NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-3226
DARRIEL K. CASTON,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Respondent.
Darriel K. Caston, of Sacramento, California, pro se.
David F. D’Alessandris, Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on
the brief were Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson,
Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel was Kevin D. Mack,
Assistant Regional Solicitor, Office of the Regional Solicitor, United States Department
of the Interior, of Sacramento, California.
Appealed from: Merit Systems Protection Board
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-3226
DARRIEL K. CASTON,
Petitioner,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
Respondent.
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in SF0752040058-X-1.
___________________________
DECIDED: November 4, 2008
___________________________
Before BRYSON, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM
Darriel K. Caston (“Caston”) seeks review of a final decision of the Merit Systems
Protection Board (“Board”) denying his petition for enforcement of a settlement
agreement. Caston v. Dep’t of the Interior,
108 M.S.P.R. 190 (M.S.P.B. 2008). We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
The history of this litigation stretches back fifteen years, and is described in detail
by the Board in its decision.
Id. at 192-96. The brief summary presented here includes
only that history directly relevant to the issues on review.
Darriel K. Caston was an electrical engineer with the Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Reclamation (“agency”). Effective October 1, 2003, Caston was removed
from his position. Caston timely appealed to the Board. Caston asserted that he was
removed in retaliation for protected reports to management that his supervisor, Ms.
Robinson, was “foisting her religious beliefs” on employees and “religious harassment.”
He also asserted that his removal was discrimination on the basis of “religious
harassment discrimination,” sex, and race.
On April 8, 2004, Caston and the agency signed a settlement agreement
(“agreement”). The agency agreed to cancel Caston's removal and restore him to duty
status from the date of his removal with back pay and reimbursement of attorney fees.
Caston agreed to remain on administrative leave until January 1, 2005, at which time he
would resign from the agency if unable to find other Federal employment. Provision 1 of
the agreement stated that Caston “agrees not to file any additional administrative or
judicial actions regarding the subject matter of this appeal except that he may seek
enforcement of this Agreement.” Provisions 6, 7, and 11 contain promises of
confidentiality:
6. The agency agrees to delete and destroy any and all information,
reports, correspondence, investigations, or any other matters or materials
relating to the removal . . . from Mr. Caston's personnel file or any other
supervisory files under its control. . . .
7. The agency agrees to advise managerial/supervisory officials . . . not to
disclose any negative or adverse information about Mr. Caston's
employment. . . . [T]he agency managers and supervisors . . . will refer all
written or oral requests for information about Mr. Caston from prospective
employers and others to an individual of Mr. Caston's choosing . . . .
Absolutely no mention shall be made by the designated reference person
of Mr. Caston's discipline, or any information upon which his discipline was
based, or any other alleged misconduct. . . . The agency shall not provide
any information about Mr. Caston’s removal or any negative information
about Mr. Caston to any other branch or subdivision of the U.S.
Government.
****
2008-3226 2
11. The parties to this Agreement will not discuss or disclose the terms
and conditions of this Agreement, or the contents of the case file, except
as necessary to effectuate the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
Thereafter, Caston filed a formal EEO complaint alleging a hostile work
environment between June 2003 and March 2004 on the bases of religious
discrimination and prior protected activity, including allegations that Ms. Robinson was
abusing employees and that Caston was retaliated against because he reported the
abuse to superiors. In responding to Caston's claim before the EEOC, the agency
introduced evidence regarding the reasons for Caston's removal, including information
about the prior appeal to the Board and the settlement agreement.
On November 8, 2006, an EEOC administrative judge (“AJ”) ruled against
Caston, concluding that the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to
Caston, was insufficient to support Caston’s claim of a hostile work environment leading
to his termination.
On March 28, 2007, Caston filed a petition for enforcement with the Board
relating to the 2004 settlement agreement. Caston argued that the agency violated the
confidentiality provisions of the agreement by disclosing the details of the October 2003
termination, the appeal, and the settlement agreement to the EEOC. In response, the
agency argued that Caston had already breached the agreement by initiating the EEOC
proceedings, and that the agency needed to disclose information covered by the
agreement in order to defend itself in the proceedings.
On July 26, 2007, the AJ found that Caston breached provision 1 of the
agreement by filing the EEO complaint of September 8, 2004, and that the agency
materially breached the agreement by its disclosures in the EEOC proceeding.
2008-3226 3
However, the AJ concluded that the appropriate response of the agency to Caston's
breach would have been an action for enforcement of the agreement. The AJ reasoned
that the agency did not seek to enforce the agreement in a timely manner, and that
Caston's breach did not excuse the agency's breach in response. The AJ concluded
that Caston’s settled appeal should be reinstated.
On review, the Board rejected the AJ’s recommendation and dismissed Caston's
petition for enforcement of the agreement. The Board concluded that Caston breached
the agreement, and that Caston's material breach “discharged the agency from its
obligation to perform” under the agreement. 108 M.S.P.R. at 198.
Caston timely petitioned for review to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
DISCUSSION
We must affirm the Board's decision unless we find it to be arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without
procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or unsupported by
substantial evidence.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Interpretation of the terms of the settlement
agreement is a matter of law that we review without deference. Greco v. Dep't of the
Army,
852 F.2d 558, 560 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The question of whether there has been a
material breach of a settlement agreement is a mixed question of law and fact. Gilbert
v. Dep't of Justice,
334 F.3d 1065, 1071-72 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
On review, Caston first argues that he did not breach the settlement agreement.
We conclude that the Board did not err in finding that Caston breached the agreement.
Caston “agree[d] not to file any additional administrative or judicial actions regarding the
2008-3226 4
subject matter of this appeal . . . .” (emphases added). Caston argues we should not
construe the settlement agreement to preclude claims of a hostile work environment,
even if based on the same factual predicate as the settled MSPB action. We need not
decide this issue, however, as Caston raised not only a hostile work environment claim
in his EEO complaint, he also raised the issue of his removal, which is indisputably
covered by the settlement agreement. Caston thereby breached the settlement
agreement.
Caston also argues that any such breach was not material. The Board found,
and we agree, that Caston’s breach is material. “A breach is material when it relates to
a matter of vital importance, or goes to the essence of the contract.” Thomas v. Dep’t of
Housing & Urban Dev.,
124 F.3d 1439, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 5 Arthur L. Corbin,
Corbin on Contracts § 1104 (1964)). From the agency’s perspective the primary value
of a settlement agreement is that it settles the dispute with the employee and ends the
litigation. Breaching this provision by reinitiating administrative or judicial procedures
“goes to the essence of the contract” by completely destroying the most valuable aspect
of the agreement for one of the parties. Id. Caston’s breach was therefore material.
Caston finally argues that even if he materially breached the agreement, the
agency’s breach was not excused. We agree with the Board that when Caston
materially breached the agreement by filing a complaint alleging discrimination in his
removal and settlement, the agency was not obligated to remain silent, but was entitled
to defend itself. “In resolving disputes among parties who each claim that the other has
breached, courts will ‘[o]ften . . . impose liability on the party that committed the first
material breach.’” Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States,
360 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed.
2008-3226 5
Cir. 2004) (emphasis omitted) (quoting E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts §
8.15, at 439 (1990)); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (1979) (“[I]t is a
condition of each party’s remaining duties to render performances . . . that there be no
uncured material failure by the other party . . . .”). This principle applies to settlement
agreements of Board appeals. See Thomas,
124 F.3d at 1442. Of course, this
principle is not without limits; had the agency elected not to terminate the agreement but
engaged in an unrelated breach of the agreement in disclosing information to
prospective employers, that breach might not be excused by Caston’s prior breach.
The agency’s decision to engage in a responsive breach does not mean that the
agency has constructively elected to rescind the agreement; Caston's obligations under
the agreement remain in force. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 cmt. a,
illus. 1, 2 (1979).
Caston also argues that the Board improperly refused to hear evidence of
“perjury,” and that the law of the case and judicial estoppel apply to this case. The
Board properly considered all such evidence on credibility offered by Caston; the Board
was not required to believe Caston’s interpretation of that evidence and did not abuse
its discretion in crediting the challenged agency evidence. The Board has stated that
the law of the case applies “only to an issue that was previously decided in a different
stage of the same litigation.” Nease v. Dep’t of the Army,
103 M.S.P.R. 118, 124
(M.S.P.B. 2006). None of the findings in various EEOC and other actions mentioned by
Caston is relevant; the doctrine of law of the case does not apply here. Judicial or
administrative estoppel also does not apply because Caston has not identified any
instance in which the agency argued and benefited from an administrative finding that
2008-3226 6
the agency subsequently argued was erroneous. See 31 C.J.S. Estoppel & Waiver §
186 (2008).
In summary, the Board correctly held that Caston’s material breach of the
settlement agreement excused the agency’s actions.
The decision of the Board is affirmed.
No costs.
2008-3226 7
