Wagoner v. Office of Personnel Management , 524 F. App'x 630 ( 2013 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    WILLIAM O. WAGONER,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2013-3006
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. CH0831110115-B-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 8, 2013
    ______________________
    WILLIAM O. WAGONER, of Pittsboro, Indiana, pro se.
    CAMERON COHICK, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litiga-
    tion Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on
    the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Principal Deputy Assis-
    tant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director and
    DEBORAH A. BYNUM, Assistant Director.
    ______________________
    2                                 WILLIAM WAGONER   v. OPM
    Before DYK, MAYER, and O'MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    William O. Wagoner appeals the final decision of the
    Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), which affirmed
    the Office of Personnel Management’s (“OPM”) finding
    that Mr. Wagoner was not eligible for retirement benefits
    under the Civil Service Retirement System (“CSRS”), and
    ordered him to repay the annuities he improperly re-
    ceived. Mr. Wagoner argues on appeal that he was denied
    due process because the Board refused to allow him to
    present evidence or obtain discovery regarding his remov-
    al from the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). Be-
    cause we agree with OPM that the grounds for Mr.
    Wagoner’s removal from the USPS are not within the
    scope of this case, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Wagoner worked as a Mail Processing Clerk, Lev-
    el 6, for the USPS in Indianapolis, Indiana. In 2007,
    Wagoner had been involved in several incidents with law
    enforcement personnel leading up to his arrest, including
    an incident in which police arrested Mr. Wagoner for
    public intoxication and discovered drug paraphernalia on
    his person. As a result, the USPS informed Mr. Wagoner
    on June 25, 2008 that it was removing him for cause from
    his position, effective July 3, 2008. Mr. Wagoner ap-
    pealed his removal to the Board.
    While Mr. Wagoner’s appeal was pending, the USPS
    first moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely, then moved
    to dismiss the appeal without prejudice because the
    criminal charges arising from the same conduct for which
    he was removed were unresolved. The administrative
    judge granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice,
    and directed Mr. Wagoner to re-file his appeal within 30
    days of the resolution of the criminal charges, or by July
    1, 2009, even if the criminal matter was not yet resolved.
    WILLIAM WAGONER   v. OPM                                 3
    Mr. Wagoner entered a plea of guilty on March 23, 2009,
    and the criminal proceedings ended. Accordingly, Mr.
    Wagoner had until April 22, 2009 to re-file his appeal. He
    did not. Mr. Wagoner did, however, re-file his appeal
    almost two months later, on June 13, 2009.
    Mr. Wagoner explained that he was tardy in re-filing
    his claim because his spouse was severely ill and her
    treatment was both costly and time-consuming. The
    administrative judge rejected Mr. Wagoner’s explanation
    for his late-filed appeal, finding that general references to
    his spouse’s medical difficulties were not sufficient to
    justify the delay. The administrative judge found that
    Mr. Wagoner did not explain how his spouse’s condition or
    his responsibilities as her care-giver caused the delay in
    the re-filing of his appeal. The administrative judge also
    noted that the record reflected that Mr. Wagoner appar-
    ently waited to re-file his appeal until after he lost a
    grievance objecting to his removal. The administrative
    judge explained that waiting for completion of the griev-
    ance before re-filing his appeal with the Board does not
    excuse his untimely filing. Mr. Wagoner did not appeal
    the dismissal of his claim, and his removal from the USPS
    was effective as of May 21, 2009.
    Meanwhile, on April 9, 2009, the USPS sent Mr. Wag-
    oner a Voluntary Early Retirement (“VER”) offer package.
    The USPS informed Mr. Wagoner that, if he chose to take
    early retirement, his decision would become irrevocable
    on June 19, 2009. Mr. Wagoner signed and returned the
    acknowledgement form indicating that he accepted VER,
    it was approved, and Mr. Wagoner began to receive re-
    tirement annuity benefits shortly thereafter.
    Over a year later, in July 2010, OPM informed Mr.
    Wagoner that he was actually ineligible for retirement
    benefits. While Mr. Wagoner met the service requirement
    with 36 years of federal service, he was only 54 years old
    on the date of his separation from the USPS, rather than
    4                                WILLIAM WAGONER   v. OPM
    55, as required for immediate CSRS retirement under 5
    U.S.C. § 8336(a). And, though he met the age and service
    requirements for Discontinued Service Retirement
    (“DSR”) under 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d)(1), because he was
    removed from his position for misconduct, he did not
    qualify for that either. As such, OPM advised Mr. Wag-
    oner that, over the past year, he had received $24,747 in
    annuity payments he was not entitled to keep. After a
    reduction of $65.70 for paid federal income taxes, OPM
    demanded that Mr. Wagoner repay the remaining
    $24,681.30 in annuities.
    Mr. Wagoner asked OPM to reconsider its initial deci-
    sion. OPM explained that, because Mr. Wagoner was
    removed from the USPS for misconduct, he was not
    eligible for early retirement. And, because OPM did not
    terminate his annuity until May 2010 1, he had received
    an annuity overpayment he was now required to repay.
    OPM recognized that Mr. Wagoner was not at fault for
    the overpayments, but found that, because he failed to
    demonstrate that recovery of the overpayment would not
    be against equity and good conscience, Mr. Wagoner was
    required to repay the full amount.
    Mr. Wagoner appealed OPM’s decision to the Board,
    and an administrative judge affirmed on October 3, 2011.
    Mr. Wagoner argued that, because OPM (and the USPS)
    approved his request for retirement, that OPM was
    estopped from revoking the benefits he had already
    received. The administrative judge rejected Mr. Wagon-
    er’s argument. Mr. Wagoner did not challenge OPM’s
    calculation of overpayment, or contend he was entitled to
    1   The OPM decision states that Mr. Wagoner’s an-
    nuity was terminated on May 2009, but this appears to be
    a typo. Other documents reflect the correct date as May
    2010.
    WILLIAM WAGONER   v. OPM                               5
    waive the repayment obligation.        Mr. Wagoner then
    requested consideration by the full Board.
    On July 10, 2010, the Board affirmed the administra-
    tive judge’s decision. The Board first affirmed the admin-
    istrative judge’s decision that Mr. Wagoner was not
    entitled to retirement benefits because he was removed
    from his position for misconduct. The Board also rejected
    Mr. Wagoner’s argument that his annuity was irrevoca-
    ble. The Board recognized that, while Mr. Wagoner’s own
    election was irrevocable, OPM is not similarly bound, and
    is only obligated to provide annuities to persons who meet
    the statutory requirements for them. The Board last
    affirmed the administrative judge’s decision to exclude
    evidence related to the grounds for Mr. Wagoner’s remov-
    al. The Board found that, because the reasons for Mr.
    Wagoner’s removal were not within the scope of his cur-
    rent appeal, any witnesses and discovery requests related
    to the removal properly were denied by the administrative
    judge.
    Mr. Wagoner now appeals the Board’s final decision
    affirming OPM’s decisions that he was not eligible for
    retirement benefits and was required to repay $24,681.30
    in annuity benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1295(a)(9).
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The scope of our review in an appeal from a decision
    of the Board is limited. In general, we can set aside the
    Board’s decision only if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious,
    an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
    with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by
    law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) un-
    supported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c);
    see Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    331 F.3d 1307
    , 1311
    (Fed. Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
    to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
    6                                 WILLIAM WAGONER   v. OPM
    
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938). Mr. Wagoner has the burden of
    proving that he is entitled to retirement benefits. Carreon
    v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    321 F.3d 1128
    , 1130 (Fed. Cir.
    2003).
    We begin with Mr. Wagoner’s main contention: that
    the Board erred and deprived him of due process rights by
    not allowing him to present evidence and serve discovery
    requests regarding his dismissal from the USPS. Despite
    Mr. Wagoner’s protestations, the grounds for his removal
    are not within the scope of this case. Mr. Wagoner twice
    appealed the USPS’s decision to remove him from his
    position, first in 2008, and again in 2009. The Board
    dismissed his first appeal in 2008 without prejudice to re-
    filing when his related criminal proceedings were com-
    pleted. The Board dismissed his second, re-filed appeal,
    as untimely. Mr. Wagoner did not appeal the Board’s
    dismissals of his claim of wrongful removal. The current
    case relates only to OPM’s decisions regarding Mr. Wag-
    oner’s eligibility for retirement benefits. Because Mr.
    Wagoner did not further appeal the Board’s dismissal of
    his removal in the earlier filed case, the Board was enti-
    tled to rely on Mr. Wagoner’s removal for misconduct as
    an established fact in the current case. As such, the
    Board properly did not consider evidence relating to the
    propriety of Mr. Wagoner’s removal because it was beyond
    the scope of this case.
    We now briefly turn to the substantive merits of Mr.
    Wagoner’s current appeal. Section 8336 of Title 5 pro-
    vides the conditions under which a civil servant may be
    entitled to an annuity in the CSRS. Two provisions are
    important to Mr. Wagoner’s appeal: (1) 5 U.S.C. § 8336(a),
    which provides that an employee is entitled to an imme-
    diate retirement under CSRS so long as he or she is at
    least 55 years of age and has completed 30 years of cred-
    itable federal service; and (2) 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d), which
    provides that an employee is entitled to an annuity if the
    employee is separated from service involuntarily, but not
    WILLIAM WAGONER   v. OPM                              7
    removed for cause for misconduct, and is at least 50 years
    of age and has completed 25 years of creditable federal
    service. OPM established that Mr. Wagoner was not
    eligible for CSRS retirement benefits under either provi-
    sion. Because he was under 55 years of age at the time of
    his separation he was not eligible under § 8336(a). Mr.
    Wagoner was also removed for cause on charges of mis-
    conduct and was, thus, not eligible under § 8336(d). As
    such, OPM and the Board properly determined that Mr.
    Wagoner was not eligible for CSRS retirement benefits.
    Mr. Wagoner does not claim that the Board applied the
    wrong law or that the Board misstated his age or the
    grounds for his removal. Instead, Mr. Wagoner contends
    that his retirement benefits could not be revoked because
    the USPS and OPM had approved his request for VER.
    We find, however, that the Board correctly rejected that
    assertion. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 
    496 U.S. 414
    , 422 (1990) (“no money can be paid out of the
    Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of
    Congress.”) (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States,
    
    301 U.S. 308
    , 321 (1937)).
    OPM also established with substantial evidence that
    Mr. Wagoner had received an overpayment of retirement
    annuities in the amount of $24,681.30 because he was not
    eligible for benefits under the CSRS. Mr. Wagoner did
    not, and has not, challenged OPM’s calculation of the
    overpayment, nor has he argued that the collection of the
    overpaid benefits would be against equity and good con-
    science under 5 U.S.C. § 8346(b).     Mr. Wagoner’s only
    assertion is that he was denied due process because he
    was denied the ability to present evidence and conduct
    discovery regarding the propriety of his removal from the
    USPS. As previously stated, however, the propriety of
    Mr. Wagoner’s removal from the USPS is not within the
    scope of this case, and any evidence presented relating to
    his removal would be irrelevant.
    8                               WILLIAM WAGONER   v. OPM
    CONCLUSION
    Because we hold that the Board did not violate Mr.
    Wagoner’s due process rights by refusing to allow evi-
    dence beyond the scope of the case, we affirm the final
    order of the Board.
    AFFIRMED