Luna v. MSPB , 636 F. App'x 564 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    M. CARMEN LUNA,
    Petitioner
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2015-3159
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. DA-0752-14-0378-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 7, 2016
    ______________________
    M. CARMEN LUNA, San Antonio, TX, pro se.
    KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH, Office of the General
    Counsel, Merits Systems Protection Board, Washington,
    DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G.
    POLISUK.
    ______________________
    2                                            LUNA   v. MSPB
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and REYNA, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM
    M. Carmen Luna petitions for review of a decision of
    the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB” or “Board”)
    dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because
    Ms. Luna was a reemployed voluntary early retirement
    annuitant during her time at the Department of Veterans
    Affairs (“VA”), she does not have a right to appeal to the
    MSPB. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    The basic facts of this case are simple. On June 30,
    2003, Ms. Luna retired early from the Food and Drug
    Administration (“FDA”). Ms. Luna, a participant in the
    Civil Service Retirement System, began receiving an
    annuity from the Office of Personnel Management
    (“OPM”). Her retirement was apparently treated by the
    FDA as a voluntary “early out” retirement, and the
    Standard Form 50 (“SF-50”) classified her as such. On
    February 2, 2006, Ms. Luna was hired by the VA, and she
    continued to receive an annuity from OPM while em-
    ployed there. On February 23, 2010, the VA terminated
    Ms. Luna for cause. As discussed below, Ms. Luna would
    have had a right to appeal to the Board if her early re-
    tirement was an involuntary Discontinued Service Re-
    tirement (“DSR”) but would not have had a right to appeal
    if her retirement was a voluntary early out retirement.
    Ms. Luna initially appealed her termination by the
    VA to the MSPB on March 8, 2010. The MSPB dismissed
    for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that she was a
    reemployed voluntary early retirement annuitant, relying
    on her SF-50, which characterized her as a voluntary
    early out retiree. Luna v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, DA-
    0752-10-0294-I-1, 
    2010 WL 10840184
    (M.S.P.B. Final
    LUNA   v. MSPB                                            3
    Order, Nov. 10, 2010). Ms. Luna later requested and
    received a corrected SF-50 reclassifying her 2003 retire-
    ment as an involuntary DSR rather than a voluntary
    early out. In light of the corrected SF-50, Ms. Luna again
    appealed her 2010 termination to the MSPB on March 17,
    2014. After initial dismissal of this second appeal by an
    administrative judge, Ms. Luna petitioned for review by
    the full Board. The Board again dismissed for lack of
    jurisdiction, finding that the corrected SF-50 did not
    affect Ms. Luna’s status as a voluntary early out retiree
    since she had continued to receive an annuity while she
    was reemployed. Luna v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No.
    DA-0752-14-0378-I-1, 
    2015 WL 1927478
    (M.S.P.B. Apr.
    29, 2015).      We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1295(a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    Subject matter jurisdiction of the MSPB is a question
    of law, which we review de novo. Vesser v. Office of Pers.
    Mgmt., 
    29 F.3d 600
    , 603 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Waldau v. Merit
    Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    19 F.3d 1395
    , 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The
    subject matter jurisdiction of the MSPB is “limited to
    actions designated as appealable to the Board ‘under any
    law, rule, or regulation.’” Prewitt v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
    
    133 F.3d 885
    , 886 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
    § 7701(a)).
    Under 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d), federal employees partici-
    pating in the Civil Service Retirement System can retire
    early via a DSR, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 831.503, or via an
    “early out” Voluntary Early Retirement Authority retire-
    ment, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 831.114. While DSR is
    involuntary and early out retirement is voluntary, both
    plans make the retiree eligible for an ongoing annuity,
    and the annuity computation formula is the same under
    both. See, e.g., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Guide to Volun-
    tary Early Retirement Regulations (2006). If a DSR
    4                                             LUNA   v. MSPB
    retiree returns to work for the federal government, her
    annuity ends and she collects a new salary in full; by
    contrast, a rehired early out retiree becomes a reemployed
    annuitant who continues to collect her annuity and sepa-
    rately collects a reduced salary, with the amount of the
    annuity offset from that salary. 5 U.S.C. § 8344; see also
    Wolthuis v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 94-3596, 
    1995 WL 19381
    , at *6 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 19, 1995) (unpublished).
    The distinction between full employee and reemployed
    annuitant status affects an individual’s right to appeal an
    adverse personnel action. While most federal employees
    subjected to such actions have a right to appeal the agen-
    cy decision to the MSPB, see Kloeckner v. Solis, 
    133 S. Ct. 596
    , 600 (2012), reemployed voluntary early out retirees
    do not enjoy an appeal right. Section 3323(b)(1) of title 5
    specifies,
    Notwithstanding other statutes, an annuitant, as
    defined by section 8331 or 8401, receiving annuity
    from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability
    Fund [e.g., an early out retiree] is not barred by
    reason of his retired status from employment in
    an appointive position for which the annuitant is
    qualified. An annuitant so reemployed . . . serves
    at the will of the appointing authority.
    Section 3323(b)(1) thus makes clear that any retired and
    later reemployed individual receiving an annuity from the
    Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund serves at
    the will of the agency that has reemployed her. 1 See
    
    Vesser, 29 F.3d at 604
    . The consequence of being an at
    will employee is that the employee has no right of appeal
    1   An exception exists for retired administrative law
    judges, who are covered by a special provision in 28
    U.S.C. § 3323(b)(2).
    LUNA   v. MSPB                                            5
    to the Board. 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.401(d)(4), 432.102(f)(11); see
    also Evans v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 50 F. App’x 439, 440
    (Fed. Cir. 2002).
    Ms. Luna argues that the corrected SF-50 classifying
    her retirement as a DSR should be determinative of her
    right to appeal to the MSPB. But we have held that
    characterization of an employee’s retirement on her SF-50
    is not dispositive in Grigsby v. Dep’t of Commerce, 
    729 F.2d 772
    , 775 (Fed. Cir. 1984). There we stated, “Grigsby
    interprets [prior] cases as holding that the characteriza-
    tion of a personnel action on the face of the SF-50 is
    determinative of the appointment. We disagree with
    Grigsby's interpretation.” 
    Id. Rather, our
    court has held
    that “actual receipt of the annuity is significant with
    regard to the status of a reemployed individual.” 
    Vesser, 29 F.3d at 605
    . That is, an individual’s receipt of an
    annuity while reemployed, rather than the formal classifi-
    cation of the retirement, makes her a reemployed annui-
    tant for purposes of § 3323(b)(1). Id.; see also Terrill v.
    Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 610 F. App’x 982, 983 (Fed. Cir.
    2015) (“[W]hether or not a reemployed annuitant falls
    within § 3323(b)(1) turns on whether the individual
    continues to receive an annuity upon reemployment.”).
    There is no dispute that Ms. Luna qualified for and
    received an annuity at the time of her retirement from the
    FDA in 2003, and there is likewise no dispute that she
    continued to receive an annuity while employed by the VA
    between 2006 and 2010. Because Ms. Luna met the
    requirements to receive an annuity on her separation
    from the FDA and continued to receive an annuity during
    her time at the VA, she was a reemployed voluntary
    retiree “annuitant” as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 8331(9). As
    6                                               LUNA   v. MSPB
    such, she served at will and cannot appeal her termina-
    tion to the MSPB. 2
    We have considered Ms. Luna’s other arguments, in-
    cluding those relating to the Board’s refusal to accept
    additional filings from Ms. Luna and other alleged due
    process violations. We find them to be without merit. For
    the foregoing reasons, we affirm the MSPB’s dismissal of
    her suit for lack of jurisdiction.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.
    2   The parties appear to dispute whether the salary
    paid by the VA was properly offset by the amount of Ms.
    Luna’s annuity. In addition, at one point OPM sought to
    recover an alleged overpayment of annuity to Ms. Luna,
    but the MSPB found that OPM had not substantiated the
    overpayment. Luna v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. DA-
    831M-14-0569-C-1, 
    2015 WL 3990796
    , at ¶¶ 2, 4
    (M.S.P.B. Jun. 30, 2015). If Ms. Luna seeks to have her
    annuity reinstated (as it seems she has, see 
    id. at ¶¶
    3, 8),
    any overpayment established by OPM would have to be
    deducted before the annuity could be reinstated.