Seda v. Department of the Army , 505 F. App'x 940 ( 2013 )


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  •          NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ANTHONY WAYNE SEDA,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2012-3173
    ______________________
    Petition for review from the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in Nos. PH0752100382-B-1 and PH0752100382-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 8, 2013
    ______________________
    ANTHONY WAYNE SEDA, of Aberdeen, Maryland, pro
    se.
    MICHELLE R. MILBER, Trial Attorney, Commercial Lit-
    igation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department
    of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With her
    on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director,
    KENNETH M. DINTZER, Assistant Director.
    ______________________
    2                                     ANTHONY SEDA   v. ARMY
    Before LOURIE, PROST, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Anthony W. Seda appeals pro se from the final deci-
    sion of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”)
    regarding his removal by the Department of the Army
    (the “Army”) and the denial of his whisteblower reprisal
    affirmative defense. Seda v. Dep’t of the Army, No. PH-
    0752-10-0382-B-1 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 19, 2011) (whisteblow-
    ing); Seda v. Dep’t of the Army, No. PH-0752-10-0382-I-1
    (M.S.P.B. June 22, 2011) (removal). Because the Board’s
    decisions were supported by substantial evidence and not
    arbitrary and capricious, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Seda worked for the Social Security Administration
    prior to his employment with the Army. He was fired
    from that job. Within five years, the Army’s Adelphia
    Civilian Personnel Advisory Center (CPAC), Aberdeen
    Proving Ground, Maryland, appointed Seda as an except-
    ed service Human Resources Specialist. In relation to
    this appointment, Seda submitted a Declaration of Feder-
    al Employment (the “Declaration”). Question 12 to that
    form asked:
    During the last five years, have you been fired
    from any job for any reason, did you quit after be-
    ing told that you would be fired, did you leave
    any job by mutual agreement because of specific
    problems, or were you debarred from Federal
    employment by the Office of Personnel Manage-
    ment or any other Federal agency?
    J.A. 16. In response to the question, Seda checked the
    “No” box. Id.
    After being hired by the Army, Seda complained to his
    supervisor that the Army had set his salary at a rate not
    ANTHONY SEDA   v. ARMY                                3
    commensurate with his qualifications. While investigat-
    ing that complaint, the Army discovered that Seda was
    fired from his prior federal service and hence that the
    statement on his Declaration was a misrepresentation.
    The Army then issued a notice of termination during
    Seda’s probation period based on the misrepresentation,
    effective January 15, 2010.
    Prior to that effective date, Seda wrote to his Con-
    gressman regarding his complaint that the Army hired
    him at the wrong GS level. Seda also complained to the
    Office of Special Counsel concerning his removal. The
    Army subsequently rescinded its original termination
    notice because Seda, as a preference-eligible veteran, had
    completed his probationary period. Accordingly, the Army
    then issued a second notice of proposed removal dated
    February 4, 2010. Seda responded to the second notice,
    and the Army thereafter issued a notice of decision to
    remove him on March 30, 2010, effective that same day.
    Seda appealed to the Board.
    The administrative judge (“AJ”) upheld Seda’s remov-
    al because the Army had demonstrated by a preponder-
    ance of the evidence that Seda provided a false statement
    and made a misrepresentation on a Federal employment
    form. The Board affirmed that finding, but remanded the
    case for consideration of Seda’s defense of whistleblowing
    reprisal. On remand, the AJ considered and rejected
    Seda’s defense. The AJ found that it was unclear that
    any disclosures Seda made to his Congressman, the Office
    of Special Counsel, and his supervisor were protected and
    that it was clear the Army had removed Seda based solely
    upon his misrepresentations. The AJ also assumed,
    arguendo, that even if he had made a protected disclosure,
    Seda failed to prove that it was a contributing factor in
    the decision to remove him. Based on these findings, the
    AJ affirmed Seda’s removal. Seda filed a petition for
    review by the full Board.
    4                                      ANTHONY SEDA   v. ARMY
    On review, the Board affirmed the AJ’s decision deny-
    ing his whistleblower defense. The Board agreed with the
    AJ because none of the officials at the Army were aware
    of Seda’s complaints to his Congressman or to the Offfice
    of Special counsel prior to the removal action. Seda
    appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board de-
    cision is limited. We can set aside the Board’s decision
    only if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
    tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained
    without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation
    having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial
    evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c); see Briggs v. Merit Sys.
    Prot. Bd., 
    331 F.3d 1307
    , 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    Seda spends a significant portion of his briefing dis-
    cussing the circumstances surrounding his removal from
    his position at the Social Security Administration. He
    asserts that he was not removed for misconduct, but for
    performance reasons or other factors unrelated to miscon-
    duct. However, the propriety of his removal from the
    Social Security Administration is not within the scope of
    this appeal. It is the fact of his prior termination from the
    Social Security Administration, which Seda does not
    contest, that is relevant to the falsehood of his later
    misrepresentation to the Army. We thus decline to con-
    sider Seda’s arguments regarding the details of his em-
    ployment by the Social Security Administration.
    As Seda does not contest the fact of his prior termina-
    tion, the falsehood of his response to question 12 on his
    Declaration is likewise not in dispute. As the AJ found,
    Seda has not provided a credible explanation regarding
    how and why he answered question 12 in the negative.
    Instead, the AJ determined that Seda’s intent to deceive
    could be inferred from the repeated omission of any
    ANTHONY SEDA   v. ARMY                                 5
    mention of his employment at and removal from the
    Social Security Adminstration on his Declaration and the
    two resumes he submitted to the Army. We see no error
    in that determination.
    Turning to the penalty, Seda argues that the Board
    improperly applied the Douglas factors in considering
    whether his removal was a reasonable penalty under the
    circumstances. Seda contends that given his service
    record and lack of any evidence of intent, the removal
    penalty was overly harsh. In reviewing an agency’s
    penalty decision, the Board is required to ascertain
    whether the agency has responsibly balanced the factors
    delineated in Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 
    5 MSPB 313
    , 
    5 M.S.P.R. 280
    , 305–06 (1981).
    We conclude that the AJ properly considered and
    weighed all of the relevant Douglas factors in determining
    that the penalty of removal was reasonable, and this court
    “will not disturb a choice of penalty within the agency’s
    discretion unless the severity of the agency’s action ap-
    pears       totally    unwarranted      in      light    of
    all factors.” Lachance v. Devall, 
    178 F.3d 1246
    , 1251
    (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Mings v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    813 F.2d 384
    , 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). The AJ explained the
    Douglas factors and then examined whether the Army
    official considered them. The AJ noted that the Army
    official avowed that she had considered the Douglas
    factors and record evidence. In particular, the Army
    official considered the charges to be necessary given that
    Seda was hired for a human resources position and was
    unable to complete his own human resources paperwork.
    The Army official also found that removal was consistent
    with other penalties for similar misconduct. The Army
    official finally noted that the questions and instructions
    on the Declaration were clear and that there were no
    mitigating circumstances, feasible rehabilitation, or
    alternative sanctions. Based on these facts, the AJ con-
    cluded that removal was reasonable. We see no reason to
    6                                    ANTHONY SEDA   v. ARMY
    disturb that determination based on substantial evidence
    supporting it.
    The only remaining dispositive issue in this case is
    whether the Army removed Seda in reprisal for protected
    whistleblowing. A federal employee may seek corrective
    action from the Board when personnel action has been
    taken in retaliation for a WPA-protected disclosure.
    Fields v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    452 F.3d 1297
    , 1302 (Fed. Cir.
    2006) (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 1221
    (a)). “To prevail in a case of
    retaliation for whistleblowing under the WPA, an employ-
    ee must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a
    protected disclosure was made and that it was a contrib-
    uting factor in the personnel action.” Willis v. Dep’t of
    Agric., 
    141 F.3d 1139
    , 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    Seda alleges that the disclosures to his Army supervi-
    sor, his Congressman, and the Office of Special Counsel
    regarding his compensation and his supervisor’s actions
    were protected disclosures and a contributing factor to his
    removal. However, the AJ found that disclosures to the
    Congressman and the Office of Special Counsel were
    merely vague conclusory assertions not rising to the level
    of a protected disclosure. Seda has not presented any
    evidence or argument to the contrary; thus, we see no
    reason to disturb that finding by the AJ. As the Board
    also correctly noted, the disclosure to Seda’s supervisor
    about her own alleged wrongdoing was not protected. See
    Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    263 F.3d 1341
    , 1350
    (Fed. Cir. 2001).
    Moreover, regardless whether the disclosures to the
    Congressman and the Office of Special Counsel were
    protected, Seda has offered no evidence that the alleged
    disclosures were a factor contributing to his removal.
    Seda has not offered any evidence that any Army officials
    were aware of Seda’s complaints to his Congressman or to
    the Office of Special Counsel prior to the initiation of the
    removal action.     On the contrary, Seda’s supervisor
    ANTHONY SEDA   v. ARMY                                 7
    avowed that she was unaware of the Congressional in-
    quiry prior to the notice of proposed removal, and there is
    no other evidence that any Army official involved in the
    removal knew of the complaints to the Office of Special
    Counsel or the Congressman prior to the removal action.
    Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the
    disclosure was a contributing factor in Seda’s removal.
    In sum, as there is no evidence of either a protected
    disclosure or that any such disclosure was a contributing
    factor in Seda’s removal, the Board did not err in denying
    his defense of whistleblower reprisal.
    We have considered Seda’s remaining arguments and
    do not find them persuasive. We find no error in the
    Board’s well reasoned decisions. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.