Thibeault v. MSPB , 611 F. App'x 975 ( 2015 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    DANIEL THIBEAULT,
    Petitioner
    v.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
    Respondent
    ______________________
    2014-3200
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. SF-0752-13-0646-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: May 7, 2015
    ______________________
    DANIEL THIBEAULT, El Cajon, CA, pro se.
    STEPHEN FUNG, Office of the General Counsel, Merit
    Systems Protection Board, Washington DC, for respond-
    ent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK.
    ______________________
    Before O’MALLEY, PLAGER, and TARANTO, Circuit
    Judges.
    2                                       THIBEAULT   v. MSPB
    PER CURIAM.
    Daniel Thibeault appeals a final decision of the Merit
    Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) dismissing his
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction based on his inability to
    demonstrate that his decisions to take leave and retire
    were involuntary. Thibeault v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. SF-
    0752-13-0646-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 13, 2014) (hereinafter,
    Final Decision) (reproduced at Respondent’s Appendix
    (“RA”) 1–7). Because we agree with the Board that
    Thibeault has not established jurisdiction, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Thibeault was a mail handler for the United States
    Postal Service (“USPS”), who had operated mail pro-
    cessing machines before the USPS replaced these ma-
    chines in late 2012. Thibeault v. U.S. Postal Serv., No.
    SF-0752-13-0646-I-1 at 1–2 (M.S.P.B. Feb. 24, 2014)
    (hereinafter, Initial Decision) (reproduced at RA 8–21).
    Because these new machines were to be operated by mail-
    processing clerks, and not mail handlers, USPS informed
    Thibeault that his services as a mail handler were no
    longer required, and invited him to bid for a new assign-
    ment. 
    Id. at 2.
    When Thibeault did not bid on a new
    assignment, USPS assigned him to a new shift—from 8:00
    p.m. to 4:30 a.m. Thibeault objected to this assignment,
    arguing that his psoriatic arthritis would be exacerbated
    by the cold weather he would be exposed to while travel-
    ling to and from work. He, thus, requested a reasonable
    accommodation in light of this disability, asking to be
    returned to his original shift—4:00 p.m. to 12:30 a.m.
    When USPS did not grant this request, Thibeault used
    his sick leave beginning in January 2013 in order to avoid
    working the overnight shift. When his sick leave was
    exhausted in June 2013, he retired from USPS.
    On July 5, 2013, Thibeault filed an action with the
    Board, contending that USPS had constructively sus-
    pended him from February to June 2013, and construc-
    THIBEAULT   v. MSPB                                              3
    tively removed him from his position when he was forced
    to retire in June 2013. 
    Id. at 6.
    In the initial decision, the
    administrative judge (“AJ”) concluded that the Board did
    not have jurisdiction to consider Thibeault’s appeal. 
    Id. at 3,
    16.
    As a general matter, the Board does not have jurisdic-
    tion to review cases where an employee takes leave or
    retires, because it is presumed these actions are volun-
    tary. Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    437 F.3d 1322
    ,
    1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc); Justice v. Dep’t of Navy,
    89 M.S.P.R. 379, ¶ 5 (2001). Thus, in order to establish
    jurisdiction, a claimant must satisfy a two part test.
    First, a claimant must make “non-frivolous allegations . . .
    that, if proven, can establish the Board’s jurisdiction.”
    
    Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1330
    . If a claimant’s allegations meet
    this threshold, then a claimant is entitled to a hearing.
    
    Id. at 1330,
    1344. “At the hearing, the claimant must
    prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.”
    
    Id. at 1344;
    see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i) (“The appellant
    has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evi-
    dence . . . with respect to: [i]ssues of jurisdiction . . . .”). If
    a claimant is able to do so, only then may the Board
    consider the merits of the appeal. See 
    Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1340
    .
    In this case, the AJ notified Thibeault that the Board
    might not have jurisdiction to consider his appeal, but
    Thibeault did not request a hearing. See Initial Decision
    at 2. Accordingly, after both parties filed responses
    addressing the jurisdictional question, the AJ proceeded
    to determine whether Thibeault satisfied his burden to
    prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e.,
    the step two inquiry reference above) based solely on the
    papers presented. Upon review, the AJ concluded that
    Thibeault did not satisfy his burden of establishing that
    his absence and his retirement were involuntary.
    4                                        THIBEAULT   v. MSPB
    With respect to Thibeault’s claim that he was forced
    to use his sick leave because USPS decided to assign him
    to an unworkable overnight shift, the AJ determined that
    its decision to do so was not actionable. 
    Id. at 3.
    The AJ
    first noted that there was no evidence Thibeault had
    informed USPS he could not work an overnight shift prior
    to his reassignment. 
    Id. at 4.
    Under the agency’s collec-
    tive bargaining agreement (“CBA”), which governed
    Thibeault, USPS was allowed to assign Thibeault to any
    vacant duty assignment. Therefore, the AJ reasoned that
    the initial decision to assign him to an overnight shift was
    not improper.
    With respect to Thibeault’s request for reasonable ac-
    commodation after his reassignment, the AJ explained
    that an agency is required to make a reasonable accom-
    modation for the known physical and mental limitations
    of a disabled person unless doing so would cause undue
    hardship. 
    Id. (citing 29
    C.F.R. § 1630.9(a)). The AJ
    assumed that Thibeault had a disability that gave him
    the right to reasonable accommodations, even though his
    sensitivity to cold temperatures related to his commute
    and not his actual working conditions. 
    Id. Nonetheless, the
    AJ concluded that USPS was not required to reassign
    him to another post as a reasonable accommodation,
    because there were no vacant positions to which
    Thibeault could have been reassigned. While there were
    part-time, non-career positions available between Janu-
    ary and June 2013, the CBA prohibited assigning a full-
    time employee, such as Thibeault, to a non-career posi-
    tion. 
    Id. at 6.
    Without any evidence that Thibeault would
    have accepted a voluntary demotion or that there was an
    exceptional circumstance which justified violating the
    CBA, the AJ found that Thibeault had failed to demon-
    strate USPS committed any wrongful acts that caused
    him to take leave. 
    Id. at 7.
    Because a constructive sus-
    pension requires such proof, the AJ concluded that
    Thibeault did not prove his absence was involuntary, and,
    THIBEAULT   v. MSPB                                      5
    thus, the Board lacked jurisdiction over his constructive
    suspension claim. 
    Id. Regarding Thibeault’s
    claim for constructive removal,
    the AJ again explained that Thibeault had failed to
    demonstrate that USPS’s failure to reassign him was
    improper because there were no other suitable assign-
    ments available at the time. 
    Id. at 8.
    Further, there was
    no evidence that USPS misled him, considered unwar-
    ranted disciplinary action, or prevented him from with-
    drawing his retirement before its effective date. 
    Id. While the
    AJ recognized that Thibeault may have faced
    unpleasant working conditions, constructive removal
    requires more. In the absence of evidence that the condi-
    tions were so intolerable to compel a reasonable person to
    resign, the AJ found that Thibeault had failed to demon-
    strate he lacked a meaningful choice regarding retire-
    ment. 
    Id. at 9.
    Accordingly, the AJ found that the Board
    also lacked jurisdiction over Thibeault’s constructive
    removal claim and dismissed his entire appeal for lack of
    jurisdiction.
    Thibeault urged the Board to reconsider the AJ’s deci-
    sion, but the Board denied Thibeault’s petition for review.
    In addition to affirming the AJ’s initial decision, the
    Board considered three additional arguments presented
    by Thibeault for the first time on appeal. First, the Board
    dismissed Thibeault’s claim that USPS failed to comply
    with its own rules, which require that an employee who
    suffered a compensable injury receive a medical evalua-
    tion before a reassignment. It found that such a conten-
    tion did not change the AJ’s determination that there
    were no available assignments that could accommodate
    his disability, particularly because the AJ had accepted as
    true Thibeault’s claim that he, in fact, had a disability.
    Final Decision at 4. Second, the Board found that the
    AJ’s decision not to allow a statement regarding
    Thibeault’s willingness to take a part-time position did
    not provide a basis for reversal. It explained that, under
    6                                        THIBEAULT   v. MSPB
    the Rehabilitation Act, there is no requirement that an
    agency create a new position for an employee in order to
    provide reasonable accommodation. Thus, even if the
    Board considered this information, it would not demon-
    strate that USPS acted improperly when it did not reas-
    sign Thibeault to a part-time position as the agency had
    no duty to do so. 
    Id. at 5.
    Lastly, the Board concluded
    that the AJ correctly determined USPS did not err when
    it did not assign him to a full-time position posted in
    September 2013, because there was no evidence this
    position was available prior to Thibeault’s retirement in
    June 2013. 
    Id. at 6.
    Because the AJ properly determined
    the Board lacked jurisdiction over Thibeault’s claims, the
    Board affirmed the AJ’s decision and denied Thibeault’s
    petition for review.
    Thibeault timely appealed the Board’s final decision
    to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
    § 1295(a)(9) (2012).
    DISCUSSION
    The scope of our review in an appeal from a final deci-
    sion of the Board is limited. We must affirm the Board’s
    decision unless it was: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
    of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2)
    obtained without procedures required by law, rule or
    regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
    substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the
    Board’s decision regarding its own jurisdiction de novo.
    Palmer v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    550 F.3d 1380
    , 1382 (Fed.
    Cir. 2008). We are bound, however, by the Board’s factual
    findings on which a jurisdictional determination is based
    “unless those findings are not supported by substantial
    evidence.” Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    154 F.3d 1313
    ,
    1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    On appeal, Thibeault does not challenge the Board’s
    procedure, but rather its findings that his leave of absence
    and retirement were not the result of an erroneous deci-
    THIBEAULT   v. MSPB                                      7
    sion by USPS. Specifically, Thibeault argues that the
    Board erred by failing to properly consider that (1) he is
    disabled, (2) USPS misrepresented Thibeault’s legal
    position to the Board, and (3) USPS was obligated to
    medically evaluate Thibeault prior to reassigning him to
    any position.
    With respect to the Board’s consideration of his disa-
    bility, Thibeault argues that the Board simply ignored
    this fact when evaluating whether his leave of absence
    and retirement were involuntary. But a review of the
    record reveals that both the AJ and the Board assumed he
    had a disability that gave him the right to reasonable
    accommodations. See Initial Decision at 4 (“I will assume,
    for purposes of this decision, that the appellant had a
    disability that gave him the right to reasonable accommo-
    dations.”); Final Decision at 4–6 (discussing whether
    USPS wrongfully failed to assign Thibeault to a position
    as accommodation for his disability). Thibeault’s asser-
    tions to the contrary are unpersuasive.
    Thibeault also alleges that USPS misled the Board by
    inaccurately describing Thibeault’s position and misrep-
    resenting his rights under the applicable law. He con-
    tends that a reasonable accommodation only required an
    assignment that met his medical needs—he did not re-
    quire a fully-funded position. Essentially, Thibeault
    disputes whether USPS erred by not assigning him to an
    available part-time position, as opposed to creating a new
    one for him. When determining if an agency failed to
    provide reasonable accommodations, a claimant must
    prove that such an accommodation was available at the
    relevant time. See Benavidez v. Dep’t of Navy, 
    241 F.3d 1370
    , 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). If there was no accommoda-
    tion available, then an agency cannot be found to have
    constructively suspended or removed a claimant. See id.;
    Williams v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 227 F. App’x 916, 919
    (Fed. Cir. 2007).
    8                                        THIBEAULT   v. MSPB
    While there were part-time positions available during
    this time period, the AJ relied upon unrebutted evidence
    to find that it would violate the CBA to assign Thibeault
    to such a position. Initial Decision at 6. Although an
    agency can override a CBA if special circumstances exist,
    it does not appear Thibeault made such a showing. See
    U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 
    535 U.S. 391
    , 405–06 (2002)
    (“[T]he plaintiff must bear the burden of showing special
    circumstances that make an exception from the seniority
    system reasonable in the particular case.”). In the ab-
    sence of such circumstances, substantial evidence sup-
    ports the AJ’s finding that the part-time positions
    available during the relevant time were not reasonable
    accommodations. Further, to the extent that Thibeault
    does argue that USPS should have created a new position
    for him to accommodate his disability, the AJ correctly
    determined that USPS was not required to do so. Office of
    the Architect v. Office of Compliance, 
    361 F.3d 633
    , 643
    (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]n employer is not required to create a
    new position to accommodate a disabled employee . . . .”);
    see Wade v. U.S. Postal Serv., 157 F. App’x 268, 270 (Fed.
    Cir. 2005) (“While the agency is required to assign a
    disabled employee to a position he can perform, if one
    exists, it is not required to generate such a position when
    it does not reasonably exist.”).
    Lastly, with respect to Thibeault’s claims that USPS
    could not reassign him without a medical examination, as
    the Board correctly found, this does not change the AJ’s
    finding that there were no other positions available
    between January and June 2013. Thibeault must demon-
    strate that USPS erred by failing to provide reasonable
    accommodations in order to establish that he was con-
    structively suspended and then constructively removed
    from his job, by showing USPS could have reassigned him
    to a different position. Here, there was substantial evi-
    dence to support the AJ’s finding that there were no other
    available assignments during the relevant time. Thus,
    THIBEAULT   v. MSPB                                      9
    the Board did not err when it affirmed the AJ’s decision to
    dismiss Thibeault’s claims for lack of jurisdiction.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of
    the Board.
    AFFIRMED