Bell v. City of Dallas , 72 F. App'x 82 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 18, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
____________________ Clerk
No. 02-10985
Summary Calendar
____________________
DAVID BELL; WARREN GULLEY; WARRYN SIMON; LUIS ANDRADE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CITY OF DALLAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:01-CV-29-P)
_________________________________________________________________
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs appeal the summary judgment awarded the City of
Dallas against (1) Title VII gender discrimination claims, (2) 42
U.S.C. § 1983 procedural due process claims, and (3) state law
breach of contract claims. All of the claims arose from a
reorganization of the City’s Communications Information Services
Department, by which: male plaintiffs Bell and Andrade’s positions
were reclassified from grade 49 to 48; male plaintiffs Gulley and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Simon’s grades remained the same, but their job titles were
changed; and a new grade 63 position was created, to which Goree
(female, originally grade 48) was appointed. On appeal, the City
is charged with: discriminating against three of the four
plaintiffs, by allegedly promoting Goree; and violating Bell and
Andrade’s procedural due process rights and breaching their
contract, by not providing a post-demotion hearing.
Summary judgment was awarded against the Title VII claim
because Goree’s reclassification was not an “ultimate employment
decision”. E.g., Burger v. Central Apartment Management, Inc., 168
F.3d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1999)(such decisions include “hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating”
(citations omitted)). It was awarded on the due process claim
because it was time barred and on the contract claim because, in
the context of the city-wide reclassification, the City was not
obligated contractually to provide a post-demotion hearing.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo. E.g., Taita Chem.
Co., Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir.
2001). Such judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
Bell, Gulley, and Simon (but not Andrade) contend Goree’s
reclassification from grade 48 to 63 was an “ultimate employment
decision” for purposes of Title VII. They maintain Goree’s
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reclassification: included a higher salary range; placed her on a
“career path”, which allowed for subsequent promotions; entitled
her to an office; allowed her to attend school, without documenting
her absence from work; and relieved her from being called to work
overtime. As the district court noted, however, Goree’s
reclassification did not increase her pay or change her job
description. In fact, it appears that, because of her new
inability to earn overtime, her pay decreased as a result of the
reclassification. In short, and essentially for the reasons stated
by the district court, Goree’s reclassification did not constitute
an “ultimate employment decision”.
Concerning an ultimate employment decision vel non, plaintiffs
summarily contend, in reference to Bell and Andrade, that this
court “should analyze whether any of the ... parties involved
received an increase or decrease in salary”. (As noted, Andrade
does not contest the Title VII ruling.) However, the demotions, as
opposed to the City’s alleged failure to reclassify to grade 63,
are entirely distinct from Goree’s reclassification, and therefore
cannot count as “ultimate employment decisions” for the purposes of
the Title VII claim.
Regarding their demotion-related claims, Bell and Andrade
maintain: the limitations period for a procedural due process
action did not begin until their salary was decreased, even though
their grievance concerning the claimed demotions had been denied
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two years earlier; and the City’s charter entitled those demoted
(pursuant to the city-wide reclassification) to an appellate
hearing. Essentially for the reasons stated by the district court
in its well-reasoned opinion, these contentions are without merit.
AFFIRMED
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