In Re: Trivita, Inc. , 783 F.3d 872 ( 2015 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    IN RE: TRIVITA, INC.,
    Appellant
    ______________________
    2014-1383
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
    Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
    77658158.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 17, 2015
    ______________________
    ADAM STEPHENSON, Adam R. Stephenson, LTD., Tem-
    pe, AZ, for appellant.
    NATHAN K. KELLEY, Office of the Solicitor, United
    States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for
    appellee. Also represented by THOMAS L. CASAGRANDE,
    CHRISTINA HIEBER, THOMAS W. KRAUSE.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, MOORE, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
    NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
    TriVita filed trademark application Serial No.
    77/658,158 to register the mark NOPALEA on the Princi-
    pal Register for dietary and nutritional supplements
    “containing, in whole or in substantial part, nopal juice.”
    The examiner rejected the application under section
    2                                         IN RE: TRIVITA, INC.
    2(e)(1) of the Lanham Trademark Act as “descriptive of a
    feature of applicant’s goods on the grounds that appli-
    cant’s products contain nopal which is derived from an
    [ex]tract of the nopalea plant.” TriVita appealed to the
    Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, arguing that “no-
    palea plant” is not a term used in the food industry, and
    that the term is not descriptive because TriVita’s products
    contain extracts from the Opunti genus of nopal cactus,
    not the Nopalea genus.
    The Board affirmed the rejection. The Board cited
    various websites showing Nopalea as the name of a genus
    of cactus used in food and supplements, noting that some
    of the websites were those of TriVita’s affiliates, and that
    some explicitly stated that TriVita’s products were de-
    rived from the Nopalea cactus. The Board acknowledged
    that both Opuntia and Nopalea cacti may be referred to
    as nopal cacti, but that TriVita’s registration application
    states only that the goods contain “nopal juice,” and does
    not state whether the nopal juice is derived from cacti in
    either the Opuntia or Nopalea genus. The Board cited
    instances of the word “nopal” used interchangeably with
    the word “nopalea,” and stated:
    The record indicates that nopalea is indeed a ge-
    nus of cacti which is used for food and medicine,
    and which is commonly referred to as “nopal.”
    Consumers may well assume, (as apparently do
    some of [TriVita’s] affiliates) that, as a character-
    istic of nopal juice, [TriVita’s] goods derive from
    genus nopalea.
    In re Trivita, Inc., 
    2013 WL 6858011
    , at *4 (T.T.A.B. Dec.
    17, 2013). The Board concluded that there was “no doubt
    that a consumer would understand the term ‘nopalea’
    used in connection with [TriVita’s] goods as conveying
    information about them,” and affirmed the refusal to
    register NOPALEA because it is “merely descriptive”
    under section 2(e)(1). 
    Id. at *5.
    IN RE: TRIVITA, INC.                                      3
    DISCUSSION
    Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act provides that a
    term is not a registerable trademark when it “consists of a
    mark which (1) when used on or in connection with the
    goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively
    misdescriptive of them.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (2014). A
    mark is merely descriptive if it “‘consist[s] merely of
    words descriptive of the qualities, ingredients or charac-
    teristics of’ the goods or services related to the mark.” In
    re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 
    373 F.3d 1171
    , 1173 (Fed.
    Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Estate of P.D.
    Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 
    252 U.S. 538
    , 543
    (1920)). The Board’s determination that a mark is merely
    descriptive is a factual finding that is reviewed for sup-
    port by substantial evidence. In re Bayer Aktiengesell-
    schaft, 
    488 F.3d 960
    , 964 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
    Whether a mark is merely descriptive is determined
    in relation to the goods or services for which registration
    is sought. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1). The question is
    whether someone who is presented with the mark in
    connection with the goods or services would understand
    that the mark describes the goods or services. See 2 J.
    Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
    Competition §11:16 (4th ed. 2014) (“Descriptiveness
    cannot be determined as an abstraction. The possible
    descriptiveness of a designation is highly dependent on
    the goods or services in connection with which the desig-
    nation is used. A term can be descriptive of one product
    and nondescriptive of another.”). “A merely descriptive
    mark qualifies for registration only if the applicant shows
    that it has acquired secondary meaning.” In re Nett
    Designs, Inc., 
    236 F.3d 1339
    , 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
    The record contains somewhat conflicting evidence as
    to the content of TriVita’s goods. TriVita initially stated
    that “the term NOPALEA refers to the nopalea plant in
    the relevant industry” and that “the goods contain nopal
    4                                        IN RE: TRIVITA, INC.
    which is an extract of the nopalea plant.” TriVita later
    stated that its goods contain extracts of a nopal cactus,
    but not of a Nopalea cactus. TriVita referred the examin-
    er to a Master’s thesis stating that the term “nopal cac-
    tus” is used to refer to prickly pear cacti from both the
    Opuntia and Nopalea genera. The TriVita labels list as
    ingredients of its products “Nopal fruit puree (Opuntia
    ficus indica)” and “Nopal powder (Opuntia ficus indica).”
    On receiving these arguments, the examiner also re-
    jected TriVita’s application under section 2(a) of the
    Lanham Act, stating that “[i]f the goods do not contain
    Nopalea or ingredients or extracts derived from the
    Nopalea plant, then the applied-for mark contains a term
    that is misdescriptive of the composition of the goods
    marketed thereunder.” U.S. Trademark Appl. Serial No.
    77658158, Office Action, at 2 (Jan. 7, 2011). The examin-
    er withdrew the misdescriptiveness rejection after TriVita
    amended the description of the goods to state that the
    goods contained nopal juice.
    TriVita makes four primary arguments on appeal.
    Although the PTO complains that some arguments were
    not presented to the Board, the need for these arguments
    did not appear until the Board’s decision. Thus we have
    considered all of TriVita’s arguments.
    First, TriVita argues that the Board failed to compare
    the word “nopalea” to the word “nopal,” the common name
    for prickly pear cacti of the Nopalea and Opuntia genera,
    and the term used in TriVita’s description of the goods.
    TriVita argues that in 
    Bayer, 488 F.3d at 964
    –65, this
    court endorsed comparing the appearance and sound of a
    mark with the “common word” for the goods, to determine
    if the mark is “sufficiently similar” to the common word.
    TriVita argues that the addition of the letters “EA” at the
    end of “nopal” makes the mark NOPALEA substantially
    different in sight and sound. However, “nopalea” is not a
    made-up word obtained by adding arbitrary letters. The
    IN RE: TRIVITA, INC.                                       5
    record shows, and the Board found, that “nopalea” is a
    genus of cacti from which nopal juice, the product at
    issue, is derived. Even if TriVita’s product contains
    ingredients derived from the Opuntia and not the Nopalea
    cactus, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding
    that consumers are likely to assume that the NOPALEA
    mark denotes that TriVita’s products contain ingredients
    from the Nopalea cactus.
    Second, TriVita argues that the Board made no factu-
    al findings concerning the level of sophistication of the
    average consumer likely to encounter TriVita’s goods.
    TriVita argues that the ordinary purchaser of its products
    will be of low botanical sophistication and will not imme-
    diately recognize the botanical meaning of the word
    “nopalea.” TriVita is correct that descriptiveness is
    determined from the viewpoint of the relevant purchasing
    public. However, as the Board found, there is abundant
    evidence, scientific and non-scientific, of the words “no-
    palea” and “nopal” being used interchangeably. This
    interchangeability is seen largely in the context of discus-
    sion of the health benefits of this class of cactus.
    Third, TriVita argues that its products are sold
    through “multi-level direct marketing,” and that consum-
    ers purchase and obtain information about its products
    only directly from TriVita or its affiliates, and thus TriVi-
    ta can “ensure the Mark is used non-descriptively in
    conjunction with the goods in question at the point of
    sale.” Appellant Br. at 23. However, such non-descriptive
    use was not established by any factual showing. See Roux
    Labs., Inc. v. Clairol Inc., 
    427 F.2d 823
    , 828 (CCPA 1970)
    (“The mere fact that a combination of words or a slogan is
    adopted and used by a manufacturer with the intent
    Clairol has manifested here—that it identify its goods and
    distinguish them from those of others—does not neces-
    sarily mean that the slogan accomplishes that purpose in
    reality.”). Further, the record shows that several of
    TriVita’s distributors state that the products contain juice
    6                                        IN RE: TRIVITA, INC.
    from the Nopalea cactus, rather than the limited non-
    descriptive use proposed by TriVita.
    Fourth, TriVita argues that the Board erroneously re-
    lied on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Aloe
    Corp. v. Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. 
    420 F.2d 1248
    (7th Cir.
    1970), to support the descriptiveness finding. That deci-
    sion embodies the principle that the trademark applicant
    “cannot appropriate for its own trademark use the generic
    name of the distinguishing and effective ingredient in its
    
    product.” 420 F.2d at 1252
    . The Board did not err in
    applying this principle to the facts in the record.
    The Board found that the relevant consumer, knowing
    that the goods are supplements containing nopal cactus
    juice, would understand the mark NOPALEA to convey
    information that the goods contain ingredients from the
    Nopalea cactus. The Board based its finding on evidence
    that “nopalea” is the name of a genus of cacti used in food
    and supplements, that the word “nopal” is a common
    name for prickly pear cacti including cacti in the genus
    Nopalea, and that the words “nopal” and “nopalea” are
    used interchangeably to refer to cacti of that genus.
    Substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings, and
    its conclusion that “nopalea” is merely descriptive of
    TriVita’s goods.
    We affirm the Board’s decision that NOPALEA is not
    registrable on the Principal Register for TriVita’s nutri-
    tional supplements containing nopal juice.
    AFFIRMED