Ragados v. Office of Personnel Management , 180 F. App'x 917 ( 2006 )


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  •                  NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    05-3351
    VICTORIANO V. RAGADOS,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
    Respondent.
    ____________________________
    DECIDED: April 11, 2006
    ____________________________
    Before SCHALL, Circuit Judge, CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and GAJARSA,
    Circuit Judge.
    PER CURIAM.
    DECISION
    Victoriano V. Ragados petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit
    Systems Protection Board (“Board”) that sustained the reconsideration decision of the
    Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) denying his application for a deferred annuity
    under the Civil Service Retirement Act (“CSRA”), Ragados v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No.
    SF0831040671-I-1, slip op. (M.S.P.B July. 22, 2005) (“Final Decision”). We affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Mr. Ragados is a Filipino national who was employed in civilian service by the
    Department of the Navy at Subic Bay, Philippines, during two periods of service. He
    was hired on December 22, 1947, and remained employed until July 22, 1949, at which
    time he was separated by a reduction in force. Mr. Ragados began his second period
    of service on March 21, 1951, and he was employed by the Navy until he retired on
    November 24, 1989.
    On October 3, 2002, Mr. Ragados submitted to OPM an application for a
    deferred retirement annuity. Upon concluding that the positions in which Mr. Ragados
    had been employed were not covered by the CSRA, OPM denied the application. Mr.
    Ragados sought reconsideration of that decision, and on May 28, 2004, OPM issued a
    reconsideration decision, again denying Mr. Ragados’ application.          Mr. Ragados
    appealed the reconsideration decision to the Board. In an initial decision dated October
    26, 2004, the administrative judge (“AJ”) to whom the case was assigned affirmed
    OPM’s ruling.      Ragados v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. SF0831040671-I-1, slip op.
    (M.S.P.B. Oct. 26, 2004) (“Initial Decision”).   The Initial Decision became the final
    decision of the Board when the Board denied Mr. Ragados’ petition for review for failure
    to meet the criteria for review set forth at 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    (d). Final Decision. This
    appeal followed.
    II
    We have jurisdiction over appeals from the Board under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    The decision of the Board will be affirmed unless it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    05-3351                                     2
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without procedures
    required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsupported by substantial
    evidence. 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c).
    To receive an annuity under the CSRA, an individual must meet the requirements
    of the law in effect at the time the individual was separated. Esteban v. Office of Pers.
    Mgmt., 
    978 F.2d 700
    , 701 (Fed. Cir. 1992).          Because Mr. Ragados’ first period of
    service was from 1947 to 1949, the Retirement Act of January 24, 1942, determines his
    eligibility for that period of service. The 1942 Act required an employee to have a total
    of five years of creditable service at the time of separation. See id.; Vanaman v. Office
    of Pers. Mgmt., 
    59 M.S.P.R., 598
    , 601-02 (1993), review dismissed, No. 94-3157 (Fed.
    Cir. 1994). Because Mr. Ragados’ first period of service totaled only nineteen months,
    which is less than the five years required by the 1942 Act, the Board was correct to hold
    that this service did not qualify him for a deferred retirement annuity. See Sabado v.
    Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    905 F.2d 387
     (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding no entitlement to annuity
    where a civilian Navy employee completed less than five years of creditable service
    even though his separation was caused by a service related disability).
    Mr. Ragados’ second period of service is governed by the Retirement Act of
    August 31, 1954, which is still in effect today and has only been amended in ways
    immaterial to this case. See 
    5 U.S.C. § 8333
    . Section 8333(a) provides: “An employee
    must complete at least 5 years of civilian service before he is eligible for an annuity
    under this subchapter.”     Section 8333(b) further requires in relevant part that “[a]n
    employee or Member must complete, within the last 2 years before any separation from
    service . . . at least 1 year of creditable civilian service during which he is subject to this
    05-3351                                       3
    subchapter before he or his survivors are eligible for annuity . . . .” There is no dispute
    that Mr. Ragados served well in excess of five years. His entitlement to an annuity
    turns upon whether the covered service requirement of section 8333(b) was satisfied.
    Mr. Ragados’ second period of service began under an excepted-intermittent
    appointment on March 21, 1951. Block #20 of the Standard Form 50 “Notification of
    Personnel Action” (“SF-50”) for the appointment stated that Mr. Ragados was not
    subject to the CSRA. On December 10, 1951, Mr. Ragados’ service was converted to
    an excepted-indefinite appointment, with block #18 of the SF-50 for the appointment
    stating that he was not subject to the CSRA. 
    5 C.F.R. § 831.201
    (a)(2) provides that
    intermittent appointments are specifically excluded from CSRA coverage. See Rosete
    v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    48 F.3d 514
    , 520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (upholding the exclusion in 
    5 C.F.R. § 831.201
    (a) of employees holding indefinite appointments from receiving CSRA
    retirement benefits).
    Significantly, all SF-50s ever issued concerning Mr. Ragados reflect that his
    retirement status was “none” or “other,” namely other than the CSRA. Moreover, the
    relevant documents indicate that no retirement contributions were ever withheld from
    Mr. Ragados’ pay. See 
    id. at 516
     (“Covered service only includes an appointment . . .
    for which an employee must deposit part of his or her pay into the Civil Service
    Retirement and Disability Fund.”).
    Finally, the AJ found that Mr. Ragados was required to retire pursuant to a
    collective bargaining agreement that afforded him retirement pay in accordance with the
    Filipino Employment Personnel Instructions. Initial Decision, slip op. at 6. Employees
    subject to another retirement system for government employees are excluded from
    05-3351                                     4
    coverage under the CSRA. 
    5 U.S.C. § 8331
    (1)(ii); see De Guzman v. Dep’t of Navy,
    
    231 Ct. Cl. 1005
     (1982) (“5 U.S.C. 8331(1)(ii) provides that the Retirement Act does not
    include an employee subject to another retirement system for Government workers.”).
    The Board determined that the fact that Mr. Ragados’ SF-50 indicated that he
    was in “Tenure Group 1” did not affect the inquiry into whether he was a permanent
    employee. Initial Decision, slip op. at 7. The Board reasoned that the tenure group
    status is used primarily to determine an employee’s rights in a reduction in force, but is
    not determinative of either appointment or retirement rights.        
    Id.
       The Board noted
    DeJesus v. Office of Personnel Management, 
    63 M.S.P.R. 586
    , 593 (1994), aff’d, 
    62 F.3d 1431
     (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Table) and Fredeluces v. Office of Personnel Management,
    
    57 M.S.P.R. 598
    , 602 n.4 (1993), aff’d, 
    16 F.3d 421
     (Fed. Cir. 1993), as standing for the
    proposition that tenure groups may be considered in determining the nature of the
    underlying appointment “if the personnel records are incomplete and the employee was
    at any time subject to the CSRA.” Initial Decision, slip op. at 7. However, because the
    Board found that Mr. Ragados’ personnel records appeared complete and because no
    evidence was presented demonstrating that he was ever covered under the CSRA, the
    Board found that the tenure group designation was insufficient to overcome the other
    evidence in the record. 
    Id.,
     slip op. at 8. We see no error in this finding.
    Lastly, the fact that Mr. Ragados was employed during the transition period in
    which administering authority over CSRA coverage was transferred from the President
    to the newly reorganized Civil Service Commission is without consequence. Executive
    Order 10,180, which made appointments to Executive branch positions nonpermanent
    and excluded them from CSRA benefits, was repealed effective January 23, 1955. The
    05-3351                                      5
    Civil Service Commission regulation excluding indefinite appointees from CSRA
    coverage was not promulgated until October 30, 1956.          However, the AJ correctly
    observed that Federal Circuit case law has held that the applicable retirement
    exclusions concerning indefinite appointment employees remained in effect without any
    “lapse.” See Carreon v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
    321 F.3d 1128
    , 1131-33 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
    (finding that the suggestion that indefinite appointments between the revocation of
    Executive Order 10,180 and the promulgation of the Civil Service Commission’s
    regulation 
    5 C.F.R. § 29.2
     “may well have been eligible for CSR[A] coverage” is contrary
    to the law of this circuit); Casilang v. Office of Pers. Mmgt., 
    248 F.3d 1381
    , 1383 (Fed.
    Cir. 2001) (holding that “the exclusion of nonpermanent employees from coverage by
    the CSRA effected by Executive Order No. 10,180 [remained in effect] until the Civil
    Service Commission promulgated new regulations, which it did in 1956, thus preventing
    the appellant’s service between January 25, 1952, and June 30, 1958, from entitling him
    to a retirement annuity). Thus, Mr. Ragados’ argument that his employment during the
    transition period could impact whether any of his service was creditable is without merit.
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Board is affirmed.
    Each party shall bear its own costs.
    05-3351                                      6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2005-3351

Citation Numbers: 180 F. App'x 917

Judges: Clevenger, Gajarsa, Per Curiam, Schall

Filed Date: 4/11/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023