Capital Security Systems, Inc. v. Ncr Corporation ( 2018 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    NCR CORPORATION, SUNTRUST BANKS, INC.,
    SUNTRUST BANK,
    Defendants-Appellees
    ______________________
    2017-2368
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Georgia in No. 1:14-cv-01516-WSD,
    Judge William S. Duffey, Jr.
    ______________________
    Decided: March 7, 2018
    ______________________
    PETER LAMBRIANAKOS, Brown Rudnick, LLP, New
    York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represent-
    ed by ALFRED ROSS FABRICANT.
    PAUL WHITFIELD HUGHES, Mayer Brown LLP, Wash-
    ington, district court, argued for defendants-appellees.
    Also represented by STEPHEN ERIC BASKIN, JONATHAN
    WEINBERG.
    2        CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION
    ______________________
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, MOORE and STOLL,
    Circuit Judges.
    STOLL, Circuit Judge.
    Capital Security Systems, Inc. filed a patent in-
    fringement action against NCR Corporation and other
    defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
    District of Georgia, asserting infringement of U.S. Patent
    Nos. 5,897,625; 7,653,600; 7,991,696; and 8,121,948. The
    district court granted summary judgment of invalidity,
    holding indefinite the term 1) “ascertains an apparent
    signature” in claim 1 of the ’600 patent, claim 1 of the ’696
    patent, and claims 1 and 2 of the ’948 patent; and 2)
    “transactional operator” in claim 15 of the ’625 patent.
    We reverse the district court’s determination that the
    term “ascertains an apparent signature” is indefinite, we
    affirm the district court’s determination that the term
    “transactional operator” is indefinite, and we remand to
    the district court for further proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    BACKGROUND
    I.
    The patents asserted by Capital Security are directed
    to an automated document cashing machine. See, e.g.,
    ’625 patent col. 3 ll. 57–58. The ’600, ’696, and ’948 pa-
    tents (“the continuation patents”) share a common specifi-
    cation and each claim priority to the parent ’625 patent.
    The parent ’625 patent purports to “[increase] the
    profitability of the ATMs” by disclosing an “ATM-like
    machine that performs and allows a number of service
    options, such as for example the withdrawing of cash, the
    depositing of cash, the cashing of a check, the cashing of a
    money order, the buying of a money order, the transfer-
    CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION        3
    ring of funds by wire, paying a bill and purchasing of end
    user items.” 
    Id. at col.
    1 ll. 27–28, col. 3 ll. 57–63. The
    continuation patents likewise describe “an automated
    machine that cashes monetary transaction documents
    such as checks, money orders, and that makes deposit
    entries into the bank account of the user after validation
    of the user and monetary transaction document, without
    the aid of a bank teller.” ’600 patent, Abstract.
    A. “ascertains an apparent signature”
    The term “ascertains an apparent signature” is recit-
    ed in the independent claims of the continuation patents.
    Although the term appears in slightly different forms in
    the different continuation patents, i.e., “ascertaining . . .
    an apparent signature” (the ’696 patent) and “ascertain
    an apparent signature” (the ’948 patent), the differences
    are negligible for purposes of this appeal. Claim 1 of the
    ’600 patent is illustrative:
    1. An automated machine for an automated
    document handling system for making bank de-
    posits with a monetary document comprising:
    a card reader for a card having an intelli-
    gence associated therewith for identifying
    a system user as a qualified user;
    a document scanner for scanning the mon-
    etary document;
    a processor for receiving input from the
    document scanner and generating an im-
    age thereof;
    a document reader in the machine for the
    monetary document from which a deposit
    is being made;
    a display device coupled to the processor
    for displaying the image from the scanned
    4         CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION
    monetary document to the system user;
    and
    an acceptance of deposit indicator opera-
    ble by the processor after qualification of
    the user and validity of the document to
    indicate proof of deposit to the system us-
    er,
    wherein the processor reviews images from a legal
    amount recognition (LAR) line and a courtesy
    amount recognition (CAR) line and ascertains an
    apparent signature from the document image in
    order to validate the document.
    ’600 patent col. 39 l. 35 – col. 40 l. 11 (emphasis added).
    In connection with the disputed term, the specifica-
    tion of the ’600 patent provides the following description:
    In accordance with a further aspect of the inven-
    tion, the bank will receive a validation that a sig-
    nature is present at the signature line of the
    document, such as a check, before performing the
    requested financial transaction with respect to the
    check. To this end, the signature line is located
    and an analysis is made to an acceptable confi-
    dence level that a signature is present at the sig-
    nature line. If a signature is lacking, the check
    will be rejected. Preferably, an analysis will be
    made as to verify the user’s signature against
    stored user signatures to provide an additional se-
    curity check to provide further confidence to the
    bank doing the transaction. Machine protection
    against a skilled forgery is difficult with current
    technology; nonetheless, unskilled forgeries or
    ambiguous signatures may still be detected.
    
    Id. at col.
    4 ll. 39–52.
    CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION    5
    B. “transactional operator”
    The term “transactional operator” is recited in claim
    15 of the parent ’625 patent:
    15. An automated banking system for receiv-
    ing cash from a user and for dispensing cash to a
    user comprising:
    an automated machine having a card re-
    ceiver for receiving a card which identifies
    a user as being qualified to use the ma-
    chine;
    a document receiver for receiving a docu-
    ment to be cashed;
    a reader for reading the document for the
    amount and for a valid signature of the
    user if cash is to be dispensed to the user;
    a cash dispenser in the automated ma-
    chine for dispensing cash to the user oper-
    able upon an accepted reading by the
    reader;
    a cash receiver for receiving cash and for
    analyzing the amount of cash received
    from the user;
    a cash storage in the machine for receiving
    the cash being deposited by the user; and
    a transactional operator for operation by
    the user to perform a transaction upon
    deposit of sufficient cash by user for the
    requested transaction.
    ’625 patent col. 24 ll. 31–53 (emphasis added).
    The ’625 patent specification does not use the term
    “transactional operator.”   It does, however, describe
    “keypads 26 and 27” on the machine that a user can
    6         CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION
    operate to perform a transaction option displayed to the
    user. Specifically, the specification teaches a display
    screen 20 which displays transaction options to a user
    including “1) withdraw; 2) deposit; 3) cash check; 4) cash
    money order; 5) buy money order; 6) wire transfer; 7) bill
    payments; 8) purchase.” 
    Id. at col.
    10 ll. 3–8. The display
    20 is “adjacent a pair of flanking additional keypads 26
    and 27” with “arrow keys” “aligned with these options 1-
    8.” See 
    id. at col.
    10 ll. 9–11. A user may depress one of
    the arrow keys to perform one of the displayed transac-
    tion options. 
    Id. at col.
    10 ll. 8–16.
    The specification also teaches a computer within the
    machine that responds to input signals and executes
    commands. Specifically:
    The user keyboard 18 supplies command signals
    to a microcomputer 21, in this embodiment a 133
    Mhz Pentium-based personal computer having a
    2.1 gigabyte hard disk drive for storing software, a
    32 megabyte random access memory for storing
    instructions and operands, a 133 Mhz Pentium
    microprocessor, an ISA bus, a PCI bus, a serial in-
    terface, and a parallel interface. (FIG. 3). The mi-
    crocomputer 21 executes application software
    under Windows 95, which among other things, re-
    sponds to keystrokes on the user keyboard 18, and
    signals from other input devices as set forth be-
    low. The microcomputer 21 drives the output dis-
    play 20 in response to the software it is executing
    and the various signals it receives from the input
    devices connected to transfer signals to it.
    
    Id. at col.
    8 ll. 43–56.
    II.
    Prior to granting summary judgment of indefinite-
    ness, the district court issued a claim construction order.
    In the order, the court determined that NCR failed, at the
    CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION        7
    Markman stage, to establish indefiniteness of the two
    disputed terms by clear and convincing evidence, and
    construed both terms. Capital Sec. Sys., Inc. v. NCR
    Corp., No. 1:14-CV-1516-WSD, 
    2016 WL 3517595
    , at *5
    (N.D. Ga. June 28, 2016). The court noted that “NCR
    [did] not provide any expert testimony, prior art, or other
    evidence to show that a person skilled in the art would be
    unable to ascertain, with reasonable certainty, the scope
    of the invention.” 
    Id. The court
    added, however, that it
    construed the terms “without prejudice” to NCR’s ability
    to challenge the validity of the claims for indefiniteness at
    the summary judgment stage. 
    Id. at *4.
         The court construed “ascertains an apparent signa-
    ture” as “[discovering] the presence of a person’s cursive
    signature in the signature field.” 
    Id. at *5.
    The court
    explained that its construction was “supported by the
    differentiation of validating a signature from recognizing
    the presence of a signature,” and that “the kind of signa-
    ture that is the subject of the patents is a cursive one.”
    
    Id. at *5
    n.6. With respect to “transactional operator,” the
    court construed the term as “[a] computer within an
    automated banking system that, after deposit of sufficient
    cash, permits the user to perform the requested transac-
    tion.” 
    Id. at *6.
        NCR subsequently filed a motion for summary judg-
    ment of invalidity asserting, among other things, that
    these two terms were indefinite. The district court, after
    considering competing testimony from Capital Security’s
    expert, Dr. Bajaj, and NCR’s expert, Dr. Chatterjee,
    granted summary judgment of indefiniteness. See Capital
    Sec. Sys., Inc. v. NCR Corp., 
    263 F. Supp. 3d 1366
    , 1375
    (N.D. Ga. 2017).
    In analyzing “ascertains an apparent signature,” the
    district court credited Dr. Chatterjee’s testimony and
    found Dr. Bajaj’s competing testimony conclusory and not
    supported by “any reasoning or evidence.” 
    Id. at 1372.
    In
    8        CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION
    particular, the court agreed with Dr. Chatterjee’s testi-
    mony that:
    [a] skilled artisan would not have been able to de-
    cide amongst four different plausible meanings of
    “apparent signature”: (1) determining if anything
    in the way of a mark was present in the signature
    field, useful or otherwise; (2) distinguishing a
    mark resembling legible text from a mark never
    intended to be a signature, such as a scratch or
    smudge mark; (3) determining if the scanned im-
    age field corresponds to a handwritten cursive
    signature versus an otherwise legitimate block
    letter printed name; or (4) determining if the sig-
    nature is forged.
    
    Id. at 1373.
        The court was unpersuaded by NCR’s argument that
    Dr. Chatterjee’s testimony merely shows that the term is
    broad, not indefinite. The court explained that “Dr.
    Chatterjee’s opinion is not that the term is broad enough
    to encompass the four possibilities he set forth, but that a
    skilled artisan would not be able to decide whether the
    term encompasses all four examples or some subset of
    them.” 
    Id. at 1372.
        Regarding “transactional operator,” the court found
    Dr. Bajaj’s testimony—that one of ordinary skill in the art
    would understand that a computer included in an auto-
    mated banking system is the “transactional operator”—
    unsupported by any reasoning or evidence, and again
    credited Dr. Chatterjee’s competing testimony. Specifical-
    ly, Dr. Chatterjee testified that one of ordinary skill in the
    art would be unable to determine the scope of “transac-
    tional operator.” He opined that “transactional operator”
    could be any of (1) a user interface allowing user selec-
    tions; (2) an internal computer component like software
    executing an algorithm; or (3) a computer component that
    performs the task of “a bill reader [that] reads the provid-
    CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION        9
    er’s account number and the user’s identification from the
    bill” as in the transaction in Claim 17, and could include
    “various input devices such as user keyboards, touch
    screen, and auxiliary user input devices.” 
    Id. at 1374.
    The court concluded that “[a] person of ordinary skill in
    the art, informed by the specification and the prosecution
    history, would not be apprised with reasonable certainty
    about the scope of the invention.” 
    Id. at 1375.
       Capital Security timely appealed to this court.       We
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    We review de novo a district court’s determination of
    indefiniteness, and we review for clear error any of the
    district court’s underlying findings of fact based on extrin-
    sic evidence. MasterMine Software, Inc. v. Microsoft
    Corp., 
    874 F.3d 1307
    , 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2017). A patent
    claim must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[]
    the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
    invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. “[A] patent is invalid for
    indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specifica-
    tion delineating the patent, and the prosecution history,
    fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in
    the art about the scope of the invention.” Nautilus, Inc. v.
    Biosig Instruments, Inc., 
    134 S. Ct. 2120
    , 2124 (2014).
    I.   “ascertains an apparent signature”
    NCR argues that, although the term “ascertains an
    apparent signature” does not appear verbatim in the
    specification, the term is not indefinite when considered
    in the context of the claims and the specification. We
    agree.
    Claim 1 of the ’600 patent recites a processor that “re-
    views images from a legal amount recognition (LAR) line
    and a courtesy amount recognition (CAR) line” of a
    scanned monetary document (e.g., check) and “ascertains
    an apparent signature from the document image in order
    10       CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION
    to validate the document.” Read in the context of this
    surrounding claim language, “ascertain[ing] an apparent
    signature” seems to require, consistent with the ordinary
    meaning of the claim language, determining the presence
    of what appears to be a signature. This is consistent with
    the specification.
    The specification explains that the automated ma-
    chine determines whether “a signature is present at the
    signature line of the document.” ’600 patent col. 4 ll. 40–
    41. Specifically, the invention accomplishes this by first
    locating the signature line, then analyzing “to an accepta-
    ble confidence level that a signature is present at the
    signature line.” 
    Id. at col.
    4 ll. 43–45. Thus, a skilled
    artisan would understand the claimed ascertaining step
    to correspond to determining the presence of a signature
    on the signature line of a check, while acknowledging that
    such a determination cannot be made with complete
    certainty.
    The district court held “ascertains an apparent signa-
    ture” indefinite principally because one of ordinary skill
    could implement it in any, all, or a subset, of the four
    different ways suggested by Dr. Chatterjee. Capital Sec.
    
    Sys., 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1372
    –73. The four implementa-
    tions suggested by Dr. Chatterjee, however, fall within a
    reasonable range of implementations permitted by the
    broad claim language as understood in light of the specifi-
    cation. The specification discloses that, based on the
    particular desired confidence level implemented in the
    system, a check may be accepted unless (1) “a signature is
    lacking,” ’600 patent col. 4 ll. 45–46; or (2) the signature
    does not pass verification against a stored signature “to
    provide an additional security check to provide further
    confidence,” 
    id. at col.
    4 ll. 46–49. Given this disclosure in
    the specification, we conclude that one of ordinary skill in
    the art would understand, with reasonable certainty, the
    scope of “ascertains an apparent signature” to include all
    four implementations.
    CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION        11
    Citing, inter alia, Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Soft-
    ware, Inc., 
    417 F.3d 1342
    , 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and
    Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 
    766 F.3d 1364
    , 1371
    (Fed. Cir. 2014), NCR argues that “ascertain[ing] an
    apparent signature” is indefinite because it lacks any
    objective standard of measure.      Appellee Br. 18–21.
    Unlike the terms determined to be indefinite in the cases
    relied on by NCR, however, the scope of the claimed
    ascertaining step does not depend on the “unrestrained,
    subjective opinion of a particular individual,” 
    Datamize, 417 F.3d at 1350
    (determining “aesthetically pleasing” to
    be indefinite), and is not subject to the “unpredictable
    vagaries of any one person’s opinion,” Interval 
    Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1374
    (determining “unobtrusive manner” to
    be indefinite).
    NCR also analogized “[ascertaining] an apparent sig-
    nature” to the term “block-like,” which was held indefinite
    in In re Walter, 698 F. App’x 1022, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
    In In re Walter, however, the term “block-like” was held
    indefinite in view of applicant’s “erratic” statements made
    during prosecution that defined the term in “inconsistent”
    ways. 
    Id. at 1025,
    27. In particular, the applicant sug-
    gested during prosecution that “block-like” could encom-
    pass any material with flat sides, or even discreet pieces
    conjoined “in some manner.” 
    Id. at 1027.
    Here, on the
    other hand, Capital Security did not muddle the scope of
    “ascertains an apparent signature” during prosecution or
    otherwise. Accordingly, we do not conclude that the term
    “ascertains an apparent signature” is indefinite.
    We agree with the claim construction adopted by the
    district court with one exception: we would remove the
    “cursive” limitation. Although the parent ’625 patent
    specification describes a “cursive signature,” see, e.g., ’625
    patent col. 4 ll. 10–11, the common specification of the
    continuation patents does not. In fact, of the three in-
    stances “cursive” appears in the specification, none of
    them relate to a user’s signature. ’600 patent col. 5 ll. 20–
    12        CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION
    22 (“[Account numbers] are difficult to locate and must be
    precisely delineated from other adjacent typing, printing,
    letter or cursive to allow the transaction to be accom-
    plished.”); 
    id. at col.
    18 ll. 14–19 (“[T]he processor . . . will
    also read the cursive legal amount (LAR) line . . .”); 
    id. at col.
    27 ll. 45–49 (“[T]he area immediately surrounding
    the bounding box . . . is analyzed to determine whether
    portions of characters, cursive strokes or the like extend
    outside the bounding box region.”). Thus, we find no
    reason to limit “signature” to cursive. Accordingly, the
    correct construction of the term “ascertains an apparent
    signature” in the continuation patents is “to discover the
    presence of a person’s signature in the signature field.”
    II. “transactional operator”
    Capital Security next argues that the claims and spec-
    ification inform those skilled in the art about the scope of
    the “transactional operator” with reasonable certainty.
    Specifically, Capital Security argues that column 8, lines
    43–56 of the ’625 patent specification describes an “em-
    bodiment of a transactional operator.” Appellant Br. 22.
    Consistent with this argument, Dr. Bajaj testified that
    one of ordinary skill in the art would understand “a
    computer included in an automated banking system” to be
    one that, “after deposit of sufficient cash, permits the user
    to perform the requested operation.” J.A. 2840. Dr. Bajaj
    explained that the claimed operations “would include
    options such as ‘withdraw,’ ‘deposit,’ and ‘cash check’ as
    described in Figure 9.” 
    Id. The passage
    relied on by Capital Security describes a
    microcomputer 21 that “responds to keystrokes on the
    user keyboard 18” and “signals from other inputs devices.”
    ’625 patent col. 8 ll. 52–53. It also explains that micro-
    computer 21 “drives the output display 20 in response to
    the software it is executing and the various signals it
    receives from the input devices connected to transfer
    signals to it.” 
    Id. at col.
    8 ll. 53–56. It is unclear from this
    CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION       13
    passage, however, whether the computer or “transactional
    operator” includes the microcomputer 21, the keyboard
    18, and the display 20, or a subset thereof. It is also
    unclear why the “transactional operator” does not include
    the keypads 26 and 27 described in column 10 of the
    specification, which a user depresses to perform a trans-
    action option.
    This uncertainty is compounded by Capital Security’s
    representations during oral argument. When asked about
    the scope of the term during oral argument, Capital
    Security indicated that it includes the keyboard described
    in the passage, but not the display described in the same
    passage. Oral Arg. at 12:12–13:29, http://oralarguments.
    cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2017-2368.mp3. Capital
    Security did not explain why the “transactional operator”
    would include keyboard 18, but not display 20, which
    displays the transaction options to a user. Nor did Capi-
    tal Security explain why “transactional operator” would
    include keyboard 18, but not keypads 26 and 27, which a
    user depresses to perform a transaction option.
    Indeed, we find no rationale supporting the seemingly
    arbitrary definition of “transactional operator” as a mi-
    croprocessor and keyboard, while excluding the associated
    display and keypads. Because “transactional operator”
    has no commonly-accepted definition and its scope is
    unclear in view of the intrinsic evidence and Capital
    Security’s proposed construction, we agree with the
    district court that this term indefinite.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
    and find them unpersuasive. Thus, we reverse the dis-
    trict court’s determination that “ascertains an apparent
    signature” in claim 1 of the ’600 patent, claim 1 of the ’696
    patent, and claims 1 and 2 of the ’948 patent, is indefinite,
    and we affirm the district court’s determination that
    “transactional operator” in claim 15 of the ’625 patent is
    14        CAPITAL SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC.   v. NCR CORPORATION
    indefinite. Accordingly, we remand to the district court
    for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND
    REMANDED
    COSTS
    No costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2368

Filed Date: 3/7/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/7/2018