United States v. Robert Packer ( 2023 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
    No. 22-3070                                                  September Term, 2022
    FILED ON: JUNE 16, 2023
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    APPELLEE
    v.
    ROBERT KEITH PACKER,
    APPELLANT
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Columbia
    (No. 1:21-cr-00103-1)
    Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, and MILLETT and CHILDS, Circuit Judges.
    JUDGMENT
    This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the
    District of Columbia and on the briefs and oral argument of the parties. The panel has accorded
    the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. See
    D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is hereby
    ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the appeal be dismissed as moot.
    Appellant Robert Packer pled guilty to parading, demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol
    building, in violation of 
    40 U.S.C. § 5104
    (e)(2)(G). The Statement of Offense to which Packer
    agreed contained a section entitled “Robert Packer’s Participation in the January 6, 2021, Capitol
    Riot.” Statement of Offense at 3, App. 33. According to that Statement, Packer “attend[ed] the
    rally of former President Trump in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021,” and “then went to the
    Capitol building and went inside,” where he was “with the crowd” when, among other things, “the
    large mob breached the police line . . . to go into the House side of the Capitol.” 
    Id.
    In his plea agreement, Packer waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, with
    certain exceptions. The district court sentenced Packer to 75 days of imprisonment, $500 in
    restitution, and a $10 special assessment. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3013
    (a)(1)(A)(ii), 3663; 
    40 U.S.C. § 5109
    (b). Packer was not sentenced to any term of probation or supervised release.
    2
    In this appeal, Packer contends that the district court, in fashioning Packer’s sentence of
    imprisonment, impermissibly relied on the fact that Packer wore a shirt on the day of the offense
    that bore the words “Camp Auschwitz” and “Work Means Freedom.” During the pendency of the
    appeal, Packer completed his 75-day term of imprisonment and was released from the custody of
    the Bureau of Prisons. See Gov’t Br. 13.
    We hold that Packer’s appeal is moot and thus do not reach the merits of his claim. The
    sole claim Packer brings in this appeal is a challenge to his sentence, and his briefing limits that
    challenge to one seeking relief from his 75-day term of imprisonment. Accordingly, he frames the
    relevant issue he raises as whether “the district court err[ed] in imposing a sentence of seventy-
    five (75) days of imprisonment by improperly taking into account an offensive t-shirt worn by
    defendant/appellant that contained the words ‘Camp Auschwitz.’” Packer Br. 1. And he argues
    that the “trial court erroneously considered the offensive t-shirt in fashioning the prison sentence
    of seventy-five (75) days of incarceration.” 
    Id.
     at 5–6; see 
    id. at 5
     (“The United States made
    reference to the offensive language in its sentencing Memorandum and the trial court clearly
    referenced the offensive words in fashioning a sentence. Defendant/appellant received a sentence
    of imprisonment of seventy-five days.”). Similarly, in setting out the “rulings at issue in this
    appeal,” Packer identifies the “trial court’s imposition of a sentence of seventy-five (75) days of
    incarceration and whether the sentence was based upon an improper consideration that
    defendant/appellant was wearing a t-shirt with an offensive expression.” 
    Id.
     at i.
    Packer’s completion of his 75-day term of imprisonment renders his appeal moot. “[I]f an
    event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant ‘any
    effectual relief whatever’ to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.” Honeywell Int’l,
    Inc. v. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 
    628 F.3d 568
    , 576 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Here, Packer challenges his 75-day term of imprisonment on the ground that the district
    court impermissibly based that term on Packer’s wearing of an offensive t-shirt, but it is impossible
    for us to grant him any effectual relief with regard to the 75-day term of imprisonment he
    challenges because he has already served it, and he has not alleged that he has suffered any
    collateral consequences from it.
    At oral argument, Packer asserted for the first time that a live controversy persists because,
    even if his term of imprisonment has expired, the district court’s sentence included a $500 order
    of restitution. See Oral Argument at 0:37–0:58. But in his brief, Packer challenges only the length
    of his sentence of imprisonment and does not challenge the restitution order, and a challenge
    sought to be raised for the first time at oral argument is forfeited. See Ark Las Vegas Rest. Corp.
    v. NLRB, 
    334 F.3d 99
    , 108 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2003). At any rate, while Packer mentioned the
    restitution award at oral argument in contending that the appeal is not moot, he has never suggested
    that his challenge on appeal—i.e., that the district court considered an impermissible factor in
    fashioning Packer’s sentence—pertains to the restitution award. Rather, Packer’s argument all
    along has been that his 75-day term of imprisonment impermissibly rested on his wearing of an
    offensive t-shirt, and he has never suggested that the amount of the restitution award turned in any
    3
    way on that consideration. That is unsurprising given that he agreed to the $500 amount of the
    award in his plea agreement, separate from (and well before) the sentencing hearing at which he
    alleges that the district court improperly took into account his t-shirt in fashioning his term of
    imprisonment.
    That is presumably why in his brief, Packer challenges only the length of his sentence of
    imprisonment and not the restitution order. Indeed, whereas his brief, as explained, repeatedly
    frames his challenge as one contending that the 75-day term of imprisonment rested on an
    impermissible consideration, his brief mentions the $500 restitution amount only once in passing
    in the background section as something he agreed to pay in his plea agreement. Packer Br. 3. Nor
    is it the case that Packer’s challenge to the length of his term of imprisonment somehow implicitly
    incorporates a challenge to the restitution award: to the contrary, the length of a term of
    imprisonment does not bear on the amount of a restitution award under the governing statutes. See
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3663
    , 3664. In short, the sole challenge Packer raises in his appeal—to his 75-day
    term of imprisonment—was mooted by his release upon completing that term.
    Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is
    directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition
    for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41.
    Per Curiam
    FOR THE COURT:
    Mark J. Langer, Clerk
    BY: /s/
    Daniel J. Reidy
    Deputy Clerk
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-3070

Filed Date: 6/16/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/16/2023