The Secretary of Transportation may issue a
    permit . . . authorizing . . . a foreign air carrier if
    the Secretary finds that—
    (1) the person is fit, willing, and able to
    provide the foreign air transportation to
    be authorized by the permit and to
    comply with this part and regulations of
    the Secretary; and
    (2)(A) the person is qualified, and has
    been designated by the government of
    its country, to provide the foreign air
    transportation under an agreement with
    the United States Government; or
    (B) the foreign air transportation to be
    provided under the permit will be in the
    public interest.
    49 U.S.C. § 41302 (emphasis added). Section 41302 provides
    two paths to authorization: if the Secretary finds the carrier to
    be fit, willing, and able under the first paragraph, the Secretary
    must find either that the carrier is qualified and designated by
    its home country under an agreement with the United States
    pursuant to paragraph 2(A), or that the transportation will be in
    the public interest pursuant to paragraph 2(B).
    The Secretary found, as Union counsel conceded at oral
    argument, that Norwegian was fit, willing, and able, thus
    satisfying paragraph one, and that the airline was qualified and
    designated by Ireland under the Air Transport Agreement, thus
    12
    satisfying paragraph 2(A). See Oral Arg. 16:18–25. Under the
    statute’s plain text, then, the Secretary could grant Norwegian’s
    permit without engaging in a public-interest analysis under
    paragraph 2(B) because Norwegian satisfied paragraph 2(A)
    and the statute unambiguously requires only one “or” the other.
    Attempting to convince us that “or” really means “and,”
    the Unions point to the statute’s history. Pet’rs’ Br. 28–30. In
    doing so, however, the Unions run afoul of a fundamental
    principle of statutory interpretation: where the text is
    unambiguous, as it is here, courts may not look to history. See
    United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 
    489 U.S. 235
    , 241
    (1989) (“[W]here, as here, the statute's language is plain, ‘the
    sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
    terms.’” (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 
    242 U.S. 470
    , 485
    (1917))).
    Even were we to look beyond the statute’s text, the
    evidence the Unions offer works against them. They first cite
    an earlier version of the statute, which empowered the Civil
    Aeronautics Board to “issue [a] permit if it finds that [a] carrier
    is fit, willing, and able . . . and that such transportation will be
    in the public interest.” 49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1976) (emphasis
    added). That a prior version of the statute says “and,” requiring
    a mandatory public-interest determination, serves only to
    underscore the current version’s use of “or,” evincing
    Congress’s intent to make the public-interest determination a
    disjunctive condition.
    Legislative history likewise demonstrates that, contrary to
    the impression the Unions give in their brief, Congress’s use of
    the word “or” was far from a thoughtless choice. As a State
    Department official explained in a Senate subcommittee
    hearing on the relevant amendment: “The provision will be
    most helpful in eliminating a dilemma previously faced on
    13
    occasion where a service by a foreign carrier was authorized by
    a bilateral agreement but nevertheless attacked . . . as not being
    in the ‘public interest.’ The provision, in effect, creates a
    conclusive presumption that a service authorized by a bilateral
    agreement is in the public interest.” International Air
    Transportation Competition Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1300
    Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee
    on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong. 101
    (1979) (statement of Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary for
    Economic Affairs, Department of State). Reinforcing this point
    at the same hearing, the chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
    Board presented the Board’s view that the proposed
    amendment “avoid[s] an unnecessary relitigation of the public
    interest question.” 
    Id. at 67
    (statement of Marvin S. Cohen,
    Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board). Congress, then,
    understood the word “or” to function exactly as we interpret it,
    establishing a “conclusive presumption” that compliance with
    an international agreement (under paragraph 2(A)) obviates the
    need to “relitigat[e]” the public-interest question (under
    paragraph 2(B)). In other words, “‘or’ . . . mean[s] . . . well,
    ‘or.’” Loughrin v. United States, 
    134 S. Ct. 2384
    , 2391 (2014).
    Undaunted, the Unions next claim that the Secretary has
    always engaged in a public-interest analysis as part of the
    permit-granting process. This argument runs into another
    fundamental principle of statutory interpretation: that agency
    practice cannot alter unambiguous statutory text. See Chevron
    U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842–43 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear,
    that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
    must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
    Congress.”). Even so, the Unions cite no case where the
    Secretary found that a permit applicant satisfied section 2(A)
    yet nonetheless denied a permit on public-interest grounds.
    14
    Finally, the Unions argue that even if the Secretary had no
    obligation to engage in a public-interest analysis before
    granting a permit, the Secretary should have imposed
    conditions on Norwegian’s permit “required in the public
    interest.” 49 U.S.C. § 41305(b). The Secretary concedes that
    “the Department of Transportation did not expressly address
    [the Unions’] request” for permit conditions. Resp’t’s Br. 33.
    As the Final Order makes clear, however, Norwegian
    voluntarily agreed to certain steps to address “concerns
    regarding [its] potential hiring and employment practices,”
    Final Order at 4, J.A. 572, which the Secretary took into
    account in awarding the permit, see 
    id. at 5,
    J.A. 573 (“In
    reaching our decision to grant [Norwegian’s] permit, we have
    taken into account the totality of the record . . . including those
    changes to its hiring and employment practices that it has
    offered as a direct result of the difficult issues that have been
    raised during the course of this proceeding.”). This, we think,
    means that the Secretary thought no further conditions were
    necessary. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 
    394 U.S. 759
    , 766
    n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion) (finding remand unnecessary
    where it “would be an idle and useless formality”).
    IV.
    After traversing the landscape of international-agreement
    and statutory interpretation, we end where we began: with the
    text. Broad statements of principle cannot create binding
    obligations and when a statute requires “(A) or (B),” (A) is
    enough. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    denied.
    So ordered.
    ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur that the
    Unions have Article III standing to challenge the decision of
    the Secretary of Transportation approving the permit
    application of Norwegian Air International Limited to fly
    between the United States and foreign countries. Op. at 5-7. I
    also concur that the plain text of 49 U.S.C. § 41302(2)(B) did
    not require the Secretary to make a “public interest” finding in
    approving the permit application. Op. at 10-13. Although I
    concur that Article 17 bis of the Air Transport Agreement does
    not provide an independent basis for denying a permit
    application, Op. at 7-10, I write separately to clarify that
    Article 17 bis has both an immediate role in the permit
    approval process, through the Secretary’s consideration of a
    permit application and imposition of terms for service under a
    permit, and a continuing role once a permit becomes
    operational, through (at least) action by the referenced Joint
    Committee.
    The preamble to the Air Transport Agreement between the
    United States and the European Community states that the
    Agreement was intended not only to promote competition
    among airlines, but also to ensure that “all sectors of the
    transport industry, including airline workers,” would “benefit”
    under the new “liberalized” regime. 2007 Agreement pmbl.
    The 2010 Protocol amending the Agreement added Article 17
    bis. Article 17 bis consists of two paragraphs: The first
    paragraph states that “[t]he opportunities created by the
    Agreement are not intended to undermine labour standards or
    the labour-related rights and principles contained in the Parties’
    respective laws.” 2010 Protocol art. 4. The second paragraph
    implements the first, instructing that “[t]he principles in
    paragraph 1 shall guide the Parties as they implement the
    Agreement, including regular consideration by the Joint
    Committee” of the Agreement’s “social effects.”                
    Id. (emphases added).
                                    2
    Based on its plain text, Article 17 bis can provide a basis
    for imposing conditions in connection with the Secretary’s
    consideration of an application for a permit and thereafter, if an
    application is approved pursuant to the Secretary’s authority
    under 49 U.S.C.§ 41305(b) to “impose terms for providing
    foreign air transportation under the permit.” The reference to
    “implement” in paragraph 2 can encompass both the
    Secretary’s consideration of a permit application and the terms
    of the permit to be issued pursuant to approval of the
    application. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
    DICTIONARY (1961) (defining “implement” as “to give
    practical effect to and ensure of actual fulfillment by concrete
    measures”); OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2 ed. 1989) (“[T]o
    complete, perform, carry into effect (a contract, agreement,
    etc.)”). Additionally, given that “[t]he participle including
    typically indicates a partial list,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
    777 (10th ed. 2014), the use of “including” in paragraph 2
    indicates that the Joint Committee is not the only mechanism
    for vindicating “high labour standards” and “labour-related
    rights.” Indeed, the Secretary’s action in the instant case
    accords with this interpretation. It is undisputed that the
    Secretary has authority to impose terms for providing service
    under the permit and did so here. And in considering
    Norwegian Air’s application for a permit, the Secretary
    expressly relied on voluntary commitments made by its Chief
    Executive Officer. Dep’t of Transp. Final Order 2016-11-22 at
    4-5 & n.17 (Dec. 2, 2016) (“Final Order”); Letter of Bjorn
    Kjos, Chief Exec. Off’r., Norwegian Air, Ex. 1 to Mot. of
    Norwegian Air Int’l Ltd. for Leave to File and Expedited
    Treatment, DOT-OST-2013-0204-0203 (June 1, 2015).
    During the Department of Transportation’s consideration
    of Norwegian Air’s application for a permit, the Unions
    requested conditions be placed on Norwegian Air’s permit “to
    ensure that its operations are consistent with Article 17 bis”;
    3
    “[t]hese conditions could include that [Norwegian Air’s]
    aircrew will (1) be based in Ireland; (2) be employed on
    contracts with an Irish company that will be governed by Irish
    employment and social security laws; and (3) have the right to
    choose a representative for collective bargaining purposes.”
    Objection of Labor Parties to Order to Show Cause, DOT-
    OST-2013-0204-13281 (May 16, 2016) at 38. The Unions now
    contend that the failure to place these terms on Norwegian
    Air’s permit was arbitrary and capricious, specifically that
    “[b]y failing to address their requested conditions at all, much
    less whether such terms would be consistent with the intent
    expressed in Article 17 bis, DOT failed to address ‘an
    important aspect of the problem.’’’ Pet’rs’ Br. 33-34 (quoting
    Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
    
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983)).
    The Secretary acknowledges that the “Department of
    Transportation did not expressly address petitioners’ request”
    for conditions, Resp’t’s Br. 33, but maintains that the concerns
    underlying the Unions’ conditions were addressed during the
    Department’s consideration of Norwegian Air’s application.
    
    Id. at 40-41.
    In fact, the administrative record makes clear that
    the serious and sensitive labor issues of concern to the Unions
    were explored and that considerable attention was focused on
    Norwegian Air’s business model and its potential impact on
    airline employees. Final Order at 4; see, e.g., Answer of Allied
    Pilots Ass’n to Application of Norwegian Air Int’l Ltd., DOT-
    OST-2013-0204-0006 (Dec. 20, 2013); Reply of Norwegian
    Air Int’l Ltd., DOT-OST-2013-0204-043 (Feb. 21, 2014). In
    granting the permit application, the Secretary considered “the
    totality of the record.” 
    Id. at 5.
    Further, to the extent the
    Unions were concerned that Norwegian Air would hire through
    employment agencies under contracts “governed by the laws of
    a country other than the carrier’s licensing country” and
    deprive its employees of a “collective say over their wages and
    4
    working conditions,” Joint Reply Comments of Air Line Pilots
    Ass’n, DOT-OST-2013-0204-0161 (Aug. 25, 2014) at 10-11,
    the Secretary’s reliance and expectation Norwegian Air would
    implement its voluntary commitments, consistent with law,
    suggests these concerns underlying the Unions’ requests were
    considered.
    Although it cannot be gainsaid that the Secretary should
    have explained his reasons for not including the Unions’ timely
    and germane conditions in the permit, cf. BNP Paribas Energy
    Trading GP v. FERC, 
    743 F.3d 264
    , 270 (D.C. Cir. 2014), this
    is not a case where the Secretary “entirely failed to consider an
    important aspect of the problem,” State 
    Farm, 463 U.S. at 43
    .
    Nor do the Unions make that precise argument, instead
    focusing on the Secretary’s failure to consider their requested
    permit conditions. See Pet’r’s Br. 33-34. Under the
    circumstances, the Unions’ immediate objection to non-
    inclusion of their conditions as terms in Norwegian Air’s
    permit fails. But there remains another avenue by which the
    Unions can potentially obtain additional protections for labor
    interests and rights during the operational phase of the permit
    — by requesting action by the Joint Committee, see 2010
    Protocol art. 4, para. 2.
    SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: Because I
    agree with the majority that the standing question in this case is
    governed by controlling precedent in International Brotherhood
    of Teamsters v. U.S. Department of Transportation, 
    724 F.3d 206
    (D.C. Cir. 2013), I concur in the opinion of the court.
    Because I disagree with the International Brotherhood opinion,
    I write separately to express my belief that if we were writing on
    a clean slate, we should dismiss for want of standing rather than
    denying the petition on its merits.
    Both International Brotherhood and the present case
    depend on the application of our competitor standing precedents.
    I have no problem with the proposition that the competitors of
    a regulated entity have standing to challenge the application or
    relaxation of regulations affecting their competitor. My
    difficulty is that neither the union in International Brotherhood
    nor the union in the present controversy is a competitor of the
    regulated entity. Unions do not compete with airlines. Airlines
    compete with airlines.
    Although the majority today, relying on International
    Brotherhood and earlier cases, asserts that the actions of the
    government cause putative harm to the petitioner, this does not
    appear to me to be the case. The possible future harm to the
    union members in each instance is caused, not by the actions of
    the government, but by the actions of a third party who is not the
    competitor of the petitioner. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561-62 (1992).
    But, again, we do not write on a clean slate, and given the
    precedential force of the case decided by the court, I join the
    court’s decision.