Wiggins v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 490 F. App'x 336 ( 2012 )


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  •         NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    WAYNE F. WIGGINS,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    2011-3114
    __________________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in case no. CH0752100618-I-1.
    __________________________
    Decided: July 13, 2012
    __________________________
    R. MARK NASTEFF, JR. Mitchell, Kristl, & Lieber, P.C.,
    of Kansas City, Missouri, for petitioner.
    MICHAEL A. CARNEY, Attorney, Office of the General
    Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, of Washington,
    DC, for respondent. With him on the brief were JAMES M.
    EISENMANN, General Counsel, and KEISHA DAWN BELL,
    Deputy General Counsel.
    __________________________
    WIGGINS v. MSPB                                          2
    Before BRYSON, PROST, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    The Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) dis-
    missed Petitioner Wayne Wiggins’ appeal of his construc-
    tive removal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    Because Wiggins failed to make non-frivolous allegations
    in support of his contention that his resignation was not
    voluntary, we affirm.
    I.
    From February 24, 1992, until July 18, 2008, Wiggins
    was an employee of the Internal Revenue Service (“the
    agency”). Effective April 12, 2004, he was removed for
    improperly using the agency’s Integrated Data Retrieval
    System. He appealed this termination and eventually
    settled, agreeing to accept a sixty-day unpaid suspension
    in lieu of termination.
    Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Wiggins was
    reassigned to, and trained for, a new position. In March
    2006, due to what he perceived as retaliation, Wiggins
    filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) com-
    plaint. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    (“EEOC”) conducted a hearing at which Wiggins claimed
    that Carolyn Tanis, his former supervisor, had taken
    actions against him that he believed to be retaliatory and
    discriminatory.
    Following this hearing, Ms. Tanis contacted the
    Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
    (“TIGTA”) and reported that Wiggins may have made an
    unauthorized access or disclosure of taxpayer information
    (a “UNAX” violation) at the EEOC hearing. Five days
    after the hearing, the EEOC administrative judge in-
    formed Wiggins that the TIGTA planned to investigate
    the possible UNAX violation. Wiggins retired from his
    position three days later.
    3                                          WIGGINS V. MSPB
    About one month after retiring, Wiggins contacted the
    agency’s EEO office, asserting that his retirement was not
    voluntary but was instead the result of agency discrimi-
    nation, intolerable working conditions, and coercion. The
    agency issued a final agency decision finding that Wiggins
    had not established a claim for constructive removal
    because he had not been subjected to discrimination or
    intolerable working conditions.
    Wiggins appealed the agency’s final decision to the
    MSPB. He continued to argue that he was constructively
    removed and that he had retired under threat and duress.
    An administrative judge (“AJ”) issued an Acknowledge-
    ment Order requiring Wiggins to “file evidence and argu-
    ment that this action is within the [MSPB]’s jurisdiction.”
    Resp’t App. 9. 1 In response, Wiggins asserted that after
    his termination in 2004, he had filed two other retaliation
    actions, at least one of which involved Ms. Tanis. He
    asserted that there was no evidence that he had commit-
    ted a UNAX violation and that the TIGTA investigation
    had been commenced due to an inaccurate report. He
    then argued that the “commencement of an investigation
    into a UNAX violation coupled with . . . having an investi-
    gator knock on the door of his private residence [caused
    him to feel] as if he had no other choice but to resign in
    lieu of what appeared to be his certain termination.”
    Resp’t App. 18.
    The AJ dismissed Wiggins’ appeal for lack of jurisdic-
    tion, noting that anticipation of adverse action does not
    constitute coercion or duress and that the choice between
    disciplinary action and resignation does not overcome the
    presumption that resignation is voluntary. A planned
    1  Citations to “App. ” herein refer to pages in the
    Appendix to Petitioner’s Brief, and citations to “Resp’t
    App. ” refer to pages in the Appendix to Respondent’s
    Brief.
    WIGGINS v. MSPB                                          4
    disciplinary action only renders a resignation involuntary
    when an employee can show that the agency knew or
    believed that discipline could not be sustained or that no
    arguable basis for discipline existed. The AJ concluded
    that Wiggins made no such showing. Furthermore,
    although coercion could also be shown by alleging that the
    agency effectively imposed the terms of his resignation,
    that there was no realistic alternative to resignation, and
    that the resignation was the result of improper actions by
    the agency, Wiggins had alleged none of these factors.
    The AJ did not grant a hearing because Wiggins had
    “failed to make a non-frivolous allegation that the Board
    ha[d] jurisdiction over his appeal.” App. 20. Wiggins
    sought review of the decision by the full MSPB, but the
    MSPB denied his request, making the initial decision
    final.
    This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
    to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    II.
    The scope of our review is limited to whether the
    MSPB’s decision was (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
    obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or
    regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
    substantial evidence. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c). Whether the
    MSPB has jurisdiction is a question of law that this court
    reviews de novo. Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    47 F.3d 409
    , 410 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “When an individual appeals to
    the [MSPB], he or she has the burden of proving, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that the board has juris-
    diction.” 
    Id.
     To obtain an evidentiary hearing, Wiggins
    was required to make non-frivolous allegations that, if
    proven, would establish that the MSPB had jurisdiction.
    See Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    437 F.3d 1322
    , 1344
    (Fed. Cir. 2006).
    5                                           WIGGINS V. MSPB
    The MSPB has jurisdiction over certain agency ac-
    tions, including termination. See 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 7513
    (d),
    7512. A resignation is presumed voluntary. Terban v.
    Dep’t of Energy, 
    216 F.3d 1021
    , 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2000). To
    overcome that presumption, Wiggins was required to
    show either (1) that the resignation or retirement was the
    product of misinformation or deception by the agency or
    (2) that the retirement was coerced. 
    Id.
     To show that his
    resignation was coerced, Wiggins needed to establish that
    “(1) the agency effectively imposed the terms of [his]
    resignation or retirement; (2) [he] had no realistic alter-
    native but to resign or retire, and (3) [his] resignation or
    retirement was the result of improper acts by the agency.”
    Garcia, 
    437 F.3d at 1329
     (quoting Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agric.,
    
    260 F.3d 1336
    , 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The test is objec-
    tive, and required Wiggins to demonstrate that “a reason-
    able employee confronted with the same circumstances
    would feel coerced into resigning.” 
    Id.
    Wiggins recognizes that voluntary resignation is gen-
    erally not reviewable by the MSPB. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 7512
    .
    He recites the three-part test for duress or coercion but
    does not explain how it is satisfied in this case. Instead,
    he argues for the first time that “[a]lthough this Court
    has upheld MSPB decision[s] ruling resignations were
    voluntary where they were submitted to avoid threatened
    termination for cause, the threatened termination must
    be for good cause.” Pet’r’s Br. at 11. Wiggins suggests
    that the threatened termination was not for good cause
    because he did not actually commit a UNAX violation.
    These arguments fail. First, Wiggins was not threat-
    ened with termination, but rather with an investigation
    that he claims would have exonerated him. This is not
    consistent with his claim that his termination was inevi-
    table and that he had no choice but to resign. See
    Holman v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
    9 M.S.P.R. 218
    , 220
    (1981) (concluding that fear of a possible future adverse
    WIGGINS v. MSPB                                           6
    action is not adequate to rebut a presumption of volun-
    tariness). Second, he has at no point in this proceeding
    even alleged, let alone offered factual support for, the
    factors necessary to show coercion. Nor has he alleged
    facts that would support a finding that a reasonable
    employee in the same circumstances would feel coerced
    into resigning.
    Wiggins alleges only that he chose to retire rather
    than endure an investigation that he believes would have
    exonerated him. However, the choice between two unat-
    tractive options does not render the decision to retire
    involuntary. Staats v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    99 F.3d 1120
    ,
    1124 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 
    810 F.2d 1133
    , 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“An unpleasant choice be-
    tween disciplinary action and retirement does not rebut
    the presumption of voluntariness of [a] choice to retire.”);
    Christie v. United States, 
    518 F.2d 584
    , 587 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
    (“Merely because the plaintiff was faced with an inher-
    ently unpleasant situation in that [the] choice was argua-
    bly limited to two unpleasant alternatives does not
    obviate the voluntariness of [the] resignation.”). Even if
    true, these allegations are not sufficient to overcome the
    presumption that Wiggins’ retirement was voluntary.
    Therefore, the judgment of the MSPB is hereby
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.