Error: Bad annotation destination
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
06-1042, -1143
DIXON TICONDEROGA COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MUSGRAVE PENCIL COMPANY,
ROSEMOON PENCIL COMPANY
and GENERAL PENCIL COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.
Daniel E. Traver, Gray Robinson, PA, of Orlando, Florida, argued for plaintiff-
appellee. On the brief was Guy S. Haggard.
David S. Silverbrand, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-
appellant United States. With him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney
General; David M. Cohen, Director; Jeanne E. Davidson, Deputy Director, of
Washington, DC. Of counsel on the brief was Charles Steuart, Attorney, Office of Chief
Counsel, United States Customs and Border Protection, of Washington, DC.
George W. Thompson, Neville Peterson LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for
defendants-appellants Musgrave Pencil Company, et al. With him on the brief were
Curtis W. Knauss and John M. Peterson, of New York, New York.
Appealed from: United States Court of International Trade
Judge Judith M. Barzilay
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
06-1042, -1143
DIXON TICONDEROGA COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MUSGRAVE PENCIL COMPANY,
ROSEMOON PENCIL COMPANY
and GENERAL PENCIL COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.
_______________________
DECIDED: November 6, 2006
_______________________
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and LINN, Circuit Judge.
ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge.
The government and Musgrave Pencil Company, Rosemoon Pencil Company,
and General Pencil Company (“the pencil companies”) appeal the United States Court
of International Trade’s judgment granting Dixon Ticonderoga Company’s (“Dixon”)
motion for judgment on the administrative record. Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. United
States Customs & Border Prot., No. 04-00027 (Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 4, 2005). Because
the record contains no evidence that Dixon was substantially prejudiced by the United
States Customs and Border Protection’s (“Customs”) failure to timely publish a notice of
intention to distribute assessed duties as required by
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a), we reverse.
I
The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“CDSOA”) provides that
assessed duties received from antidumping orders, countervailing duty orders, or
findings under the Antidumping Act of 1921 be distributed to “affected domestic
producers” for certain qualifying expenditures. 19 U.S.C. § 1975c (2003). As a part of
the CDSOA distribution process, Customs is statutorily required to publish a Notice of
Intent to Distribute (“Notice”) at least 30 days before the distribution of a continued
dumping and subsidy offset and to make distributions within 60 days after the fiscal
year. Id. § 1975c(c), (d)(2). In implementing the statute, Customs is required by
regulation to publish the Notice at least 90 days before the end of the fiscal year.
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a) (2003). This is generally done in the Federal Register.
Claimants seeking a share of the distribution then have 60 days from the date of
publication of the Notice to file the certifications required to receive offset distributions.
19 C.F.R. § 159.63(a) (2003).
In 2003, Customs published the Notice on July 14 (“the 2003 Notice”), 78 days
prior to the end of the fiscal year and twelve days after the regulatory deadline. See
Distribution of Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset to Affected Domestic Producers,
68 Fed. Reg. 471,597 (July 14, 2003). Dixon filed its application to receive a portion of
the relevant assessed duties for Fiscal Year 2003 102 days after Customs’ publication
of the 2003 Notice. Customs denied Dixon’s application, and Dixon appealed this
denial to the Court of International Trade. Dixon argued to the Court of International
06-1042, -1143 2
Trade (and to us) that Customs’ failure to provide notice as required by
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a) caused it, as well as other domestic pencil manufacturers, to file
late.
The Court of International Trade concluded that the timing requirements of
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a) were merely procedural aids in applying the CDSOA and thus
Customs did not lose its authority to administer the CDSOA when it failed to meet its
own regulatory timing requirements.
Id. at 9. The court also held, however, that Dixon
was prejudiced by this regulatory violation. Accordingly, the court granted Dixon’s
motion and entered judgment in favor of Dixon.
Id. at 10.
The government and the pencil companies appealed, and we have jurisdiction
pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
II
When reviewing decisions by the Court of International Trade pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), we apply the standard of review set forth in
5 U.S.C. § 706.
Consol. Bearings Co. v. United States,
348 F.3d 997, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, we
“will set aside Customs’ denial of offset distributions only if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” See Candle Corp. of Am.
v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
374 F.3d 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 706).
III
An agency is generally required to comply with its own regulations. See Kemira
Fibers Oy v. United States,
61 F.3d 866, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1995). However, simple failure
of an agency to follow a procedural requirement does not void subsequent agency
06-1042, -1143 3
action.1 See
id. at 868, 875 (holding that failure to timely comply with the notice
requirement of
19 C.F.R. § 353.25(d) did not deprive the Department of Commerce of
the authority to commence an administrative review where the antidumping review was
noticed by the agency after the regulatory deadline); Brock v. Pierce County,
476 U.S.
253, 260 (1986). Rather, in order to prevail, Dixon must establish that it was
substantially prejudiced by Customs’ noncompliance with
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a). See
Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv.,
397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970) (“[I]t is always
within the discretion of . . . an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural
rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the
ends of justice require it. The action of [an agency] in such a case is not reviewable
except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.”).
We recently discussed the issue of prejudice in the context of failure to comply
with a notice regulation. In PAM, S.p.A. v. United States,
463 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 13, 2006), a domestic producer violated
19 C.F.R. § 351.303(f)(3)(ii) by failing to
give a foreign exporter, PAM, notice of a request for further administrative review of
several companies, including PAM, that were under antidumping duty orders. Following
the request for further review, the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), as required
by statute, published notice of its initiation of this review in the Federal Register listing
the companies involved, including PAM.
Id. at 1346. This was the first time PAM
learned of the request for further review. There was a 17-day lag between the time that
the domestic producer should have served notice of its request for review on PAM and
1
No party challenges the Court of International Trade’s determination that
the timing requirements of
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a) are merely procedural aids in applying
the CDSOA.
06-1042, -1143 4
the time that Commerce published notice of the initiation of review.
Id. at 1346 n.2.
Ultimately, PAM was given a 29-day extension to file its response to the questionnaires
subsequently provided by Commerce. In concluding that PAM had not demonstrated
that it was substantially prejudiced, we noted that “the total amount of additional time
Commerce granted to PAM . . . far exceeded the 17 days PAM lost due to the lack of
service” by the domestic producer.
Id. at 1349. We further observed that “PAM neither
claim[ed] or attempt[ed] to show that [the domestic company’s] failure to serve it
impeded its ability to respond to and defend its interests in the administrative review.”
Id.
The only discernable difference between the present case and PAM is that in
PAM the party asserting prejudice was ultimately given several extensions to complete
its response to Customs’ questionnaire. Here, Dixon was not given more than 60 days
from the date of the Notice to file its certification request; however, no extension was
requested. Indeed, Dixon has not asserted that this time period was insufficient either
to determine whether it wished to request a disbursement or to actually request a
disbursement.
In fact, Dixon has provided no evidence, or even an allegation (other than
attorney argument), that the cause of its failure to file a timely application was Customs’
late publication of the Notice. Additionally, there is no indication in the record as to why
Dixon failed to monitor the Federal Register past the publication deadline of
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a), as it had the previous year.
Dixon argues that a statement in Intercargo Insurance Co. v. United States,
83
F.3d 391 (Fed. Cir 1996), supports the Court of International Trade’s finding of prejudice
06-1042, -1143 5
here. Intercargo explained that “prejudice” in this context “means injury to an interest
that the statute, regulation, or rule in question was designed to protect.”
Id. at 396.
Dixon asserts that because the Antidumping Act was enacted to protect U.S. industries
from reduced-price foreign products and Dixon is a domestic producer, these facts
alone demonstrate that it was prejudiced under Intercargo. This argument ignores the
fact that the regulation violated here is one governing notice to domestic producers
regarding Customs’ intention to distribute duties under the CDSOA, not the Antidumping
Act itself. While it is true that the CDSOA is intended to protect domestic producers,
see CDSOA, Pub. L. No. 106-387, § 1(a),
114 Stat. 1549 (2000), the purpose of
19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a) is simply to provide notice to the domestic producers that
disbursements pursuant to the CDSOA are available for a given year. As discussed
above, Dixon has failed to present any evidence that such an interest was injured. The
regulation itself does not function to protect domestic producers from foreign dumped
products.
Finally, the Court of International Trade concluded that Customs’ failure to timely
publish the 2003 Notice harmed domestic producers, such as Dixon, who assume
agency compliance with § 195.62(a) and are prejudiced by noncompliance because
they receive no other indication of Customs’ intent to distribute an offset or the deadline
within which to file for a share of the offset. Dixon, slip op. at 11. The flaw in this
analysis is that it simply assumes prejudice without requiring a showing thereof. For
example, under the Court of International Trade’s rationale, any domestic producer
eligible for disbursements under the CDSOA is prejudiced whenever Customs is late in
publishing its distribution notice regardless of whether the domestic producer actually
06-1042, -1143 6
seeks disbursements. Such a result is illogical. In fact, the Court of International
Trade’s holding would effectively eliminate the prejudice requirement. As a result, any
time an agency misses a statutory or regulatory deadline, its subsequent action could
be challenged (and voided) indefinitely.
IV
Because the administrative record contains no evidence that Dixon was
prejudiced by Customs’ late publication of the 2003 Notice, we reverse the judgment of
the Court of International Trade.
REVERSED.
06-1042, -1143 7
