Douglas Marshall Jackson v. Mark Inch ( 2022 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 21-14351       Date Filed: 05/23/2022   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-14351
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    DOUGLAS MARSHALL JACKSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    MARK INCH,
    Individual and Official Capacity as Secretary,
    J. BALDRIDGE,
    Individual and Official Capacity as Warden,
    R SCHMITT,
    Individual and Official Capacity as Assistant Warden,
    JOHNNY FRAMBO,
    Individual and Official Capacity as D/B/A Chaplaincy
    Services Administrator for Fl Department of Corrections,
    USCA11 Case: 21-14351           Date Filed: 05/23/2022       Page: 2 of 6
    2                        Opinion of the Court                    21-14351
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00255-TPB-PRL
    ____________________
    Before GRANT, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Douglas Jackson, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from
    the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his amended complaint
    against former Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections
    (“FDOC”) March Inch, prison officials J. Baldridge, R. Schmitt, and
    Johnny Frambo, and the FDOC, as frivolous, malicious, and insuf-
    ficient to state a claim. His complaint raised violations of the Reli-
    gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42
    U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 and 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , and purported to raise
    claims under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 242
     and 247. 1
    Jackson makes four arguments on appeal: (1) the District
    Court erred by dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim;
    (2) the District Court erred by failing to enforce the Establishment
    1 On appeal, Jackson has abandoned all his claims besides those raised under
    RLUIPA.
    USCA11 Case: 21-14351             Date Filed: 05/23/2022         Page: 3 of 6
    21-14351                   Opinion of the Court                               3
    Clause and sovereignty of his religious group; (3) the District Court
    abused its discretion by denying his petition for a writ of manda-
    mus; and (4) the District Court abused its discretion by denying his
    motion for a preliminary injunction. 2 We consider each argu-
    ment in turn.
    I.
    Courts must review, before docketing or as soon as practi-
    cable after docketing, any civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks
    redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28
    U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or
    dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
    claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. (b)(1). We review de
    novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a
    claim pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) and apply the same standard used
    for dismissals pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Leal v. Ga. Dep’t
    of Corr., 
    254 F.3d 1276
    , 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2001).
    An appellant abandons any argument not briefed before us,
    made in passing, or raised briefly without supporting arguments or
    authority. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1330
    (11th Cir. 2004); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 
    739 F.3d 678
    ,
    2 We note that Jackson moves to substitute the current FDOC Secretary,
    Ricky Dixon for Inch in his official capacity. We conclude that an order sub-
    stituting Dixon is unnecessary here because Dixon was automatically substi-
    tuted for Inch in his official capacity when Inch resigned as secretary. Fed. R.
    App. P. 43(c)(2). We deny the motion without further discussion.
    USCA11 Case: 21-14351        Date Filed: 05/23/2022     Page: 4 of 6
    4                      Opinion of the Court                21-14351
    681 (11th Cir. 2014). To obtain reversal of a district court judgment
    that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must
    argue that each ground is incorrect: if he fails to challenge any
    ground on appeal, the judgment is due to be affirmed. See
    Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
    Here, Jackson does not argue on appeal that the court
    abused its discretion by finding that his complaint was frivolous or
    malicious and has thus abandoned any argument on those issues.
    See Access Now, Inc., 
    385 F.3d at 1330
    . Because he does not chal-
    lenge on appeal two of the court’s independent grounds for the dis-
    missal of his complaint, we affirm that dismissal. See Sapuppo, 739
    F.3d at 680. Furthermore, his assertions that the defendants bur-
    dened his religious exercise and that he was denied group worship
    services were conclusory. See Oxford Asset Mgmt. v. Jaharis, 
    297 F.3d 1182
    , 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
    II.
    Jackson has abandoned his arguments that the court failed
    to enforce the Establishment Clause or the sovereignty of his reli-
    gious group by failing to provide supporting arguments. See
    Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.
    III.
    We review the denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus
    for an abuse of discretion. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist.,
    
    426 U.S. 394
    , 403 (1976). A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy
    that is solely invoked in extraordinary situations. 
    Id. at 402
    . The
    USCA11 Case: 21-14351        Date Filed: 05/23/2022     Page: 5 of 6
    21-14351               Opinion of the Court                        5
    writ should issue solely where the party seeking it has no other
    means of obtaining the relief he desires and shows that his right to
    issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. 
    Id. at 403
    .
    Here, Jackson has abandoned any argument that the court
    erred by denying his petition for a writ of mandamus by failing to
    raise supporting arguments and authorities. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d
    at 681. Furthermore, he failed to indisputably establish that he
    lacked any other means of obtaining relief or that he was entitled to
    issuance of the writ. See Kerr, 
    426 U.S. at 403
    .
    IV.
    We review the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunc-
    tion for an abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v. Georgia Power
    Co., 
    180 F.3d 1309
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). To receive a preliminary
    injunction, a movant must demonstrate that he (1) is likely to suc-
    ceed on the merits, (2) will be irreparably injured if the injunction
    is denied, (3) is threatened by an injury greater than the injury the
    opposing party may suffer from an injunction, and (4) is requesting
    an injunction that would not be against the public interest. Siegel
    v. LePore, 
    234 F.3d 1163
    , 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A movant
    must clearly meet his burden of persuasion on each element. 
    Id.
    Finally, a finding that a complaint fails to state a claim moots any
    issues regarding a preliminary injunction. Gissendaner v. Comm’r,
    Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 
    794 F.3d 1327
    , 1330 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015).
    USCA11 Case: 21-14351       Date Filed: 05/23/2022    Page: 6 of 6
    6                     Opinion of the Court                21-14351
    Here, Jackson has abandoned any argument that the district
    court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a preliminary
    injunction because he has failed to provide supporting arguments
    and authorities. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Furthermore, his
    motion was moot once the court dismissed his complaint. Gissen-
    daner, 794 F.3d at 1330 n.3.
    AFFIRMED.