Creative Kingdoms, LLC v. Itc , 588 F. App'x 993 ( 2014 )


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  •       NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC, AND
    NEW KINGDOMS, LLC,
    Appellants,
    v.
    INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
    Appellee,
    AND
    NINTENDO CO., LTD., AND
    NINTENDO OF AMERICA, INC.,
    Intervenors.
    ______________________
    2014-1072
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States International Trade
    Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-770.
    ______________________
    Decided: December 19, 2014
    ______________________
    JAMES R. BARNEY, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,
    Garrett & Dunner, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for
    appellants. With him on the brief were ELIZABETH D.
    FERRILL and LAURENCE M. SANDELL.
    2                              CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC   v. ITC
    SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIG, Attorney Advisor, Office of
    the General Counsel, United States International Trade
    Commission, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. On
    the brief were DOMINIC L. BIANCHI, General Counsel,
    WAYNE W. HERRINGTON, Assistant General Counsel and
    JIA CHEN, Attorney Advisor.
    STEPHEN R. SMITH, Cooley LLP, of Reston, Virginia,
    for intervenors. With him on the brief were THOMAS J.
    FRIEL, JR., of San Francisco, California, and STEPHEN C.
    NEAL, TIMOTHY S. TETER and MATTHEW J. BRIGHAM, of
    Palo Alto, California.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, BRYSON, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.
    O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.
    Creative Kingdoms, LLC and New Kingdoms, LLC
    (collectively, “Creative Kingdoms”) appeal the Interna-
    tional Trade Commission’s (“Commission”) finding that
    Nintendo Co., Ltd. and Nintendo of America, Inc. (collec-
    tively, “Nintendo”) did not violate § 337 of the Tariff Act of
    1930 by importing, selling for importation, or selling
    certain video game systems and controllers. Specifically,
    Creative Kingdoms challenges the Commission’s determi-
    nation that claim 7 of U.S. Patent No. 7,500,917 (the “’917
    Patent”) and claim 24 of U.S. Patent No. 7,896,742 (the
    “’742 Patent”) (collectively, “the asserted claims”) are
    invalid for lack of enablement and written description,
    that the accused Nintendo products do not infringe the
    asserted claims, and that Creative Kingdoms failed to
    establish the existence of a domestic industry relating to
    the patented articles. Because the Commission properly
    determined that the asserted claims are invalid for lack of
    enablement, we affirm.
    CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC   v. ITC                           3
    DISCUSSION
    The ’917 and ’742 Patents generally describe motion-
    sensing devices, which detect motion and generate wire-
    less signals based on that motion to create a desired play
    effect in an interactive environment. Specifically, claim 7
    of the ’917 Patent is directed to a toy wand comprising a
    pair of first motion sensors, which detect a motion, and a
    second motion sensor, which detects a different motion
    from the first. These sensors then generate signals based
    on the detected motions, which are transmitted to a
    receiver to control play effects. Similarly, claim 24 of the
    ’742 Patent is directed to a motion-sensitive device that
    contains two arrangements of sensors, which detect
    different motions and generate signals that activate or
    control play effects based upon those motions. The two
    asserted patents are related—the ’742 Patent is a contin-
    uation-in-part of the ’917 Patent, and it is undisputed
    that the relevant portions of the two specifications are the
    same.
    The Commission concluded that the asserted claims
    are invalid for lack of enablement. It first determined
    that a novel aspect of both claims was the combination of
    sensors. Because the scope of the asserted claims encom-
    passes both mechanical and electronic sensors, but the
    specifications do not disclose how to use multiple electron-
    ic sensors together to detect different motions, the Com-
    mission concluded that the specifications failed to enable
    the full scope of the asserted claims.
    We agree with the Commission’s enablement conclu-
    sion. “To be enabling, the specification must teach those
    skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of
    the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”
    ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 
    603 F.3d 935
    , 940
    (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). It is well established
    that a specification need not disclose what is well-known
    4                             CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC   v. ITC
    in the art, but “[i]t is the specification, [and] not the
    knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the
    novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute ade-
    quate enablement.” Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N.
    Am., Inc., 
    501 F.3d 1274
    , 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting
    Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 
    108 F.3d 1361
    , 1366
    (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
    Here, the novelty of the asserted claims includes the
    use of sensors in combination, and the scope of the assert-
    ed claims includes both mechanical and electronic sen-
    sors. But the two specifications contain no guidance as to
    how electronic sensors, such as accelerometers and gyro-
    scopes, can be substituted or added to detect different
    motions, as required by the asserted claims. Instead, the
    specifications merely include a laundry list of the types of
    electronic sensors that could be used. ’917 Patent col.
    10:32–42; ’742 Patent col. 10:56–66. Without any further
    guidance, the specifications fail to disclose how to make
    and use the full scope of the asserted claims. Accordingly,
    the asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement.
    Because the Commission correctly determined that
    the asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement, we
    need not address Creative Kingdoms’ other arguments
    regarding written description, infringement, and domestic
    industry. See Solomon Techs., Inc. v. ITC, 
    524 F.3d 1310
    ,
    1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are not required to address
    every possible ground on which the Commission’s order
    might be sustained.”). Accordingly, we affirm the Com-
    mission’s finding of no Section 337 violation.
    AFFIRMED