Aisha Goodison v. Washington Mutual Bank , 232 F. App'x 922 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAY 18, 2007
    No. 06-13041                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 05-21495-CV-FAM
    AISHA GOODISON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,
    LAW OFFICES OF MARSHALL C. WATSON, P.A.,
    MICHELLE E. OLENN,
    SCOTT R. WEISS,
    LAURA M. CARBO,
    FABY VARGAS, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (May 18, 2007)
    Before BLACK, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Aisha Goodison appeals the district court’s order dismissing, with prejudice,
    her third amended civil complaint against Washington Mutual Bank, the Law
    Offices of Marshall C. Watson, the Village of Miami Shores, the law firm of
    Genovese, Joblove and Battista, and several individual defendants, pursuant to Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 41(b), because she failed to comply with the district court’s order to
    conform her amended complaint to the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and
    10(b). We affirm the district court.
    The district court dismissed Goodison’s third complaint because: (1) she
    failed to make meaningful modifications to her complaint in order to comply with
    Rule 8(a)(2); and (2) she continued to employ a “shotgun approach” to pleading,
    making it virtually impossible for the defendants to answer. The district court did
    not abuse its discretion in dismissing Goodison’s complaint. Goforth v. Owens,
    
    766 F.2d 1533
    , 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating we review orders dismissing
    complaints based on non-compliance for an abuse of discretion). A district court
    may dismiss an action sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to
    prosecute or failure to obey a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Hildebrand v.
    Honeywell, Inc., 
    622 F.2d 179
    , 181 (5th Cir. 1980).1 “The legal standard to be
    1
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
    Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
    to close of business on September 30, 1981.
    2
    applied under Rule 41(b) is whether there is a ‘clear record of delay or willful
    contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.’ Dismissal of a
    case with prejudice is considered a sanction of last resort, applicable only in
    extreme circumstances.” Goforth, 
    766 F.2d at 1535
     (internal citation omitted).
    Even though the district court instructed Goodison to re-draft her complaint in
    order to make it more concise, her third amended complaint was approximately
    eight pages longer than her original 57-page complaint. Furthermore, her third
    amended complaint, like her original complaint, contained multiple pages of
    irrelevant factual allegations and redundant narratives. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
    (requiring a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” showing
    that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
    In addition, as the district court correctly noted, it was impossible to discern
    how the defendants could answer Goodison’s complaint because she repeatedly
    failed to comply with Rule 10(b) by ensuring that each count stated a legal basis
    for the claim it set forth. Rule 10(b) requires the averments of a claim “shall be
    made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far
    as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances . . . [and][e]ach claim
    founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence . . . shall be stated in a separate
    count.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Moreover, Goodison continued to employ a
    3
    “shotgun” approach in her third amended complaint by including approximately 60
    legal and non-legal subheadings/counts, and, in several instances, she did not even
    designate which “defendants” she was accusing. We have determined that
    “shotgun” complaints are not sufficient pleadings, stating that:
    The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, each one
    incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading
    to a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain
    irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions. Consequently, in
    ruling on the sufficiency of a claim, the trial court must sift out the
    irrelevancies, a task that can be quite onerous.
    Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 
    305 F.3d 1293
    ,
    1295 (11th Cir. 2002). In such cases, it is important for a court to “narrow and
    define the issues from the earliest stages of the litigation.” Ebrahimi v. City of
    Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 
    114 F.3d 162
    , 165 (11th Cir. 1997). “Absent such efforts,
    shotgun notice pleadings . . . would impede the orderly, efficient, and economic
    disposition of disputes.” 
    Id.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Goodison’s third
    amended complaint, pursuant to Rule 41(b), because Goodison made no
    meaningful attempt to comply with the district court’s orders despite being given
    multiple opportunities to file amended complaints. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    4