Carrier v. Marr , 35 F. App'x 712 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 4 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARK FRANCIS CARRIER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 01-1011
(D.C. No. 96-D-1419)
RICHARD MARR; KEN SALAZAR, (D. Colo.)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, SEYMOUR , Circuit Judge, and BRORBY , Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Mark Francis Carrier appeals from the district court’s order
denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We previously
granted Mr. Carrier’s request for a certificate of appealability, see id. § 2253(c).
We now affirm the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief.
Mr. Carrier was convicted after a jury trial in Colorado state court of two
counts of attempted second degree murder and two counts of “crime of violence.”
The Colorado Court of Appeals summarized the facts relating to his convictions
as follows:
Defendant’s wife moved with the party’s children to her
parents’ home as a result of marital discord. Thereafter, defendant
and his wife met for dinner during which she stated that she would
resume living with defendant. However, when defendant arrived the
next morning at her parent’s home, his wife stated that she would not
reconcile. At that point, defendant pulled out a knife.
Conflicting testimony described the events that followed.
However, it is undisputed that the wife was stabbed four times,
receiving serious wounds in the chest, the back, and the arm. Her
father was stabbed twice, once in the abdomen and once in the back.
Both victims required extensive surgical intervention.
People v. Carrier , 791 P.2d 1204, 1205 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Carrier does
not dispute these basic factual findings, which are amply supported by the record.
On appeal, Mr. Carrier contends that the prosecutor denied him due process
by repeatedly asserting in closing argument that the defense had tried to confuse
the jury (1) by putting lesser included offenses before it and (2) by relying on the
law of lesser included offenses rather than the facts of the case. The federal
-2-
district court held that the challenged prosecutorial comments did not rise to the
level of a denial of due process.
Although Mr. Carrier exhausted this claim in state court, see Carrier v.
Marr , No. 99-1137, 1999 WL 1244474, at **2 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1999), the
Colorado Court of Appeals did not discuss clearly established constitutional law
in resolving the claim. We therefore review the district court’s order denying
Mr. Carrier’s habeas claim de novo , and its factual findings, if any, for clear
error. Mitchell v. Gibson , 262 F.3d 1036, 1045 (10th Cir. 2001).
The information filed against Mr. Carrier charged him with two counts of
attempted first degree murder. At trial, Mr. Carrier did not deny stabbing the
victims. His theory of defense was that he was guilty at most of a lesser included
offense. The jury received instructions on a number of lesser included offenses,
including attempted second degree murder, attempted manslaughter, first degree
assault and second degree assault. Mr. Carrier’s counsel spent considerable time
during closing argument explaining these instructions to the jury.
In its rebuttal closing, the prosecution argued as follows:
[I]f you don’t have the facts, you argue the law. And that’s what’s
been done here. And if you have the facts, you don’t have to argue
the law.
We’ve charged this man with two counts of . . . attempted first
degree murder and two counts of crime of violence. That’s what we
charged him with. All the other book of stuff you get is lesser
included offenses that the defense has the right to ask you to
-3-
consider. That’s not what we considered. But that book, that’s the
law. That book is their defense. Confusion is their defense in this
case. We didn’t put that book of assault first, second, reckless, some
kind of reckless –
Trial Tr., Vol. II at 340. At this point, the defense objected, arguing that it is the
court’s duty to give the instructions. Id. In response, both the prosecutor and the
court stated their agreement to this principle.
The prosecutor then continued his argument that the prosecution was not
responsible for the lesser included offense instructions, culminating in this
comment:
So if you don’t have the facts, you argue the law.
You heard [defense counsel] get up there and tell you I don’t
know what it’s going to mean. It’s going to take you years to get
through this book of instructions. He doesn’t want you to look at the
facts. He wants to keep you in that book of instructions.
Id. at 341. Defense counsel again objected. The trial court held a bench
conference but did not make any ruling before the jury and took no immediate
corrective action. The prosecutor continued, referring to the “you never know
defense”:
That’s an expression where, uh, you got nothing to lose so let’s
throw up all this stuff to them. You heard that argument. Let’s
throw all this stuff out to them and heck, you never know. It only
takes one juror. You never know defense.
Id. at 342. Defense counsel again objected, but the trial court responded that the
prosecutor had the right to comment on the defense arguments. The prosecution
-4-
later returned to the theme of lesser included offenses, arguing that any time one
commits a murder, he also commits lesser included offenses. He admonished the
jury not to let the lesser included offenses confuse them. Id. at 345.
After closing arguments were complete, defense counsel moved for
a mistrial based on the prosecution’s comments. He also requested that the jury
be instructed to disregard the comments. The trial court denied both the mistrial
and the curative instruction, stating that it had already instructed the jury that it
was the court’s duty to give the instructions, not the prosecution’s.
Habeas relief will be granted for improper prosecutorial remarks only
where the comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo , 416 U.S. 637,
643 (1974). We must consider “the totality of the circumstances, evaluating the
prosecutor’s conduct in the context of the whole trial.” Cummings v. Evans ,
161 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
[W]e look first at the strength of the evidence against the defendant
and decide whether the prosecutor’s statements plausibly could have
tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution. We also ascertain
whether curative instructions by the trial judge, if given, might have
mitigated the effect on the jury of the improper statements. When
a prosecutor responds to an attack made by defense counsel, we
evaluate that response in light of the defense argument. Ultimately,
we must consider the probable effect the prosecutor’s [statements]
would have on the jury’s ability to judge the evidence fairly.
Id. (quotation omitted).
-5-
Some of these factors weigh in favor of Mr. Carrier. The state court
arguably could have given a more explicit curative instruction, and defense
counsel’s argument did not invite the attack on the court’s instructions. The
remaining and more essential factors, however, weigh against Mr. Carrier.
The jury did not convict Mr. Carrier of the offense charged, but of the
lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder. This fact suggests the
jury followed the trial court’s admonitions to apply the law rather than the
prosecution’s suggestion to avoid reliance on the instructions.
Moreover, a careful review of the record shows that the jury more likely
rejected the lesser included offenses of attempted manslaughter, first degree
assault or second degree assault for lack of evidence rather than as a result of the
prosecution’s admonitions. There was ample evidence from which the jury could
have found that Mr. Carrier acted knowingly and without “heat of passion” in
stabbing the victims. Much less evidence supported Mr. Carrier’s theory that his
wife’s actions in refusing to reconcile with him, during the course of what was
described as a quiet or normal conversation, would have excited an “irresistible
passion” in a reasonable person, leading him to stab her with a near-fatal wound.
See State R., Vol. I, Instruction 12 (defining elements of attempted manslaughter).
The jury likely also rejected as implausible the defense theory that his father-in-
law contributed to his own injuries by impaling himself on the knife, and by
-6-
putting Mr. Carrier in such fear of his life that he had no choice but to strike out
blindly and stab his victims multiple times. The lesser included offenses for first
or second degree assault were further contraindicated by the evidence that both
victims nearly died from their wounds.
In sum, the evidence in this case tips strongly against Mr. Carrier. He fails
to show that the probable effect of the prosecutor’s statements was to prevent the
jury from judging the evidence fairly and reaching a verdict consonant with the
instructions provided.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
-7-