Gillespie v. Department of the Navy , 168 F. App'x 421 ( 2006 )


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  •                  NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    05-3193
    KATHY J. GILLESPIE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
    Respondent.
    ___________________________
    DECIDED: February 15, 2006
    ___________________________
    Before BRYSON, GAJARSA, and DYK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    DECISION
    Kathy J. Gillespie appeals from a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board,
    Docket No. SF-0752-00-0671-C-1.        The Board dismissed as moot her petition to
    enforce a settlement agreement. Because we agree with both parties that the Board
    erroneously required a showing of material breach of the agreement as a condition of
    reinstating Ms. Gillespie’s prior appeal from her removal action, we vacate the Board’s
    decision and remand this case to the Board with instructions to reinstate Ms. Gillespie’s
    prior appeal.
    BACKGROUND
    Ms. Gillespie worked as a contract specialist for the Department of the Navy until
    she was removed from her position in May 2000. She appealed to the Board from the
    removal action, and that appeal was resolved with a settlement agreement.            The
    settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that she would withdraw her appeal and
    resign her position. For its part, the agency agreed that it would “cancel and purge from
    the appellant’s Official Personnel Folder (OPF) the Notification of Personnel Action (SF-
    50) form that removed her from her position,” and would remove all other termination
    documents from other agency files; that it would remove from the agency’s files all
    references regarding her performance improvement plan; and that it would “issue a
    1999 and 2000 performance appraisal indicating the appellant passed” and would so
    advise any third party. The agreement further provided that the parties agreed “that if
    the agency or the appellant does not carry out, or rescind any action specified by the
    terms of this Agreement for any reason not attributable to the acts or conduct of the
    appellant or the agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board shall, upon written request
    of the appellant or the agency, reinstate this appeal for further processing.”
    In 2003, Ms. Gillespie inspected her OPF. She alleges that she discovered that
    the personnel folder contained a copy of the form SF-50 evidencing her removal, as well
    as copies of the settlement agreement and the Board’s decision dismissing her appeal
    as settled. In addition, she alleges that her personnel file did not contain the revised
    1999 and 2000 performance appraisals that the agency had agreed to prepare.
    Believing that the agency had breached the settlement agreement, Ms. Gillespie
    filed a petition for review with the Board in which she sought reinstatement of her prior
    05-3193                                      2
    appeal from the removal action against her. The Board treated her petition as a petition
    for enforcement of the settlement agreement and referred the petition to an
    administrative judge.
    The administrative judge found that the agency had breached the settlement
    agreement because, as of July 8, 2003, it had not purged the relevant form SF-50 from
    Ms. Gillespie’s OPF and because her OPF contained copies of the settlement
    agreement and the Board’s initial decision accepting that agreement. With respect to
    Ms. Gillespie’s argument as to the performance appraisals, the administrative judge
    found that the agency issued the appraisals in question, and because it was not
    required to retain those appraisals in Ms. Gillespie’s OPF, she had failed to show a
    breach of that provision of the settlement agreement.
    Although the administrative judge found that the agency had breached the
    agreement, he concluded that the agency’s breach was not material and that she was
    therefore not entitled to rescission of the agreement. He explained that Ms. Gillespie
    had subsequently been employed elsewhere in the agency and that her hiring “tends to
    show that the agency’s breach did no harm to the vital interest in question; i.e., the
    appellant’s employment prospects.” Observing that the agency had since complied with
    the provisions of the settlement agreement that were in dispute, the administrative judge
    dismissed Ms. Gillespie’s enforcement petition as moot. Ms. Gillespie timely petitioned
    this court for review of the Board’s decision.
    DISCUSSION
    Both parties agree that the Board erred by requiring Ms. Gillespie to prove, as a
    condition for obtaining reinstatement of the appeal from her removal action, that the
    05-3193                                      3
    breach of the settlement agreement was material. We accept the parties’ joint position
    with respect to that issue.
    A settlement agreement is a contract. Greco v. Dep’t of the Army, 
    852 F.2d 558
    ,
    560 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In construing a contract, we look to the terms of the agreement to
    determine the intent of the parties at the time they contracted.      
    Id.
       Ordinarily, an
    examination of whether a breach is material is required to justify rescission as a
    remedy. See Christopher Vill., L.P. v. United States, 
    360 F.3d 1319
    , 1335 (Fed. Cir.
    2004); Thomas v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
    124 F.3d 1439
    , 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
    In this case, however, the parties expressly agreed in the settlement agreement that in
    the event of any breach, the prior appeal would be subject to reinstatement at the
    behest of the nonbreaching party. Because the agreement specifically provided for
    reinstatement of the appeal as a remedy for any breach by the agency, the
    administrative judge should not have inquired into the materiality of the breach as a
    prerequisite for granting the remedy of reinstatement of the appeal. This is not to say
    that any technical departure from the strict terms of the agreement, no matter how
    trivial, would necessarily have required reinstatement of the appeal, but in this case the
    agency’s noncompliance was not trivial. Accordingly, we hold that the administrative
    judge erred in denying Ms. Gillespie’s petition for reinstatement of her prior appeal
    based on his conclusion that the agency’s breach was not material, and we vacate the
    Board’s order and remand with instructions to reinstate Ms. Gillespie’s appeal from the
    removal action.
    05-3193                                     4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2005-3193

Citation Numbers: 168 F. App'x 421

Judges: Bryson, Dyk, Gajarsa, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 2/15/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023