Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. ( 2006 )


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  •  United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    06-1021, -1022, -1034
    ABBOTT LABORATORIES
    and CENTRAL GLASS COMPANY, LTD.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    BAXTER PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, INC.
    and BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORP.,
    Defendants-Cross Appellants.
    R. Mark McCareins, Winston & Strawn LLP, of Chicago, Illinois, argued for
    plaintiffs-appellants. With him on the brief were Edward L. Foote, Raymond C. Perkins,
    Peggy M. Balesteri, James F. Herbison, and Timothy M. Schaum.
    Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Sidley Austin LLP, of Chicago, Illinois, argued for
    defendants-cross appellants. With him on the brief were David T. Pritikin, William H.
    Baumgartner, Jr., and Russell E. Cass. Of counsel on the brief was Thomas S. Borecki,
    Baxter Healthcare Corporation, of Deerfield, Illinois. Of counsel was Marc A. Cavan,
    Sidley Austin LLP, of Chicago, Illinois.
    Appealed from: United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
    Judge Ronald A. Guzman
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    06-1021, -1022, -1034
    ABBOTT LABORATORIES
    and CENTRAL GLASS COMPANY, LTD.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    BAXTER PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS, INC.
    and BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORP.,
    Defendants-Cross
    Appellants.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: November 9, 2006
    __________________________
    Before BRYSON, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and GAJARSA, Circuit
    Judge.
    GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.
    Plaintiffs Abbott Laboratories and Central Glass Company (collectively “Abbott”)
    appeal from a judgment of noninfringement of 
    U.S. Patent No. 5,990,176
     (“the ’176
    patent”) by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
    Defendants Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. and Baxter Healthcare Corp.
    (collectively “Baxter”) cross-appeal the district court’s determination that the asserted
    claims are valid and its refusal to find unenforceability due to inequitable conduct. This
    is our second hearing of this case; following our first, we reversed the district court’s
    claim construction and remanded for trial. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc.,
    
    334 F.3d 1274
     (Fed. Cir. 2003). The district court conducted a bench trial, then further
    construed the claims at issue and found them valid and enforceable but not infringed.
    Abbott Labs v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., No. 01-CV-1867 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2005).
    This appeal timely followed.
    Because we hold the asserted claims of the ’176 patent to be anticipated by the
    disclosure in 
    U.S. Patent No. 5,684,211
     (“the ’211 patent”), we reverse the district
    court’s validity judgment.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    A.     The technology
    Sevoflurane is a fast-acting, highly effective inhalation anesthetic. However, pure
    sevoflurane has a serious problem, unknown at the time of its invention and original
    shipment: it degrades in the presence of Lewis acids.        Lewis acids are essentially
    defined as any species with an empty electron orbit leading to electron affinity and are
    common enough that avoiding exposure of sevoflurane to Lewis acids is quite difficult.
    Among the products of the degradation reaction is hydrofluoric acid, which is highly
    dangerous if inhaled. ’176 patent col.1 ll.52-57. The original containers in which Abbott
    shipped its product had Lewis acids exposed on their interiors. The hydrofluoric acid
    thus produced etched the containers’ glass surfaces, exposing even more Lewis acids,
    resulting in a vicious-cycle cascading reaction that seriously compromised Abbott’s
    product while on the shelf and forced a recall.
    After investigating the cause of the degradation, Abbott discovered the source of
    the problem. It also found a solution: water mixed in with sevoflurane will bind to and
    deactivate Lewis acids, protecting the sevoflurane from the degradation reaction.
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    A deliberate addition of water to sevoflurane ran counter to the conventional wisdom at
    the time: previously, Abbott had sought to minimize its product’s water content. Abbott
    filed a patent application on the degradation-preventing combination of water or other
    “Lewis acid inhibitors” with sevoflurane, which issued as the ’176 patent at issue here.
    B.     Prior proceedings
    Baxter sought to ship its own sevoflurane product. On January 26, 2001, it filed
    an amended Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with the Food and Drug
    Administration (“FDA”) covering its own sevoflurane product. Baxter filed with the FDA
    a certification of noninfringement and invalidity of the ’176 patent pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 355
    (j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (commonly known as a “paragraph IV certification”), which created
    the cause of action giving rise to this suit under 
    35 U.S.C. § 271
    (e)(2).
    There are multiple product and method claims at issue. Claim 1 of the ’176
    patent is representative:
    An anesthetic composition comprising: a quantity of sevoflurane; and a
    Lewis acid inhibitor in an amount effective to prevent degradation by a
    Lewis acid of said quantity of sevoflurane, said Lewis acid inhibitor
    selected from the group consisting of water, butylated hydroxytoluene,
    methylparaben, propylparaben, propofol, and thymol.
    ’176 patent col.11 ll.21-29. The other claims at issue speak to using water specifically,
    methods of combining sevoflurane and Lewis acid inhibitors to produce the above-
    mentioned composition, or both. 
    Id.
     at cols.11-12.
    This case came before us for the first time when we reviewed the district court’s
    construction of the phrase “amount effective to prevent degradation” to require at least
    131 parts per million (“ppm”) of water and its consequent summary judgment of
    noninfringement. Abbott, 
    334 F.3d at 1277
    . We disagreed with that construction, noting
    that “an effective amount of any given Lewis acid inhibitor will vary according to the
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    conditions to which sevoflurane is subjected,” making construction referencing particular
    ranges of water content inappropriate. 
    Id. at 1278
    . We vacated the district court’s
    summary judgment and remanded.            
    Id. at 1283
    .     On remand, the district court
    conducted a bench trial. It determined that the term “to prevent degradation” had been
    left unconstrued, Abbott, No. 01-CV-1867, slip op. at 7, and concluded that “sevoflurane
    is degraded if it contains degradants in amounts greater than 300 ppm.” Id. at 16. It
    found Abbott’s literal infringement evidence to be unpersuasive, id. at 27, and Abbott’s
    doctrine of equivalents argument to be barred by prosecution history estoppel, id. at 31.
    It addressed Baxter’s claim that the patent was unenforceable due to inequitable
    conduct, but declined to so hold. Id. at 48.
    Baxter made two distinct invalidity arguments. It first argued that since some lots
    of the pre-recall sevoflurane sold by Abbott had not degraded, there had been a prior
    sale which would bar the patent. The district court found insufficient evidence that those
    lots had actually been exposed to Lewis acids, making a finding that they had contained
    water “in an amount effective to prevent degradation” unsupportable. Id. at 44. Baxter’s
    second argument was that the ’211 patent disclosed a composition of water-saturated
    sevoflurane that met all the limitations of the asserted claims. Id. at 37-39. The district
    court noted some of our holdings finding anticipation even where, as here, there was no
    knowledge at the time of the relevant properties of the prior art. Id. at 40-41 (citing Atlas
    Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 
    190 F.3d 1342
    , 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999); SmithKline
    Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 
    403 F.3d 1331
    , 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Schering
    Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 
    339 F.3d 1373
    , 1378-80 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). However, it
    concluded that the ’211 patent did not anticipate. Id. at 43. That decision was based on
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    its reading of our decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., in
    which we noted that “[n]ewly discovered results of known processes directed to the
    same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.” Id. at 42 (quoting
    
    246 F.3d 1368
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added by district court)). It concluded
    that since the ’211 patent disclosed an “intermediate step” in the manufacture of
    sevoflurane, “the patent’s purpose was not to produce sevoflurane in its final useable
    form,” in distinction to the purpose of the ’176 patent, which “involves a final step in
    production.” Id. at 42. The district court reasoned that since the patents’ purposes were
    different, the Bristol-Myers Squibb distinction foreclosed a finding of anticipation. Id. at
    42-43.
    All of these rulings by the district court are before us via either Abbott’s appeal or
    Baxter’s cross-appeal.        Abbott challenges the claim construction, arguing that the
    intrinsic evidence of the ’176 patent permits more than 4,000 ppm of impurities before
    the sevoflurane may be considered “degraded.”            Abbott also challenges the district
    court’s findings on literal and doctrine of equivalents infringement. Baxter challenges
    enforceability and validity, the latter in light of both the ’211 patent and the alleged prior
    sale. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    II.    DISCUSSION
    A.       Standard of review
    Patent claims are presumed to be valid, 
    35 U.S.C. § 282
    , and the party seeking
    to show invalidity must prove facts supporting invalidity by clear and convincing
    evidence. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 
    7 F.3d 1371
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir.
    1993). Since this case comes to us from a trial without jury, we review the district
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    court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Panduit Corp. v.
    Dennison Mfg. Co., 
    810 F.2d 1561
    , 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
    B.     The ’211 patent
    The ’211 patent was applied for in 1995 and awarded to Kawai et al. in
    November 1997. Appellant Central Glass Co. is the assignee. The parties do not
    dispute that the ’211 patent predates the ’176 patent for the purposes of 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    , and the facts about what the ’211 patent teaches are in relevant part undisputed.
    It discloses a technique for purifying sevoflurane for “use[] as a pharmaceutical and
    particularly as an inhalation anesthetic,” ’211 patent abstract, which involves the
    addition of water. If the steps of its Illustration 1, Table 2 are practiced, the result will be
    sevoflurane that is saturated with water, unable to absorb any more moisture.
    Saturation implies that the sevoflurane contains an amount of water sufficient to prevent
    it from degrading due to Lewis acids.
    At the time, however, knowledge of the beneficial nature of a water-sevoflurane
    mix was wholly lacking in the art. The district court describes the matter succinctly:
    [P]rior to [the ’176 patent] invention no one had any idea that Lewis acids
    had the potential to degrade sevoflurane. Further, no one was aware of
    the stabilizing effect water would have to prevent Lewis acid degradation.
    In fact, water was considered an impurity and was removed from
    sevoflurane to the extent possible during the manufacturing process that
    included the teachings of the ’211 patent.
    Abbott, No. 01-CV-1867, slip op. at 39. Thus, the ’211 patent discloses a particular
    composition and claims a process for making that composition, but does not teach the
    advantageous feature of that composition whose discovery led to the patent in suit.
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    C.     Unknown properties and anticipation
    Our cases have consistently held that a reference may anticipate even when the
    relevant properties of the thing disclosed were not appreciated at the time. The classic
    case on this point is Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 
    778 F.2d 775
     (Fed. Cir. 1985). In
    Titanium Metals, the applicants sought patent protection on an alloy with previously
    unknown corrosion resistance and workability properties.        
    Id. at 776
    .   The prior art
    reference was an article by two Russian scientists that disclosed in a few data points on
    its graphs an alloy falling within the scope of the claims of the patent in suit. 
    Id.
     at 776-
    77. There was no sign that the Russian authors or anyone else had understood the
    later-discovered features of the alloy thus described. 
    Id. at 780-81
    . Despite the fact
    that “the applicants for patent had discovered or invented and disclosed knowledge
    which is not to be found in the reference,” we held that the Russian article anticipated
    the asserted patent claims. 
    Id. at 782
    . The Titanium Metals rule has been repeatedly
    confirmed and applied by this court. See, e.g., In re Crish, 
    393 F.3d 1253
    , 1258-59
    (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing cases; holding asserted claims covering a gene’s nucleotide
    sequence anticipated where the gene, though not its particular sequence, was already
    known to the art); In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 
    301 F.3d 1343
    , 1349-50 (Fed. Cir.
    2002) (inventor’s recognition of substances that render broccoli and cauliflower
    particularly healthy does not permit patent on identifying broccoli seeds or preparing
    broccoli as a food product); Atlas Powder, 
    190 F.3d at 1347-1350
     (holding asserted
    claims covering air mixed into an explosive composition anticipated by prior art that
    necessarily also contained air as claimed, even though benefits of the air were not
    recognized). Indeed, the rule did not originate with Titanium Metals. See Ansonia
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    Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co., 
    144 U.S. 11
    , 18 (1892) (“[T]he application of
    an old process or machine to a similar or analogous subject, with no change in the
    manner of application and no result substantially distinct in its nature, will not sustain a
    patent even if the new form of result had not before been contemplated.”); In re
    Pearson, 
    494 F.2d 1399
    , 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (inventor’s recognition that prior-art
    compound inhibited defects in peanut plants did not suffice to grant patent protection on
    that compound); In re Benner, 
    174 F.2d 938
    , 942 (C.C.P.A. 1949) (“[N]o provision has
    been made in the patent statutes for granting a patent upon an old product based solely
    upon discovery of a new use for such product.”).
    The general principle that a newly-discovered property of the prior art cannot
    support a patent on that same art is not avoided if the patentee explicitly claims that
    property.   “[A] prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of the
    claimed invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the
    single anticipating reference.” Schering, 
    339 F.3d at
    1377 (citing Continental Can Co. v.
    Monsanto Co., 
    948 F.2d 1264
    , 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). “[I]nherent anticipation does not
    require that a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time would have recognized the
    inherent disclosure.” 
    Id.
     (citing Cruciferous Sprout, 
    301 F.3d at 1351
    ).
    Abbott’s objection here is merely that at the time of the ’211 patent, nobody knew
    that the water-saturated sevoflurane that patent disclosed had the property of resisting
    the Lewis acid degradation reaction. Just as in Titanium Metals, that lack of knowledge
    is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether the ’176 patent claims something “new”
    over the disclosure of the ’211 patent; the claimed property of resistance to degradation
    is found inherently in the disclosure.     Since the ’211 patent discloses sevoflurane
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    saturated with water – i.e., unable to absorb any additional water to further protect it
    from the degradation reaction – it anticipates the claims of the ’176 patent. This is true
    under any definition of the term “prevent degradation” that the claims might reasonably
    bear, so we need not construe that phrase with numerical exactitude in order to reach
    our decision.
    The district court nonetheless found the patent valid due to the purpose-based
    distinction we drew in Bristol-Myers Squibb. Abbott, No. 01-CV-1867, slip op. at 42-43
    (citing 
    246 F.3d at 1376
    ).     As a threshold matter, we note that that distinction is
    applicable only to process claims. Bristol-Myers Squibb states that “new uses of known
    processes may be patentable,” citing in support the definition of “process” found at 
    35 U.S.C. § 100
    (b). 
    246 F.3d at 1376
    . The case does not speak to composition claims;
    the district court therefore committed legal error by applying it to sustain the validity of
    those claims of the ’176 patent that cover a mixture of sevoflurane and water. As to the
    ’176 patent’s process claims, we agree that Bristol-Myers Squibb needs to be
    considered, but we disagree with the concept that the processes described in the ’176
    patent are not “directed to the same purpose,” 
    id.,
     under the meaning of Bristol-Myers
    Squibb. Both the ’211 and the ’176 patents disclose methods which help to ensure that
    sevoflurane will be of high purity at the time it is administered to patients. The ’211
    patent discloses a method of achieving that end by adding water and then distilling the
    solution, which results in removing impurities from the sevoflurane, while the ’176 patent
    accomplishes the same objective by merely adding water, which results in safeguarding
    the sevoflurane against impurities generated by the presence of Lewis acids. All of the
    steps of the ’176 patent are thus disclosed in the ’211 patent in furtherance of the same
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    purpose: the delivery of safe, effective sevoflurane anesthetic. All that is contributed by
    the method claims of the ’176 patent is the recognition of a new property of the prior art
    process. We hold today, as we did in Bristol-Myers Squibb, that “the claimed process
    here is not directed to a new use; it is the same use.” Id.; see also Catalina Mktg. Int’l,
    Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 
    289 F.3d 801
    , 809-10 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that an
    inventor may not obtain a patent on a process having the same steps as a prior art
    process, in which the new process merely identifies a new, advantageous property of
    the prior art process).
    We also do not find it material that the district court found the anticipating
    method in the ’211 patent to be “an intermediate step” in the manufacture of
    sevoflurane. Abbott, No. 01-CV-1867, slip op. at 42. The product of that method was
    an anesthetic sevoflurane composition with sufficient water to prevent Lewis acid
    degradation—exactly what is claimed by the ’176 patent. Commercial finality is not
    claimed.
    III.    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons given above, we reverse the district court’s judgment that the
    asserted claims of the ’176 patent are valid. Since all asserted claims are invalid, we do
    not reach questions of infringement or inequitable conduct.
    REVERSED.
    No costs.
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