Barnes v. United States ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    CAROLYN BARNES,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2018-2096
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:17-cv-00534-MCW, Judge Mary Ellen
    Coster Williams.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 9, 2019
    ______________________
    CAROLYN BARNES, Leander, TX, pro se.
    JOSHUA A. MANDLEBAUM, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also
    represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, ROBERT EDWARD
    KIRSCHMAN, JR., LOREN MISHA PREHEIM.
    ______________________
    Before DYK, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
    2                                  BARNES v. UNITED STATES
    PER CURIAM.
    Plaintiff–Appellant Carolyn Barnes appeals the Court
    of Federal Claims’ (“Claims Court’s”) denial of her motion
    for relief under Rule 60 of the Rules of the United States
    Court of Federal Claims. 1 Because we agree that the
    Claims Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On June 11, 2013, Ms. Barnes was convicted of aggra-
    vated assault with a deadly weapon while using or exhib-
    iting a firearm. Barnes v. State, No. 03-13-00434, 
    2016 WL 3917126
    , at *1 (Tex. App. July 13, 2016) (affirming
    conviction). Ms. Barnes filed a complaint on behalf of
    herself and her children in the Claims Court on April 13,
    2017, against numerous defendants, including but not
    limited to the United States, stemming from her purport-
    edly wrongful conviction. The Claims Court aptly sum-
    marized Ms. Barnes’ complaint as follows:
    Plaintiffs’ 179-page complaint is difficult to un-
    derstand, but appears to stem from Ms. Barnes’
    2013 aggravated assault conviction. Plaintiffs al-
    lege conspiracy on the part of a number of indi-
    viduals to “frame” Ms. Barnes for a crime she did
    not commit. Plaintiffs further claim numerous vi-
    olations of the Constitution, state and federal
    statutes, “international treaties, covenants, cove-
    nants, and conventions,” as well as breach of con-
    tract, criminal activity, and torts.
    1   Ms. Barnes styled her filing as a motion for recon-
    sideration but the Claims Court treated it as a Rule 60
    motion for relief from judgment.
    BARNES v. UNITED STATES                                  3
    S.A. 207. All of Ms. Barnes’ allegations before the Claims
    Court amount to collateral attacks on her criminal convic-
    tion.
    On November 29, 2017, the Claims Court dismissed
    Ms. Barnes’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
    tion. The Claims Court entered judgment on November
    30, 2017. Ms. Barnes submitted a motion styled as a
    “motion to reconsider” on December 29, 2017. The Claims
    Court construed Ms. Barnes’ motion as a motion for relief
    from the judgment under Rule 60. On May 24, 2018, the
    Claims Court denied Ms. Barnes’ motion because she
    “ha[d] not articulated any grounds warranting reconsid-
    eration.” Ms. Barnes appealed to this court on June 21,
    2018. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28
    U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
    DISCUSSION
    This court reviews a denial of a motion for relief from
    judgment for abuse of discretion. Progressive Indus., Inc.
    v. United States, 
    888 F.3d 1248
    , 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
    We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction de novo. Alpine PCS, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    878 F.3d 1086
    , 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
    Ms. Barnes purports to appeal from the Claims
    Court’s judgment dismissing her complaint. But Ms.
    Barnes’ appeal was docketed on June 21, 2018, well past
    the 60-day deadline to appeal from the Claims Court’s
    November 2017 judgment of dismissal. See Fed. R. App.
    P. 4(a)(1)(B). Though this deadline may be suspended by
    a motion under Rule 60, that is only so where the motion
    was filed with the Claims Court “within the time al-
    lowed,” which in this case is 28 days following entry of
    judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
    Because Ms. Barnes filed her motion for relief with
    the Claims Court 29 days after the Claims Court’s judg-
    ment of dismissal was entered, her motion did not sus-
    4                                  BARNES v. UNITED STATES
    pend the deadline to appeal the Claims Court’s order of
    dismissal and was therefore untimely. Our jurisdiction is
    thus limited to a review of the Claims Court’s denial of
    Ms. Barnes’ motion for relief from judgment. See Browder
    v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 
    434 U.S. 257
    , 263 (1978) (“[A]n
    appeal from denial of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
    60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for
    review.”); Brown v. United States, 80 F. App’x 676, 677
    (Fed. Cir. 2003) (construing plaintiff’s untimely motion for
    reconsideration as a Rule 60 motion for relief from judg-
    ment and limiting this court’s review to the denial of Rule
    60 relief). 2 Even if we were to consider Ms. Barnes’
    appeal from both the Claims Court’s order of dismissal
    and denial of relief under Rule 60, the result would be the
    same.
    Ms. Barnes’ claims are collateral attacks on her crim-
    inal conviction. It is well-established that the Claims
    Court “lacks jurisdiction to consider claims which amount
    to ‘collateral attacks’ on criminal convictions.” Mercer v.
    United States, 668 F. App’x 362, 363 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
    accord Beadles v. United States, 
    115 Fed. Cl. 242
    , 245
    (2014); Carter v. United States, 
    228 Ct. Cl. 898
    , 900
    (1981). The Claims Court thus correctly dismissed Ms.
    Barnes’ claims for lack of jurisdiction.
    To the extent that Ms. Barnes argues that the limits
    on the jurisdiction of the Claims Court are unconstitu-
    2   The standard of review for a denial of relief is the
    same for both a Rule 60 motion under the Federal Rules
    of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the Court of Federal
    claims. See Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. United States,
    
    994 F.2d 792
    , 794 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (applying the
    Rule 60 standard of review from Browder because “Rule
    60(b) of the Claims Court is a virtual duplicate of Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)”).
    BARNES v. UNITED STATES                                   5
    tional, she provides no reasoned basis for why this would
    be the case.
    CONCLUSION
    Because the Claims Court did not err in dismissing
    Ms. Barnes’ case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we
    affirm.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-2096

Filed Date: 1/9/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/9/2019