DCH Regional Medical Center v. Alex M. Azar II , 925 F.3d 503 ( 2019 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued September 24, 2018                Decided June 4, 2019
    No. 17-5203
    DCH REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,
    APPELLANT
    v.
    ALEX MICHAEL AZAR, II, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
    SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
    APPELLEE
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:16-cv-00212)
    Geoffrey M. Raux argued the cause for appellant. With
    him on the briefs were Lori A. Rubin and Donald H. Romano.
    Abby C. Wright, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jessie
    K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, Alisa B. Klein, Attorney, Robert P.
    Charrow, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Health and
    Human Services, Janice L. Hoffman, Associate General
    Counsel, Susan Maxson Lyons, Deputy Associate General
    Counsel, and Jonathan C. Brumer, Attorney.
    Before: MILLETT and KATSAS, Circuit Judges, and
    SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
    2
    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.
    KATSAS, Circuit Judge: The Medicare statute precludes
    judicial review of estimates used to make certain payments to
    hospitals for treating low-income patients. We must decide
    whether this preclusion provision bars challenges to the
    methodology used to make the estimates.
    I
    Through Medicare, the federal government pays for health
    care for elderly and disabled individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et
    seq. Hospitals receive increased payments if they serve “a
    significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients.”
    
    Id. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I).
    These increases are known as
    “DSH payments,” which is shorthand for disproportionate
    share hospital payments. 
    Id. § 1395ww(r).
    The payment at issue here is the “additional payment”
    described in paragraph (2) of section 1395ww(r), which is
    made annually to each disproportionate share hospital. The
    payment is the product of three statutory “factors” estimated by
    the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The third factor
    measures an individual hospital’s share of all nationwide
    uncompensated care. It is the quotient of two amounts:
    (i) the amount of uncompensated care for such
    hospital for a period selected by the Secretary (as
    estimated by the Secretary, based on appropriate data
    (including, in the case where the Secretary determines
    that alternative data is available which is a better
    proxy for the costs of [DSHs] for treating the
    uninsured, the use of such alternative data)); and
    (ii) the aggregate amount of uncompensated care for
    all [DSHs] that receive a payment under this
    3
    subsection for such period (as so estimated, based on
    such data).
    42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(2)(C).
    Congress precluded judicial review of the estimates of the
    three statutory factors. Specifically, it provided that “[t]here
    shall be no administrative or judicial review under section
    1395ff of this title, section 1395oo of this title, or otherwise”
    of “[a]ny estimate of the Secretary for purposes of determining
    the factors described in paragraph (2).”              42 U.S.C.
    § 1395ww(r)(3)(A). Congress also precluded administrative
    and judicial review of “[a]ny period selected by the Secretary
    for such purposes.” 
    Id. § 1395ww(r)(3)(B).
    In 2013, HHS promulgated a rule setting forth the “data
    sources and methodologies for computing” the three factors for
    fiscal year 2014. 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496, 50,627 (Aug. 19, 2013)
    (FY 2014 Rule). HHS decided to use data from 2010 or 2011,
    as provided on hospitals’ then-most recent Medicare cost
    reports. 
    Id. at 50,640.
    In the regulatory preamble, HHS stated
    that, “in the case of a merger between two hospitals” during
    that time, “Factor 3 will be calculated based on the [data] under
    the surviving [hospital’s certification number].” 
    Id. at 50,642.
    Plaintiff DCH Regional Medical Center merged with
    Northport Regional Medical Center on May 1, 2011. The
    merged entity operated under DCH’s name and certification
    number. Consistent with the preamble, it received a DSH
    payment for fiscal year 2014 based on DCH’s share of
    uncompensated care, but not Northport’s.
    DCH filed an appeal with the Provider Reimbursement
    Review Board, which denied relief on the ground that section
    1395ww(r)(3) barred administrative review.
    4
    DCH then sued. It sought to challenge “the methodology
    adopted and employed” by HHS to calculate the third factor
    bearing on its DSH additional payment. J.A. 5. DCH
    requested vacatur of “the Secretary’s Fiscal Year 2014 Factor
    3 calculation for Plaintiff,” as well as an order compelling the
    Secretary “to recalculate the Fiscal Year 2014 disproportionate
    share adjustment owed to Plaintiff through application of a
    methodology for determining Factor 3 that considers data
    associated with both the surviving and non-surviving hospitals
    that underwent a merger.” J.A. 20.
    The district court held that section 1395ww(r)(3) barred
    judicial review of DCH’s claims, so it dismissed the case for
    lack of jurisdiction. DCH Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Price, 257 F.
    Supp. 3d 91 (D.D.C. 2017). We review that decision de novo.
    Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 
    895 F.3d 822
    , 825 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
    II
    By its terms, section 1395ww(r)(3)(A) provides that
    “[t]here shall be no administrative or judicial review” of “[a]ny
    estimate of the Secretary for purposes of determining the
    factors described” in section 1395ww(r)(2). DCH concedes
    that this preclusion provision bars review of the estimates used
    by the Secretary to make the DSH additional payments under
    section 1395ww(r)(2). Yet DCH contends that the provision
    does not bar review of the methodology used to make the
    estimates. We disagree.
    A
    Although we “presume” that agency action is judicially
    reviewable, “that presumption, like all presumptions used in
    interpreting statutes, may be overcome by specific language
    that is a reliable indicator of congressional intent.” Knapp
    Med. Ctr. v. Hargan, 
    875 F.3d 1125
    , 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
    5
    (cleaned up). When Congress provides that “there shall be no
    administrative or judicial review” of specified agency actions,
    42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(i)(3)(I), its intent to bar review is clear, so
    we determine only whether the challenged action falls “within
    the preclusive scope” of the statute, Knapp Med. 
    Ctr., 875 F.3d at 1128
    . Here, Congress has barred review of “[a]ny estimate”
    used by the Secretary to calculate a DSH additional payment.
    42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(3)(A).
    In this statutory scheme, a challenge to the methodology
    for estimating uncompensated care is unavoidably a challenge
    to the estimates themselves. The statute draws no distinction
    between the two. Instead, it simply provides for payments
    under a formula consisting of three factors estimated by the
    Secretary. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(2). There is also no way to
    review the Secretary’s method of estimation without reviewing
    the estimate itself. DCH’s complaint confirms this point. It
    seeks both vacatur of “the Secretary’s Fiscal Year 2014 Factor
    3 calculation for Plaintiff” and an order compelling the
    Secretary “to recalculate the Fiscal Year 2014 disproportionate
    share adjustment owed to Plaintiff.” J.A. 20. This attacks the
    estimate used to calculate a DSH additional payment.
    Moreover, DCH’s proposed distinction between
    methodology and estimates would eviscerate the statutory bar,
    for almost any challenge to an estimate could be recast as a
    challenge to its underlying methodology. For example, all the
    determinations made in the FY 2014 Rule, see 78 Fed. Reg. at
    50,627–47, or in any of its successor rules, are fairly described
    as methodological. So, the only unreviewable estimates would
    be ones turning on how to apply these elaborate rules in
    individual cases. Such a line might make sense if Congress had
    required the Secretary to formulate a methodology for
    calculating DSH additional payments by rule, and then
    foreclosed judicial review only of adjudications applying the
    6
    rule to specific hospitals. But here, Congress has foreclosed
    review of “[a]ny estimate” used by the Secretary “for purposes
    of determining the factors” bearing on DSH additional
    payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(3)(A). Many of the
    relevant estimates involve determinations that do not vary from
    hospital to hospital—and thus are sensibly made by rule. For
    example, the first statutory factor turns on “the aggregate
    amount of payments” that would have been made to all
    disproportionate share hospitals under a prior version of the
    statute, “as estimated by the Secretary.”                    
    Id. § 1395ww(r)(2)(A).
    The second factor turns on the “percent
    change” of uninsured individuals under 65 years old
    nationwide, “as calculated by the Secretary” for fiscal years
    2014 to 2017, and on the “percent change” of all uninsured
    individuals nationwide, “as estimated by the Secretary” in each
    subsequent fiscal year. 
    Id. § 1395ww(r)(2)(B).
    The third
    factor turns on each individual hospital’s share of uninsured
    care, measured relative to a denominator of “the aggregate
    amount of uncompensated care” provided by all
    disproportionate share hospitals, “as estimated by the
    Secretary.” 
    Id. § 1395ww(r)(2)(C).
    Under this statutory
    structure, which plainly bars review of estimates made across-
    the-board and by rule, estimates cannot be separated from the
    methodology used to generate them.
    Our decision in Florida Health Sciences Center, Inc. v.
    Secretary of HHS, 
    830 F.3d 515
    (D.C. Cir. 2016), reinforces
    this analysis. There, we held that section 1395ww(r)(3)(A)
    bars judicial review of the choice of data used to estimate a
    hospital’s amount of uncompensated care. We rejected the
    argument that “an ‘estimate’ is not the same thing as the ‘data’
    on which it is based.” 
    Id. at 519.
    Instead, we held that, because
    the selection of data used to make estimates is “inextricably
    intertwined” with the estimates themselves, the bar on judicial
    review applies to both. 
    Id. at 521.
    That reasoning governs this
    7
    case, for the methodology used to generate estimates is no less
    “inextricably intertwined” with the estimates. In particular, the
    decision held unreviewable in Florida Health—to exclude
    from the 2014 estimates any data submitted after March
    2013—is a methodological choice as well as a data choice.
    Indeed, both the Secretary and this Court described it as such.
    See 
    id. at 517
    (“methodology for calculating DSH payments”);
    FY 2014 Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,634 (“Methodology to
    Calculate Factor 3”).
    If anything, the case for preclusion is even stronger here
    than in Florida Health. The governing statute speaks of
    uncompensated care “as estimated by the Secretary, based on
    appropriate data.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(2)(C)(i). So, it
    provides at least some textual basis for considering whether
    estimates can be separated from their underlying data. But the
    statute makes no reference to “methodology” as such—and
    thus provides no textual basis for separating estimates from
    their underlying methodology.
    In construing other Medicare provisions barring judicial
    review, we have employed similar reasoning. For example, in
    Texas Alliance for Home Care Services v. Sebelius, 
    681 F.3d 402
    (D.C. Cir. 2012), we construed a statute that bars review
    of “the awarding of contracts” to cover challenges to a
    regulation setting forth financial eligibility standards, which
    we described as “indispensable to ‘the awarding of contracts.’”
    
    Id. at 409.
    Likewise, we construed a provision barring review
    of “the bidding structure and number of contractors selected”
    to cover the same eligibility regulation, which we described as
    “inextricably intertwined with the bidding structure.” 
    Id. at 411.
    Most recently, we held that a statute barring judicial
    review of “prospective payment rates” covers “adjustments
    used to calculate th[ose] rate[s].” Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Azar,
    
    891 F.3d 1062
    , 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Citing Florida Health,
    8
    we reasoned that the adjustments were “inextricably
    intertwined” with the rates. 
    Id. at 1066–67
    (“Because
    reviewing a formula used by the prospective payment rate
    would effectively review the rate itself, we cannot review the
    former if we cannot review the latter.”). These decisions
    confirm our analysis above: We cannot review the Secretary’s
    method of estimation without also reviewing the estimate. And
    because     the    two    are     inextricably    intertwined,
    section 1395ww(r)(3)(A) precludes review of both.
    B
    To support its argument for jurisdiction, DCH invokes
    McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 
    498 U.S. 479
    (1991),
    and ParkView Medical Associates v. Shalala, 
    158 F.3d 146
    (D.C. Cir. 1998). Neither case is apposite.
    McNary involved a provision that barred district-court
    review of any “determination respecting an application for
    adjustment of status” of certain alien 
    farmworkers. 498 U.S. at 486
    n.6. The Supreme Court held that this provision did not
    bar a class action asserting due-process challenges to the
    procedures used by the agency to adjudicate individual
    adjustment decisions. The Court reasoned that the preclusion
    provision covered only “a single act rather than a group of
    decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making
    decisions.” 
    Id. at 491–92.
    McNary is inapplicable here. For one thing, the preclusion
    provision there covered only decisions made through
    adjudicatory determinations about individual applications.
    Here, by contrast, the preclusion provision covers “[a]ny
    estimate of the Secretary for purposes of determining” DSH
    additional payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(3)(A). As
    explained above, this text suggests, and statutory context
    confirms, that the provision covers broad estimates made by
    9
    rule, as well as individualized estimates made by adjudication.
    Moreover, the relief sought in McNary—greater agency
    process—would not have had “the practical effect of also
    deciding th[e] claims for benefits on the merits.” Fornaro v.
    James, 
    416 F.3d 63
    , 68 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting 
    McNary, 498 U.S. at 495
    ). Here, by contrast, DCH seeks to attack the very
    estimates that the preclusion provision insulates from review.
    Finally, this case involves only statutory claims, so we may
    apply the preclusion provision without straining to avoid the
    “serious constitutional question” that would arise from denying
    judicial review of constitutional claims. Bowen v. Mich. Acad.
    of Family Physicians, 
    476 U.S. 667
    , 681 n.12 (1986) (quotation
    marks omitted).
    ParkView is similarly inapplicable. That case involved a
    provision barring review of “[t]he decision of the Secretary”
    about whether to reclassify a hospital, for Medicare
    reimbursement purposes, from rural to 
    urban. 158 F.3d at 147
    –
    48. The Court held that “this bar leaves hospitals free to
    challenge the general rules leading to denial” of
    reclassification, 
    id. at 148,
    and it went on to conclude that
    regulations governing the choice of data for reclassification
    decisions were not arbitrary and capricious, 
    id. at 148–49.
    As
    in McNary, the preclusion provision in ParkView targeted only
    a particular kind of adjudicatory decision, rather than any
    estimate used to make the decision.
    Moreover, ParkView has been twice limited, in a way that
    creates a second dispositive distinction. First, in addressing the
    preclusion provision at issue there, we clarified that “when a
    procedure is challenged solely in order to reverse an individual
    reclassification decision, judicial review is not permitted.”
    Palisades Gen. Hosp. Inc. v. Leavitt, 
    426 F.3d 400
    , 405 (D.C.
    Cir. 2005). In other words, ParkView is “inapplicable … where
    the hospital’s challenge is no more than an attempt to undo an
    10
    individual [decision].” 
    Id. Later, in
    Florida Health, we
    extended that reasoning to the preclusion provision at issue
    here. We held that section 1395ww(r)(3) barred review
    because the plaintiff was “simply trying to undo the Secretary’s
    estimate of the hospital’s uncompensated care by recasting its
    challenge to the Secretary’s choice of data as an attack on the
    general rules leading to her 
    estimate.” 830 F.3d at 522
    .
    That principle governs this case. As explained above,
    DCH is simply trying to undo the Secretary’s estimate of its
    uncompensated care by recasting its challenge to that estimate
    as an attack on the underlying methodology. Indeed, DCH is
    trying to do so explicitly, in seeking vacatur of the calculation
    of its own DSH additional payment for fiscal year 2014 and an
    order requiring the Secretary to recalculate it. For these
    reasons, Florida Health—not Parkview—controls here.
    III
    DCH further argues that even if the statutory bar on
    judicial review applies, the district court still should have set
    aside the calculation of its DSH additional payment as ultra
    vires. According to DCH, the district court could have done so
    because the Secretary, in making the calculation, failed to
    choose appropriate data. DCH is mistaken.
    The doctrine invoked by DCH traces to Leedom v. Kyne,
    
    358 U.S. 184
    (1958). That case involved section 9(b)(1) of the
    National Labor Relations Act, which provides that the National
    Labor Relations Board “shall not” certify a bargaining unit
    including professionals and other employees “unless a majority
    of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit.”
    29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1). The Board had done just that, and the
    Supreme Court described its action as one “made in excess of
    its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in
    the 
    Act.” 358 U.S. at 188
    . The Court further held that the
    11
    district court had jurisdiction to set aside this unlawful agency
    action. That question arose because the NLRA permits court-
    of-appeals review of any “final order of the Board,” 29 U.S.C.
    § 160(f), a term that the Court had construed not to encompass
    certification orders, see Am. Fed’n of Labor v. NLRB, 
    308 U.S. 401
    (1940). The Court held that this specific-review scheme
    did not oust the district court of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1337, which otherwise applied. 
    See 358 U.S. at 187
    , 191.
    In Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v.
    MCorp Financial, Inc., 
    502 U.S. 32
    (1991), the Supreme Court
    cautioned against overreading Kyne’s jurisdictional holding. A
    court of appeals had read Kyne “as authorizing judicial review
    of any agency action that is alleged to have exceeded the
    agency’s statutory authority,” but the Supreme Court
    disagreed. 
    Id. at 43.
    The Court stressed that, in Kyne, the
    putative bar on district-court review was “implied” from the
    “silence” of a statute permitting review in the courts of appeals.
    
    Id. at 44.
    The Court further described Kyne as merely standing
    for the “familiar proposition” that judicial review is presumed
    to be available absent a clear statute to the contrary. 
    Id. And it
    distinguished Kyne because the statute at issue in MCorp
    barred judicial review “clearly and directly.” 
    Id. Following MCorp,
    there is not much room to contend that
    courts may disregard statutory bars on judicial review just
    because the underlying merits seem obvious. This Court has
    stated that such an argument “is essentially a Hail Mary pass—
    and in court as in football, the attempt rarely succeeds.” Nyunt
    v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 
    589 F.3d 445
    , 449
    (D.C. Cir. 2009). Other decisions confirm that Kyne, if
    construed to permit this kind of backdoor review, has “very
    limited scope.” DOJ v. FLRA, 
    981 F.2d 1339
    , 1342 (D.C. Cir.
    1993); see also Griffith v. FLRA, 
    842 F.2d 487
    , 493 (D.C. Cir.
    1988) (“extremely limited scope”); Hartz Mountain Corp. v.
    12
    Dotson, 
    727 F.2d 1308
    , 1312 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“extraordinarily
    narrow”). At most, such a “Kyne exception” applies only when
    three requirements are met: “(i) the statutory preclusion of
    review is implied rather than express; (ii) there is no alternative
    procedure for review of the statutory claim; and (iii) the agency
    plainly acts in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a
    specific prohibition in the statute that is clear and mandatory.”
    
    Nyunt, 589 F.3d at 449
    (cleaned up). The third requirement
    covers only “extreme” agency error, not merely “[g]arden-
    variety errors of law or fact.” 
    Griffith, 842 F.2d at 493
    .
    DCH fails to satisfy the first or third of these requirements.
    Here, the bar on judicial review is express. Moreover, DCH
    fails to allege any obvious violation of a clear statutory
    command. To the contrary, it invokes only the requirement that
    the Secretary, in calculating the DSH additional payment, must
    choose “appropriate data.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r)(2)(C).
    DCH makes no attempt to explain why the Secretary’s
    treatment of hospital mergers violates this open-ended
    provision at all, much less obviously so. Instead, DCH argues
    only that the Secretary treats hospital mergers differently in
    different contexts and that, in calculating DSH additional
    payments, the Secretary treated hospital mergers differently in
    fiscal years 2014 and 2015. At most, that suggests that the
    2014 treatment may have been arbitrary and capricious. And
    even that point is debatable, for the Secretary, in discussing the
    choice of data for the 2014 payment calculations, suggested
    possible administrability problems with the rule urged by
    DCH. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,642. Whatever the merits of
    DCH’s objection, it is worlds apart from the obvious violation
    of the clear statutory command at issue in Kyne.
    DCH claims support from Southwest Airlines Co. v. TSA,
    
    554 F.3d 1065
    (D.C. Cir. 2009), and COMSAT Corp. v. FCC,
    
    114 F.3d 223
    (D.C. Cir. 1997), but those cases are off-point.
    13
    They permitted review not because an obvious legal error
    justified disregarding an applicable statutory bar, but because
    the relevant statutory bar, in the circumstances of each case,
    was effectively coextensive with the merits. The same agency
    error thus simultaneously made the jurisdictional bar
    “inapplicable” and compelled setting aside the challenged
    agency action. See 
    COMSAT, 114 F.3d at 227
    (statutory bar
    “merges consideration” of jurisdiction and merits); Sw.
    
    Airlines, 554 F.3d at 1071
    (following COMSAT). Moreover,
    even if these cases did support a Kyne exception, each involved
    a far more obvious legal error than anything arguably present
    here. In COMSAT, the agency was authorized to collect fees
    only for “rulemaking proceedings or changes in law,” yet it
    sought to collect fees for concededly different 
    activities. 114 F.3d at 225
    . Likewise, in Southwest Airlines, the agency was
    authorized to collect certain fees only for screening
    “passengers and property,” yet it sought to collect those fees
    for screening 
    non-passengers. 554 F.3d at 1070
    –71. Nothing
    remotely analogous is present here.
    IV
    For these reasons, the district court correctly concluded
    that section 1395ww(r)(3) bars judicial review in this case.
    Affirmed.