Air Alliance Houston v. EPA , 906 F.3d 1049 ( 2018 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued March 16, 2018             Decided August 17, 2018
    No. 17-1155
    AIR ALLIANCE HOUSTON, ET AL.,
    PETITIONERS
    v.
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND ANDREW
    WHEELER, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
    PROTECTION AGENCY,
    RESPONDENTS
    UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER,
    MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE
    WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC, ET AL.,
    INTERVENORS
    Consolidated with 17-1181
    On Petitions for Review of a Final Rule of the
    United States Environmental Protection Agency
    2
    Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of New York, argued the cause
    for State Petitioners. With him on the briefs were Eric T.
    Schneiderman, Attorney General, Barbara D. Underwood,
    Solicitor General, David S. Frankel, Assistant Solicitor
    General, Michael J. Myers, Assistant Attorney General, Ellen
    F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
    General for the State of Oregon, Paul Garrahan, Attorney-in-
    Charge, Peter F. Kilmartin, Attorney General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island, Gregory S.
    Schultz, Special Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J.
    Donovan, Jr., Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
    General for the State of Vermont, Nicholas F. Persampieri,
    Assistant Attorney General, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois,
    Matthew J. Dunn, Gerald T. Karr, James P. Gignac, Assistant
    Attorneys General, Tom Miller, Attorney General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of Iowa, Jacob Larson,
    Assistant Attorney General, Janet T. Mills, Attorney General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine, Gerald
    D. Reid, Natural Resources Division Chief, Robert W.
    Ferguson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General
    for the State of Washington, William R. Sherman, Assistant
    Attorney General, Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Office of
    the Attorney General for the State of Maryland, Steven M.
    Sullivan, Solicitor General, Maura Healey, Attorney General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of
    Massachusetts, Christophe Courchesne, Assistant Attorney
    General, Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of New Mexico, and William
    Grantham, Assistant Attorney General.
    Emma C. Cheuse and Susan J. Eckert argued the cause for
    Community Petitioners and Petitioner-Intervenor. With them
    3
    on the briefs were Gordon E. Sommers and Joseph M.
    Santarella, Jr.
    Scott L. Nelson and Allison M. Zieve were on the brief for
    amici curiae Former Regulatory Officials in support of
    petitioners and vacatur.
    Richard L. Revesz, Bethany A. Davis Noll, Denise A. Grab,
    and Jason A. Schwartz were on the brief for amicus curiae
    Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
    Law in support of petitioners.
    Jonathan Brightbill, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
    U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents.
    With him on the brief were Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, Stephanie J. Talbert, Attorney, and Brian
    Doster, Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Environmental
    Protection Agency.
    Shannon S. Broome argued the cause for intervenor
    Chemical Safety Advocacy Group, et al. With her on the brief
    were C. Frederick Beckner III, Justin A. Savage, Ryan C.
    Morris, Kurt A. Johnson, Charles H. Knauss, Peter Tolsdorf,
    Steven P. Lehotsky, Michael B. Schon, Leslie A. Hulse, and
    Richard S. Moskowitz.
    Elizabeth B. Murrill, Solicitor General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, argued the cause
    for intervenor State of Louisiana. With her on the brief were
    Jeff Landry, Attorney General, Michelle M. White, Assistant
    Solicitor General, Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, Office of
    the Attorney General for the State of Arkansas, Lee Rudofsky,
    Solicitor General, Nicholas J. Bronni, Deputy Solicitor
    General, Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of Kansas, Jeffrey A. Chanay,
    4
    Chief Deputy Attorney General, Bryan C. Clark, Assistant
    Solicitor General, Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, Office of
    the Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Dominic E.
    Draye, Solicitor General, Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the State of Florida, Edward
    M. Wenger, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Mike Hunter,
    Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
    of Oklahoma, Mithun Maninghani, Solicitor General, Ken
    Paxton, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of
    the State of Texas, Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General, Patrick
    Morrisey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
    the State of West Virginia, Erica N. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor
    General, S. Chad Meredith, Deputy General Counsel, Office of
    the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
    Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General
    for the State of South Carolina, James Emory Smith, Jr.,
    Deputy Solicitor General, Sean Reyes, Attorney General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, Tyler R.
    Green, Solicitor General, Brad Schimel, Attorney General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the State of Wisconsin, and
    Misha Tseytlin, Solicitor General. Paul A. Martin, Chief
    Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for
    the State of West Virginia, Harry J. Vorhoff, Assistant
    Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
    of Louisiana, and Jonathan L. Williams entered appearances.
    Before: ROGERS, KAVANAUGH* and WILKINS, Circuit
    Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.
    *
    Judge Kavanaugh was a member of the panel at the time
    the case was argued but did not participate in this opinion.
    5
    PER CURIAM: This appeal presents the question whether
    the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had authority
    under Sections 307(d)(7)(B) and 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act
    (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7607(d)(7)(B), 7412(r)(7), to delay the
    effective date of the Chemical Disaster Rule of January 13,
    2017, for twenty months for the purpose of reconsideration,
    and, if so, whether it properly exercised that authority. We hold
    that where EPA has exercised its Section 7607(d)(7)(B)
    authority to delay the effectiveness of a final rule, it cannot
    avoid that statute’s express limitations by invoking general
    rulemaking authority under a different statutory provision.
    EPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious in any event.
    Accordingly, we vacate the Delay Rule of June 14, 2017.
    I.
    A.
    In 1990, Congress amended the CAA, and addressed
    among other things multiple high-profile chemical accidents
    that harmed workers, local communities, and the environment.
    See 136 CONG. REC. S16,899, S16,926–27 (1990) (Conf. Rep.).
    Section 112(r) of the 1990 Amendments, “Prevention of
    Accidental Releases,” provides that “[i]t shall be the objective
    of the regulations and programs authorized under this
    subsection to prevent the accidental release and to minimize the
    consequences of any such release of any [listed substance] or
    any other extremely hazardous substance.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 7412(r)(1).    “Accidental release” is defined as “an
    unanticipated emission of a regulated substance or other
    extremely hazardous substance into the ambient air from a
    stationary source.” 
    Id. § 7412(r)(2)(A).
    Congress also
    established the Chemical Safety Board (“CSB”) to investigate
    major accidental releases and issue reports to EPA
    “recommending measures to reduce the likelihood or the
    6
    consequences of accidental releases and proposing corrective
    steps to make chemical [industrial processes] as safe and free
    from risk of injury as is possible.” 
    Id. § 7412(r)(6)(C)(ii).
    “Whenever the [CSB] submits a recommendation with respect
    to accidental releases to [EPA], the Administrator shall respond
    to such recommendation . . . not later than 180 days after
    receipt,” indicating whether EPA will “initiate a rulemaking or
    issue such orders as are necessary to implement the
    recommendation in full or in part, pursuant to any timetable
    contained in the recommendation.” 
    Id. § 7412(r)(6)(I).
    If the
    Administrator decides not to implement the CSB’s
    recommendation in whole or part, “including any variation
    from the schedule contained in the recommendation,” the
    Administrator must provide a statement “setting forth the
    reasons for such determination.” 
    Id. Section 7412(r)(7)
    authorizes EPA to “promulgate release
    prevention, detection, and correction requirements which may
    include monitoring, record-keeping, reporting, training, vapor
    recovery, secondary containment, and other design, equipment,
    work practice, and operational requirements.”                   
    Id. § 7412(r)(7)(A).
    “Regulations promulgated pursuant to this
    subparagraph shall have an effective date, as determined by the
    Administrator, assuring compliance as expeditiously as
    practicable.” 
    Id. That section
    also requires EPA to
    “promulgate reasonable regulations and appropriate guidance
    to provide, to the greatest extent practicable, for the prevention
    and detection of accidental releases of regulated substances and
    for response to such releases by the owners or operators of the
    sources of such releases,” and requires that such regulations
    “be applicable to a stationary source 3 years after the date of
    promulgation.” 
    Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(i).
    These regulations must
    direct stationary sources to implement a Risk Management
    Plan (“RMP”) to “detect and prevent or minimize accidental
    releases . . . and to provide a prompt emergency response to
    7
    any such releases in order to protect human health and the
    environment.” 
    Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii).
    The RMPs must be
    registered with the EPA and available to the public. 
    Id. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(iii).
    Under Section 307(d)(7)(B) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
    § 7607(d)(7)(B), EPA must convene a proceeding to reconsider
    a rule if a person “raising an objection can demonstrate to the
    Administrator that [1] it was impracticable to raise such
    objection within [the notice and comment period] . . . and [2] if
    such objection is of central relevance to the outcome of the
    rule.” Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 
    862 F.3d 1
    , 4–5 (D.C. Cir.
    2017) (alterations in original). “Such reconsideration shall not
    postpone the effectiveness of the rule.”            42 U.S.C.
    § 7607(d)(7)(B).      “The statute also provides that the
    ‘effectiveness of the rule may be stayed during such
    reconsideration, however, by the Administrator or the court for
    a period not to exceed three months.’” Clean Air 
    Council, 862 F.3d at 5
    (quoting § 7607(d)(7)(B)).
    B.
    EPA first promulgated accidental release prevention
    regulations in 1996.         Accidental Release Prevention
    Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under Clean Air
    Act Section [7412(r)(7)], 61 Fed. Reg. 31,668 (June 20, 1996).
    In July 2012, a coalition of environmental groups, community
    organizations, unions, and health workers petitioned EPA for a
    rulemaking under Section 7412(r)(7) to “require the use of
    inherently safer technologies, where feasible, by facilities that
    use or store hazardous chemicals.” Greenpeace, United
    Steelworkers, Sierra Club et al., Petition to Prevent Chemical
    Disasters to EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson (July 25, 2012).
    The petition cited dangers from releases caused both by
    accidents and by terrorist attacks on U.S. chemical facilities.
    8
    Soon after, several chemical accidents occurred that received
    significant public attention and became subjects of CSB
    investigations. These accidents included the April 2013
    explosion of a fertilizer plant in West, Texas and the June 2013
    explosion of a chemical plant in Geismar, Louisiana. See
    Oversight of Federal Risk Management and Emergency
    Planning Programs to Prevent and Address Chemical Threats,
    Including the Events Leading Up to the Explosions in West, TX
    and Geismar, LA, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Envt. &
    Pub. Works, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rafael Moure-
    Eraso, Chairperson of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board). The
    West, Texas disaster involved a fire and explosion that crushed
    buildings and sent projectiles into neighboring communities,
    killing twelve first responders and two members of the public
    and causing $230 million in damage. The Geismar, Louisiana
    disaster also involved a fire and explosion, which killed two
    workers and injured many more.
    On August 1, 2013, President Obama issued an executive
    order establishing a Chemical Facility Safety and Security
    Working Group co-chaired by the EPA Administrator and the
    Secretaries of Labor and Homeland Security. Exec. Order No.
    13,650 § 2, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,
    78 Fed. Reg. 48,029 (Aug. 1, 2013). The Executive Order
    directed that within 90 days,
    [T]he Administrator of EPA and the Secretary of
    Labor shall review the chemical hazards covered by
    the Risk Management Program (RMP) . . . and
    determine if [it] can and should be expanded to address
    additional regulated substances and types of hazards.
    In addition, the EPA . . . shall develop a plan, including
    a timeline and resource requirements, to expand,
    implement, and enforce [the RMP] in a manner that
    9
    addresses the additional regulated substances and
    types of hazards.
    
    Id. § 6(c).
    One year later, EPA published a request for information in
    the Federal Register seeking comment on “potential revisions
    to its [accidental release] regulations and related programs.”
    Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk
    Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section
    [7412(r)(7)], 79 Fed. Reg. 44,604, 44,604 (July 31, 2014). The
    request solicited comments on dozens of potential regulatory
    actions under Section 7412(r), citing several chemical
    accidents that had occurred since the most recent promulgation
    of accidental release prevention requirements under that
    section. EPA received over 100,000 responses, including a 50-
    page letter from the CSB recommending dozens of regulatory
    regulations based on research and recent accident
    investigations.
    In March 2016, EPA issued a Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking proposing amendments to the accidental release
    prevention regulations.       Accidental Release Prevention
    Requirements: Risk Management Programs under the Clean
    Air Act (“Disaster Rule NPRM”), 81 Fed. Reg. 13,638 (Mar.
    14, 2016). The Disaster Rule NPRM explained that although
    EPA “believe[d] the [existing regulations] ha[ve] been
    effective in preventing and mitigating chemical
    accidents . . . [,] major incidents, such as the West, Texas
    explosion, highlight the importance of reviewing and
    evaluating current practices and regulatory requirements, and
    applying lessons learned . . . to advance process safety where
    needed.” 
    Id. at 13,646.
    EPA also explained that “[i]n addition
    to the tragedy at the West Fertilizer facility, a number of other
    incidents have demonstrated a significant risk to the safety of
    10
    American workers and communities,” and proceeded to discuss
    several recent explosions and fires that resulted in death, injury,
    and property damage to workers, first responders, and local
    communities. 
    Id. at 13,644
    (emphasis added). EPA estimated
    the annualized cost of on-site damages from chemical releases
    was $274.7 million, and estimated the cost of carrying out the
    proposed rule would be $131.2 million annually for the 12,500
    facilities potentially subject to its requirements. Although EPA
    was “unable to quantify what specific reductions [in damages]
    may occur as a result of these proposed revisions [to the
    accidental release regulations],” it “anticipate[d] that
    promulgation and implementation of this rule would result in a
    reduction of the frequency and magnitude of damages from
    releases,” and “expect[ed] that some portion of future damages
    would be prevented through implementation of a final rule.”
    
    Id. at 13,642.
    Further, EPA found, “the monetized impacts
    omit many important categories of accident impacts including
    lost productivity, the costs of emergency response, transaction
    costs, property value impacts in the surrounding
    community . . . , and environmental impacts.” 
    Id. at 13,643.
    The Disaster Rule NPRM specifically solicited comments on
    proposed compliance and effective dates for the various
    requirements.
    EPA promulgated a final rule on January 13, 2017.
    Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk
    Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act (“Chemical
    Disaster Rule”), 82 Fed. Reg. 4594 (Jan. 13, 2017). The final
    rule revised dozens of Section 7412(r)(7) requirements in three
    major areas: (1) accident prevention, including expanded post-
    accident investigations, more rigorous safety audits, safety
    training, and safer technology requirements; (2) emergency
    response, including more frequent coordination with local first
    responders and emergency response committees, and more
    intensive incident-response exercises; and (3) public
    11
    information disclosure, including public disclosure of safety
    information and public-meeting requirements. EPA responded
    to comments it received regarding the appropriate effective and
    compliance dates for various provisions of the rule and
    explained in detail why it chose to adopt or reject these
    recommendations. The final rule set an overall effective date
    of March 14, 2017, sixty days after promulgation. 
    Id. at 4594.
    Some provisions related to clarifying regulatory definitions
    went into effect on that date. Others, including most local
    emergency-response coordination requirements, became
    effective in one year, on March 14, 2018. 
    Id. at 4678.
    The
    requirements for emergency response exercises, public
    information-sharing and post-accident public meetings, third-
    party audits, more rigorous post-incident analyses, and safer
    technology requirements became effective three years later, on
    March 15, 2021. 
    Id. The compliance
    deadline for covered
    facilities to submit an updated RMP was March 14, 2022. 
    Id. C. Following
    a change in presidential administration, EPA
    delayed the effective date of the final Chemical Disaster Rule
    three times. On January 26, 2017, less than two weeks after
    promulgation of the rule, EPA published a final rule delaying
    its effective date by one week, to March 21, 2017, along with
    the effective dates of twenty-nine other final EPA rules. Delay
    of Effective Date for 30 Final Regulations Published by the
    Environmental Protection Agency Between October 28, 2016
    and January 17, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 8499-02 (Jan. 26, 2017).
    This initial delay implemented a January 20, 2017
    memorandum from then-White House Chief of Staff Reince
    Priebus directing agency heads to “temporarily postpone [the]
    effective dates for 60 days” of regulations that had been
    promulgated but not yet taken effect. Memorandum from
    Reince Priebus to Heads of Executive Departments and
    12
    Agencies: Regulatory Freeze Pending Review (Jan. 20, 2017)
    (“Priebus Memorandum”). The Priebus Memorandum also
    directed agency heads to “consider proposing for notice and
    comment a rule to delay the effective date for regulations
    beyond that 60-day period.” 
    Id. On February
    28, 2017, a coalition of industry groups
    submitted a petition for reconsideration of the Chemical
    Disaster Rule. A group of states also petitioned for
    reconsideration.      About two weeks later, the EPA
    Administrator announced his determination that the criteria for
    reconsideration under Section 7607(d)(7)(B) had been met and,
    pursuant to that section, administratively stayed the Chemical
    Disaster Rule’s effective dates for ninety days, until June 19,
    2017. See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk
    Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Further Delay
    of Effective Date (“90-Day Stay”), 82 Fed. Reg. 13,968-02
    (Mar. 16, 2017). During that stay, on April 3, 2017, EPA
    issued a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing to delay the
    effective date of the Chemical Disaster Rule by an additional
    20 months, until February 19, 2019. Accidental Release
    Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under
    the Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date (“Delay
    Rule NPRM”), 82 Fed. Reg. 16,146-01, 16,148 (Apr. 3, 2017).
    EPA promulgated the final rule on June 14, 2017, delaying
    the effective date of the Chemical Disaster Rule until February
    19, 2019. Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk
    Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Further Delay
    of Effective Date (“Delay Rule”), 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133-01
    (June 14, 2017). The Delay Rule recounted that EPA has
    received three petitions for reconsideration of the Chemical
    Disaster Rule “as provided for in [Section 7607(d)(7)(B)],” and
    that EPA issued a three-month stay under that section because
    “the criteria for reconsideration ha[d] been met for at least one
    13
    of the three objections.” 
    Id. at 27,134–35.
    However, EPA
    explained, Section 7607(d)(7)(B) limits a stay “to three
    months,” and “EPA believed that three months was insufficient
    to complete the necessary steps in the reconsideration process
    for the [Chemical Disaster Rule].” 
    Id. at 27,135.
    Thus, according to EPA, the Delay Rule has the purpose
    of “allow[ing] EPA to conduct a reconsideration proceeding
    and to consider other issues that may benefit from additional
    comment.” 
    Id. at 27,133.
    The Delay Rule further explained
    that EPA might take additional action during the 20-month
    delay period, “which could include proposing and finalizing a
    rule to revise or rescind [the Chemical Disaster Rule].” 
    Id. EPA justified
    its choice of a 20-month delay because of the
    complex issues involved and “[b]ased on EPA rulemaking
    experience,” without further elaboration. 
    Id. at 27,140.
    It
    justified its delay of the first-responder coordination provisions
    — which otherwise would have been effective on March 14,
    2018 — because “[i]n agreeing to convene a proceeding for
    reconsideration of the final rule, EPA agreed to provide the
    public with an opportunity to comment on other issues . . . . By
    finalizing these provisions immediately, EPA would not be
    allowing the public an additional opportunity to comment on
    them.” 
    Id. at 27,142.
    The Delay Rule also explained that “[a]
    delay of effectiveness will allow EPA time for a
    comprehensive review of objections to the [Chemical Disaster
    Rule] without imposing the rule’s substantial compliance and
    implementation resource burden when the outcome of the
    review is pending.” 
    Id. at 27,136.
    EPA stated that
    “[c]ompliance with all of the rule provisions is not required as
    long as the rule does not become effective. The EPA did not
    propose and is not taking any action on any compliance dates
    at this time.” 
    Id. As authority
    for promulgating the Delay Rule,
    EPA cited Sections 7607(d) and 7412(r)(7). 
    Id. at 27,135.
                                   14
    Two groups petitioned for review of the Delay Rule: over
    a dozen community and environmental groups, including Air
    Alliance Houston (“Community Petitioners”), and a number of
    states (“State Petitioners”). The United Steel, Paper and
    Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial
    and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO/CLC
    (“United Steelworkers”), intervened on behalf of Community
    Petitioners.   A group of industry interests (“Industry
    Intervenors”), many of whom had petitioned EPA for
    reconsideration of the Chemical Disaster Rule, intervened on
    EPA’s behalf.
    II.
    As a threshold matter, EPA and Industry Intervenors
    challenge the Article III standing of Community Petitioners
    and State Petitioners to bring these petitions. Standing is a
    structural, constitutional restraint on the subject matter
    jurisdiction of the federal judiciary. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
    USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
    , 412 (2013). Petitioners in an agency
    appeal must, in their opening brief, either identify “record
    evidence” or “submit additional evidence to the court of
    appeals” to support their standing. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. NHTSA
    (“Public Citizen I”), 
    489 F.3d 1279
    , 1289 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
    “When evaluating such evidence concerning standing, we
    ‘assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in
    their claims.’” 
    Id. (quoting City
    of Waukesha v. EPA, 
    320 F.3d 228
    , 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
    To establish standing, a petitioner must show (i) it has
    “suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact, (ii) that
    was caused by or is fairly traceable to the actions of the
    defendant, and (iii) is capable of resolution and likely to be
    redressed by judicial decision.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 
    755 F.3d 968
    , 973 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
    
    15 U.S. 555
    , 560–61 (1992)). “An allegation of future injury may
    suffice” to show injury in fact “if the threatened injury is
    ‘certainly impending’ or there is a ‘substantial risk that the
    harm will occur.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.
    Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting 
    Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414
    n.5).
    The party asserting standing must also demonstrate “a causal
    connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.”
    
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
    . When challenging failure to regulate,
    a petitioner need demonstrate only a “substantial probability
    that local conditions will be adversely affected, and thus will
    harm members of the petitioner organization.” Am. Petroleum
    Inst. v. EPA, 
    216 F.3d 50
    , 63 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quotation marks
    omitted). At the same time, “when the [petitioner] is not
    himself the object of government action or inaction he
    challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily
    ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” 
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562
    (quoting Allen v. Wright, 
    468 U.S. 737
    , 758 (1984)).
    “An organization has standing to sue on behalf of its
    members when . . . ‘its members would otherwise have
    standing to sue in their own right.’” Public Citizen 
    I, 489 F.3d at 1289
    (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
    
    432 U.S. 333
    , 343 (1977)). When organizations assert such
    representational standing, “they must demonstrate that at least
    one of their members would otherwise have standing to sue in
    his or her own right; that the interests they seek to protect are
    germane to their organizations’ purposes; and that neither the
    claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation
    of individual members.” Sierra 
    Club, 755 F.3d at 973
    . “When
    more than one association brings suit, ‘we need only find one
    party with standing’ to satisfy the [standing] requirement.”
    Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 
    861 F.3d 174
    , 182 (D.C.
    16
    Cir. 2017) (quoting Ams. for Safe Access v. DEA, 
    706 F.3d 438
    ,
    443 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
    A.
    EPA and Industry Intervenors do not contest that a
    challenge to the Delay Rule is germane to Community
    Petitioners’ organizational purposes. Nor do they argue that
    the participation of individual members is necessary. The
    question, then, is whether Community Petitioners have
    adequately shown that at least one of their members meets the
    requirements of injury, traceability, and redressability. See
    Sierra 
    Club, 755 F.3d at 973
    . They have.
    Even if the only tangible impact of the Delay Rule were
    delay of the Chemical Disaster Rule’s first-responder
    provisions, the potential harm to members of United
    Steelworkers is alone sufficient to provide standing to
    Community Petitioners. Ctr. for Biological 
    Diversity, 861 F.3d at 182
    (only one organization need have standing).
    Approximately 25,000 of United Steelworkers’ members work
    in 350 covered chemical plants in the United States, and United
    Steelworkers-represented “refineries account for almost two-
    thirds of United States production. No single company, and no
    other union, either operates, or represents the workers in more
    plants that are the subject of the [RMP] regulations than”
    United Steel. Nibarger Decl. ¶ 2 (DEC. 96). Several
    declarations from United Steelworkers members describe
    hazards that they face from accidental releases as plant workers
    and that their families face as residents of communities close
    to the covered facilities. See, e.g., Kelley Decl. ¶¶ 3–16 (DEC.
    21–24); Lilienfeld Decl. ¶¶ 1–11 (DEC. 56–58); Nibarger
    17
    Decl. ¶¶ 1–20 (DEC. 96–99). For example, Ben Lilienfeld, a
    United Steelworkers member in Baytown, Texas, avers that:
    [A] butadiene release in 2015 at Shell Deer Park
    Refinery & Chemical in Deer Park, Texas, put our
    members at risk . . . . At the LyondellBasell facility
    in Houston, Texas, multiple fires have occurred over
    the last several years causing releases. The same risks
    that caused the explosions at the Phillips Pasadena
    complex in 1989 [— a series of explosions at a Texas
    chemical plant resulting from the accidental release of
    flammable process gases that killed 23 employees,
    injured 100 more, and caused $1.4 billion in damage
    —] still exist today and our members and
    communities were, are and will remain on the front
    line.
    Lilienfeld Decl. ¶ 10 (DEC. 58); Comment, Coalition to
    Prevent Chemical Disasters (Oct. 29, 2014), J.A. 497. Such
    risks are particularized to chemical plant workers such as the
    United Steelworkers’ members, and EPA found that the
    Chemical Disaster Rule would reduce the kinds of accidents
    that Lilienfeld and the other United Steelworkers declarants
    face in their workplace and communities, and would mitigate
    such harms by improving coordination between facilities and
    local first responders. See Chemical Disaster Rule, 82 Fed.
    Reg. at 4597; EPA Activities Under EO 13650: Risk
    Management Program (RMP) Final Rule Questions & Answers
    (June 2017) (“EPA’s changes to the RMP rule will help protect
    local first responders, community members and employees
    from death or injury due to chemical facility accidents.”).
    Living and working with a higher risk of such harms than
    18
    would exist if the Chemical Disaster Rule became effective on
    time is therefore directly traceable to the Delay Rule.
    B.
    State Petitioners also have Article III standing. “[T]here
    is no difficulty in recognizing [a state’s] standing to protect
    proprietary interests or sovereign interests.” 13B WRIGHT &
    MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3531.11.1, Government
    Standing – States (3d ed.). The Supreme Court has recognized
    “[t]wo kinds of nonsovereign interests” for state standing
    purposes: proprietary interests such as “own[ing] land or
    participat[ing] in a business venture,” and private interests of
    another when the state is the “real party in interest.” Alfred L.
    Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 
    458 U.S. 592
    ,
    601–02 (1982).
    The Delay Rule affects State Petitioners’ proprietary
    interests due to the expenditures states have previously made
    and may incur again when responding to accidental releases
    during the delay period. State Pet. Br. 22–26. Hundreds of
    covered industrial facilities are located in State Petitioners’
    territory.    Petitioner Washington State spent $370,000
    responding to and investigating a refinery explosion that EPA
    specifically cited as an example of why the existing regulations
    needed to be strengthened. State Pet. Br. 26; Chemical Disaster
    Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4599; see also Disaster Rule NPRM, 79
    Fed. Reg. at 44,621 (explaining that the CSB found that this
    explosion in Washington State “could have been avoided if
    safer technologies had been employed”).                Monetary
    expenditures to mitigate and recover from harms that could
    have been prevented absent the Delay Rule are precisely the
    kind of “pocketbook” injury that is incurred by the state itself.
    See 
    Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602
    . Because State Petitioners have
    demonstrated their independent proprietary interests in
    19
    avoiding chemical releases in their territory sufficient to
    support standing, the court need not reach the alternative
    argument that Congress has abrogated the prudential bar on
    state parens patriae standing under the CAA. See Md.
    People’s Counsel v. FERC, 
    760 F.2d 318
    , 320 (D.C. Cir.
    1985).
    III.
    EPA has thrice delayed the effective date of the Chemical
    Disaster Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 4594 (Jan. 13, 2017) (eff. Mar. 14,
    2017). First, in response to a White House memorandum of
    January 20, 2017, EPA delayed the effective date by one week.
    Priebus Memorandum, 82 Fed. Reg. 8499-02 (Jan. 26, 2017).
    Second, on March 16, 2017, EPA granted industry petitions for
    reconsideration and stayed the effective date and compliance
    dates of the Chemical Disaster Rule for three months pursuant
    to Section 7607(d)(7)(B). 90-Day Stay, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,968-
    02 (Mar. 16, 2017). Third, during this stay, EPA promulgated
    the Delay Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133 (June 14, 2017). The
    preamble to the Delay Rule states that it allows EPA, beyond
    the three-month period authorized in Section 7607(d)(7)(B),
    “an additional 20 months . . . to conduct reconsideration
    proceedings and to consider other issues that may benefit from
    additional comment.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    “[I]t is ‘axiomatic’ that ‘administrative agencies may act
    only pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress.’”
    Clean Air 
    Council, 862 F.3d at 9
    (quoting Verizon v. FCC, 
    740 F.3d 623
    , 632 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). This court reviews “an
    agency’s construction of the statute which it administers” under
    the framework of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842 (1984). If “Congress has spoken directly to the
    precise question at issue” and “the intent of Congress is clear,
    20
    that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
    must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
    Congress.” 
    Id. at 842–43.
    But “if the statute is silent or
    ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court will
    uphold the agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable. 
    Id. at 843.
    Section 7607(d)(7)(B) provides that reconsideration of a
    final rule pursuant to that section “shall not postpone the
    effectiveness of the rule” and that the “effectiveness of the rule
    may be stayed during such reconsideration . . . for a period not
    to exceed three months.” It is beyond dispute that EPA relied
    upon Section 7607(d)(7)(B) when delaying the Chemical
    Disaster Rule in response to reconsideration petitions. Delay
    Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,134. Throughout the Delay Rule, EPA
    repeatedly justified delay of effective dates on the basis that it
    needs more time to reconsider the Chemical Disaster Rule than
    was provided under Section 7607(d)(7)(B). See 
    id. at 27,136
    (“A delay of effectiveness will allow EPA time for a
    comprehensive review of objections to the [Chemical Disaster
    Rule] without imposing the rule’s substantial compliance and
    implementation resource burden when the outcome of the
    review is pending.”); 
    id. at 27,138
    (“EPA concurs with
    commenters to the extent that they argue for finalizing the
    proposed delay in effective date . . . in order to conduct a
    reconsideration proceeding.” (emphasis added)); 
    id. at 27,140
    (“[T]hese issues may be difficult and time consuming to
    evaluate.”). The only justification offered in EPA’s short
    summary of the Delay Rule is that it “allows the Agency time
    to consider petitions for reconsideration of the [Chemical
    Disaster Rule] and take further regulatory action, as
    appropriate.” 
    Id. at 27,133.
    But regardless whether EPA
    “believe[s] that three months [is] insufficient to complete the
    necessary steps in the reconsideration process,” 
    id. at 27,135,
    that is not EPA’s call. Congress saw fit to place a three-month
    statutory limit on “such reconsideration,” 42 U.S.C.
    21
    § 7607(d)(7)(B), and this court “must give effect to the
    unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
    .       Because the Delay Rule arose from
    reconsideration petitions under Section 7607(d)(7)(B) and
    EPA’s reliance on its authority to delay a rule for
    reconsideration under that provision, that statute’s limitations
    apply.
    Tellingly, EPA’s briefing makes no mention of its reliance
    on Section 7607(d)(7)(B) in promulgating and justifying the
    Delay Rule. Rather, EPA argues that the Delay Rule is
    permissible under 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7), which provides that
    a rule’s effective date “as determined by the Administrator”
    must “assure[] compliance as expeditiously as practicable.”
    See Respondent Br. 27–35. Even if Section 7412(r)(7) grants
    EPA authority to delay the effectiveness of a final rule in the
    absence of reconsideration under Section 7607(d)(7)(B), it is
    well established that an agency may not circumvent specific
    statutory limits on its actions by relying on separate, general
    rulemaking authority. As we explained in NRDC v. Reilly, a
    “general grant of rulemaking power . . . [cannot] trump the
    specific provisions of the act.” 
    976 F.2d 36
    , 40 (D.C. Cir.
    1992); see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 
    551 U.S. 158
    , 169–70 (2007) (explaining that when two regulations
    conflict on the same subject matter, “the specific governs the
    general,” and the more specific regulation applies). Similarly,
    in Halverson v. Slater, this court held that the Secretary of
    Transportation’s general statutory authority to delegate “duties
    and powers of the Secretary to an officer or an employee of the
    Department” was trumped by a more specific provision that the
    “Secretary may delegate the duties and powers conferred by
    this subtitle . . . to any officer, employee, or member of the
    Coast Guard.” 
    129 F.3d 180
    , 183–84 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This
    court rejected the Secretary’s argument that he could use his
    general delegation authority absent an express restriction on
    22
    that authority, concluding that under Chevron step one, “the
    language of [the more specific provision] compels the
    conclusion that the Congress did not intend to authorize
    delegation of [these] functions to a non-Coast Guard official.”
    
    Id. at 185;
    see also Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 
    976 F.3d 2
    , 22 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (EPA may not “accommodate” two
    statutes by allowing one to “override” the more specific
    requirements of the other).
    So too here. EPA cannot escape Congress’s clear intent to
    specifically limit the agency’s authority under Section
    7607(d)(7)(B) by grasping at its separate, more general
    authority under Section 7412(r)(7). That would almost always
    allow EPA to avoid the restrictions of Section 7607(d)(7)(B)
    by simply insisting it was invoking Section 7412(r)(7), even
    when it is indisputably responding to a Section 7607(d)(7)(B)
    petition and reconsidering a rule under that specific provision.
    Such an unreasonable interpretation “would deprive [the more
    specific authority] of virtually all effect.” 
    Halverson, 129 F.3d at 189
    (quoting Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. FLRA, 
    798 F.2d 1525
    , 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
    The court’s conclusion that the plain text of Section
    7607(d)(7)(B) limits EPA’s authority to delay final rules for the
    purposes of reconsideration under that provision is bolstered by
    the statute’s history. Congress enacted the CAA in 1970 to
    encourage and promote “pollution prevention.” 42 U.S.C.
    § 7401(c). It found that that air pollution posed “mounting
    dangers to the public health and welfare, including injury to
    agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the
    deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground
    transportation.” 
    Id. § 7401(a)(2).
    It envisioned a cooperative
    effort by federal, state, and local governments to, among other
    things, “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air
    resources so as to promote the public health and welfare.” 
    Id. 23 §
    7401(b), (c). EPA was directed to carry out these purposes
    by, for instance, identifying and listing hazardous air pollutants
    (“HAPs”), setting standards for mobile sources, and issuing
    rules for new stationary sources. In fact, statutory deadlines
    were not met for meeting the National Ambient Air Quality
    Standards (“NAAQS”), and Congress found that “many of the
    Nation’s most important air pollution problems have failed to
    improve or have grown more serious.” H.R. REP. No. 101-490,
    at 144 (May 17, 1990). Also, “a number of serious new air
    pollution problems have emerged.” 
    Id. In 20
    years, EPA had
    established standards for only seven HAPs, “a small fraction of
    the many substances associated . . . with cancer, birth defects,
    neurological damage, or other serious health impacts.” 
    Id. at 151.
    In 1990, Congress — no longer willing to wait for EPA to
    act — amended the CAA. Section 7412 of Title III, the HAPs
    provision, was amended to establish “a new program for the
    control of [HAPs].” 
    Id. at 315.
    Congress identified and listed
    189 HAPs and assigned specific timetables for the
    promulgation of regulations and the attainment of NAAQS.
    Significantly for present purposes, Congress was aware that
    “[a]ccidental releases of air toxics occur with surprising
    frequency.” 
    Id. at 154.
    The 1990 Amendments created “a new
    program under which EPA is to establish reasonable and
    appropriate regulations to prevent and detect accidental
    releases to the maximum extent practicable.” 
    Id. at 157;
    see S.
    REP. No. 101-228, at 237 (Dec. 20, 1989). The section-by-
    section analysis stated:
    Accident prevention, detection, and response.—
    [Section 7412(r)(7)] directs the Administrator within
    three years of enactment to promulgate, in
    consultation with the Secretaries of Transportation
    and Labor . . . regulations to provide, to the greatest
    24
    extent practicable, for the prevention and detection of
    accidental releases into the ambient air.          The
    regulations must also provide for effective responses
    to such accidental releases by regulated sources. The
    regulations are to take effect three years after
    promulgation.
    H.R. REP. No. 101-490, at 334.
    The Chemical Disaster Rule is the most recent outgrowth
    of Congress’s effort in the 1990 Amendments to ensure
    adequate protections against highly dangerous accidental
    releases of chemicals. By Executive Order No. 13,650,
    Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security, 78 Fed. Reg.
    48,029 (Aug. 1, 2013), issued in the wake of serious disasters
    at chemical plants, EPA and several other agencies were
    directed to “improve chemical facility safety and security in
    coordination with owners and operators,” 
    id. § 1,
    and EPA was
    instructed to strengthen its accident prevention regulations, 
    id. §§ 2–7.
    EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in March
    2016, held public hearings, and received written comments.
    The final rule revised and strengthened accident prevention,
    emergency response, and public information disclosure
    requirements. Chemical Disaster Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4595;
    
    see supra
    Part [I.B]. It was to take effect in 30 days, on March
    14, 2017, with different compliance dates for some provisions
    in order to accommodate industry needs. Chemical Disaster
    Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4594, 4678.
    EPA brought this regulatory action to a halt. Section
    7607(d)(7)(B) provides:
    If the person raising an objection can demonstrate to
    the Administrator that it was impracticable to raise
    such objection within such time or if the grounds for
    25
    such objection arose after the period for public
    comment . . . and if such objection is of central
    relevance to the outcome of the rule, the
    Administrator shall convene a proceeding for
    reconsideration of the rule . . . . Such reconsideration
    shall not postpone the effectiveness of the rule. The
    effectiveness of the rule may be stayed during such
    reconsideration, however, by the Administrator or the
    court for a period not to exceed three months.
    42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (emphasis added). In the Delay
    Rule, EPA interpreted that provision as “generally allow[ing]
    the EPA to set effective dates as appropriate unless other
    provisions of the CAA control.” Delay Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at
    27,135. As an initial matter, EPA previously interpreted that
    provision as establishing the CAA’s exclusive mechanism for
    staying the effectiveness of a final rule pending
    reconsideration. See EPA Mem. in Opp. to Sierra Club’s Mot.
    for Summ. J. at 11, Sierra Club v. Jackson, No. 1:11-cv-01278
    (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2011). In any event, there is no textual basis
    for EPA’s current interpretation.
    The court has explained that Section 7607(d)(7)(B)
    “authorizes the agency to grant a stay during ‘such
    reconsideration,’ a term that quite obviously refers back to the
    reconsideration EPA ‘shall’ undertake when someone presents
    an objection of ‘central relevance’ that was ‘impracticable’ to
    raise during the period for public comment.” Clean Air
    
    Council, 862 F.3d at 9
    (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
    § 7607(d)(7)(B)). Regardless whether the three-month stay
    authorized by Section 7607(d)(7)(B) is cabined by the word
    “such,” the Delay Rule is the functional equivalent of a stay
    under that section. It is based on industry petitions for
    reconsideration and is the direct outgrowth of the three-month
    stay EPA issued under Section 7607(d)(7)(B). In the Delay
    26
    Rule, EPA makes no finding that a 20-month delay is required
    for regulated parties over and above the delayed compliance
    dates in the Chemical Disaster Rule. Instead, EPA repeatedly
    states that it was using the 20 months merely to reconsider
    concerns expressed by industry and unidentified “other issues
    that may benefit from additional comment.” Delay Rule, 82
    Fed. Reg. at 27,133, 27,135, 27,140. It has neither adopted
    industry concerns as its own nor proposed substantive changes
    to the programmatic requirements of the Chemical Disaster
    Rule. Because the Delay Rule is for all intents and purposes a
    Section 7607(d)(7)(B) stay pending reconsideration for EPA to
    decide what it wants to do, rather than a substantive
    amendment to tools and programs in the Chemical Disaster
    Rule, it cannot delay the effective date beyond three months.
    Nor is the Delay Rule authorized by Section 7412(r)(7).
    Section 7412(r)(7) is a comprehensive accident prevention
    regime affording EPA broad discretion as to regulatory tools,
    albeit with multiple requirements.            Subparagraph (A)
    references types of substantive actions that EPA may require
    by regulation: “release prevention, detection, and correction
    requirements which may include monitoring, record-keeping,
    reporting, training, vapor recovery, secondary containment,
    and other design, equipment, work practice, and operational
    requirements.” Once EPA makes a substantive regulatory
    choice — to add, modify, or subtract requirements — EPA
    must set an effective date for that choice that will “assur[e]
    compliance as expeditiously as practicable.” Subparagraph (B)
    requires EPA to determine that such regulations “provide, to
    the greatest extent practicable, for the prevention and detection
    of accidental releases of regulated substances.”             And
    subparagraph (E) provides that the three-month time limit of
    Section 7607(d)(7)(B) applies to regulations promulgated
    pursuant to Section 7412(r)(7). Reading the plain text makes
    clear that Congress is seeking meaningful, prompt action by
    27
    EPA to promote accident prevention. In this way, the
    framework of Section 7412(r)(7) does not differ significantly
    from the “highly circumscribed schedule” analyzed in 
    Reilly, 976 F.2d at 41
    , where the court held that EPA’s general
    rulemaking authority under the CAA could not “trump the
    specific provisions of the Act,” 
    id. Section 7412(r)(7)
    contains
    several “highly circumscribed” timing components. See S.
    REP. No. 101-228, at 237–39.
    The Delay Rule is not the type of substantive amendment
    authorized by Section 7412(r)(7). EPA has interpreted that
    section as according it “flexibility to make a rule effective with
    no specific outside date beyond that which ‘assur[es]
    compliance as expeditiously as practicable.’” Delay Rule, 82
    Fed. Reg. at 27,135. The Delay Rule states that “[i]n light of
    EPA’s commitment to take further regulatory action in the near
    future, with the potential for a broad range of rule
    revisions . . . and the substantial resources required,” “several
    industry trade associations” that had submitted “comment
    agreed that the 20-month delay in the effective date would be
    as expeditious[] as practicable.” 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    But
    EPA merely references arguments without standing behind any
    of them. By its own repeated admissions in the preamble to the
    Delay Rule, EPA has made no substantive decisions demanded
    by Section 7412(r)(7). The preamble reveals no attempt by
    EPA to consider how much time industry needs to comply, or
    why 20 months, as opposed to some other period of delay, are
    necessary. Nor does it engage with EPA’s determinations and
    findings in the Chemical Disaster Rule with respect to
    compliance dates. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 4675–80 (Part VIII).
    Nor does EPA claim to have changed those findings or taken
    any action with respect to them. Instead, EPA posits instead
    that the Delay Rule is designed to allow it time to rethink “the
    difficulties of compliance planning” while also claiming it is
    not revisiting the compliance dates or the rationale underlying
    28
    them. Delay Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,137. But see 
    id. at 27,144
    n.23. To the extent EPA offers any reasoning — namely, that
    “[a] delay of 20 months is a reasonable length of time” for it
    “to engage in the process of revisiting issues in the underlying
    [Chemical Disaster Rule],” 
    id. at 27,136
    — that reasoning does
    not relate to what is “practicable” for compliance by regulated
    sources; its explanation relates to its own “unidentified, new
    ‘policy preferences’ and the mere fact of reconsideration.”
    Cmty. Pet. Br. 42 (quoting Delay Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,136).
    This makes a mockery of the statute. The Delay Rule does
    not have the purpose or effect of “assur[ing] compliance” with
    Section 7412(r)(7); it is calculated to enable non-compliance.
    The Delay Rule removes both immediate and future obligations
    under the Chemical Disaster Rule, authorizing regulated
    facilities to ignore all pre-2019 deadlines. Delay Rule, 82 Fed.
    Reg. at 27,142, 27,144 n.23. Read as a whole, Section
    7412(r)(7)’s effective date provision is intended to provide a
    short window of notice before facilities are required to comply
    or prepare to comply with agency regulations. See 42 U.S.C.
    § 7412(r)(7)(E). In addition, the Delay Rule does not
    demonstrate, or even acknowledge, that EPA considered
    Section 7412(r)(7)’s statutory objectives, namely, to “prevent
    accidental releases,” to “minimize . . . consequences of any
    such release,” to “protect human health and the environment,”
    and “to include procedures and measures for emergency
    response after an accidental release.” 
    Id. § 7412(r)(1),
    (r)(7)(A), (r)(7)(B). The Delay Rule undermines these
    objectives without explaining why implementation delay was
    necessary; it refers only to the fact of EPA’s own
    reconsideration. By contrast with EPA’s final, record-based
    determinations in setting the Chemical Disaster Rule’s
    effective and compliance dates, EPA makes no findings of its
    own in the Delay Rule. It refers merely to alleged “security
    risks” and other hypotheticals raised by industry without
    29
    endorsing those findings or concerns. See, e.g., Delay Rule, 82
    Fed. Reg. at 27,136, 27,138, 27,140–41. Indeed, EPA
    explicitly conceded that it “has not concluded [the Chemical
    Disaster Rule] would increase such risks.” 
    Id. at 27,141.
    The
    Delay Rule thus contains no provisions that advance or
    accomplish these goals, but instead delays these objectives
    contrary to EPA’s prior determinations in a rulemaking.
    By delaying the effective date, EPA has delayed
    compliance, reduced or eliminated the lead-up time to achieve
    the compliance that EPA had earlier found necessary, and thus
    has delayed life-saving protections. EPA may not employ
    delay tactics to effectively repeal a final rule while sidestepping
    the statutorily mandated process for revising or repealing that
    rule on the merits. EPA states that it “does not wish to cause
    confusion among the regulated community and local
    responders by requiring these parties to prepare to comply with,
    or in some cases, immediately comply with, rule provisions
    that might be changed during the subsequent reconsideration.”
    
    Id. at 27,139.
    But this “confusion” stems solely from the
    confusion EPA has caused by the almost two-years’
    reconsideration it desires in order to decide what it wants to do,
    not compliance concerns relevant to regulated facilities’
    implementation of the Chemical Disaster Rule. That is not a
    basis for delaying protections. That the pre-existing rule
    remains in effect during the delay period does not show the
    Delay Rule satisfies Section 7412(r)(7). In promulgating the
    Chemical Disaster Rule, EPA had found, and the record shows,
    that there was a need for improvements to protect worker and
    community safety, and to reduce facilities, injuries, life
    disruption, and other harm. Chemical Disaster Rule, 82 Fed.
    Reg. at 4599–600.
    Without regard to context, purpose, or history, EPA has
    equated its authority to amend a final rule pursuant to
    30
    applicable statutory requirements with authority to delay a final
    rule merely because EPA is considering revising it. Delay
    Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,133, 27,136, 27,138. The overarching
    statutory purpose and design of the CAA, as well as the
    statutory context of Section 7412(r)(7) and Section
    7607(d)(7)(B), reject an interpretation that EPA can further
    delay a final rule for reconsideration when it has neither
    explained it has reached a different conclusion about
    preventing accidental releases nor offered new evidence to
    support a different conclusion, but has delayed a final rule
    based on speculation about future amendments. That does not
    conform to the carefully designed regime Congress envisioned
    in the 1990 Amendments. Congress has twice emphasized the
    finality of CAA rules by prohibiting reconsideration from
    delaying a final rule. Section 7607(d)(7)(B) provides a strict
    limit of three months on stays of effective dates pending
    reconsideration, and Section 7607(b)(1) provides that a petition
    for judicial review “shall not affect the finality of such rule . . .
    and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule.” These
    provisions (read in light of the history of the 1990
    Amendments) show Congress intended EPA to act with
    appropriate dispatch, not to delay protections. EPA points to
    nothing that would allow a misuse of its substantive
    rulemaking authority to evade these limits.
    EPA’s interpretation of its delay authority is not
    reasonable because it has no stopping point. Nothing in the
    text, context, structure, or history of the CAA supports
    interpreting Section 7412(r)(7) as allowing delays akin to those
    that prompted Congress to adopt the 1990 Amendments in
    order to spur EPA action. As Community Petitioners note, the
    absence of a date from the “practicable” clause in Section
    7412(r)(7)(B) does not reveal a lack of legislative urgency for
    effectiveness and compliance, but rather reflects Congress’s
    acknowledgement that, depending on EPA’s regulatory
    31
    choices, some flexibility in timing might be required. See
    Cmty. Pet. Br. 44 (citing S. REP. No. 101-228, at 234–35, 245).
    EPA may not “substitut[e] [its] desires for the plain text” of the
    Act. New Jersey v. EPA, 
    517 F.3d 574
    , 582–83 (D.C. Cir.
    2008). Nor may it render illusory a limitation like Section
    7607(d)(7)(B), which is designed to limit EPA’s authority and
    facilitate judicial review by assuring finality and creating an
    agency record. See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 372.
    For these reasons, the Delay Rule must be vacated. Our
    holding is narrow, as our analysis makes clear. In the Delay
    Rule, EPA has neither substantively amended — nor proposed
    any substantive amendments to — the Chemical Disaster Rule,
    but instead seeks to delay that rule pending reconsideration
    during which it decides what it wants to do. EPA retains
    authority under Section 7412(r)(7) to substantively amend the
    programmatic requirements of the Chemical Disaster Rule, and
    pursuant to that authority, revise its effective and compliance
    dates, subject to arbitrary and capricious review.
    IV.
    Moreover, EPA’s promulgation of the Delay Rule was
    arbitrary and capricious. Although “[t]he scope of review
    under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow . . . the
    agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
    satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
    explanation of the facts found and the choice made.” Motor
    Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
    Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). When
    an agency reverses itself, it “must show that there are good
    reasons for the new policy,” but it need not show that “the
    reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the
    old one.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
    556 U.S. 502
    ,
    515 (2009) (emphasis in original). However, if the “new policy
    32
    rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay
    its prior policy,” it must provide “a reasoned explanation . . .
    for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were
    engendered by the prior policy.” 
    Id. at 515–16;
    see also Encino
    Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 
    136 S. Ct. 2117
    , 2126 (2016)
    (“[A]n ‘unexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is ‘a
    reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and
    capricious change from agency practice.’” (quoting Nat’l
    Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
    545 U.S. 967
    , 981 (2005))).
    EPA’s explanations for its changed position on the
    appropriate effective and compliance dates are inadequate
    under Fox and State Farm, and therefore arbitrary and
    capricious, for several reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9).
    First, EPA repeatedly justifies the 20-month delay as
    providing time for taking and considering public comment on
    the Chemical Disaster Rule and any potential revisions or
    rescission thereof. But EPA nowhere explains how the
    effectiveness of the rule would prevent EPA from undertaking
    notice and comment or other tasks for reconsideration, why a
    delay is necessary to EPA’s process, or how the Chemical
    Disaster Rule becoming effective on schedule would otherwise
    impede its ability to reconsider that rule. See Public Citizen v.
    Steed, 
    733 F.2d 93
    , 102 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Without showing
    that the old policy is unreasonable, for [the agency] to say that
    no policy is better than the old policy solely because a new
    policy might be put into place in the indefinite future is as silly
    as it sounds.” (emphasis in original)). Agencies regularly
    reconsider rules that are already in effect. But as the Second
    Circuit has pointed out, “a decision to reconsider a rule does
    not simultaneously convey authority to indefinitely delay the
    existing rule pending that reconsideration.” NRDC v. NHTSA,
    
    894 F.3d 92
    , 111–12 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Clean Air Council,
    
    33 862 F.3d at 9
    ). Thus, the mere fact of reconsideration, alone,
    is not a sufficient basis to delay promulgated effective dates
    specifically chosen by EPA on the basis of public input and
    reasoned explanation, particularly where the statute requires
    the agency to “assur[e] compliance as expeditiously as
    practicable.” 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(7)(A). Further, under the
    plain text of Section 7412(r)(7), the timeframe for effective or
    compliance dates must be justified in terms of “assuring
    compliance as expeditiously as practicable,” meaning that EPA
    must explain why its proposed timeline is practicable for
    regulated parties to comply with the rule expeditiously — not
    for the agency to engage in the regulatory process. 
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Second, nothing in the Delay Rule explains EPA’s
    departure from its stated reasoning in setting the original
    effective date and compliance dates. In promulgating the
    Chemical Disaster Rule, EPA considered comments
    specifically about the rule’s proposed effective date and the
    compliance timeline for various requirements, and explained
    why it adopted or rejected the comments. See Chemical
    Disaster Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4675–78. For example, EPA
    “received comments supporting the proposed one-year
    compliance date for emergency response coordination
    activities,” and “EPA agree[d] with commenters and [was]
    finalizing a one-year compliance date for emergency response
    coordination activities.” 
    Id. at 4,677.
    As another example, one
    commenter objected to a four-year compliance date for
    emergency-response exercises and argued the deadline should
    be one year; EPA disagreed because four years would “allow
    owners and operators to develop an exercise program,” train
    personnel, and familiarize themselves with guidance EPA
    expected to develop after promulgation of the Chemical
    Disaster Rule. 
    Id. 34 The
    Delay Rule does not explain its departure from EPA’s
    previous conclusions regarding the appropriate and practicable
    timeline for implementing the Chemical Disaster Rule. Nor
    does it explain why the detailed factual findings regarding the
    harm that would be prevented upon implementation of the
    Chemical Disaster Rule are now only “speculative,” 
    id. at 27,139,
    or why the entire rule must be delayed wholesale
    despite its many different provisions with different effective
    and compliance dates. Although EPA need not show that “the
    reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the
    old one,” it must provide “a reasoned explanation . . . for
    disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were
    engendered by the prior policy.” 
    Fox, 556 U.S. at 515
    –16.
    EPA has not done so. Instead, EPA attempts to minimize the
    impact of the Delay Rule by asserting that by merely delaying
    the overall effective date until February 2019, it leaves the
    major compliance dates unaffected. Delay Rule, 82 Fed. Reg.
    at 27,137 (“This rule does not impact compliance dates except
    for those dates that would be triggered prior to February
    2019.”). This assertion is incompatible with the EPA’s
    statement in the Delay Rule — and the common-sense
    conclusion — that “[a] delay of effectiveness will allow EPA
    time for a comprehensive review of objections to the [Chemical
    Disaster Rule] without imposing the rule’s substantial
    compliance and implementation resource burden when the
    outcome of the review is pending.” 
    Id. at 27,136.
    EPA and the
    Industry Intervenors contend that the Delay Rule has no
    significant costs because it merely maintains the “status quo,”
    as regulated sources are not required to comply with all but one
    “major” provision until 2020. Putting aside EPA’s concession
    that the Delay Rule immediately delays multiple “minor”
    provisions and would delay the “major” first-responder
    coordination provisions, the baseline for measuring the impact
    of a change or rescission of a final rule is the requirements of
    the rule itself, not the world as it would have been had the rule
    35
    never been promulgated. See Consarc Corp. v. OFAC, 
    71 F.3d 909
    , 913 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“The legal definition of status quo
    ante [is] . . . the last uncontested status which preceded the
    pending controversy.” (quotations marks omitted)). The status
    quo would be a Chemical Disaster Rule that went into effect on
    March 14, 2017, with the ongoing compliance efforts by
    regulated parties to meet the compliance deadlines set in that
    rule.
    EPA cannot have it both ways. Either there would be
    “substantial compliance and implementation” efforts by
    regulated parties absent the Delay Rule, or the rule has no effect
    on compliance requirements and does nothing more than
    maintain the status quo with “speculative but likely
    minimal . . . foregone benefits.” Delay Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at
    27,139. Therefore, EPA has failed to rationally explain its
    departure from its previous conclusions about appropriate
    compliance periods that it reached after specifically soliciting
    and considering comments on the subject. See NRDC, Inc. v.
    EPA, 
    683 F.2d 752
    , 760–61 (3d Cir. 1982) (“By postponing the
    effective date of the amendments, EPA reversed its course of
    action up to the postponement. That reversal itself constitutes
    a danger signal.”).
    Third, contrary to EPA’s statement in the Delay Rule that
    “the timing” of a “finding by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
    and Firearms . . . that the West Fertilizer explosion was caused
    by arson” rather than an accident supports delay, that is not a
    reasoned basis for delaying the entire Chemical Disaster Rule.
    See 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,137–38. EPA cited many more
    incidents than just the West, Texas disaster throughout the
    development and promulgation of the rule. See, e.g., Chemical
    Disaster Rule NPRM, 79 Fed. Reg. at 44,608 (“An April 8,
    2011 explosion at [a plant in] Hawaii killed five workers who
    were disposing of fireworks.”); 
    id. at 44,616
    (“In October
    36
    2007, five contractor workers were killed [at a plant] in
    Georgetown, Colorado, when a fire occurred inside a
    tunnel . . . . The CSB found that inadequate contractor safety
    practices and oversight contributed to the accident.”); 
    id. at 44,618
    (citing the “CSB’s findings concerning a lack of
    rigorous compliance audits in the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery
    explosion” that killed fifteen plant workers); Chemical Disaster
    Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. at 4599 (citing, in a section titled “Events
    Leading to This Action,” “[i]n addition to the tragedy . . . in
    West, Texas,” “an explosion and fire at the Tesoro Refinery in
    Anacortes, Washington,” a fire “at the Chevron Refinery in
    Richmond, California,” and “a fire and explosion at Williams
    Olefins in Geismar, Louisiana.”). Even were the court to agree
    for purposes of argument that the cause of the West, Texas
    disaster being arson is relevant to some of the accident-
    prevention provisions of the Chemical Disaster Rule, it is
    irrelevant to the emergency-response and information-sharing
    provisions, including those that have indisputably been delayed
    from the original March 14, 2018 effective date. Given that
    twelve of the fifteen fatalities in the West, Texas disaster were
    local volunteer firefighters and other first responders, this
    would be a fairly weak explanation for delaying provisions that
    EPA previously determined would help keep first responders
    safe and informed about emergency-response planning.
    Because EPA has not engaged in reasoned
    decisionmaking, its promulgation of the Delay Rule is arbitrary
    and capricious.
    ***
    Accordingly, the court grants the petitions for review and
    vacates the Delay Rule.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1155

Citation Numbers: 906 F.3d 1049

Filed Date: 8/17/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (17)

natural-resources-defense-council-inc-1725-i-street-nw-suite-600 , 683 F.2d 752 ( 1982 )

Halverson, Paul D. v. Slater, Rodney E. , 129 F.3d 180 ( 1997 )

Maryland People's Counsel v. Federal Energy Regulatory ... , 760 F.2d 318 ( 1985 )

natural-resources-defense-council-inc-v-william-k-reilly , 976 F.2d 36 ( 1992 )

Consarc Corporation and Consarc Engineering, Ltd. v. United ... , 71 F.3d 909 ( 1995 )

American Petroleum Institute,petitioners v. United States ... , 216 F.3d 50 ( 2000 )

City of Waukesha v. Environmental Protection Agency , 320 F.3d 228 ( 2003 )

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State ... , 103 S. Ct. 2856 ( 1983 )

American Federation of Government Employees, Afl-Cio, ... , 798 F.2d 1525 ( 1986 )

public-citizen-and-center-for-auto-safety-v-diane-steed-deputy , 733 F.2d 93 ( 1984 )

Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Ex Rel. Barez , 102 S. Ct. 3260 ( 1982 )

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n , 97 S. Ct. 2434 ( 1977 )

National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X ... , 125 S. Ct. 2688 ( 2005 )

Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke , 127 S. Ct. 2339 ( 2007 )

Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television ... , 129 S. Ct. 1800 ( 2009 )

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, ... , 104 S. Ct. 2778 ( 1984 )

Allen v. Wright , 104 S. Ct. 3315 ( 1984 )

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