Kerner v. Interior , 778 F.3d 1336 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    EDWARD P. KERNER,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2014-3012
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. CH3330110394-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 20, 2015
    ______________________
    GLENN L. SMITH, Wheeler Upham, P.C., of Grand Rap-
    ids, Michigan, argued for petitioner.
    HILLARY A. STERN, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial
    Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depart-
    ment of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respond-
    ent. With her on the brief were STUART F. DELERY,
    Assistant Attorney General, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,
    Director, and CLAUDIA BURKE, Assistant Director.
    ______________________
    Before CHEN, LINN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
    2                                        KERNER   v. INTERIOR
    HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
    Edward Kerner applied for two merit-promotion va-
    cancies at his employing agency, the Department of the
    Interior, but his applications were rejected because he did
    not meet the time-in-grade requirements necessary to be
    considered for the positions. He now claims that the
    agency violated the Veterans Employment Opportunity
    Act (VEOA) by not crediting his military and non-federal
    service when determining whether he met the time-in-
    grade requirements.        But the provisions on which
    Mr. Kerner relies only apply to preference-eligible veter-
    ans not already employed in the federal civil service, not
    to current federal employees seeking merit promotions.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Merit Systems Protection
    Board’s final decision denying Mr. Kerner’s claim.
    I
    In 2010, while Mr. Kerner was an Evidence Custodi-
    an, GS-05, with the Department’s Fish and Wildlife
    Service, he applied for two vacancies within the Depart-
    ment: Wildlife Inspector, GS-09/11, and Wildlife Inspec-
    tor, GS-11/11.     Both positions were merit-promotion
    vacancies. Each required federal employee applicants to
    meet a time-in-grade requirement. A federal civil service
    applicant must have completed at least fifty-two weeks of
    experience equivalent to GS-07 to be qualified for the GS-
    09 position, and at least fifty-two weeks of experience
    equivalent to GS-09 to be qualified for the GS-11 position.
    5 C.F.R. § 300.604. The vacancies also required one year
    of specialized experience in the federal civil service equiv-
    alent to GS-07 or GS-09, respectively. Mr. Kerner had no
    federal civil service experience at the GS-07 or GS-09
    level and, therefore, did not meet the time-in-grade re-
    quirements. Accordingly, the Department determined
    KERNER   v. INTERIOR                                        3
    that he did not qualify for either of the Wildlife Inspector
    vacancies. 1
    Mr. Kerner then filed a VEOA claim with the De-
    partment of Labor, alleging that the Department violated
    his VEOA rights when it removed his applications from
    consideration for not meeting the time-in-grade require-
    ments.    The Department of Labor determined that
    Mr. Kerner’s VEOA rights were not violated, and
    Mr. Kerner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection
    Board. The Board affirmed. Mr. Kerner appeals. We
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
    II
    We must affirm a Merit Systems Protection Board de-
    cision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
    tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained
    without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation
    having been followed; or unsupported by substantial
    evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review statutory and
    regulatory interpretations de novo. Kievanaar v. Office of
    Pers. Mgmt., 
    421 F.3d 1359
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
    Federal agencies generally use two types of selection
    processes when filling vacancies in the competitive ser-
    vice: open competition and merit promotion. Open compe-
    tition is used for employees seeking to join the competitive
    service. Joseph v. FTC, 
    505 F.3d 1380
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir.
    2007). Merit promotion is “used when the position is to be
    filled by an employee of the agency or by an applicant
    1  Mr. Kerner was eventually granted a non-
    competitive excepted Veterans’ Recruitment Appointment
    to Wildlife Inspector, GS-05/11, in 2011. At that time, the
    Department considered Mr. Kerner’s non-federal experi-
    ence and determined that he was qualified for GS-05,
    because he did not have the specialized experience re-
    quired for the next grade.
    4                                         KERNER   v. INTERIOR
    from outside the agency who has ‘status’ in the competi-
    tive service.” 
    Id. When a
    federal agency posts a merit-promotion va-
    cancy that accepts applications from individuals outside
    its own workforce, preference-eligible veterans “may not
    be denied the opportunity to compete” for the vacancy.
    5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1). It is undisputed that the Wildlife
    Inspector vacancies at issue here were merit-promotion
    vacancies that accepted applications from individuals
    outside the Department’s workforce.
    Mr. Kerner argues that the Department violated his
    VEOA rights under § 3304(f) because it did not credit his
    non-federal civil service experience under § 3311 when
    determining whether he met the time-in-grade require-
    ments. Section 3311 reads:
    In examinations for the competitive service in
    which experience is an element of qualification, a
    preference eligible is entitled to credit
    (1) for service in the armed forces when his em-
    ployment in a similar vocation to that for
    which examined was interrupted by the ser-
    vice; and
    (2) for all experience material to the position for
    which examined, including experience gained
    in religious, civic, welfare, service, and organi-
    zational activities, regardless of whether he re-
    ceived pay therefor.
    Mr. Kerner argues that if the Department had considered
    all of his experience, it would have found at least fifty-two
    weeks of non-federal civil service experience equivalent to
    experience at the GS-07 and GS-09 levels. Thus, accord-
    ing to Mr. Kerner, he would have met the time-in-grade
    requirements.
    KERNER   v. INTERIOR                                      5
    Mr. Kerner’s argument assumes that § 3304(f) re-
    quires federal agencies to apply § 3311 to merit-promotion
    vacancies that accept applicants from outside the agency’s
    workforce, even when the applicant is already employed
    in the federal civil service. The statutory language, the
    legislative history, and the case law do not support this
    argument.
    Congress enacted § 3311 as part of the Veterans’ Pref-
    erence Act, the precursor to the VEOA. Courts have
    interpreted the Veterans’ Preference Act to give prefer-
    ence in a veteran’s initial appointment to the federal civil
    service, but not to an employee’s transfer or other intra-
    agency movement, such as promotions. Brown v. Dep’t of
    Veterans Affairs, 
    247 F.3d 1222
    , 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
    (“We affirm the proposition established in Crowley, name-
    ly, that veterans are not accorded any preference under
    the VPA when seeking promotion or intra-agency trans-
    fers.”); see also Bates v. Runyon, 
    97 F.3d 1464
    , 
    1996 WL 532210
    , at *2 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[J]udicial interpretation
    clearly establishes that veterans’ preference does not
    apply to an employee’s transfer or other intra-agency
    movement.”) (unpublished table decision); Glenn v. U.S.
    Postal Serv., 
    939 F.2d 1516
    , 1523 (11th Cir. 1991)
    (“[V]eterans’ preference only applies to initial employ-
    ment, not to movement of an incumbent employee from
    one job to another within an agency.”); Stephens v. Cole-
    man, 
    712 F. Supp. 1571
    , 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (“[N]either
    the [VPA] nor the . . . regulations promulgated thereunder
    accord veterans preferential treatment in promotions.”),
    aff’d, 
    901 F.2d 1571
    (11th Cir. 1990).
    The text of the VEOA shows that it is intended to as-
    sist veterans in gaining access to federal civil service
    employment, not to give veterans preference in merit
    promotions. The VEOA’s title itself—“Veterans Employ-
    ment Opportunity Act”—shows that its purpose is to help
    veterans get the opportunity for federal employment. See
    Pub. L. No. 105-339, 112 Stat 3182. And § 2 of the VEOA,
    6                                        KERNER   v. INTERIOR
    which amended § 3304(f), is titled “Access for Veterans,”
    showing that the VEOA is intended to help veterans gain
    access to federal employment, not preferential treatment
    in promotion decisions. See 
    id. at §
    2.
    Additionally, § 3304(f)(4) states that merit-promotion
    vacancies accepting applications from outside the agency’s
    workforce must announce that preference-eligible veter-
    ans are “eligible to apply.” This language shows that
    Congress intended the VEOA to assist veterans otherwise
    ineligible to apply. Veterans already employed by the
    competitive service are already “eligible to apply” to
    merit-promotion vacancies, and thus cannot be the in-
    tended target for § 3304(f).
    The legislative history of the VEOA confirms that
    Congress did not intend for § 3304 to apply when a veter-
    an or other preference-eligible applicant is already em-
    ployed in federal civil service. When introducing the
    original version of the VEOA, Senator Charles Hagel
    stated that the purpose of the VEOA was to help veterans
    “get and hold jobs with the Federal Government.” 143
    CONG. REC. 14,682 (1997) (emphasis added). There was
    no mention of promotion preference for veterans already
    employed in the competitive service. Indeed, statements
    show that the VEOA was specifically targeted to veterans
    not already employed in the federal civil service. E.g., 
    id. at 5,258
    (statement of Rep. Maloney) “[T]he VEOA opens
    Federal employment opportunities for individuals honor-
    ably discharged from the military . . . by eliminating
    artificial barriers which prevent them from competing for
    Federal jobs because they are not already civilian employ-
    ees or employees of a particular agency.”) (emphasis add-
    ed); 144 CONG. REC. 24,806 (1998), (statement of Rep.
    Mica) (“Very often, . . . Federal agencies will only allow
    current civilian employees to apply for vacancies. Veter-
    ans who do not work for the Federal Government are
    barred from even competing on their merits for these jobs.
    That will change when this legislation is enacted. Under
    KERNER   v. INTERIOR                                   7
    this bill whenever an agency opens the competition to
    civilian employees outside of its own workforce, it must
    also allow these qualified veterans to compete.”) (empha-
    sis added); 
    id. at 24,808
    (statement of Rep. Pappas) (“I
    rise today to support our veterans by calling for the
    passage of . . . the Veterans Employment Opportunity Act
    of 1998. . . . For too long many of our nation’s veterans
    have been neglected by our own government when it
    comes to obtaining federal employment.”) (emphasis
    added).
    In light of this evidence, we conclude that 5 U.S.C.
    §§ 3304(f) and 3311 do not require a federal agency to
    consider non-federal civil service experience when deter-
    mining whether a veteran employed in the federal civil
    service meets a time-in-grade requirement for purposes of
    a merit promotion.
    We have considered Mr. Kerner’s remaining argu-
    ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we
    affirm the Board’s denial of Mr. Kerner’s claims.
    AFFIRMED
    No costs.