Tomita Technologies USA, LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd. , 594 F. App'x 657 ( 2014 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC, AND
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    NINTENDO CO., LTD. AND
    NINTENDO OF AMERICA, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ______________________
    2014-1244
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of New York in No. 1:11-CV-04256,
    Judge Jed S. Rakoff.
    ______________________
    Decided: December 8, 2014
    ______________________
    KENNETH L. STEIN, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP,
    of New York, New York, argued for plaintiffs-appellees.
    With him on the brief were JOSEPH DIAMANTE and IAN G.
    DIBERNARDO.
    STEVEN S. ROSENTHAL, Kaye Scholer LLP, of Wash-
    ington, DC, argued for defendants-appellants. With him
    2       TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    on the brief were PAUL I. MARGULIES; JAMES S. BLANK and
    SCOTT G. LINDVALL, of New York, New York.
    ______________________
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, BRYSON and HUGHES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PROST, Chief Judge.
    Nintendo Co., Ltd. and Nintendo of America, Inc.
    (“Nintendo”) appeal from a final judgment of the U.S.
    District Court for the Southern District of New York, in
    which a jury found that Nintendo infringed claim 1 of
    U.S. Patent No. 7,417,664 (“’664 patent”). The jury fur-
    ther found that the infringed claim was not invalid and
    awarded damages to plaintiffs-appellees Tomita Technol-
    ogies USA, LLC and Tomita Technologies International,
    Inc. (“Tomita”).
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district
    court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law
    (“JMOL”) on the infringement of the “cross-point measur-
    ing means” claim element and the validity of the asserted
    claim. We also affirm the district court’s denial of Nin-
    tendo’s motion for a new trial based on jury instructions
    relating to “cross-point,” “cross-point information,” and
    “cross-point measuring means.” However, we reverse the
    district court’s construction of the “offset presetting
    means” claim element. We remand for further proceed-
    ings to determine whether the accused instrumentalities
    infringe the ’664 patent under the correct claim construc-
    tion.
    BACKGROUND
    I. Patent
    A three-dimensional or 3D movie is typically captured
    with two cameras providing slightly different images
    known as stereoscopic images. A viewer perceives a 3D
    effect when each eye separately views a stereoscopic
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.       3
    image intended for that eye. The strength of the 3D effect
    varies with the viewing conditions. For example, stretch-
    ing the images to fit a display that is too large may cause
    viewer discomfort. The ’664 patent aims to address
    problems relating to the strength of the 3D effect, which
    the patent refers to as stereoscopic feelings. ’664 patent
    col. 2 ll. 11–24, col. 2 l. 65–col. 3 l. 2.
    The ’664 patent describes the adjustment of stereo-
    scopic feelings during playback by initially recording the
    “cross-point information” at the same time the cameras
    capture the stereoscopic images. 
    Id. at col.
    2 ll. 1–6. The
    cross-point is where the optical axes of the two stereoscop-
    ic cameras intersect. 
    Id. at col.
    1 ll. 27–31. In turn, an
    “offset presetting means” uses “cross-point information”
    and conditions relating to the playback to provide viewers
    with the appropriate stereoscopic feelings. 
    Id. at col.
    9 ll.
    3–10. Specifically, the ’664 patent describes circuit com-
    ponents adjusting the relative timing between the left-eye
    and right-eye video images “to provide optimal stereoscop-
    ic feeling.” 
    Id. at col.
    10 ll. 16–20. The ’664 patent ex-
    plains that adjusting the relative timing between the left-
    eye and right-eye video images shifts their relative posi-
    tions when they are displayed. 
    Id. at col.
    11 ll. 26–59.
    II. District Court Proceedings
    Tomita accuses Nintendo’s 3DS gaming system along
    with its camera application and augmented reality (“AR”)
    game card application of infringing the ’664 patent. The
    3DS has a 3D-capable top display, 3D-capable outer
    cameras and a “3D Depth Slider” to adjust the depth of
    3D images.
    The district court construed both “offset presetting
    means” and “cross-point measuring means” as means-
    plus-function elements and adopted Tomita’s proposed
    constructions. On March 13, 2013, the jury returned a
    verdict for Tomita finding that the 3DS infringed claim 1
    of the patent and that claim 1 is not invalid. On April 11,
    4       TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    2013, Nintendo filed a motion for JMOL or a new trial on
    liability, which the district court denied on August 14,
    2013.
    Nintendo now appeals the denial of its post-trial mo-
    tion for JMOL or a new trial. This court has jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    I. Claim Construction
    Claim construction is a question of law that we review
    de novo. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N.
    Am. Corp., 
    744 F.3d 1272
    , 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en
    banc).
    The district court construed the function of “offset
    presetting means” as “offsetting and displaying said
    different video images based upon said video image in-
    formation, said cross-point information and information
    on the size of the image which is displayed by said stereo-
    scopic video image display device.” Tomita Techs. USA,
    LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., 
    855 F. Supp. 2d 33
    , 42
    (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The district court then adopted Tomita’s
    proposal for the corresponding structure, which is:
    The structure is comprised of a circuit and a man-
    ual entry unit that sets the offset between the
    right and left eye images. The ’664 patent de-
    scribes various embodiments of this structure in
    Figures One and Two, which identify it as number
    106, Figures Two and Three, which refer to man-
    ual entry of information, Figures Four through
    Eight, and at 3:24–29, 3:39–44, 4:14–19, 4:63–67,
    5:21–24; 5:35–37, 5:63–67, 9:3–10, 11:12–12:52,
    15:50–67, 16:9–10, 16:15–16, 17:58–63, 18:6–11,
    18:49–54, 19:31–35, 19:56–59, and 20:3–5. The
    structure also includes equivalents of the struc-
    tures described above.
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC    v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.        5
    J.A. 96–97.
    The only dispute here is the identification in the spec-
    ification of the structure of “offset presetting means”
    corresponding to the claim function under 35 U.S.C.
    § 112(f). Our review is not an easy task. Tomita’s pro-
    posed construction says that “various embodiments” of the
    structure can be found in lengthy citations to the specifi-
    cation. It is unclear what the structure is for a particular
    embodiment and where in the specification that structure
    is described. At oral argument, Tomita clarified that its
    theory of the corresponding structure is box 106 in Figure
    2 working in the manner described in Figures 7 and 8.
    Oral Arg. 20:50–21:32, available at http://www.cafc.
    uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/14-1244/all.
    According to Tomita, the corresponding structure shown
    in Figures 2, 7 and 8 is any “simple circuit” that performs
    the claim function. Tomita concedes, however, that
    Figure 3 also shows a corresponding structure for “offset
    presetting means.” 
    Id. at 27:49–28:39.
    To reconcile these
    two sets of corresponding structures, Tomita contends
    that they are alternative embodiments.
    We first resolve the question of whether the ’664 pa-
    tent discloses multiple embodiments of “offset presetting
    means” recited in claim 1. The descriptions of Figures 1
    to 3 repeatedly refer to “the present embodiment” in
    explaining how the different aspects relate to one anoth-
    er. ’664 patent col. 8 ll. 7–9, 25, 31, 37, 43, 56, col. 9 ll.
    11–16. Figures 4 to 8 are further listed as “view[s] show-
    ing how the stereoscopic image is viewed by a viewer.”
    See 
    id. at col.
    7 ll. 23–32. These figures collectively de-
    scribe the purported invention without any suggestion of
    different embodiments of “offset presetting means.” See
    
    id. at col.
    7 l. 56–col. 10 l. 45, col. 11 l. 12–col. 12 l. 52.
    Tomita quotes nothing from the descriptions of Figures 2
    and 3 that identify those figures as contemplating multi-
    ple embodiments of the purported invention.
    6       TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC    v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    Instead, Tomita infers “plainly different embodi-
    ments” because Figure 3 and its descriptions fail to identi-
    fy explicitly the components that correspond to box 106 of
    Figure 2. Appellees’ Br. 55–56. This inference fails upon
    review of the descriptions of Figures 2 and 3. The de-
    scriptions of Figure 2 introduce a larger circuit comprising
    the “offset presetting means” among other compo-
    nents. ’664 patent col. 8 l. 60–col. 9 l. 10. The details of
    this larger circuit “of the present embodiment” are “shown
    in FIG. 3.” 
    Id. at col.
    9 ll. 11–16. The ’664 patent is clear
    that Figures 2 and 3 refer to the same embodiment of a
    larger circuit that comprises the “offset presetting
    means.” Within that same larger circuit referred to in
    Figures 2 and 3, there is necessarily only a single embod-
    iment of the “offset presetting means.”
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.      7
    We address next Tomita’s contention that Figures 2,
    7, and 8 describe the corresponding structure for “offset
    presetting means.” The descriptions of Figure 2 introduce
    a larger circuit comprising the “offset presetting means”
    and paraphrase the claim language for the same. See 
    id. at col.
    8 l. 60–col. 9 l. 10 (“The stereoscopic video image
    signal generating circuit 101 comprises . . . offset preset-
    ting means for presetting a [sic] offset value . . . .”).
    However, repeating or paraphrasing means-plus-function
    claim language in the specification alone does not describe
    any structure. See Ergo Licensing, LLC v. CareFusion
    303, Inc., 
    673 F.3d 1361
    , 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The
    recitation of ‘control device’ provides no more structure
    than the term ‘control means’ itself, rather it merely
    replaces the word ‘means’ with the generic term ‘device.’”).
    Without disclosing any structure of “offset presetting
    means,” the descriptions of Figure 2 fail to provide the
    corresponding structure for the claim element.
    Figures 7, 8 and their descriptions also do not disclose
    sufficient structural details. The specification uses Fig-
    ures 7 and 8 to describe “the amount of the offset of the
    8       TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    right-eye and left-eye video images.” 
    Id. at col.
    12 ll. 15–
    16. Calculating the amount of offset provides only func-
    tional information for “offsetting” but not its structure.
    Tomita concedes as much. Appellees’ Br. 53 (stating that
    Figures 4, 7 and 8 describe “[t]he manner in which the
    system determines the offset”). Even if Figures 7 and 8
    were to disclose a structure for the “offsetting” aspect,
    they do not provide the full structure required by the
    claim function. The claim function recites “offsetting and
    displaying.” The “displaying” aspect of the claim function
    is not described at all in Figures 7, 8 and their descrip-
    tions. Figures 7, 8 and their descriptions cannot provide
    sufficient structure that performs the claim function. See
    Noah Sys., Inc. v. Intuit Inc., 
    675 F.3d 1302
    , 1314 (Fed.
    Cir. 2012) (requiring that the corresponding structure
    “address both aspects of this functional language”).
    Figures 2, 7, 8 and their descriptions, in fact, do not
    use “circuit” or any other structural terms in connection
    with any discussion of “offset.” See ’664 patent col. 8 l.
    54–col. 9 l. 10, col. 12 ll. 15–52. Tomita thus does not
    quote from those descriptions to justify using the word
    “circuit” in its proposed construction. Instead, Tomita
    quotes the phrase “simple circuit” from the summary of
    dependent claim 11. This “simple circuit,” in the proper
    context, refers to:
    said offset presetting means includes timing con-
    trol means for controlling the timing of the read-
    out of video image data from said frame memory
    for left-eye video image and/or said frame memory
    for right-eye video image; and said timing control
    means presets the offset of said left-eye video im-
    age and right-eye video image by advancing or de-
    laying the timing of the read-out of the video
    image data from one of said frame memories for
    left-eye and right-eye video images relative to the
    timing of the read-out of the video image data
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.      9
    from the other of said from memories for the left-
    eye and right-eye video images.
    
    Id. at col.
    5 ll. 9–20. Tomita omits this detailed structure
    entirely but quotes “simple circuit” out of context to
    interpret “offset presetting means” as covering any circuit
    that performs the claim function. Stripped of the struc-
    ture in the specification, Tomita’s interpretation is no
    more specific than defining “offset presetting means” in
    purely functional terms. Such purely functional interpre-
    tation is prohibited under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). See Med.
    Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 
    344 F.3d 1205
    , 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    Tomita further contends that Figures 2, 7, 8 and their
    descriptions show structure because its expert says so.
    However, expert testimony cannot gloss over the total
    absence of structure in the cited portion of the specifica-
    tion. Cf. Default Proof Credit Card v. Home Depot USA,
    
    412 F.3d 1291
    , 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he testimony of
    one of ordinary skill in the art cannot supplant the total
    absence of structure from the specification.”). The lack of
    structure for “offset presetting means” in Figures 2, 7, 8
    and their descriptions cannot be cured by the Tomita
    expert’s conclusory statements to the contrary.
    Finally, we identify the corresponding structure for
    “offset presetting means.” The parties agree that Figure 3
    and its descriptions contain the corresponding structure.
    Oral Arg. at 27:49–28:39. In particular, “timing control
    unit 32” in Figure 3 operates to “provide optimal stereo-
    scopic feeling” based on “CP information 12” and “screen
    size information” among others. 
    Id. at col.
    10 ll. 3–20.
    “[T]iming control unit 32” thus performs the “offsetting”
    portion of the claim function. Tomita, in fact, concedes
    that in Figure 3, it would “identify primarily box 32” as
    the “offset presetting means.” Oral Arg. 28:18–39. The
    “displaying” portion of the claim function is performed by
    “the switch control unit 41 preset[ting] the timing of
    10         TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    switching of the signal switch 40 for writing of video data
    into synthesis frame memory 50.” ’664 patent col. 10 ll.
    26–29.
    Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s adoption of
    Tomita’s proposed corresponding structure for “offset
    presetting means.” The correct corresponding structure
    should be: timing control unit 32, signal switch 40, switch
    control unit 41, and synthesis frame memory 50 described
    in Figure 3 and column 9 line 44 to column 10 line 29 and
    equivalents thereof. 1
    II. JMOL of Non-Infringement and Invalidity
    We review a denial of a motion for judgment as a mat-
    ter of law (“JMOL”) under regional circuit law. Lazare
    Kaplan Int’l, Inc. v. Photoscribe Techs., Inc., 
    628 F.3d 1359
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit reviews a
    denial of JMOL de novo. Whitserve, LLC v. Computer
    Packages, Inc., 
    694 F.3d 10
    , 18 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing
    AMW Materials Testing, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 
    584 F.3d 436
    , 456 (2d Cir. 2009)). In the Second Circuit, a district
    court may set aside the jury’s verdict and enter judgment
    as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 only where there is
    “such a complete absence of evidence supporting the
    verdict . . . or there is such an overwhelming amount of
    evidence in favor of the movant.” AMW Materials Testing,
    1  We depart from Nintendo’s proposed construction
    because it includes components that do not actually
    perform the claim function. See Asyst Techs., Inc. v.
    Empak, Inc., 
    268 F.3d 1364
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The
    corresponding structure to a function set forth in a
    means-plus-function limitation must actually perform the
    recited function, not merely enable the pertinent struc-
    ture to operate as intended . . . .”). We also decline to
    adopt Tomita’s inclusion of a “manual entry unit” for the
    same reason.
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.    
    11 584 F.3d at 456
    . This requirement is similar to the sub-
    stantial evidence standard. 
    Whitserve, 694 F.3d at 18
    .
    A. Non-infringement
    1. “offset presetting means”
    Nintendo argues that the judgment of infringement
    should be reversed because Tomita has not proved that
    the 3DS satisfies this claim element under the correct
    construction. Tomita argues that if the district court’s
    construction is reversed, Tomita should be given the
    opportunity to show infringement under any new con-
    struction of this claim element.
    We have now construed this claim element. See supra
    at 10–10. Because the jury was not presented with the
    question whether the 3DS infringes the ’664 patent under
    the correct construction, we remand for further proceed-
    ings to determine whether the 3DS infringes “offset
    presetting means.”
    2. “cross-point measuring means”
    Nintendo argues that the 3DS cannot satisfy the func-
    tion of this claim element because of the following syllo-
    gism: camera bodies arranged in parallel have parallel
    optical axes that can never intersect to have a “cross-
    point”; the camera bodies of the 3DS are arranged in
    parallel; so, the 3DS has parallel optical axes that do not
    have a “cross-point.” Nintendo thus insists that the 3DS
    cannot measure “cross-point information.”         Nintendo
    contends instead that the accused software application
    uses image processing, which cannot provide “cross-point
    information.”
    We cannot agree with Nintendo. The major premise
    of Nintendo’s syllogism was disproved by Tomita’s sub-
    mission of a 1993 technical paper. That paper shows
    cameras arranged in parallel can have intersecting optical
    axes under particular optical configurations. Indeed,
    12      TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    claim 8—dependent from claim 1—explicitly claims
    cameras “disposed in a parallel relationship.” Parent
    claim 1 cannot exclude the scope of dependent claim 8.
    See 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) ([“A] claim in dependent form shall
    contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and
    then specify a further limitation of the subject matter
    claimed.”). Claim 1 thus cannot be read to exclude cam-
    eras that are arranged in parallel. What is important is
    that the optical axes of the accused cameras intersect, and
    Tomita presented a theory of how that is so which the
    jury apparently credited.
    Moreover, Nintendo does not dispute that Tomita pre-
    sented evidence to support the allegation that the “focus
    value” in the 3DS satisfies “cross-point information.”
    Instead, Nintendo argues that Tomita failed to prove
    certain factual issues under Nintendo’s own interpreta-
    tion. See, e.g., Reply Br. 12 (“Tomita provides no evidence
    showing how the ‘focus value’ . . . is used to determine any
    distance relating to a cross-point of optical axes, as op-
    posed to the convergence of displayed images.”). Failure
    to abide by Nintendo’s own interpretation of facts does not
    mean that there was a complete absence of evidence
    supporting the verdict.
    Nintendo next contends that the 3DS does not satisfy
    the “cross-point measuring means” because the 3DS does
    not have the corresponding structure that uses any of the
    three techniques purportedly required by the district
    court’s construction.    Instead, Tomita’s infringement
    theory was based on a fourth technique “based upon the
    position of picking up of an object.” Nintendo contends
    that this “fourth technique” was outside of the district
    court’s construction. Nintendo also disputes that the 3DS
    uses this “fourth technique” because “the 3DS does not
    recognize objects in images.” Appellants’ Br. 44-47.
    Nintendo is mistaken. The district court’s construc-
    tion includes the description in column 3 lines 50–67 of
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.      13
    the ’664 patent. 2 This cited portion of the specification
    mentions “said cross-point measuring means calculates
    the cross-point based upon the position of picking-up of an
    object.” ’664 patent col. 3 ll. 64–66. Calculating the cross-
    point “based upon the position of picking up of an object”
    is what Nintendo refers to as the “fourth technique” and it
    is included in the district court’s construction. Moreover,
    Nintendo does not rebut Tomita’s citation of evidence—
    including source code documentation, patent application,
    and Tomita’s expert testimony—used to show that the
    3DS measures “focus value” based on objects in the scene
    thus allegedly satisfying the technique of “calculat[ing]
    the cross-point based upon the position of picking-up of an
    object.”
    Accordingly, we conclude that the jury’s finding that
    the 3DS satisfies the “cross-point measuring means” was
    supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm
    the district court’s denial of JMOL on the infringement of
    “cross-point measuring means.”
    B. Invalidity
    Nintendo contends that the ’664 patent lacks enable-
    ment “[t]o the extent claim 1 includes a device with cam-
    eras having parallel optical axes” and lacks adequate
    written description “[t]o the extent claim 1 of the ’664
    patent is construed to cover pick-up means having paral-
    lel optical axes as in the 3DS.” Appellants’ Br. 54–59.
    These invalidity contentions are the reverse of Nin-
    tendo’s non-infringement theory based on “cross-point
    measuring means,” namely that the cameras of the 3DS
    have parallel optical axes that can never intersect to have
    a “cross-point.” See supra at 11. Reasoning in reverse,
    2   Nintendo does not appeal the construction of
    “cross-point measuring means.” We thus assume this
    construction without passing judgment on its correctness.
    14      TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC    v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    Nintendo infers that finding the 3DS to infringe requires
    interpreting claim 1 to encompass cameras with parallel
    optical axes. This is not what Tomita presented in its
    infringement theory. Instead, as discussed above in
    section II.A.2, Tomita contended that although the cam-
    eras of the 3DS are disposed in parallel, they have inter-
    secting optical axes.
    Nintendo has not shown that the infringement verdict
    must have rested on an incorrect assumption by the jury
    that claim 1 encompasses cameras with parallel optical
    axes thus rending the claim invalid. Accordingly, the
    district court did not err in denying Nintendo’s JMOL
    motion with respect to invalidity.
    III. Motion for a New Trial
    We review a denial of a motion for a new trial under
    regional circuit law. Lazare 
    Kaplan, 628 F.3d at 1366
    .
    The Second Circuit reviews the denial of a motion for new
    trial for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. (citing SEC
    v. DiBella,
    
    587 F.3d 553
    , 563 (2d Cir. 2009)). In the Second Circuit,
    “[a] motion for a new trial ordinarily should not be grant-
    ed unless the trial court is convinced that the jury has
    reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is
    a miscarriage of justice.” Armstrong v. Brookdale Univ.
    Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
    425 F.3d 126
    , 133 (2d Cir. 2005).
    Nintendo argues that a new trial is warranted be-
    cause the district court failed to properly instruct the jury
    on claim construction. Specifically, Nintendo complains
    that the improper jury instruction allowed Tomita to
    prove infringement that departs from the district court’s
    claim construction of “cross-point measuring means.”
    Nintendo’s contentions are again misplaced. The dis-
    trict court’s instructions made clear to the jury that it is
    not free to apply its own reading of disputed terms to the
    facts of the case. The district court is not required to use
    rigid, legal language to instruct the jury. The district
    TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.     15
    court has the discretion to determine “the particular form
    and precise nature of jury instructions.” Sulzer Textil AG
    v. PICANOL NV, 
    358 F.3d 1356
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
    Moreover, we have previously disposed of Nintendo’s
    argument that Tomita departed from the district court’s
    claim construction of “cross-point measuring means” in
    section II.A.2. See supra at 11–13. Nintendo has thus
    failed to establish prejudice flowing from the alleged error
    in the district court’s jury instructions.
    Finally, Nintendo argues that a new trial is warrant-
    ed because the district court declined to construe “cross-
    point,” allowing Tomita to confuse the jury by conflating
    the claim terms “cross-point” and “cross-point infor-
    mation” with “offset.”
    We are not persuaded. The ’664 patent is clear in its
    use of “cross-point” and further equates it with “conver-
    gence point.” ’664 patent at col. 1 l. 28. At least “conver-
    gence point” had an ordinary meaning to a skilled person.
    See J.A. 9601. Tomita’s discussions of “cross-point” did
    not differ with how it was used in the ’664 patent. Moreo-
    ver, Nintendo fails to rebut Tomita’s response that it
    distinguished the two offsets allegedly determined by the
    3DS—one corresponding to focus value and “cross-point
    information,” and the other one corresponding to the
    “offset” for displaying in the ’664 patent. Compare Appel-
    lees’ Br. 65–66 with Reply Br. 29–33 (focusing on Tomita’s
    alleged departure from the district court’s construction of
    “cross-point measuring means”).
    Nintendo has failed to show that the district court
    abused its discretion in denying Nintendo’s motion for a
    new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
    denial of Nintendo’s motion for a new trial based on jury
    instructions relating to “cross-point,” “cross-point infor-
    mation” and “cross-point measuring means.”
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
    VACATED-IN-PART AND REMANDED
    16       TOMITA TECHNOLOGIES USA, LLC   v. NINTENDO CO., LTD.
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.