State of New York v. NRC , 681 F.3d 471 ( 2012 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    Argued March 16, 2012                   Decided June 8, 2012
    No. 11-1045
    STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,
    PETITIONERS
    v.
    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF
    AMERICA ,
    RESPONDENTS
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY , ET AL.,
    INTERVENORS
    Consolidated with 11-1051, 11-1056, 11-1057
    On Petitions for Review of Orders
    of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    Monica Wagner, Deputy Bureau Chief, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of New York, argued the cause
    for petitioners States and Prairie Island Indian Community
    Petitioners. With her on the briefs were Eric T. Schneiderman,
    Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State
    of New York, John J. Sipos and Janice A. Dean, Assistant
    Attorneys General, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General,
    Brian A. Sutherland, Assistant Solicitor General of Counsel,
    2
    Jeffrey S. Chiesa, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
    General for the State of New Jersey, Kevin P. Auerbacher,
    Assistant Attorney General, Ruth E. Musetto, Deputy Attorney
    General, William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, Office of the
    Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Thea Schwartz,
    Assistant Attorney General, George Jepsen, Attorney General,
    Office of the Attorney General for the State of Connecticut,
    Robert Snook, Assistant Attorney General, and Joseph F.
    Halloran.
    Geoffrey H. Fettus argued the cause for petitioners the
    Environmental Groups. With him on the briefs were Andres J.
    Restrepo and Diane Curran.
    Robert M. Rader, Senior Attorney, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the
    brief were John E. Arbab, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
    Stephen G. Burns, General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
    Commission, and John F. Cordes Jr., Solicitor.
    David A. Repka argued the cause for intervenors Nuclear
    Energy Institute, et al., in support of respondents. With him on
    the brief were Brad Fagg and Jerry Bonanno. Anne W.
    Cottingham entered an appearance.
    Before: SENTELLE , Chief Judge, TATEL and GRIFFITH ,
    Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE .
    SENTELLE , Chief Judge: Four states, an Indian community,
    and a number of environmental groups petition this Court for
    review of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC” or
    “Commission”) rulemaking regarding temporary storage and
    permanent disposal of nuclear waste. We hold that the
    3
    rulemaking at issue here constitutes a major federal action
    necessitating either an environmental impact statement or a
    finding of no significant environmental impact. We further hold
    that the Commission’s evaluation of the risks of spent nuclear
    fuel is deficient in two ways: First, in concluding that permanent
    storage will be available “when necessary,” the Commission did
    not calculate the environmental effects of failing to secure
    permanent storage—a possibility that cannot be ignored.
    Second, in determining that spent fuel can safely be stored on
    site at nuclear plants for sixty years after the expiration of a
    plant’s license, the Commission failed to properly examine
    future dangers and key consequences. For these reasons, we
    grant the petitions for review, vacate the Commission’s orders,
    and remand for further proceedings.
    I. Background
    This is another in the growing line of cases involving the
    federal government’s failure to establish a permanent repository
    for civilian nuclear waste. See, e.g., In re Aiken County, 
    645 F.3d 428
    , 430–31 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recounting prior cases). We
    address the Commission’s recent rulemaking regarding the
    prospects for permanent disposal of nuclear waste and the
    environmental effects of temporarily storing such material on
    site at nuclear plants until a permanent disposal facility is
    available.
    After four to six years of use in a reactor, nuclear fuel rods
    can no longer efficiently produce energy and are considered
    “spent nuclear fuel” (“SNF”). Blue Ribbon Commission on
    America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy
    10–11 (2012). Fuel rods are thermally hot when removed from
    reactors and emit great amounts of radiation—enough to be fatal
    in minutes to someone in the immediate vicinity. 
    Id.
     Therefore,
    the rods are transferred to racks within deep, water-filled pools
    4
    for cooling and to protect workers from radiation. After the fuel
    has cooled, it may be transferred to dry storage, which consists
    of large concrete and steel “casks.” Most SNF, however, will
    remain in spent-fuel pools until a permanent disposal solution is
    available. Id. at 11.
    Even though it is no longer useful for nuclear power, SNF
    poses a dangerous, long-term health and environmental risk. It
    will remain dangerous “for time spans seemingly beyond human
    comprehension.” Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Envtl. Prot.
    Agency, 
    373 F.3d 1251
    , 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
    Determining how to dispose of the growing volume of SNF,
    which may reach 150,000 metric tons by the year 2050, is a
    serious problem. See Blue Ribbon Commission, supra, at 14.
    Yet despite years of “blue ribbon” commissions, congressional
    hearings, agency reports, and site investigations, the United
    States has not yet developed a permanent solution. That failure,
    declared the most recent “blue ribbon” panel, is the “central flaw
    of the U.S. nuclear waste management program to date.” Id. at
    27. Experts agree that the ultimate solution will be a “geologic
    repository,” in which SNF is stored deep within the earth,
    protected by a combination of natural and engineered barriers.
    Id. at ix, 29. Twenty years of work on establishing such a
    repository at Yucca Mountain was recently abandoned when the
    Department of Energy decided to withdraw its license
    application for the facility. Id. at 3. At this time, there is not
    even a prospective site for a repository, let alone progress
    toward the actual construction of one.
    Due to the government’s failure to establish a final resting
    place for spent fuel, SNF is currently stored on site at nuclear
    plants. This type of storage, optimistically labeled “temporary
    storage,” has been used for decades longer than originally
    anticipated. The delay has required plants to expand storage
    pools and to pack SNF more densely within them. The lack of
    5
    progress on a permanent repository has caused considerable
    uncertainty regarding the environmental effects of temporary
    SNF storage and the reasonableness of continuing to license and
    relicense nuclear reactors.
    In this case, petitioners challenge a 2010 update to the
    NRC’s Waste Confidence Decision (“WCD”). The original
    WCD came as the result of a 1979 decision by this court
    remanding the Commission’s decision to allow the expansion of
    spent-fuel pools at two nuclear plants. Minnesota v. NRC, 
    602 F.2d 412
     (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Minnesota, we directed the
    Commission to consider “whether there is reasonable assurance
    that an off-site storage solution [for spent fuel] will be available
    by . . . the expiration of the plants’ operating licenses, and if not,
    whether there is reasonable assurance that the fuel can be stored
    safely at the sites beyond those dates.” 
    Id. at 418
    . The WCD is
    the Commission’s determination of those risks and assurances.
    The original WCD was published in 1984 and included five
    “Waste Confidence Findings.” Briefly, those findings declared
    that: 1) safe disposal in a mined geologic repository is
    technically feasible, 2) such a repository will be available by
    2007–2009, 3) waste will be managed safely until the repository
    is available, 4) SNF can be stored safely at nuclear plants for at
    least thirty years beyond the licensed life of each plant, and 5)
    safe, independent storage will be made available if needed.
    Waste Confidence Decision, 
    49 Fed. Reg. 34,658
    , 34,659–60
    (Aug. 31, 1984). The Commission updated the WCD in 1990 to
    reflect new understandings about waste disposal and to predict
    the availability of a repository by 2025. See Waste Confidence
    Decision Review, 
    55 Fed. Reg. 38,474
    , 38,505 (Sept. 18, 1990).
    The Commission reviewed the WCD again in 1999 without
    altering it. See Waste Confidence Decision Review: Status, 
    64 Fed. Reg. 68,005
    , 68,006–07 (Dec. 6, 1999).
    6
    In 2008, the Commission proposed revisions to the Waste
    Confidence Findings, and, after considering public comments,
    made revisions in 2010. Waste Confidence Decision Update, 
    75 Fed. Reg. 81,037
     (Dec. 23, 2010). That decision, under review
    in this case, reaffirmed three of the Waste Confidence Findings
    and updated two. First, the Commission revised Finding 2,
    which, as of 1990, expected that a permanent geologic
    repository would be available in the first quarter of the twenty-
    first century. As amended, Finding 2 now states that a suitable
    repository will be available “when necessary,” rather than by a
    date certain. 
    Id. at 81,038
    . In reaching that conclusion, the
    Commission examined the political and technical obstacles to
    permanent storage and determined that a permanent repository
    will be ready by the time the safety of temporary on-site storage
    can no longer be assured. 
    Id.
    Finding 4 originally held that SNF could be safely stored at
    nuclear reactor sites without significant environmental effects
    for at least thirty years beyond each plant’s licensed life,
    including the license-renewal period. 
    Id. at 81,039
    . In revising
    that finding, the Commission examined the potential
    environmental effects from temporary storage, such as leakages
    from the spent-fuel pools and fires caused by the SNF becoming
    exposed to the air. Concluding that previous leaks had only a
    negligible near-term health effect and that recent regulatory
    enhancements will further reduce the risk of leaks, the
    Commission determined that leaks do not pose the threat of a
    significant environmental impact. 
    Id. at 81
    ,069–71. The
    Commission also found that pool fires are sufficiently unlikely
    as to pose no significant environmental threat. 
    Id. at 81
    ,070–71.
    As amended, Finding 4 now holds that SNF can be safely stored
    at plants for at least sixty years beyond the licensed life of a
    plant, instead of thirty. 
    Id. at 81,074
    . In addition, the
    Commission noted in its final rule that it will be developing a
    plan for longer-term storage and will conduct a full assessment
    7
    of the environmental impact of storage beyond the sixty-year
    post-license period. 
    Id. at 81,040
    . Based on the revised WCD,
    the Commission released a new Temporary Storage Rule
    (“TSR”) enacting its conclusions and updating its regulations
    accordingly. See Consideration of Environmental Impacts of
    Temporary Storage of Spent Fuel after Cessation of Reactor
    Operation, 
    75 Fed. Reg. 81,032
     (Dec. 23, 2010); 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.23
    (a). Petitioners challenge the amended 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.23
    (a) based on both Finding 2 and Finding 4.
    II. The Commission’s Obligations Under NEPA
    The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”),
    
    42 U.S.C. § 4321
     et seq., requires federal agencies such as the
    Commission to examine and report on the environmental
    consequences of their actions. NEPA is an “essentially
    procedural” statute intended to ensure “fully informed and well-
    considered” decisionmaking, but not necessarily the best
    decision. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 
    435 U.S. 519
    , 558 (1978). Under NEPA, each federal agency must
    prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) before
    taking a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the
    quality of the human environment.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 4332
    (2)(C).
    An agency can avoid preparing an EIS, however, if it conducts
    an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and makes a Finding of
    No Significant Impact (“FONSI”). See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of
    Transp., 
    753 F.2d 120
    , 127 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also Theodore
    Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 
    616 F.3d 497
    , 503–04
    (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining NEPA procedures in detail). The
    issuance or reissuance of a reactor license is a major federal
    action affecting the quality of the human environment. See New
    York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
    589 F.3d 551
    , 553 (2d Cir.
    2009).
    8
    The parties here dispute whether the WCD itself constitutes
    a major federal action. To petitioners, the WCD is a major
    federal action because it is a predicate to every decision to
    license or relicense a nuclear plant, and the findings made in the
    WCD are not challengeable at the time a plant seeks licensure.
    The Commission contends that because the WCD does not
    authorize the licensing of any nuclear reactor or storage facility,
    and because a site-specific EIS will be conducted for each
    facility at the time it seeks licensure, the WCD is not a major
    federal action. To the Commission, the WCD is simply an
    answer to this court’s mandate in Minnesota to ensure that plants
    are only licensed while the NRC has reasonable assurance that
    permanent disposal of the resulting waste will be available. The
    Commission also contends that the WCD constitutes an EA
    supporting the revision of 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.23
    (a), and because the
    EA found no significant environmental impact, an EIS is not
    required.
    We agree with petitioners that the WCD rulemaking is a
    major federal action requiring either a FONSI or an EIS. The
    Commission’s contrary argument treating the WCD as separate
    from the individual licensing decisions it enables fails under
    controlling precedent.
    We have long held that NEPA requires that “environmental
    issues be considered at every important stage in the decision
    making process concerning a particular action.” Calvert Cliffs'
    Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 
    449 F.2d 1109
    , 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The WCD makes generic findings
    that have a preclusive effect in all future licensing decisions—it
    is a pre-determined “stage” of each licensing decision. NEPA
    established the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)
    “with authority to issue regulations interpreting it.” Dep’t of
    Transp. v. Public Citizen, 
    541 U.S. 752
    , 757 (2004). The CEQ
    has defined major federal actions to include actions with
    9
    “[i]ndirect effects, which are caused by the action and are later
    in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
    foreseeable.” 
    40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8
    , 1508.18; Public Citizen, 
    541 U.S. at 763
    ; see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 
    442 U.S. 347
    , 358
    (1979) (holding that the CEQ’s NEPA interpretations are
    entitled to substantial deference); accord CTIA-Wireless Ass’n
    v. FCC, 
    466 F.3d 105
    , 115 (D.C. Cir. 2006). It is not only
    reasonably forseeable but eminently clear that the WCD will be
    used to enable licensing decisions based on its findings. The
    Commission and the intervenors contend that the site-specific
    factors that differ from plant to plant can be challenged at the
    time of a specific plant’s licensing, but the WCD nonetheless
    renders uncontestable general conclusions about the
    environmental effects of plant licensure that will apply in every
    licensing decision. See 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.23
    (b).
    Petitioners’ argument continues by suggesting that the
    WCD lacks an EIS and must be reversed on that basis. Not
    necessarily. No EIS is required if the agency conducts an EA
    and issues a FONSI sufficiently explaining why the proposed
    action will not have a significant environmental impact. Public
    Citizen, 
    541 U.S. at
    757–58. Though we give considerable
    deference to an agency’s decision regarding whether to prepare
    an EIS, the agency must 1) “accurately identif[y] the relevant
    environmental concern,” 2) take a “hard look at the problem in
    preparing its EA,” 3) make a “convincing case for its finding of
    no significant impact,” and 4) show that even if a significant
    impact will occur, “changes or safeguards in the project
    sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.” Taxpayers of
    Michigan Against Casinos v. Norton, 
    433 F.3d 852
    , 861 (D.C.
    Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). An agency’s decision
    not to prepare an EIS must be set aside if it is “arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
    accordance with law.” Public Citizen, 
    541 U.S. at 763
     (quoting
    
    5 U.S.C. § 706
    (2)(A)).
    10
    III. Availability of a Permanent Repository
    With these NEPA obligations in mind, we turn to the
    Commission’s conclusion that a permanent repository for SNF
    will be available “when necessary.” In so concluding, the
    Commission examined the historical difficulty—now measured
    in decades rather than years—in establishing a permanent
    facility. See, e.g., Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed.
    Reg. at 81,049. Though a number of commenters suggested that
    the social and political barriers to building a geologic repository
    are too great to conclude that a facility could be built in any
    reasonable timeframe, the Commission believes that the lessons
    learned from the Yucca Mountain program and the Blue Ribbon
    Commission on America’s Nuclear Future will ensure that,
    through “open and transparent” decisionmaking, a consensus
    would be reached. Id. Further, the Commission noted that the
    Nuclear Waste Policy Act mandates a repository program,
    demonstrating the continued commitment and obligation of the
    federal government to pursue one. The scientific and
    experiential knowledge of the past decades, the Commission
    explained, would enable the government to create a suitable
    repository by the time one is needed. Id.
    A.
    Petitioners argue that the Commission’s conclusion
    regarding permanent storage violates NEPA in two ways: First,
    it fails to fully account for the significant societal and political
    barriers that may delay or prevent the opening of a repository.
    Second, the Commission’s conclusion that a permanent
    repository will be available “when necessary” fails to define the
    term “necessary” in any meaningful way and does not address
    the effects of a failure to establish a repository in time.
    Petitioners further contest the Commission’s claim that the
    WCD constitutes an EA for permanent disposal, let alone the
    11
    EIS they contend is required here.
    The Commission responds by contending that it “candidly
    acknowledged” the societal and political challenges, and crafted
    the WCD to account for those risks. Overcoming political
    obstacles is not the responsibility of the Commission, it
    contends, and the NRC’s conclusion that institutional obstacles
    will not prevent a repository from being built is entitled to
    substantial deference. The Commission contends that the
    selection of a precise date for Finding 2 is not required by NEPA
    or any other laws governing the NRC, and the Commission used
    the “when necessary” formulation as far back as 1977. See
    NRDC v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
    582 F.2d 166
    , 170, 175
    (2d Cir. 1978).
    As for examining the environmental effects of failing to
    establish a repository, the Commission contends that the WCD
    is an EA supporting the revision of 
    10 C.F.R. § 51.23
    (a). No
    EIS is necessary regarding permanent disposal because, the
    Commission argues, the WCD is not a major federal action, and
    conducting an EIS for this issue would be the sort of “abstract
    exercise” the Supreme Court declined to require in Baltimore
    Gas and Electric Company v. NRDC, 
    462 U.S. 87
    , 100 (1983).
    Further, the Commission’s existing “Table S-3” already
    considers the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle
    generally and found no significant impacts. Therefore, the
    Commission believes, no EIS is required.
    B.
    The Commission’s “when necessary” finding is already
    imperiled by our conclusion that the WCD is a major federal
    action. We hold that the WCD must be vacated as to its revision
    to Finding 2 because the WCD fails to properly analyze the
    environmental effects of its permanent disposal conclusion.
    12
    While we share petitioners’ considerable skepticism as to
    whether a permanent facility can be built given the societal and
    political barriers to selecting a site, we need not resolve whether
    the Commission adequately considered those barriers.
    Likewise, we need not decide whether, as the Commission
    contends, an agency’s interpretation of the political landscape
    surrounding its field of expertise merits deference. Instead, we
    hold the WCD is defective on far simpler grounds: As we have
    determined, the WCD is a major federal action because it is used
    to allow the licensing of nuclear plants. See supra Part II.
    Therefore, the WCD requires an EIS or, alternatively, an EA
    that concludes with a finding of no significant impact. The
    Commission did not supply a suitable FONSI here because it did
    not examine the environmental effects of failing to establish a
    repository.
    Even taking the Commission’s word that the WCD
    constitutes an EA for the permanent storage conclusion, see
    Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,042, the
    EA is insufficient because a finding that “reasonable assurance
    exists that sufficient mined geologic repository capacity will be
    available when necessary,” id. at 81,041, does not describe a
    probability of failure so low as to dismiss the potential
    consequences of such a failure. Under NEPA, an agency must
    look at both the probabilities of potentially harmful events and
    the consequences if those events come to pass. See, e.g.,
    Carolina Envtl. Study Grp. v. U.S., 
    510 F.2d 796
    , 799 (D.C. Cir.
    1975). An agency may find no significant impact if the
    probability is so low as to be “remote and speculative,” or if the
    combination of probability and harm is sufficiently minimal.
    See, e.g., City of New York v. Dep’t of Transp., 
    715 F.2d 732
    ,
    738 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The concept of overall risk incorporates the
    significance of possible adverse consequences discounted by the
    improbability of their occurrence.”). Here, a “reasonable
    assurance” that permanent storage will be available is a far cry
    13
    from finding the likelihood of nonavailability to be “remote and
    speculative.”     The Commission failed to examine the
    environmental consequences of failing to establish a repository
    when one is needed.
    The Commission argues that its “Table S-3” already
    accounts for the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle
    and finds no significant impact. Not so. Table S-3, like the
    Commission itself, presumes the existence of a geologic
    repository. Therefore, it cannot explain the environmental
    effects of a failure to secure a permanent facility. The
    Commission also complains that conducting a full analysis
    regarding permanent storage would be an “abstract exercise.”
    Perhaps the Commission thinks so because it perceives the
    required analysis to be of the effects of the permanent repository
    itself. But we are focused on the effects of a failure to secure
    permanent storage. The Commission apparently has no long-
    term plan other than hoping for a geologic repository. If the
    government continues to fail in its quest to establish one, then
    SNF will seemingly be stored on site at nuclear plants on a
    permanent basis. The Commission can and must assess the
    potential environmental effects of such a failure.
    IV. Temporary On-Site Storage of SNF
    In concluding that SNF can safely be stored in on-site
    storage pools for a period of sixty years after the end of a plant’s
    life, instead of thirty, the Commission conducted what it
    purports to be an EA, which found that extending the time for
    storage would have no significant environmental impact. See
    Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,074.
    This analysis was conducted in generic fashion by looking to
    environmental risks across the board at nuclear plants, rather
    than by conducting a site-by-site analysis of each specific
    nuclear plant. Two key risks the Commission examined in its
    14
    EA were the risk of environmental harm due to pool leakage and
    the risk of a fire resulting from the fuel rods becoming exposed
    to air. See id. at 81,069–71. We conclude that the
    Commission’s EA and resulting FONSI are not supported by
    substantial evidence on the record because the Commission
    failed to properly examine the risk of leaks in a forward-looking
    fashion and failed to examine the potential consequences of pool
    fires.
    A.
    Petitioners challenge the finding of no significant impact on
    two bases: First, petitioners argue that a generic analysis is
    simply inappropriate and that the Commission was required to
    look at each plant individually. A site-by-site analysis is
    necessary, petitioners argue, because the risks of leaks and fires
    are affected by site-specific factors such as pool configuration,
    leak detection systems, the nature of SNF stored in the pool, and
    the location of the pool within the plant. Overall, petitioners
    argue that NEPA requires the Commission to fully analyze the
    environmental effects of on-site storage, and a generic analysis
    cannot fulfill that statutory mandate.
    Second, petitioners argue that even if generic analysis is
    appropriate, the Commission’s generic EA in this case was
    insufficient. They maintain that the Commission did not
    adequately account for leaks from on-site pools because the
    Commission only looked at past leaks to see if they caused
    environmental damage, rather than examining the risks of future
    leaks. Also, as petitioners point out, the Commission’s own
    studies have shown that previous leaks “did, or potentially
    could, impact ground-water resources relative to established
    EPA drinking water standards.” NRC, Liquid Radioactive
    Release Lessons Learned Task Force Final Report 13 (2006).
    Petitioners also argue that the Commission’s analysis of the
    15
    effects of pool fires was deficient because the Commission
    declined to examine the consequences of pool fires due to the
    low probability of such an occurrence. In petitioners’ view, the
    Commission could only avoid examining the consequences of
    pool fires in a full EIS if it found the risk so low as to be
    “remote and speculative”—a finding the Commission did not
    make. Finally, Petitioners contend that the Commission
    completely failed to look at non-health environmental factors
    such as effects on the Prairie Island Indian Community’s
    homeland, which is located near one of the plants governed by
    the rule.
    The Commission responds by stating that its examination of
    past leaks properly demonstrated that the potential for
    environmental harm from leakage is negligible.                 The
    Commission argues that the effects of past leaks have been
    shown to be quite minimal, and the Commission’s leakage task
    force has recommended twenty-six specific measures to
    minimize the risk even further. Also, the NRC exercises
    oversight over the pools and will ensure that they do not become
    unsafe over the sixty-year period. With regard to fires, the
    Commission contends that it engaged in an “exhaustive
    consideration” of the risk and found that such an event is
    extremely unlikely. In the Commission’s view, a site-by-site
    analysis of pool-fire risk is unnecessary because the
    Commission relied on studies which accounted for all of the
    variations cited by petitioners and essentially looked at the most
    dangerous combinations of site-specific factors. Even looking
    to a worst-case scenario, the Commission says, the risk of fires
    was still extremely low.
    Responding to petitioners’ argument that the Commission
    failed to determine that the risk of fires was “remote and
    speculative,” the Commission suggests that it did not dismiss the
    risk out of hand as “remote and speculative” but rather examined
    16
    it thoroughly and found it to be so low that the consequences
    could not possibly overcome the low probability. Therefore, the
    Commission did not need to conduct a full EIS for pool fires.
    Finally, the Commission argues that petitioners did not raise the
    issue of non-health impacts during the rulemaking, and thus they
    cannot raise that issue on petition now.
    B.
    Both the Supreme Court and this court have endorsed the
    Commission’s longstanding practice of considering
    environmental issues through general rulemaking in appropriate
    circumstances. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas, 
    462 U.S. at 100
     (“The
    generic method chosen by the agency is clearly an appropriate
    method of conducting the hard look required by NEPA.”); see
    also Minnesota, 
    602 F.2d at
    416–17. Though Baltimore Gas
    dealt with the nuclear fuel cycle itself, which is generally
    focused on things that occur outside of individual plants, we see
    no reason that a comprehensive general analysis would be
    insufficient to examine on-site risks that are essentially common
    to all plants. This is particularly true given the Commission’s
    use of conservative bounding assumptions and the opportunity
    for concerned parties to raise site-specific differences at the time
    of a specific site’s licensing. Nonetheless, whether the analysis
    is generic or site-by-site, it must be thorough and
    comprehensive. Even though the Commission’s application of
    its technical expertise demands the “most deferential” treatment
    by the courts, Baltimore Gas, 
    462 U.S. at 103
    , we conclude that
    the Commission has failed to conduct a thorough enough
    analysis here to merit our deference.
    1.
    The Commission admits in the WCD Update that there have
    been “several incidents of groundwater contamination
    17
    originating from leaking reactor spent fuel pools and associated
    structures.” 75 Fed. Reg. at 81,070. The Commission brushes
    away that concern by stating that the past leaks had only a
    negligible near-term health impact. Id. at 81,071. Even setting
    aside the fact that near-term health effects are not the only type
    of environmental impacts, the harm from past leaks—without
    more—tells us very little about the potential for future leaks or
    the harm such leaks might portend. The WCD Update seeks to
    extend the period of time for which pools are considered safe for
    storage; therefore, a proper analysis of the risks would
    necessarily look forward to examine the effects of the additional
    time in storage, as well as examining past leaks in a manner that
    would allow the Commission to rule out the possibility that
    those leaks were only harmless because of site-specific factors
    or even sheer luck. The WCD Update has no analysis of those
    possibilities other than to say that past leaks had “negligible”
    near-term health effects. Id. A study of the impact of thirty
    additional years of SNF storage must actually concern itself with
    the extra years of storage.
    The Commission also notes that a taskforce has made
    recommendations for improvements to spent-fuel pools, which
    the NRC “has addressed, or is in the process of addressing.” Id.
    But those improvements are thus far untested, and we have no
    way of deferring to the Commission’s conclusion that they will
    ensure the absence of environmental harm. Finally, the
    Commission refers to its monitoring and regulatory compliance
    program as a buffer against pool degradation. Id. That
    argument is even less availing because it amounts to a
    conclusion that leaks will not occur because the NRC is “on
    duty.” With full credit to the Commission’s considerable
    enforcement and inspection efforts, merely pointing to the
    compliance program is in no way sufficient to support a
    scientific finding that spent-fuel pools will not cause a
    significant environment impact during the extended storage
    18
    period. This is particularly true when the period of time covered
    by the Commission’s predictions may extend to nearly a century
    for some facilities.
    Despite giving our “most deferential” treatment to the
    Commission’s application of its technical and scientific
    expertise, we cannot reconcile a finding that past leaks have
    been harmless with a conclusion that future leaks at all sites will
    be harmless as well. The Commission’s task here was to
    determine whether the pools could be considered safe for an
    additional thirty years in the future. That past leaks have not
    been harmful with respect to groundwater does not speak to
    whether and how future leaks might occur, and what the effects
    of those leaks might be. The Commission’s analysis of leaks,
    therefore, was insufficient.
    2.
    Even though the Commission engaged in a more substantial
    analysis of fires than it did of leaks, that analysis is plagued by
    a failure to examine the consequences of pool fires in addition
    to the probabilities. Petitioners, citing Limerick Ecology Action,
    Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
    869 F.2d 719
    , 739 (3d
    Cir. 1989), argue that the Commission could only avoid
    conducting an EIS if it found the risk of fires to be “remote and
    speculative.” The Commission, citing Carolina Environmental
    Study Group v. United States, 
    510 F.2d at 799
    , argues that it did
    not need to examine the consequences of fires because it found
    the risk of fires to be very low.
    We disagree with both parties. As should be clear by this
    point in our opinion, an agency conducting an EA generally
    must examine both the probability of a given harm occurring
    and the consequences of that harm if it does occur. Only if the
    harm in question is so “remote and speculative” as to reduce the
    19
    effective probability of its occurrence to zero may the agency
    dispense with the consequences portion of the analysis. See
    Limerick Ecology Action, Inc., 869 F.2d at 739. But, contra
    petitioners, the finding that the probability of a given harm is
    nonzero does not, by itself, mandate an EIS: after the agency
    examines the consequences of the harm in proportion to the
    likelihood of its occurrence, the overall expected harm could
    still be insignificant and thus could support a FONSI. See
    Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 
    510 F.2d at 799
     (“Recognition of
    the minimal probability of such an event is not equatable with
    nonrecognition of its consequences.”). Here, however, the
    Commission did not undertake to examine the consequences of
    pool fires at all. Depending on the weighing of the probability
    and the consequences, an EIS may or may not be required, and
    such a determination would merit considerable deference. C.f.,
    City of New York, 
    715 F.2d at
    751–52 (deferring to an agency’s
    weighing of a “catastrophic” harm against an “infinitesimal
    probability”). But unless the risk is “remote and speculative,”
    the Commission must put the weights on both sides of the scale
    before it can make a determination.
    3.
    As for petitioners’ remaining argument that the Commission
    did not consider non-health environmental effects, we agree
    with the Commission that petitioners did not properly raise those
    issues in the rulemaking. Petitioners essentially present two
    non-health impacts: decrease in property values and risk of harm
    to the Prairie Island Indian Community’s homeland. The Tribe
    did mention its small size and close proximity to the Prairie
    Island Nuclear Generating Plant, but it did not assert specifically
    how it might be harmed by either the rulemaking itself or the
    licensing the rulemaking enables. With regard to property
    values, petitioners point to a study considering the economic
    impact of the Indian Point plant. But that study actually
    20
    assumes a diminution in values caused by current plant
    operation and simply extends it mathematically—it in no way
    asserts whether or how any harm to property values might occur
    nor how that harm is related to a change in the physical
    environment. Petitioners’ failure to raise these objections to the
    agency waives them. See Public Citizen, 
    541 U.S. at 764
    . We
    note, as did the Supreme Court in Public Citizen, that primary
    responsibility for compliance with NEPA lies with the
    Commission, not petitioners; nonetheless, the non-health effects
    alluded to here are not “so obvious that there is no need for a
    commentator to point them out.” 
    Id.
     Given, however, that we
    are invalidating the Commission’s conclusions as a whole,
    petitioners will have the opportunity to properly raise and clarify
    these concerns on remand.
    *   *    *
    Overall, we cannot defer to the Commission’s conclusions
    regarding temporary storage because the Commission did not
    conduct a sufficient analysis of the environmental risks. In so
    holding, we do not require, as petitioners would prefer, that the
    Commission examine each site individually. However, a
    generic analysis must be forward looking and have enough
    breadth to support the Commission’s conclusions. Furthermore,
    as NEPA requires, the Commission must conduct a true EA
    regarding the extension of temporary storage. Such an analysis
    must, unless it finds the probability of a given risk to be
    effectively zero, account for the consequences of each risk. On
    remand, the Commission will have the opportunity to conduct
    exactly such an analysis.
    V. Conclusion
    We recognize that the Commission is in a difficult position
    given the political problems concerning the storage of spent
    21
    nuclear fuel. Nonetheless, the Commission’s obligations under
    NEPA require a more thorough analysis than provided for in the
    WCD Update. We note that the Commission is currently
    conducting an EIS regarding the environmental impacts of SNF
    storage beyond the sixty-year post-license period at issue in this
    case, and some or all of the problems here may be addressed in
    such a rulemaking. In any event, we grant the petitions for
    review, vacate the WCD Update and TSR, and remand for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    So ordered.