Nichols Institute Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Laboratory, Inc. , 195 F. App'x 947 ( 2006 )


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  •                  NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    06-1087
    NICHOLS INSTITUTE DIAGNOSTICS, INC.,
    Plaintiff- Appellee,
    v.
    SCANTIBODIES CLINICAL LABORATORY, INC.,
    and SCANTIBODIES LABORATORY, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: September 20, 2006
    __________________________
    Before MAYER, RADER, and LINN Circuit Judges.
    LINN, Circuit Judge.
    Scantibodies Clinical Laboratory, Inc. and Scantibodies Laboratory, Inc.
    (collectively “Scantibodies”) appeal from an order of the United States District Court for
    the Southern District of California denying Scantibodies’ motion for partial summary
    judgment of invalidity of Nichols’ 
    U.S. Patent No. 6,030,790
     (the “’790 patent”) and
    granting Nichols Institute Diagnostics, Inc.’s (“Nichols”) cross-motion for partial
    summary judgment of no invalidity of the ’790 patent. Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v.
    Scantibodies Clinical Lab., Inc., No. 02-CV-46 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2005). Scantibodies
    also appeals from post-trial orders for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) that the
    ’790 patent is valid and infringed. Because the district court erred in denying partial
    summary judgment that the ’790 patent is anticipated and granting partial summary
    judgment that the ’790 patent is not anticipated, we reverse the grant of summary
    judgment of no anticipation, hold that all of the asserted claims (i.e., independent claim
    17 and its dependent claims 20 through 25) are anticipated under 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    , and
    direct entry of judgment for Scantibodies. We therefore need not, and do not, reach the
    remaining issues on appeal regarding infringement and alternate grounds for invalidity.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Human Parathyroid Hormone (“hPTH”) is a protein comprised of 84 amino acids
    that plays an important role in regulating calcium metabolism. Various fragments of
    hPTH may circulate in the bloodstream; however, to be biologically active, a fragment of
    hPTH must include the first two amino acids and must be at least 34 amino acids long.
    The amount of biologically active hPTH circulating in a patient’s bloodstream may be
    measured by creating antibodies that bind to specific amino acid sequences, also
    referred to as peptides, of hPTH and then incorporating those antibodies into a well-
    known immunoassay test.
    In September of 1994, Dr. Marcus Magerlein and five of his colleagues published
    an abstract disclosing that they created ten antisera, labeled K1 through K10, each of
    which contained a mixture of antibodies that bound to specific peptides of a fragment of
    hPTH that contained amino acids 1 through 37 (represented as hPTH 1-37). See M.
    Magerlein et al., Abstract, Immunological Detection of Human Parathyroid Hormone 1-
    37 (hPTH 1-37), the Physiologically Circulating Fragment of hPTH, Eur. J. Pharm. Sci. 2
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    (1994) (the “abstract”). The abstract explains that, when used in well-known assay
    tests, the disclosed sera “provide the possibility to specifically detect the physiologically
    circulating fragment of human PTH in serum.” The abstract discloses that some of the
    sera, namely sera labeled K1 through K3, bound predominantly to hPTH peptides
    having the first two amino acids. Because the antibodies in the K1 through K3 sera
    bound predominantly to peptides containing the first two amino acids, and the
    antibodies in the other sera bound to peptides of hPTH containing blocks of amino acid
    sequences through 37, the sera could be used in combination to specifically detect
    hPTH fragments that include the first two amino acids and are 37 amino acids long.
    The abstract was published and distributed to the public on September 12, 1994.
    It was not until after that date that the authors of the abstract discovered that, to be
    biologically active, a fragment of hPTH must have both the first two amino acids and be
    at least 34 amino acids long. Thus, it was not until after the abstract was published that
    the authors recognized the significance of the disclosure in the abstract.
    On September 22, 1995, Dr. Magerlein and his colleagues filed the patent
    application that is the subject of this litigation. The ’790 patent discloses compositions
    of antibodies that selectively bind to specific peptide sequences of hPTH 1-37, methods
    of using the antibodies to detect biologically active hPTH, and immunoassay test kits
    containing the antibodies to assist in the diagnosis of biologically active hPTH.
    Independent claim 17 and its dependent claims 20 through 25 are at issue in this
    appeal. At the trial court, and on appeal, the parties treated claim 17 as representative.
    Claim 17 recites:
    A composition comprising an antibody or antibody fragment
    and a suitable carrier: wherein the antibody or antibody
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    fragment selectively binds a peptide of human parathyroid
    hormone (hPTH) selected from the group consisting of
    peptides having SEQ. ID Nos. 1-6.
    ’790 patent, col. 26, ll. 29-34. The peptides having the sequence identification numbers
    1 through 6, (i.e., SEQ. ID Nos. 1-6) are hPTH 1-10, hPTH 1-9, hPTH 1-8, hPTH 1-7,
    hPTH 1-6, and hPTH 1-5, respectively.
    Nichols is the exclusive licensee of the ’790 patent. Scantibodies manufactures
    and sells test kits for hPTH that contain antibodies the bind to peptides of hPTH 1-9
    and hPTH 1-12.         On January 8, 2002, Nichols sued Scantibodies, alleging that
    Scantibodies’ hPTH 1-9 and hPTH 1-12 antibodies literally infringed claims 17 and 20-
    25 of the ’790 patent. Scantibodies counterclaimed that the ’790 patent is invalid and
    not infringed.
    Scantibodies twice sought summary judgment that the abstract anticipates the
    ’790 patent. The district court denied both motions. On June 2, 2003, in the first order
    denying Scantibodies’s summary judgment motion on anticipation, the district court held
    that Scantibodies had “not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the abstract
    [expressly] describes the same antibodies as those in the patent” because the
    antibodies described in the abstract “predominantly” bind to hPTH peptides with the first
    two amino acids, whereas the antibodies disclosed in the patent “selectively” bind to
    hPTH peptides with the first two amino acids. See Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v.
    Scantibodies Clinical Lab., Inc., No. 02-CV-46 (S.D. Ca. Jun. 2, 2003).
    On May 3, 2005, in the second order denying Scantibodies’s summary judgment
    motion on anticipation, the district court considered whether the abstract discloses the
    claimed antibodies inherently.      See Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies
    Clinical Lab., Inc., No. 02-CV-46 (S.D. Ca. May 3, 2005). The district court recognized
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    that the sera disclosed in the abstract contained a mixture of antibodies and noted that
    “there is no dispute that the [claimed antibody] was present in the K2 serum.” 
    Id.,
     slip
    op. at 9. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the abstract did not inherently
    anticipate the claimed antibody because the claimed antibody “differentiates between
    biologically active and inactive hPTH,” whereas the abstract “does not disclose or
    suggest the means of differentiating between biologically active and inactive hPTH.” 
    Id.
    The case proceeded to trial.      The jury found that Scantibodies’s hPTH 1-9
    antibody infringes claims 15 and 21, but that Scantibodies’s hPTH 1-12 antibody does
    not infringe. The jury also found that the patent was invalid for failure to disclose the
    best mode, and for lack of enablement and written description. After trial, the parties
    each filed motions for JMOL, Nichols contesting the jury’s finding that the ’790 patent is
    invalid and not infringed by the hPTH 1-12 antibody, and Scantibodies contesting the
    jury’s finding that the hPTH 1-9 antibody infringes claims 15 and 21. On August 30,
    2005, the trial court granted Nichols’s motions and denied Scantibodies’s motion. On
    November 16, 2005, the trial court granted Nichols’s motion for permanent injunction,
    but stayed the motion pending this appeal.
    Scantibodies timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. §§1292
    (a)(1).
    II. DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    This court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment under
    the law of the regional circuit. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 
    381 F.3d 1178
    , 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the law of the United States Court of Appeals for
    06-1087                                      5
    the Ninth Circuit, this court reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment without
    deference. See DeBoer v. Pennington, 
    206 F.3d 857
    , 863 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that
    the Ninth Circuit reviews both a denial and grant of summary judgment de novo).
    Anticipation is a question of fact. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,
    
    403 F.3d 1331
    , 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). “However, without genuine
    factual disputes underlying the anticipation inquiry, the issue is ripe for judgment as a
    matter of law.” 
    Id.
     Whether an asserted anticipatory document qualifies as a “printed
    publication” under § 102 is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual
    determinations. N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 
    908 F.2d 931
    , 936 (Fed. Cir.
    1990).
    B. Analysis
    Scantibodies argues that the district court erred in granting Nichols’s cross-
    motion for summary judgment of no anticipation on two grounds. First, Scantibodies
    argues that the district court erroneously limited the asserted claims to an antibody that
    will detect biologically active hPTH. Second, Scantibodies argues that, because it is
    undisputed that the antiserum disclosed in the abstract contained the claimed antibody,
    and because it was well known how to isolate the claimed antibody from the other
    antibodies in the disclosed serum, the abstract inherently anticipates the asserted
    claims.
    Nichols counters that, although the abstract discloses the K2 antibody, the
    abstract does not disclose the “selective” binding capability of the claimed antibody;
    rather, the abstract discloses only that the K1 through K3 sera show “predominant”
    binding to hPTH peptides having the first two amino acids. Nichols also contends that
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    the abstract does not anticipate because it was not until after the abstract was
    submitted that the inventors appreciated the significance of the claimed antibody,
    namely that it could be used to detect biologically active hPTH. Nichols also asserts
    that the abstract is not a “printed publication” under 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    (b) because it was
    not adequately indexed.
    Turning first to the issue whether the abstract is a “printed publication” under 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    (b), whether a given reference is a “printed publication” depends on
    whether it was “publicly accessible” during the relevant period. In re Wyer, 
    655 F.2d 221
    , 226 (C.C.P.A. 1981). The parties do not dispute that the abstract was published in
    the European Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences and mailed to subscribers, including
    scientists, attendees of industry-related conferences, universities and libraries on
    September 12, 1994. It is also undisputed that at least one library, the British Library
    Document Supply Centre, received an original copy of the abstract on September 16,
    1994 and that such copy “would have been available for public use from that date.”
    Given these undisputed facts regarding the distribution of the abstract directly in to the
    hands of the interested public, we hold that the abstract was sufficiently publicly
    accessible to be considered a printed publication under 
    35 U.S.C. § 102
    (b).           See
    Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Products, Inc., 
    291 F.3d 1317
     (Fed. Cir.
    2002) (holding that a document that was distributed to three members and six
    participants to a joint venture project was prior art); see also Wyer, 
    655 F.2d 221
    ;
    Klopfenstein, 
    380 F.3d 1345
     (Fed. Cir. 2004). In re Cronyn, 
    890 F.2d 1158
     (Fed. Cir.
    1989), cited by Nichols, does not compel a different result. In that case, a single copy of
    a research thesis was sent to one library and was indexed only by the student’s name,
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    which bore no relationship to the subject of the thesis. In this case, multiple copies of
    the abstract were distributed directly to multiple interested members of the relevant
    public.
    We also hold, for the reasons below, that the abstract anticipates the asserted
    claims, because no reasonable juror could have found that the abstract does not
    inherently disclose the claimed antibody. SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1343. The abstract
    itself and the testimony of Dr. Magerlein conclusively demonstrate that the abstract
    expressly or inherently discloses each element of the asserted claims. The abstract
    states that the authors have obtained antibodies and that “the different regions of hPTH
    1-37 are covered by the produced antibodies. Furthermore, the combinations of two
    antibodies in a two-side assay are tested.”       The abstract also discloses that sera
    mixture K1 through K3, which contains the K2 antibody, shows predominant binding to
    peptides having the first two amino acids. Dr. Magerlein testified, and Nichols does not
    dispute, that the K2 antibody is the same as the claimed antibody. See Magerlein
    Deposition at 271-72, Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Lab., Inc.,
    No. 02-CV-46 (Aug. 10, 2004) (“[T]he antibody that was used for the assay [described in
    the ’790 patent] was isolated from the antiserum K2.”); id. at 310 (“The test described or
    referenced here [in the ’790 patent] contains the K2 antibody that was isolated from the
    K2 antiserum.”). Dr. Magerlein also testified that the claimed antibody was isolated from
    the K2 antiserum using affinity purification, which was well-known in the art. See id. at
    291 (testifying that affinity purification was “well known” and that “any expert skilled in
    the art . . . would know about that technique”); Transcript of Magerlein Cross
    Examination at vol. 6, p. 94, Nichols Inst. Diagnostics, Inc. v. Scantibodies Clinical Lab.,
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    Inc., No. 02-CV-46 (Aug. 30, 2005), (testifying that “[t]his assay [described in the ’790
    patent] used the K-2 antibody obtained by affinity purification of this antiserum disclosed
    here in this abstract”). It is thus beyond dispute that the K2 antibody disclosed in the
    abstract is the claimed antibody and the claimed antibody could be isolated from the K1
    through K3 sera by a technique that was well-known in the art.
    Nichols nevertheless maintains that that the abstract does not anticipate because
    the abstract discloses only that the K1 through K3 sera shows “predominant” binding to
    hPTH peptides having the first two amino acids, whereas the claimed antibody requires
    “selective” binding to hPTH peptides having the first two amino acids.              Nichols
    acknowledges that the reason the K1 through K3 sera disclosed in the abstract show
    only “predominant” binding is because the K1 through K3 sera contain a mixture of
    antibodies.   The claims however, recite the binding properties of the isolated K2
    antibody, not the K1 through K3 sera. It is undisputed that, once the K2 antibody is
    isolated from the K1 through K3 sera, using well-known purification methods, the
    isolated K2 antibody necessarily will exhibit the claimed “selective” binding. Because
    the K2 antibody, which is contained in the K1 through K3 sera, necessarily has the
    claimed binding properties, the abstract inherently anticipates. See Schering, 339 F.3d
    at 1377 (holding that “a prior art reference may anticipate without disclosing a feature of
    the claimed invention if that missing characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in
    the single anticipating reference”). Because the abstract inherently meets each and
    every element of the asserted claims, the asserted claims are anticipated and hence
    invalid. Id. at 1379.
    06-1087                                      9
    Nichols’s argument that the abstract does not anticipate because the significance
    of the claimed antibody was not known until after the abstract was submitted is without
    merit. “[I]nherent anticipation does not require a person of ordinary skill in the art to
    recognize the inherent disclosure in the prior art at the time the prior art is created.”
    SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1343 (citations omitted); see also Schering, 339 F.3d at 1377
    (holding that “inherent anticipation does not require that a person of ordinary skill in the
    art at the time would have recognized the inherent disclosure”); MEHL/Biophile Int’l
    Corp. v. Milgraum, 
    192 F.3d 1362
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Where . . . the result is a
    necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, it is of no import that the
    article’s authors did not appreciate the results.”).
    CONCLUSION
    For the above reasons, the decision of the district court is reversed.
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