The Medicines Company v. Hospira, Inc. , 791 F.3d 1368 ( 2015 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    THE MEDICINES COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    HOSPIRA, INC.,
    Defendant-Cross-Appellant
    ______________________
    2014-1469, 2014-1504
    ______________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in No. 1:09-CV-00750, Judge Richard
    G. Andrews.
    ______________________
    Decided: July 2, 2015
    ______________________
    EDGAR HAUG, Frommer Lawrence & Haug LLP, New
    York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represent-
    ed by PORTER F. FLEMING, ANGUS CHEN.
    BRADFORD PETER LYERLA, Jenner & Block LLP, Chi-
    cago, IL, argued for defendant-cross-appellant.  Also
    represented by SARA TONNIES HORTON, AARON A. BARLOW.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
    2                   THE MEDICINES COMPANY   v. HOSPIRA, INC.
    HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
    The Medicines Company appeals the U.S. District
    Court for the District of Delaware’s claim construction
    and non-infringement findings.        Hospira, Inc. cross-
    appeals the district court’s determination that the assert-
    ed claims are not invalid under the on-sale bar, obvious-
    ness, or indefiniteness. We conclude that the district
    court clearly erred in finding that the bivalirudin batches
    prepared by Ben Venue Laboratories before the critical
    date were not sold to The Medicines Company and were
    prepared primarily for an experimental purpose. Accord-
    ingly, we reverse the district court’s validity determina-
    tion and hold the asserted claims invalid under the on-
    sale bar.
    I
    The Medicines Company owns 
    U.S. Patent No. 7,582,727
     and 
    U.S. Patent No. 7,598,343
    . The patents
    relate to the drug bivalirudin, a synthetic peptide used as
    an anti-coagulant. Bivalirudin is generally mixed with
    saline or water and administered intravenously. Because
    bivalirudin’s acidity in saline or water makes it undesira-
    ble for injection, its pH is adjusted during compounding to
    make it more alkaline.
    The Medicines Company sells a bivalirudin drug for
    injection under the Angiomax® brand. From 1997 to
    October 2006, The Medicines Company purchased phar-
    maceutical batches of Angiomax® from Ben Venue Labor-
    atories.   In 2005, Ben Venue created a batch of
    bivalirudin with levels of Asp9-bivalirudin impurity that
    exceeded the Food and Drug Administration’s approved
    maximum of 1.5%. Accordingly, The Medicines Company
    could not use the batch.
    After another batch failure, The Medicines Company
    hired a consultant, Dr. Musso, to investigate and resolve
    the issue. Dr. Musso discovered that certain methods of
    THE MEDICINES COMPANY   v. HOSPIRA, INC.                  3
    adding a pH-adjusting solution during the compounding
    process minimize the Asp9-bivalirudin impurity to less
    than 0.6%. In July 2008, The Medicines Company filed
    applications for the ’343 and ’727 patents, which include
    product-by-process claims describing this discovery.
    Over one year before filing these applications, howev-
    er, The Medicines Company hired Ben Venue to prepare
    three batches of bivalirudin using an embodiment of the
    patented method. Each invoice for these services identi-
    fies a “charge to manufacture Bivalirudin lot.” See
    JA17177–79. Each invoice also states that the bivalirudin
    lot was or will be released to The Medicines Company.
    JA17177 (“Release pending final validation report.”);
    JA17178 (same); JA17179 (“Batch released and held at
    Ben Venue pending shipping instructions.”). Each lot was
    marked with a commercial product code and a customer
    lot number, and was released to The Medicines Company
    for commercial and clinical packaging.
    On August 19, 2010, The Medicines Company sued
    Hospira, Inc., alleging that two of Hospira’s ANDA filings
    infringe claims 1–3, 7–10, and 17 of the ’727 patent and
    claims 1–3 and 7–11 of the ’343 patent. The district court
    construed the asserted claims and, after a bench trial,
    found the patents not infringed and not invalid as obvi-
    ous, indefinite, or under the on-sale bar. The Medicines
    Company appeals the district court’s claim construction
    and finding of non-infringement. Hospira appeals the
    district court’s holdings on obviousness, indefiniteness,
    and the on-sale bar. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    II
    On appeal from a bench trial, we review a district
    court’s legal determinations de novo and factual findings
    for clear error. Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Novel Labs., Inc.,
    
    749 F.3d 1349
    , 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Invalidity under the
    on-sale bar is a question of law with underlying questions
    4                    THE MEDICINES COMPANY   v. HOSPIRA, INC.
    of fact. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 
    249 F.3d 1307
    , 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
    The on-sale bar under 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    (b) applies
    when, before the critical date, the claimed invention
    (1) was the subject of a commercial offer for sale; and
    (2) was ready for patenting. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 
    525 U.S. 55
    , 67–68 (1998).
    The district court found that the claimed invention
    was ready for patenting but not commercially offered for
    sale before the critical date. Hospira disputes the district
    court’s finding that the claimed invention was not com-
    mercially offered for sale, and The Medicines Company
    disputes the district court’s finding that the claimed
    invention was ready for patenting.
    A
    The district court concluded that no commercial sale
    occurred because: (1) Ben Venue only sold manufacturing
    services, not pharmaceutical batches; and (2) the batches
    fall under the experimental use exception.
    While the district court is correct that Ben Venue in-
    voiced the sale as manufacturing services and title to the
    pharmaceutical batches did not change hands, that does
    not end the inquiry. As we have explained, “the intent of
    [invalidating claims under the on-sale bar] is to preclude
    attempts by the inventor or his assignee to profit from
    commercial use of an invention for more than a year
    before an application for patent is filed.” D.L. Auld Co. v.
    Chroma Graphics Corp., 
    714 F.2d 1144
    , 1147 (Fed. Cir.
    1983). To ensure the doctrine is not easily circumvented,
    we have found the on-sale bar to apply where the evidence
    clearly demonstrated that the inventor commercially
    exploited the invention before the critical date, even if the
    inventor did not transfer title to the commercial embodi-
    ment of the invention. For example, in D.L. Auld Co., we
    found the on-sale bar to apply where, before the critical
    THE MEDICINES COMPANY   v. HOSPIRA, INC.                   5
    date, an inventor sold products made by the patented
    method. Id.; see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
    Inc., 
    721 F.2d 1540
    , 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); cf. Kinzenbaw
    v. Deere & Co., 
    741 F.2d 383
    , 390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
    (finding a third party’s testing of the “warrantability,
    durability, and acceptability” of a commercial embodiment
    of a patented product before the critical date was an
    invalidating public use under § 102(b) because it “served
    Deere’s commercial purposes”).
    We find no principled distinction between the com-
    mercial sale of products prepared by the patented method
    at issue in D.L. Auld Co. and the commercial sale of
    services that result in the patented product-by-process
    here. The Medicines Company paid Ben Venue for per-
    forming services that resulted in the patented product-by-
    process, and thus a “sale” of services occurred. See Spe-
    cial Devices, Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 
    270 F.3d 1353
    , 1355 (Fed.
    Cir. 2001) (“A ‘sale’ under th[e on-sale bar] occurs when
    the parties offer or agree to reach ‘a contract . . . to give
    and pass rights of property for consideration which the
    buyer pays or promises to pay the seller for the thing
    bought or sold.’” (quoting Zacharin v. United States, 
    213 F.3d 1366
    , 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). As in D.L. Auld Co.,
    the sale of the manufacturing services here provided a
    commercial benefit to the inventor more than one year
    before a patent application was filed. Ben Venue’s ser-
    vices were performed to prove to the FDA that The Medi-
    cines Company’s product met the already-approved
    specifications for finished bivalirudin product. Addition-
    ally, Ben Venue marked the batches with commercial
    product codes and customer lot numbers and sent them to
    The Medicines Company for commercial and clinical
    packaging, consistent with the commercial sale of phar-
    maceutical drugs. This commercial activity was not
    insignificant; The Medicines Company admits that each
    batch had a commercial value of over $10 million.
    6                    THE MEDICINES COMPANY   v. HOSPIRA, INC.
    Accordingly, we find that the district court clearly
    erred in finding the Ben Venue sale of services did not
    constitute a commercial sale. To find otherwise would
    allow The Medicines Company to circumvent the on-sale
    bar simply because its contracts happened to only cover
    the processes that produced the patented product-by-
    process. This would be inconsistent with our principle
    that “no ‘supplier’ exception exists for the on-sale bar.”
    Special Devices, 
    270 F.3d at 1357
    .
    This is not a case where the inventors have requested
    another entity’s services in developing products embody-
    ing the invention without triggering the on-sale bar. See
    Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 
    595 F.3d 1340
    ,
    1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The batches were prepared for
    commercial exploitation, and this is not the type of “se-
    cret, personal use” described in Trading Technologies.
    Indeed, the preparation of the batches was described as
    an “Optimization Study,” and was performed because
    “several opportunities for further optimization of the
    formulation process were identified” after “successful[]
    validat[ion] in a previous validation study.” J.A. 14882–
    83.
    Moreover, “[i]f a product that is offered for sale inher-
    ently possesses each of the limitations of the claims, then
    the invention is on sale, whether or not the parties to the
    transaction recognize that the product possesses the
    claimed characteristics.” Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm.,
    
    182 F.3d 1315
    , 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999). There is no dispute
    that the batches had the levels of Asp9-bivalirudin re-
    quired by the claims. Thus, it is irrelevant whether The
    Medicines Company knew that the process limitations of
    the asserted claims reliably and consistently produced
    levels of Asp9-bivalirudin below 0.6%.
    The district court also clearly erred in finding that the
    experimental use doctrine bars the application of the on-
    sale bar to the Ben Venue batches. “[E]xperimental use
    THE MEDICINES COMPANY   v. HOSPIRA, INC.                  7
    cannot occur after a reduction to practice.” In re Cygnus
    Telecomm. Tech., LLC Patent Litig., 
    536 F.3d 1343
    , 1356
    (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Medicines Company asserts that it
    had not reduced the invention to practice when the batch-
    es were made because it did not appreciate the maximum
    impurity level limitation of the claimed invention until
    after twenty-five batches of bivalirudin were manufac-
    tured according to The Medicine Company’s new process.
    “However, we have held that where an invention is on
    sale, conception is not required to establish reduction to
    practice.” Scaltech, Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 
    269 F.3d 1321
    , 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). In other
    words, “[t]he sale of the [invention] in question obviates
    any need for inquiry into conception.” Abbott Labs., 
    182 F.3d at
    1318–19. To be sure, Abbott and Scaltech did not
    involve experimental use, and the experimental use
    defense may be available even if the invention had been
    reduced to practice if the inventor was unaware that the
    invention had been reduced to practice (i.e., worked for its
    intended purpose) and continued to experiment. See New
    Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 
    298 F.3d 1290
    ,
    1297 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“‘When an evaluation period is
    reasonably needed to determine if the invention will serve
    its intended purpose, the § 102(b) bar does not start to
    accrue while such determination is being made.’ . . .
    Once an inventor realizes that the invention as later
    claimed works for its intended purpose, further ‘experi-
    mentation’ may constitute a barring public use.” (quoting
    Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Constr., 
    98 F.3d 1318
    , 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1996))). This is not a situation in
    which the inventor was unaware that the invention had
    been reduced to practice, and was experimenting to
    determine whether that was the case. The batches sold
    satisfied the claim limitations, and the inventor was well
    aware that the batches had levels of Asp9-bivalirudin well
    below the claimed levels of 0.6%.
    8                   THE MEDICINES COMPANY    v. HOSPIRA, INC.
    B
    An invention is ready for patenting when, before the
    critical date, the invention is reduced to practice; or is
    depicted in drawings or described in writings of sufficient
    nature to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
    practice the invention. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v.
    Sunbeam Prods., Inc., 
    726 F.3d 1370
    , 1375 (Fed. Cir.
    2013).
    The Medicines Company argues that the district court
    erred in finding its invention was ready for patenting
    because there was no reduction to practice and the inven-
    tors had not prepared drawings or written descriptions
    sufficient to enable a person skilled in the art to practice
    the invention. But because the invention was sold, for the
    reasons described supra Section II(A), we find that the
    Ben Venue batches reduced the invention to practice.
    Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding the
    invention was ready for patenting.
    III
    Because the district court did not err in finding that
    the claimed invention was ready for patenting, but clearly
    erred in finding that the claimed invention was not com-
    mercially offered for sale before the critical date, we
    reverse the district court’s determination that the on-sale
    bar does not apply. Accordingly, we hold the asserted
    claims invalid, and decline to reach the other issues
    raised by the parties.
    REVERSED