Allbee v. Dhs ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 21-1608    Document: 67     Page: 1   Filed: 02/22/2022
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    LEE ALLBEE,
    Petitioner
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2021-1608
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. DA-0752-20-0238-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 22, 2022
    ______________________
    JENNIFER DUKE ISAACS, Melville Johnson PC, Atlanta,
    GA, for petitioner.
    VIJAYA SURAMPUDI, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
    ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
    BOYNTON, MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., LOREN MISHA PREHEIM.
    ______________________
    Before LOURIE, SCHALL, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 21-1608     Document: 67     Page: 2    Filed: 02/22/2022
    2                                               ALLBEE   v. DHS
    SCHALL, Circuit Judge.
    DECISION
    Lee Allbee petitions for review of the final decision of
    the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) that af-
    firmed the action of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    (“CBP” or “agency”) removing him from his position of
    GS-14 Supervisory Border Patrol Agent. Allbee v. Dep’t of
    Homeland Sec., No. DA-0752-20-0238-I-1, 
    2020 WL 6448868
     (M.S.P.B. Oct. 26, 2020), App. 1. 1 We have juris-
    diction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9). For the reasons
    set forth below, we affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    I
    CBP, which is a component of the Department of
    Homeland Security, removed Mr. Allbee based upon three
    charges: submission of reimbursement claims for unau-
    thorized travel expenses (25 specifications) (Charge 1);
    making unauthorized cash withdrawals on a government
    travel card (Charge 2); and failure to cooperate in an offi-
    cial investigation (Charge 3). App. 3. Mr. Allbee timely
    appealed his removal to the Board. Before the Board, the
    appeal was heard upon the administrative record without
    a hearing. In a decision dated October 26, 2020, the ad-
    ministrative judge (“AJ’) to whom the appeal was assigned
    affirmed the removal. App. 1. The AJ found that, although
    the agency had failed to prove Charges 2 and 3, it had
    proved 20 of the 25 specifications in Charge 1. App. 6–26.
    The AJ also found that the agency had demonstrated a
    nexus between Mr. Allbee’s misconduct and the efficiency
    of the service, App. 32, and that the penalty of removal was
    1   Our citations to “App.” refer to the Petitioner’s Cor-
    rected Appendix, filed Nov. 22, 2021 (Dkt. No. 48).
    Case: 21-1608      Document: 67     Page: 3   Filed: 02/22/2022
    ALLBEE   v. DHS                                             3
    reasonable, App. 32–36. The AJ’s initial decision became
    the final decision of the Board on November 30, 2020.
    II
    Our review of the Board’s decision is limited by statute.
    We must affirm a final decision of the Board unless it is
    “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
    wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
    cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
    followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); see also Hayes v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    727 F.2d 1535
    , 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence
    “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
    accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edi-
    son Co. v. Nat’l Labor Rels. Bd., 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938).
    III
    Between July 27, 2014, and September 6, 2015, Mr. All-
    bee was on long-term temporary duty (“TDY”) status. App.
    2. In Charge 1, CBP alleged that, when Mr. Allbee submit-
    ted expense vouchers for the TDY period, he sought reim-
    bursement for expenses that he was not allowed to claim
    under the pertinent regulations. App. 6–26. As noted, the
    AJ sustained 20 of the 25 specifications in Charge 1 and
    affirmed Mr. Allbee’s removal. On appeal, Mr. Allbee ad-
    vances several claims of error. First, he argues that the AJ
    erred when she ruled, App. 4–5, that the agency did not
    have to prove that Mr. Allbee had fraudulent intent when
    he submitted the vouchers at issue in Charge 1. Allbee Br.
    16–21. Second, he claims that the AJ’s finding that the
    agency had proved 20 of the 25 specifications by a prepon-
    derance of the evidence, App. 6–26, is not supported by sub-
    stantial evidence. Allbee Br. 21–34. Third, Mr. Allbee
    urges that, contrary to the AJ’s finding, App. 32, the agency
    failed to demonstrate a nexus between the misconduct al-
    leged in Charge 1 and the efficiency of the service. Allbee
    Br. 34–35. And fourth, Mr. Allbee argues that the AJ erred
    in finding that the penalty of removal was reasonable. See
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    4                                              ALLBEE   v. DHS
    App. 32–36; Allbee Br. 35–40. We address Mr. Allbee’s con-
    tentions in turn.
    IV
    In her initial decision the AJ pointed out that neither
    Charge 1 itself nor the individual specifications in the
    charge referred to a specific intent. App. 4. Charge 1 is
    titled “Submission of Reimbursement Claims for Unau-
    thorized Travel Expenses,” and the charge does not refer to
    any intent on the part of Mr. Allbee. See App. 46–50. A
    charge such as this “does not turn on proof of intent.” Ham-
    ilton v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    71 M.S.P.R. 547
    , 555–56 (1996)
    (holding that failure to follow instructions does not require
    proof of intent); see also Boyd v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs,
    740 F. App’x 710, 713 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“It is not necessary
    for the agency to prove that a failure to follow instructions
    was intentional.”).
    Neither are we persuaded by Mr. Allbee’s argument
    that CBP failed to prove 20 of the 25 specifications in
    Charge 1. We have reviewed both the 20 specifications and
    the evidence of record in support of them. The AJ’s finding
    that the agency proved the specifications by a preponder-
    ance of the evidence is supported by substantial evidence.
    Under 
    5 U.S.C. § 7513
    (a) an agency may remove an em-
    ployee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
    the service. In that regard, the agency must prove there is
    a nexus between the articulated grounds for an adverse ac-
    tion and either the employee’s ability to accomplish his or
    her duties satisfactorily or some other legitimate govern-
    ment interest. Hoofman v. Dep’t of the Army, 
    118 M.S.P.R. 532
    , 540 (2012), aff’d 526 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In
    this case, the AJ found that there was “a clear nexus be-
    tween the sustained charge and the efficiency of the ser-
    vice.” App. 32. The AJ found that Mr. Allbee’s misconduct
    “occurred at work and involve[d] his violation of policies re-
    lated to . . . his requests for reimbursement of travel ex-
    penses.” App. 32. We see no error in this finding. Mr.
    Case: 21-1608      Document: 67     Page: 5   Filed: 02/22/2022
    ALLBEE   v. DHS                                             5
    Allbee’s sole argument with respect to the AJ’s nexus de-
    termination is that “he was removed approximately six (6)
    years after the alleged misconduct occurred and after his
    temporary assignment ended.” Allbee Br. 35. We agree
    with the government that this fact is not relevant in deter-
    mining nexus.
    Turning to Mr. Allbee’s final argument, as far as pen-
    alty is concerned, we have stated that the Board’s “role in
    [assessing the penalty] is not to insist that the balance be
    struck precisely where the Board would choose to strike it
    if the Board were in the agency’s shoes in the first instance”
    but rather “to assure that the agency did conscientiously
    consider the relevant factors and did strike a responsible
    balance within tolerable limits of reasonableness.” Norris
    v. S.E.C., 
    675 F.3d 1349
    , 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations
    omitted). In this case, the AJ found that the agency had
    considered the relevant factors set forth in Douglas v. Vet-
    erans Administration, 
    5 M.S.P.B. 313
    , 331–32 (1981), in de-
    termining whether the penalty imposed upon Mr. Allbee
    was reasonable. See App. 33–36. We have carefully con-
    sidered Mr. Allbee’s arguments to the contrary. See Allbee
    Br. 36–40. None of them has persuaded us that, in impos-
    ing the penalty of removal, CBP abused its discretion.
    Finally, in addition to the arguments addressed above,
    we have considered several additional contentions raised
    by Mr. Allbee. We have determined that none of them war-
    rant disturbing the Board’s final decision.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the final decision
    of the Board affirming Mr. Allbee’s removal.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.