Visconi v. United States , 455 F. App'x 986 ( 2012 )


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  •         NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    __________________________
    FRANK J. VISCONI,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    2011-5086
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in case no. 10-CV-656, Judge Susan G. Braden.
    __________________________
    Decided: January 11, 2012
    ___________________________
    FRANK J. VISCONI, of Dover, Tennessee, pro se.
    JOSHUA A. MANDLEBAUM, Trial Attorney, Commercial
    Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depart-
    ment of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant-
    appellee. With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assis-
    tant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director,
    and FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., Assistant Director. Of
    counsel was JAMES D. VALENTINE, United States Marine
    VISCONI   v. US                                           2
    Corps, Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advo-
    cate General, of Washington, DC.
    __________________________
    Before LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Plaintiff Frank J. Visconi (“Visconi”) appeals a final
    decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims
    (“Claims Court”) dismissing his complaint pursuant to
    Claims Court Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction. Visconi v. United States, 
    98 Fed. Cl. 589
    , 596
    (2011). We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Visconi served on active duty in the United States
    Marine Corps (“USMC”) from July 1964 to July 1968, and
    then in the USMC Reserve until July 19, 1970, at which
    point he received an honorable discharge. Visconi main-
    tains that on May 2, 1969, he was awarded the Bronze
    Star Medal with a combat “V” and the Purple Heart
    Medal. Visconi’s DD-214 (“Certificate of Release or Dis-
    charge from Active Duty”), DD-215 (“Correction to DD-
    214”), and Service Record Book do not reflect his having
    received these medals. Starting in 2007, Visconi made
    several requests that the Board for the Correction of
    Naval Records (“BCNR”) and the USMC Headquarters
    Manpower Management Division, Military Awards
    Branch (“MMMA”) correct his records to reflect these
    awards, but all of his requests were denied.
    On September 29, 2010, Visconi filed a complaint in
    the Claims Court alleging that the BCNR and MMMA
    improperly denied his requests to correct his military
    records. The complaint requested that the Claims Court
    compel the BCNR and MMMA to correct his service
    3                                               VISCONI   v. US
    records to reflect the awards of the disputed medals and
    citations, and for other injunctive relief. Visconi did not
    assert a monetary claim. The Claims Court dismissed the
    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding
    that Visconi had failed to allege a claim under a money-
    mandating statute. Visconi, 98 Fed. Cl. at 594-96.
    Visconi timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursu-
    ant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(3). We review de novo a deci-
    sion of the Claims Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
    Brown v. United States, 
    86 F.3d 1554
    , 1559 (Fed. Cir.
    1996).
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Visconi argues that the case should be re-
    manded to the Claims Court, or, in the alternative, to an
    “appropriate court” to hold a hearing on the merits of his
    case. J.A. 7. To demonstrate Tucker Act jurisdiction, a
    plaintiff has the burden of identifying a constitutional
    provision, federal statute, executive agency regulation, or
    independent contractual relationship that provides a
    substantive right to money damages, that is, a money-
    mandating provision. Fisher v. United States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
    Here, Visconi did not establish a basis for jurisdiction
    of the Claims Court. First, 
    10 U.S.C. § 1552
    , related to
    claims for correction of military records, is not a money-
    mandating statute that gives rise to jurisdiction under the
    Tucker Act. Martinez v. United States, 
    333 F.3d 1295
    ,
    1315 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Absent a right to money provided
    by Congress, money damages are not an available remedy
    for breach of a military enlistment contract, and thus
    Visconi’s military enlistment contract alone cannot be a
    basis for a claim under the Tucker Act. See United States
    v. Larionoff, 
    431 U.S. 864
    , 869 (1977); Bell v. United
    States, 
    366 U.S. 393
    , 401 (1961); Jablon v. United States,
    VISCONI   v. US                                          4
    
    657 F.2d 1064
     (9th Cir. 1981) (“[M]oney damages are not
    an available remedy for the government’s breach of an
    enlistment contract.”). Moreover, Visconi’s complaint
    seeks only equitable relief, not money damages. The
    Tucker Act does not provide independent jurisdiction over
    claims for equitable relief. Brown v. United States, 
    105 F.3d 621
    , 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997). We therefore conclude
    that the Claims Court correctly dismissed the complaint
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    After filing his notice of appeal with this court, Vis-
    coni requested the Claims Court transfer his case to a
    federal district court, and on appeal Visconi makes a
    similar request. This argument was not properly raised
    before the Claims Court, so we do not consider it here.
    See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 
    126 F.3d 1420
    ,
    1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
    COSTS
    No costs.