Allergan, Inc. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. , 501 F. App'x 965 ( 2013 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ALLERGAN, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    BARR LABORATORIES, INC.,
    TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.,
    AND TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LTD.,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    AND
    SANDOZ INC.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ______________________
    2012-1040, -1054
    ______________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware in No. 09-CV-0333, Judge Sue L.
    Robinson.
    ______________________
    Decided: January 28, 2013
    ______________________
    JONATHAN E. SINGER, Fish & Richardson, P.C., of
    Minneapolis, Minnesota, argued for plaintiff-appellee.
    2                                    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    With him on the brief were DEANNA J. REICHEL; and
    JUANITA R. BROOKS, of San Diego, California; and
    DOUGLAS E. MCCANN, of Wilmington, Delaware. Of
    counsel on the brief was JEFFREY T. THOMAS, Gibson,
    Dunn & Crutcher LLP, of Irvine, California.
    MEREDITH MARTIN ADDY, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, of
    Chicago, Illinois, argued for defendants-appellants. With
    her on the brief for Sandoz, Inc. were THOMAS J. FILARSKI
    and BRANDON C. HELMS. On the brief for Barr Laborato-
    ries, Inc., et al, were GEORGE C. LOMBARDI and BRADLEY
    C. GRAVELINE, Winston & Strawn, LLP, of Chicago,
    Illinois.
    ______________________
    Before RADER, Chief Judge, BRYSON,  and WALLACH,
    Circuit Judges.
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
    Barr Laboratories, Inc., Teva Pharmaceuticals USA,
    Inc., and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (collec-
    tively, “Barr”), and Sandoz Inc. (“Sandoz”) appeal from
    the decision of the United States District Court for the
    District of Delaware, which held that Barr’s and Sandoz’s
    proposed products (described in Abbreviated New Drug
    Applications (“ANDA”) Nos. 91-194 and 200487, respec-
    tively) infringed claim 10 of Allergan, Inc.’s (“Allergan”)
    
    U.S. Patent No. 5,688,819
     (“the ’819 patent”) and that the
    asserted claim was not invalid. 1 Allergan, Inc. v. Barr
    
    Judge Bryson assumed senior status on Janu-
    ary 7, 2013.
    1    Allergan also asserted claims 1-3 of its U.S.
    Patent 6,403,649 (“the ’649 patent”), and the district court
    likewise found the ’649 patent was not invalid and in-
    fringed by Barr’s and Sandoz’s ANDAs. Allergan, 808 F.
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                                3
    Labs., Inc., 
    808 F. Supp. 2d 715
    , 717 (D. Del. 2011).
    Because the district court correctly construed the relevant
    claim term and determined the asserted claim was not
    obvious, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Allergan markets and sells Lumigan®, which was
    approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
    to reduce intraocular pressure (“IOP”) in people with
    ocular hypertension or glaucoma. The active ingredient
    in Lumigan® is bimatoprost. Allergan’s ’819 patent
    claims bimatoprost and methods of using bimatoprost to
    treat ocular hypertension or glaucoma.
    1. Background of the Invention
    In a healthy eye, proper IOP is maintained by
    aqueous humor, which is fluid between the cornea and the
    lens of the eye that transports nutrients like vitamins,
    sugars, and amino acids to the cornea. Too much aqueous
    humor disrupts IOP and poses a substantial risk factor
    for developing glaucoma. PGF2α is a naturally-occurring
    prostaglandin that is known to lower IOP by increasing
    the outflow of aqueous humor from the eye. Prostagland-
    ins are a class of naturally-occurring substances, all of
    which share the following twenty-carbon basic structure:
    Supp. 2d at 736. However, the ’649 patent expired on
    September 21, 2012 and thus is not at issue in this ap-
    peal.
    4                                      ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 719. The above carbon atoms
    are numbered from 1 to 20, with 1 through 7 forming an α
    (alpha) chain, 13 through 20 forming an ω (omega) chain,
    and 8 through 12 forming a five-membered (cyclopentane)
    ring. The C-1 position (highlighted by the box above)
    features carboxylic acid, which is present in all naturally-
    occurring prostaglandins.
    As noted, it was known prior to the invention at issue
    that PGF2α lowered IOP. The prior art also revealed that
    certain lipid-soluble esters of PGF2α lowered IOP, and
    actually showed greater hypotensive effects than the
    parent compound PGF2α. ’819 patent col. 2 ll. 9-38. Ac-
    cording to the ’819 patent’s specification, however, pros-
    taglandins like PGF2α and its isopropyl ester were
    associated with negative side effects like “ocular surface
    hyperemia” (red eye) and “foreign-body sensation.” Id. col.
    2 ll. 41-46. The ’819 patent discloses that certain com-
    pounds that replace the carboxylic acid group with a non-
    acidic substituent can reduce these side effects while
    retaining the desired IOP-lowering effect. Id. col. 3 ll. 9-
    18. One such compound is bimatoprost (cyclopentane N-
    ethyl heptenamide-5-cis-2-(3α-hydroxy-5-phenyl-1-trans-
    pentenyl)-3, 5-dihydroxy, [1α,2β,3α,5α]). Id. col. 7 ll. 44-46.
    Bimatoprost is PGF2α, with an ethyl amide instead
    of a carboxylic acid group at the C-1 position and a phenyl
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                               5
    ring at C-17. 2 [J.A.10] Bimatoprost has the structure
    depicted below:
    Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 720. Bimatoprost lowers IOP
    by increasing the flow of aqueous humor leaving the eye.
    2. Patent-in-Suit
    The ’819 patent is related to and claims priority
    from 
    U.S. Patent No. 5,352,708
     (“the ’708 patent”), filed
    on September 21, 1992. The ’819 patent was issued on
    November 18, 1997, and was extended for 698 days as a
    result of the FDA’s regulatory review of Lumigan®.
    Asserted claim 10 of the ’819 patent ultimately depends
    from independent claim 5, which recites:
    5. A method of treating ocular hypertension or
    glaucoma which comprises applying to the eye an
    amount sufficient to treat ocular hypertension or
    glaucoma of the formula
    2   Bimatoprost is a prostamide and is also
    known as 17-phenyl PGF2α C-1 ethylamide.
    6                                    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    wherein . . . X is a radical selected from the group
    consisting of –OR4 and –N(R4)2 wherein R4 is se-
    lected from the group consisting o[f] hydrogen, a
    lower alkyl radical having from one to six carbon
    atoms,
    wherein R5 is a lower alkyl radical having from
    one to six carbon atoms . . . .
    ’819 patent col. 13 l. 49 – col. 14 l. 7 (emphasis added to
    disputed claim term). Dependent claim 10 discloses five
    compounds that may be used in the treatment of ocular
    hypertension or glaucoma in which X is –N(R4)2. 
    Id.
     col.
    14 l. 55 – col. 15 l. 7. One of these compounds is bimato-
    prost, listed as cyclopentane N-ethyl heptenamide-5-cis-2-
    (3α-hydroxy-5-phenyl-1-trans-pentenyl)-3,      5-dihydroxy,
    [1α,2β,3α,5α]. 
    Id.
     col. 15 ll. 1-3.
    3. Barr’s and Sandoz’s Abbreviated New
    Drug Applications
    On March 26, 2009, Barr filed an ANDA for a ge-
    neric version of Lumigan®, listing Allergan’s ’819 patent
    as one of the Orange Book-listed patents associated with
    Lumigan®. 3 Barr’s ANDA contained a Paragraph IV
    certification stating that Barr believed each relied-upon
    Orange Book patent was “invalid or [would] not be in-
    3    The FDA lists all patents protecting FDA-
    approved drugs in a publication titled the “Approved Drug
    Products With Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,”
    which is generally referred to as the “Orange Book.”
    Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Ltd., 
    527 F.3d 1278
    , 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing 
    21 U.S.C. § 355
    (b)(1),
    (c)(2)).
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                                 7
    fringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug
    for which the application [was] submitted.” 
    21 U.S.C. § 355
    (b)(2)(A)(iv). Sandoz likewise filed an ANDA for a
    generic version of Lumigan®, also with an accompanying
    Paragraph IV certification. Allergan filed patent in-
    fringement suits against Barr and Sandoz; the suits were
    consolidated into one action for a bench trial on patent
    invalidity and infringement.
    4. District Court Proceedings
    A. Claim Construction
    The only claim term disputed before the district
    court was –N(R4)2 as used in claim 5, on which asserted
    claim 10 depends. The parties disagree whether or not
    –N(R4)2 requires identical R4 substituents. If it does,
    bimatoprost’s use of nonidentical R4 substituents—
    hydrogen (H) and an ethyl group (CH2CH3)—would fall
    outside the protection of the ’819 patent. The district
    court initially agreed with Barr and Sandoz that “the
    plain and ordinary meaning” of –N(R4)2 suggested that
    identical R4 substituents were required; however, it
    ultimately found that Allergan had acted as its own
    lexicographer by defining –N(R4)2 to permit nonidentical
    R4 elements. Therefore, the district court held that, as
    used in the ’819 patent, the –N(R4)2 limitation did not
    require the R4 substituents to be identical. Allergan, Inc.,
    808 F. Supp. 2d at 726-27. Given this claim construction,
    the district court found that bimatoprost satisfied all
    limitations of the asserted claims, and consequently found
    Barr’s and Sandoz’s proposed uses of bimatoprost as set
    forth in their ANDAs constituted infringement of the ’819
    patent.
    8                                     ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    B. Invalidity
    The district court found that asserted claim 10 of
    the ’819 patent was not invalid, and rejected Barr and
    Sandoz’s arguments based upon anticipation and obvi-
    ousness.      The primary invalidity reference asserted
    during trial was a patent to Johan Stjernschantz, pub-
    lished as Patent Cooperation Treaty Application No. WO
    90/02253 on March 22, 1990 and entitled “Prostaglandin
    Derivatives for the Treatment of Glaucoma or Ocular
    Hypertension” (“Stjernschantz”).      Barr and Sandoz’s
    expert witness, Dr. Ashim Kumar Mitra, testified that
    asserted claim 10 was obvious over Stjernschantz, wheth-
    er alone or in combination with other prior art, including
    unexamined Japanese Patent Application No. S49-69636
    (“JP ’636”). 4 Barr and Sandoz also asserted post-trial that
    all of the asserted claims were obvious over Stjernschantz
    in combination with a chapter in the textbook “Prodrugs:
    Topical and Ocular Drug Delivery” entitled “Improved
    Ocular Drug Delivery with Prodrugs” (“Lee & Bund-
    gaard”).
    Stjernschantz discloses IOP-reducing derivatives of
    certain prostaglandins. Two such derivatives are dis-
    closed compounds 2 and 9, which are both isopropyl esters
    that convert into bimatoprost-free acid upon hydrolysis in
    the eye. 5 A third disclosed derivative is compound 17,
    4     Other prior art discussed by Dr. Mitra at trial
    included: 
    U.S. Patent No. 4,599,353,
     and a chapter of a
    1977 textbook (“Design of Biopharmaceutical Properties
    through Prodrugs and Analogs”) entitled “Physical Model
    Approach to the Design of Drugs with Improved Intestinal
    Absorption.”
    5    Compound 9 differs from compound 2 only in
    that it has a single bond between C-13 and C-14, whereas
    compound 2 has a double bond in that position. Com-
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                                  9
    bimatoprost-free acid or 17-phenyl PGF2α, which features
    a carboxylic acid functional group at C-1. The structural
    difference between bimatoprost and these Stjernschantz
    derivatives is that bimatoprost features an ethyl amide
    functional group at the C-1 position, whereas compounds
    2 and 9 have an isopropyl ester at C-1, and compound 17
    has carboxylic acid.
    However, these obviousness theories were under-
    mined when “Mitra’s credibility was eviscerated on cross-
    examination.” Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 733. Finding
    “Mitra’s credibility flawed on a fundamental level,” the
    district court accorded no weight to his testimony. Id. at
    735. The court then declined to “review the prior art
    references and weigh their import absent the guidance of
    an expert.” Id. at 736 n.21. Furthermore, based on its
    finding that Barr and Sandoz had improperly switched
    obviousness theories after Dr. Mitra’s testimony was
    discredited, the district court held Barr and Sandoz had
    waived any obviousness theory that relied “primarily on
    JP ’636, or that combine[d] Stjernschantz with Lee &
    Bundgaard.” Id. at 735. Due to the lack of credible evi-
    dence to support Barr’s and Sandoz’s obviousness theo-
    ries, plus the waiver of post-trial obviousness theories, the
    court held that Barr and Sandoz failed to prove obvious-
    ness of the asserted claim by clear and convincing evi-
    dence.
    Barr and Sandoz filed this timely appeal. This
    court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(1).
    pound 9 became latanoprost, which is marketed as Xala-
    tan®, a leading antiglaucoma treatment.
    10                                   ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    DISCUSSION
    1. The District Court Correctly Held That –N(R4)2
    As Used in the ’819 Patent Includes Compounds
    With Non-Identical R4 Elements
    The district court determined that “the plain and
    ordinary meaning of –N(R4)2 would support [Barr and
    Sandoz’s] construction that the R4 elements are identical
    functional groups,” but went on to find that Allergan had
    acted as its own lexicographer in defining –N(R4)2 con-
    trary to its ordinary meaning. Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d
    at 725-26. Barr and Sandoz appeal the district court’s
    construction of the –N(R4)2 term, arguing that the plain
    and ordinary meaning of –N(R4)2 requires identical R4
    elements, and that Allergan failed to make any express
    statement departing from that plain and ordinary mean-
    ing.
    Claim construction is a question of law subject to de
    novo review. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 
    138 F.3d 1448
    , 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Claim terms are
    generally given their “ordinary and customary meaning”
    as they would be understood by a person of ordinary skill
    in the art. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 
    415 F.3d 1303
    , 1312-13
    (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “Importantly, the person of
    ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term
    not only in the context of the particular claim in which the
    disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire
    patent, including the specification.” 
    Id. at 1313
    . Indeed,
    “the context in which a term is used in the asserted claim
    can be highly instructive,” as can other claims of the
    patent in question. 
    Id. at 1314
    . The inventor’s lexicogra-
    phy governs when “the specification [ ] reveal[s] a special
    definition given to a claim term by the patentee that
    differs from the meaning it would otherwise possess.” 
    Id. at 1316
    .
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                                11
    In this case, a person of ordinary skill in the art
    considering the entire ’819 patent would construe the
    disputed –N(R4)2 term to encompass nonidentical R4
    elements. The disputed claim term arises in independent
    claim 5, in which –N(R4)2 is used to claim one of the
    molecules that may be located at the C-1 position of the
    compound. Claim 5 further recites that R4 must be se-
    lected from a Markush group 6 “consisting of hydrogen, a
    lower alkyl radical having from one to six carbon atoms,
    wherein R5 is a lower alkyl radical having from one to six
    carbon atoms.” ’819 patent col. 13 ll. 31-39. [J.A.49]
    Asserted claim 10 ultimately depends from claim 5 and
    expressly includes three compounds with nonidentical R4
    elements, including bimatoprost. 7 Specifically, bimato-
    prost has two different substituents at the R4 position,
    both of which are claimed in the Markush group: hydro-
    gen (H) and an ethyl group (CH2CH3). 
    Id.
     col. 14 l. 60 -
    col. 15 l. 7. Two other compounds listed in claim 10 also
    6      “A Markush group is a listing of specified al-
    ternatives of a group in a patent claim, typically ex-
    pressed in the form: a member selected from the group
    consisting of A, B, and C.” Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm.
    Prods., Inc., 
    334 F.3d 1274
    , 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    7     Claim 9 ultimately depends from claim 5 and
    claims –N(R4)2 as one of the molecules at the C-1 position.
    ’819 patent col. 14 ll. 56-57. Claim 10, in turn, depends
    from claim 9. 
    Id.
     col. 14 l. 58. Therefore, although Barr
    and Sandoz stress that the –N(R4)2 term does not appear
    in claim 10, the compounds in claim 10 plainly contain –
    N(R4)2.
    12                                     ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    feature differing R4 elements. 8 
    Id.
     col. 14 ll. 65-67; col. 15
    ll. 4-6. Consistently, claim 18, depending from claim 11,
    recites the same three compounds as having a –N(R4)2
    molecule at the C-1 position. 
    Id.
     col. 17 ll. 14-22. These
    same three compounds, all with nonidentical R4 substitu-
    ents of –N(R4)2, also appear in the specification’s list of
    “novel compounds [that] may be used in the pharmaceuti-
    cal compositions and the methods of treatment of the
    present invention.” 
    Id.
     col. 7 ll. 19-21, 41-49.
    Barr and Sandoz nevertheless focus on the district
    court’s preliminary conclusion that the plain and ordinary
    meaning of –N(R4)2 required identical R4 elements.
    However, this preliminary conclusion was based on ex-
    trinsic evidence, such as expert testimony that “[t]he (X)y
    nomenclature” was “commonly used” to represent identi-
    cal substituents, Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 725, which
    failed to consider the –N(R4)2 term as it was used in the
    ’819 patent. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (“Properly viewed,
    the ‘ordinary meaning’ of a claim term is its meaning to
    the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.”)
    (emphasis added). When the district court later consid-
    ered the term in the context of the ’819 patent, it con-
    cluded that Allergan “clearly manifest[ed]” in the claims
    and specification that the –N(R4)2 term was meant to
    encompass nonidentical R4 elements such as bimatoprost.
    Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 726. Barr and Sandoz’s
    argument regarding the plain meaning of –N(R4)2 is
    unpersuasive; when properly construed in light of the
    8       These compounds are: cyclopentane N-
    isopropyl       heptenamide-5-cis-2-(3α-hydroxy-5-phenyl-1-
    trans-pentenyl)-3, 5-dihydroxy, [1α,2β,3α,5α], and cyclopen-
    tane N-methyl heptenamide-5-cis-2-(3α-hydroxy-5-phenyl-
    1-trans-pentenyl)-3, 5-dihydroxy, [1α,2β,3α,5α]. ’819 patent
    col. 14 ll. 65-67; col. 15 ll. 4-6 (emphases added).
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                                13
    entire patent, the –N(R4)2 term plainly encompasses
    nonidentical R4 substituents.
    2. The District Court Correctly Held That the
    Asserted Claim Is Not Invalid As Obvious
    The district court held that Barr and Sandoz failed
    to prove obviousness by clear and convincing evidence.
    Barr and Sandoz appeal this determination. First, they
    argue that the district court’s adverse credibility determi-
    nation of Dr. Mitra did not excuse the court from its
    obligation to independently review the submitted prior art
    references. Additionally, they assert that their obvious-
    ness theories are supported even when considering only
    the testimony of Allergan’s experts and corroborating
    evidence.
    “The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal
    determination,” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 
    550 U.S. 398
    , 427 (2007), which we review de novo, Procter &
    Gamble Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 
    566 F.3d 989
    , 993
    (Fed. Cir. 2009). Following a bench trial, underlying
    findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Alza Corp. v.
    Mylan Labs., Inc., 
    464 F.3d 1286
    , 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A
    party seeking to invalidate a patent based on obviousness
    must prove such obviousness by clear and convincing
    evidence. Procter & Gamble Co., 
    566 F.3d at 993-94
    . A
    patented invention is obvious when “a skilled artisan
    would have been motivated to combine the teachings of
    the prior art references to achieve the claimed invention,
    and [ ] the skilled artisan would have had a reasonable
    expectation in doing so.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 
    480 F.3d 1348
    , 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
    14                                   ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    A. The District Court Did Not Err In Finding Expert
    Testimony Was Required To Show Invalidity
    The district court found that Dr. Mitra’s credibility
    was “flawed on a fundamental level” and declined to
    assign any weight to his opinions. Allergan, 808 F. Supp.
    2d at 735. This was a fair assessment of the testimony of
    Dr. Mitra, whose prevarication and inconsistency were
    repeatedly demonstrated during Allergan’s cross exami-
    nation. For instance: (1) Dr. Mitra incorrectly drew the
    bimatoprost molecule and utilized slides that inaccurately
    represented bimatoprost; (2) his previous testimony given
    at another trial directly contradicted his stated opinion
    that Stjernschantz persuasively showed the hypotensive
    effect of prostaglandin analogues; and (3) his previously
    published opinions that bimatoprost was more effective
    than latanoprost and acted through a “novel prostamide
    receptor” contradicted his trial testimony that bimato-
    prost was just a “delivery vehicle” for bimatoprost-free
    acid. Id. at 733-34.
    The district court declined to independently “review
    the prior art references and weigh their import absent the
    guidance of an expert.” Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 736
    n.21. On appeal, Barr and Sandoz challenge this refusal
    to consider their obviousness theories, contending that
    discrediting Dr. Mitra “did not then permit the [district]
    court to ignore all other evidence. . . .” BB.49.
    This court has noted that “‘expert testimony re-
    garding matters beyond the comprehension of laypersons
    is sometimes essential,’ particularly in cases involving
    complex technology.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 
    616 F.3d 1231
    , 1240 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Centricut, LLC v.
    Esab Group, Inc., 
    390 F.3d 1361
    , 1369-70 (Fed. Cir.
    2004)). Obviousness is one area in which expert testi-
    mony may be required. See Proveris Scientific Corp. v.
    Innovasystems, Inc., 
    536 F.3d 1256
    , 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                                  15
    (holding the district court did not abuse its discretion “in
    requiring [the party asserting invalidity] to present
    expert testimony in order to establish invalidity” because
    the technology was “sufficiently complex to fall beyond the
    grasp of an ordinary layperson.”). In complex cases where
    invalidity on the grounds of obviousness is asserted,
    “expert testimony may be critical, for example, to estab-
    lish the existence of certain features in the prior art or the
    existence (or lack thereof) of a motivation to combine
    references.” Wyers, 
    616 F.3d at
    1240 n.5 (interior refer-
    ences omitted).
    The district court appears to have found this case to
    be “sufficiently complex to fall beyond [the] grasp of
    ordinary layperson[s].” Allergan, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 736
    n.21 (characterizing the holding of Proveris Scientific
    Corp., 
    536 F.3d at 1367
    ). Indeed, this is not a case where
    “[t]he technology is simple,” Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte
    Fabricating Ltd., 
    550 F.3d 1356
    , 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008), or
    where the references are “easily understandable without
    the need for expert explanatory testimony,” Union Car-
    bide v. American Can Co., 
    724 F.2d 1567
    , 1573 (Fed. Cir.
    1984). Additionally, this is emphatically not a case where
    “[t]he factual inquiries underlying [the] determination of
    obviousness are not in material dispute.” Sundance, Inc.,
    
    550 F.3d at 1365
    ; see, e.g., Allergan, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d
    at 721 (explaining that “[b]imatoprost’s mechanism of
    action is greatly debated in this case,” with Barr and
    Sandoz arguing it functions as a “prodrug” with no inher-
    ent biological activity, and Allergan arguing that it is not
    a prodrug, but rather acts on a novel prostamide recep-
    tor). Although in some cases, “the legal determination of
    obviousness may include recourse to logic, judgment, and
    common sense, in lieu of expert testimony,” Wyers, 
    616 F.3d at 1239
    , the district court did not err in finding that
    common sense and logic were not sufficiently illuminating
    16                                  ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS
    in this case to carry Barr and Sandoz’s burden of proving
    obviousness.
    B. Allergan’s Expert’s Testimony Does Not Support
    Barr and Sandoz’s Obviousness Theories
    On appeal, Barr and Sandoz argue that their obvi-
    ousness theories are supported by expert testimony: that
    of Allergan’s expert, Dr. Timothy L. Macdonald, whose
    testimony the district court found to be credible. 9 In
    particular, they contend that Dr. Macdonald’s testimony
    supports the three facts needed to show the asserted
    claim is obvious in view of Stjernschantz and other refer-
    ences: (1) Stjernschantz taught that bimatoprost-free acid
    lowered IOP; (2) Stjernschantz’s compound 2 hydrolyzed
    into bimatoprost-free acid when placed in the eye; and (3)
    a skilled artisan would have known that substituting an
    amide for the ester at the C-1 position would result in a
    prodrug that hydrolyzed into bimatoprost-free acid in the
    eye.
    Dr. Macdonald provided testimony consistent with
    the first two propositions. See J.A.2086 (testifying that
    Stjernschantz taught bimatoprost-free acid would have
    the effect of lowering IOP); J.A.2062-63 (testifying that
    Stjernschantz taught compound 2 would hydrolyze into
    bimatoprost-free acid once in the body). However, his
    testimony contradicts the third requirement. Dr. Mac-
    donald instead asserted that one of skill in the art would
    not have believed substituting an amide at the C-1 posi-
    tion would create a prodrug that hydrolyzed into bimato-
    9    Barr and Sandoz also rely on other Allergan
    witnesses to support their obviousness claim, but we have
    carefully reviewed the record and find nothing in the
    testimony of these additional witnesses that could over-
    ride Dr. Macdonald’s expert opinion of non-obviousness or
    establish clear and convincing evidence of obviousness.
    ALLERGAN   v. BARR LABS                                17
    prost-free acid once in the eye. To the contrary, Dr.
    Macdonald testified that an amide converts into carbox-
    ylic acid at such a slow rate that “one doesn’t consider it
    as a candidate [as a prodrug].” J.A.2065-66. He explained
    that “a prodrug approach relies on efficient conversion of
    the prodrug into the drug,” and the “500-year half life” of
    an amide in water was “not an efficient conversion.”
    J.A.2067; see also J.A.1996. Dr. Macdonald concluded
    that the prior art did not teach or motivate one of skill in
    the art to substitute an amide at the C-1 position to create
    a glaucoma drug. Given Dr. Macdonald’s testimony to the
    contrary, Barr and Sandoz can point to no credible expert
    testimony showing that substituting an amide at the C-1
    position would have been obvious to a skilled artisan at
    the time of the invention. Because of this gap, we hold
    that Barr and Sandoz have failed to show obviousness of
    the ’819 patent by clear and convincing evidence. 10
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
    court’s claim construction and determination of nonobvi-
    ousness.
    AFFIRMED
    10   We need not determine whether the district
    court abused its discretion in finding that Barr and San-
    doz waived their post-trial obviousness theories, because,
    as determined above, the record contains insufficient
    expert testimony to support any of Barr and Sandoz’s
    obviousness theories.