Byrd v. Hhs ( 2019 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    HOUSTON BYRD, JR.,
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
    SERVICES,
    Respondent-Appellee
    ______________________
    2019-1729
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
    in No. 1:17-vv-00900-CFL, Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.
    ______________________
    Decided: July 10, 2019
    ______________________
    HOUSTON BYRD, JR., Newark, OH, pro se.
    MALLORI BROWNE OPENCHOWSKI, Vaccine/Torts
    Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
    tice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
    sented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, C. SALVATORE D'ALESSIO,
    CATHARINE E. REEVES.
    ______________________
    Before NEWMAN, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
    BYRD v. HHS
    2
    PER CURIAM.
    DECISION
    Houston Byrd, Jr., appeals the February 7, 2019 deci-
    sion of the United States Court of Federal Claims in Byrd
    v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 
    142 Fed. Cl. 79
    (“Byrd II”). In that decision, the Court of Federal Claims
    denied Mr. Byrd’s motion for review of, and also affirmed,
    the November 29, 2018 decision of the chief special master
    that dismissed Mr. Byrd’s petition for compensation under
    the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42
    U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34, as amended (“Vaccine Act”). See
    Byrd v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    2018 WL 6918820
    (“Byrd I”). We affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    I.
    Under the Vaccine Act, a petitioner seeking compensa-
    tion may prove causation in one of two ways, depending
    upon whether the case involves a “Table injury” or an “off-
    Table injury.” See Moberly v. Sec’y of Health & Human
    Servs., 
    592 F.3d 1315
    , 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010). If the admin-
    istered vaccine and injury are listed in the Vaccine Injury
    Table, and the injury manifests itself within the specified
    time period, a petitioner receives a presumption of a causal
    link between the vaccination and the injury. See de Bazan
    v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    539 F.3d 1347
    , 1351
    (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(i)
    (not requiring a showing of causation for a Table injury).
    However, for an injury not listed in the Table, or for an in-
    jury which does not occur within the specified time period,
    a petitioner seeking compensation must prove causation in
    fact. See de 
    Bazan, 539 F.3d at 1351
    ; see also 42 U.S.C.
    § 300aa-11(c)(1)(C)(ii) (requiring a showing of causation for
    an off-Table injury). This appeal involves an off-Table in-
    jury.
    BYRD v. HHS                                                  3
    A petitioner asserting an off-Table injury must file an
    affidavit and supporting documentation demonstrating
    that the vaccine-related injury for which compensation is
    sought was caused by a vaccine. Cloer v. Sec’y of Health &
    Human Servs., 
    654 F.3d 1322
    , 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
    banc). Causation must be proved by a preponderance of the
    evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1) (“Compensation
    shall be awarded . . . to a petitioner if the special master or
    court finds . . . (A) that the petitioner has demonstrated by
    a preponderance of the evidence the matters required in
    the petition.”). When a petitioner claims to have suffered
    an off-Table injury, we apply the test for causation in fact
    outlined in Althen v. Secretary of Health & Human Ser-
    vices, 
    418 F.3d 1274
    (Fed. Cir. 2005):
    [The petitioner’s] burden is to show by preponder-
    ant evidence that the vaccination brought about
    [his or] her injury by providing: (1) a medical the-
    ory causally connecting the vaccination and the in-
    jury; (2) a logical sequence of cause and effect
    showing that the vaccination was the reason for the
    injury; and (3) a showing of a proximate temporal
    relationship between vaccination and 
    injury. 418 F.3d at 1278
    .
    II.
    On July 3, 2017, Mr. Byrd, acting pro se, filed a petition
    for vaccine compensation. In his petition, he alleged that
    the influenza and pneumococcal polysaccharide vaccines
    that he received on October 1, 2015, caused him to suffer
    headaches, stomachaches, elevated blood sugar levels, and
    weight loss. Byrd I, 
    2018 WL 6918820
    , at *1.
    On March 30, 2018, the Secretary of Health and Hu-
    man Services (“Secretary”) filed the report required by
    Rule 4(c) of the Court of Federal Claims Vaccine Rules. In
    his report, in which he recommended against compensa-
    tion, the Secretary maintained that Mr. Byrd had failed to
    BYRD v. HHS
    4
    establish that his alleged injuries lasted for at least six
    months, as required by the Vaccine Act. See 42 U.S.C.
    § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(i). The Secretary also maintained that,
    even if the six-month requirement had been met, Mr. Byrd
    still failed to satisfy any of the Althen requirements. Byrd
    I, 
    2018 WL 6918820
    , at *1.
    On June 28, 2018, the chief special master issued an
    Order (“June 28 Order”), providing preliminary findings of
    fact on the merits of Mr. Byrd’s claim. App. 13. As a
    “threshold matter,” the chief special master found that Mr.
    Byrd had not established that he suffered from his alleged
    injuries for at least six months, as none of his complaints
    were documented in recent medical records. App. 15. In
    addition, turning to Althen, the chief special master found
    that Mr. Byrd had “established no causal link between the
    asserted injuries and his flu vaccination.” 
    Id. The chief
    special master stated:
    Nowhere in petitioner’s medical records or other fil-
    ings does a medical expert articulate a theory caus-
    ally connecting the vaccines to his injuries, as
    required by Althen Prong One. Likewise, peti-
    tioner describes no logical sequence of cause and ef-
    fect, as required by Althen Prong Two, nor does he
    demonstrate a proximate temporal relationship be-
    tween the vaccine and his injuries as required by
    Althen Prong Three.
    
    Id. The chief
    special master provided Mr. Byrd sixty days
    “to obtain an expert report from a reputable, qualified med-
    ical doctor and to file all medical records needed to evaluate
    his claim.” App. 15–16. In addition, she informed Mr. Byrd
    that failure to comply with these requirements would re-
    sult in “an order to show cause why this case should not be
    dismissed.” App. 16.
    Mr. Byrd did not file an expert report or otherwise re-
    spond to the June 28 Order. Accordingly, on September 6,
    2018, the chief special master issued an order to show
    BYRD v. HHS                                                    5
    cause, giving Mr. Byrd until November 5, 2018, to file the
    materials required by the June 28 Order. App. 95–96. In
    her order, she warned Mr. Byrd that failure to provide the
    required medical records and expert report “will be inter-
    preted as an inability to provide supporting documentation
    for this claim, constituting a failure to prosecute, and the
    case will be dismissed with prejudice.” App. 96.
    On November 29, 2018, after Mr. Byrd still had failed
    to provide the materials required by the June 28 Order and
    the order to show cause, the chief special master dismissed
    Mr. Byrd’s petition for insufficient proof and failure to pros-
    ecute. Byrd I, 
    2018 WL 6918820
    , at *2. Explaining her
    ruling, the chief special master stated:
    The undersigned has allowed petitioner over a year
    in which to file all necessary medical records, and
    she has given petitioner a number of opportunities
    to participate in status conferences. Under Vaccine
    Rule 21(b)(1), petitioner’s repeated failure to follow
    Court orders is ample grounds for dismissal. More-
    over, the scant medical records that were filed in
    the case fail to satisfy the causation criteria estab-
    lished in Althen, and petitioner has not retained a
    medical doctor to opine as to causation in his case.
    
    Id. Mr. Byrd
    timely moved for review of the chief special
    master’s decision. As noted, on February 7, 2019, the Court
    of Federal Claims denied the motion and affirmed the chief
    special master’s decision. After reviewing the procedural
    history of the case and detailing the repeated opportunities
    the chief special master had afforded Mr. Byrd to comply
    with her orders, the court determined that Mr. Byrd had
    failed to demonstrate that the chief special master’s dis-
    missal of his petition for failure to prosecute was an abuse
    of discretion. Byrd 
    II, 142 Fed. Cl. at 84
    , 86–87. Address-
    ing the merits of Mr. Byrd’s claim, the court stated that,
    “absent medical records pre-dating the vaccination, records
    BYRD v. HHS
    6
    of his injuries,” and records “that his injuries lasted at least
    six months, the chief special master was obliged to dismiss”
    the petition. 
    Id. at 85.
    Mr. Byrd now appeals. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f).
    III.
    We review de novo decisions of the Court of Federal
    Claims arising under the Vaccine Act, applying the same
    standard as the Court of Federal Claims applied in its re-
    view of the special master’s decision. Porter v. Sec’y of
    Health & Human Servs., 
    663 F.3d 1242
    , 1248–49 (Fed. Cir.
    2011). We owe no deference to the Court of Federal Claims
    or the special master on questions of law. Andreu v. Sec’y
    of Health & Human Servs., 
    569 F.3d 1367
    , 1373 (Fed. Cir.
    2009). At the same time, we uphold the special master’s
    findings of fact unless they are arbitrary or capricious. Por-
    
    ter, 663 F.3d at 1249
    (citing Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health
    & Human Servs., 
    618 F.3d 1339
    , 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
    “Thus, although we are reviewing as a matter of law the
    decision of the [Court of Federal Claims] under a non-def-
    erential standard, we are in effect reviewing the decision of
    the special master under the deferential arbitrary and ca-
    pricious standard on factual issues.” Lombardi v. Sec’y of
    Health & Human Servs., 
    656 F.3d 1343
    , 1350 (Fed. Cir.
    2011) (quoting Lampe v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
    
    219 F.3d 1357
    , 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
    A dismissal for failure to prosecute is reviewed under
    the abuse of discretion standard. See Claude E. Atkins En-
    ters., Inc. v. United States, 
    899 F.2d 1180
    , 1183 (Fed. Cir.
    1990). “An abuse of discretion may be found when (1) the
    court’s decision is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanci-
    ful; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of
    the law; (3) the court’s findings are clearly erroneous; or
    (4) the record contains no evidence upon which the court
    rationally could have based its decision.” Simmons v. Sec’y
    of Health & Human Servs., 
    875 F.3d 632
    , 635 (Fed. Cir.
    BYRD v. HHS                                                  7
    2017) (quoting Hendler v. United States, 
    952 F.2d 1364
    ,
    1380 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
    IV.
    In his informal brief, Mr. Byrd answers “Yes” to the
    question whether the trial court incorrectly decided or
    failed to take into account any facts. He also answers “Yes”
    to the question whether the trial court applied the wrong
    law.
    As seen, the chief special master dismissed Mr. Byrd’s
    petition for insufficient proof and for failure to prosecute.
    Mr. Byrd, however, fails to point to any erroneous fact find-
    ings by the chief special master relating to those rulings.
    He also fails to point to any legal errors by the chief special
    master relating to those rulings.
    First, the chief special master did not abuse her discre-
    tion in dismissing Mr. Byrd’s petition for failure to prose-
    cute. Vaccine Rule 21(b) provides that a special master
    “may dismiss a petition or any claim therein for failure of
    the petitioner to prosecute or comply with these rules or
    any order of the special master.” Vaccine Rules of the U.S.
    Court of Federal Claims, Rules of Ct. of Fed. Claims App.
    B., R. 21(b); see also Simanski v. Sec’y of Health & Human
    Servs., 
    671 F.3d 1368
    , 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The pro-
    cedural history of this case, which we have recited at some
    length above, makes it clear that the chief special master
    (1) gave Mr. Byrd every opportunity and more than enough
    time to file the evidence necessary to establish his claim;
    and (2) warned him that his failure to provide the required
    material would result in the dismissal of his petition.
    Second, the chief special master applied the correct law
    to her analysis of Mr. Byrd’s claim. As noted above, Mr.
    Byrd was required to show that he had suffered the resid-
    ual effects or complications of his claimed vaccine injury for
    more than six months. He also was required to satisfy the
    requirements of Althen. Rather than addressing the six-
    BYRD v. HHS
    8
    month requirement, Mr. Byrd appears to argue for the first
    time that he satisfied the alternative requirement under 42
    U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(D)(iii) of having “suffered such ill-
    ness disability, injury, or condition from the vaccine which
    resulted in inpatient hospitalization or surgery.” Appel-
    lant’s Informal Br. at 8; see also Byrd 
    II, 142 Fed. Cl. at 85
    & n.10 (“Mr. Byrd also never claimed, nor provided evi-
    dence to support, inpatient hospitalization or surgery.”).
    We need not reach this argument, however, because Mr.
    Byrd was also required to satisfy the requirements of Al-
    then. The chief special master thoroughly reviewed the rec-
    ord and correctly determined that he had failed to do so.
    We have considered the additional arguments that Mr.
    Byrd makes on appeal and have found them to be without
    merit.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
    Court of Federal Claims denying Mr. Byrd’s motion for re-
    view of the decision of the chief special master and affirm-
    ing the decision of the chief special master.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    Each party shall bear its own costs.