Barnett v. Department of Veterans Affairs , 505 F. App'x 948 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    LEE OTIS BARNETT, III,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2012-3189
    ______________________
    Appeal from the Merit Systems Protection Board in
    No. DC0432120392-I-1.
    ______________________
    Decided: February 12, 2013
    ______________________
    LEE OTIS BARNETT, III, of Raleigh, North Carolina,
    pro se.
    A. BONDURANT ELEY, Trial Attorney, Commercial Lit-
    igation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department
    of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him
    on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Principal Deputy
    Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Direc-
    tor, and MARTIN F. HOCKEY, JR., Assistant Director.
    ______________________
    2                                 LEE BARNETT, III   v. DVA
    Before MOORE, MAYER, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    Lee Otis Barnett III appeals a final decision of the
    Merit Systems Protection Board (“board”) sustaining his
    removal from his position with the Department of Veter-
    ans Affairs (“VA”) for unacceptable performance. See
    Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. DC-0432-12-0392-
    I-1, 2012 MSPB LEXIS 4314 (July 17, 2012) (“Board
    Decision”). We affirm.
    I.
    Barnett was employed by the VA as a GS-2005-06
    supply technician. His responsibilities included maintain-
    ing supply inventories, contacting vendors, confirming
    deliveries, and providing effective customer service.
    Barnett was informed that the four critical elements of
    his position were: (1) customer service/team relations; (2)
    requirements analysis/inventory management; (3) budget
    management and contract compliance; and (4) socioeco-
    nomic goals. In May 2011, Dawn Bauknight, Barnett’s
    first-line supervisor, gave him a progress review report
    which indicated that he needed improvement in both the
    customer service/team relations and the requirements
    analysis/inventory management critical elements.
    In July 2011, the VA placed Barnett on a 90-day
    performance improvement plan (“PIP”). In documenta-
    tion issued in connection with the PIP, the VA provided
    examples of Barnett’s performance deficiencies and identi-
    fied a program designed to help him improve his perfor-
    mance. This improvement program included additional
    training as well as weekly meetings with Bauknight.
    During the PIP, Barnett also met repeatedly with his
    second-line supervisor, Deborah Murray, who discussed
    specific performance issues with him and helped him to
    devise strategies “so that he could understand how to
    LEE BARNETT, III   v. DVA                            3
    avoid making the same mistake[s] moving forward.” Id.
    at *18.
    By letter dated January 12, 2012, the VA informed
    Barnett that it proposed to remove him for unsatisfactory
    performance because he had failed to improve his perfor-
    mance in the customer service/team relations critical
    element. The letter stated that Barnett had failed to
    place orders for supplies that had been requested by VA
    personnel, failed to respond in a timely manner to emails
    related to supplies, and had told Bauknight that certain
    medical supplies were on back order when they were not,
    in fact, on back order. Barnett was removed from his
    position effective March 19, 2012.
    Barnett appealed to the board, arguing that he had
    been improperly removed and that the VA had failed to
    accommodate his disabling medical condition. On May
    30, 2012, an administrative judge held a hearing at which
    seven witnesses testified. The judge subsequently issued
    an initial decision sustaining Barnett’s removal and
    concluding that the VA had established by substantial
    evidence that Barnett’s performance had been deficient in
    at least one critical element of his position. Id. at *6-7.
    The judge rejected Barnett’s claims of disability discrimi-
    nation, noting that he had “completely failed to prove that
    he [was] disabled within the meaning of the [Americans
    with Disabilities Act, 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
    ].” Board
    Decision, 2012 MSPB LEXIS 4314, at *51. Indeed, “based
    on the medical evidence submitted” by Barnett, the ad-
    ministrative judge was “unable to discern the nature of
    his alleged disabling medical condition.” 
    Id.
    Because Barnett elected not to appeal the adminis-
    trative judge’s decision to the full board, that decision
    became the final decision of the board on August 21, 2012.
    Barnett then appealed to this court.
    4                                  LEE BARNETT, III   v. DVA
    II.
    Our review of a decision of the board is limited by
    statute. We may set aside a board decision only if it is:
    “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
    wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without
    procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having
    been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evi-
    dence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c). “Substantial evidence is such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
    adequate to support a conclusion.” McEntee v. Merit Sys.
    Prot. Bd., 
    404 F.3d 1320
    , 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citations
    and internal quotation marks omitted).
    An agency has authority to “reduce in grade or re-
    move an employee for receiving a rating of ‘unacceptable’
    with respect to even a single ‘critical element’” of his
    position. Lovshin v. Dep’t of the Navy, 
    767 F.2d 826
    , 834
    (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (emphasis omitted); see 
    5 U.S.C. § 4301
    (3). When reviewing performance-based actions,
    this court must give “deference to the judgment by each
    agency of the employee’s performance in light of the
    agency’s assessment of its own personnel needs and
    standards.” Lisiecki v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    769 F.2d 1558
    , 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations and internal quota-
    tion marks omitted).
    As the board correctly concluded, the VA presented
    persuasive evidence demonstrating that Barnett’s per-
    formance was deficient in the customer service/team
    relations critical element of his position. Notwithstanding
    the fact that his supervisors provided him with guidance
    and training during his 90-day PIP, Barnett’s perfor-
    mance remained unacceptable in that critical element. At
    the hearing before the administrative judge, the VA
    introduced both testimony and documentary evidence
    showing that Barnett failed to maintain an adequate
    inventory of essential medical supplies, failed to respond
    to emails related to supplies in a timely manner, and sent
    LEE BARNETT, III   v. DVA                             5
    an email stating that certain operating room supplies
    were on back order when they were not actually on back
    order. Bauknight testified that Barnett failed to maintain
    proper records regarding the receipt of inventory supplies,
    and that a scheduled surgery had to be cancelled because
    Barnett had failed to maintain adequate inventory levels.
    Board Decision, 2012 MSPB LEXIS 4314, at *29-30. In
    light of this evidence, the administrative judge did not err
    in sustaining the VA’s determination that Barnett’s
    performance was deficient in a critical element of his
    position. See Hall v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
    264 F.3d 1050
    ,
    1060 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he evaluation of and weight to
    be given to . . . [the] evidence in the record are judgment
    calls that rest primarily within the discretion of the
    Board.”).
    At his hearing before the administrative judge,
    Barnett did not testify and did not otherwise refute the
    VA’s evidence showing that his performance had been
    unsatisfactory. He did, however, call several witnesses to
    support his claim that the deficiencies in his performance
    were due to an unmanageable workload. Barnett also
    introduced an email from Jamal Brockington, the supply
    technician who assumed Barnett’s duties after his remov-
    al. Brockington stated that he could not “seem to get
    ahead on all [the] orders,” and that it was “almost impos-
    sible to keep up with everything.” Board Decision, 2012
    MSPB LEXIS 4314, at *42. The administrative judge
    acknowledged that such evidence indicated that Barnett’s
    position was “challenging and demanding,” but noted that
    the VA had also produced evidence showing “that [Bar-
    nett’s] duties were not impossible or unattainable.” Id. at
    *43. Both Bauknight and Murray testified “that they
    were familiar with [Barnett’s] workload and duties and
    they believed that the workload was, in fact, managea-
    ble.” Id. The administrative judge found the testimony of
    Bauknight and Murray to be credible, id., and we see no
    basis for disturbing this credibility determination on
    6                                LEE BARNETT, III   v. DVA
    appeal. As an appellate court, we may not set aside an
    administrative judge’s credibility determinations unless
    we find them to be “inherently improbable or discredited
    by undisputed fact.” Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army, 
    287 F.3d 1358
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quota-
    tion marks omitted).
    We have considered the additional arguments pre-
    sented in Barnett’s informal appeal brief but do not find
    them persuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the board’s
    decision sustaining Barnett’s removal.
    AFFIRMED