Asia Vital Components Co. v. Asetek Danmark A/S , 837 F.3d 1249 ( 2016 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO., LTD.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    ASETEK DANMARK A/S,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2015-1597
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Virginia in No. 1:14-cv-01293-LO-TCB,
    Judge Liam O'Grady.
    ______________________
    Decided: September 8, 2016
    ______________________
    ANDREW C. AITKEN, Aitken Law Offices, Wheaton,
    MD, and CAMERON H. TOUSI, IP Law Leaders PLLC,
    Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also
    represented by RAYMOND HO.
    ROBERT F. MCCAULEY, Finnegan, Henderson, Fara-
    bow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Palo Alto, CA, argued for
    defendant-appellee. Also represented by C. BRANDON
    RASH, Washington, DC.
    ______________________
    2           ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S
    Before PROST, Chief Judge, LINN and TARANTO, Circuit
    Judges.
    PROST, Chief Judge.
    Asia Vital Components Co., Ltd. (“AVC”) filed a de-
    claratory judgment action against Asetek Danmark A/S
    (“Asetek”) seeking a declaration that AVC did not infringe
    U.S. Patent Nos. 8,240,362 (“’362 patent”) and 8,245,764
    (“’764 patent”) (collectively, “the asserted patents”) and
    that those patents are invalid. The United States District
    Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the
    case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding
    that AVC’s complaint did not plead sufficient facts to
    show that there is a substantial controversy between the
    parties. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the
    district court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    AVC is a Taiwanese corporation that manufactures
    cooling systems for integrated circuits. Asetek is the
    assignee of the ’362 and ’764 patents, which are generally
    directed toward liquid cooling systems that are used in
    connection with computers to cool integrated circuits.
    Beginning in 2012, Asetek brought lawsuits against
    other competitors that make and sell liquid cooling sys-
    tems, alleging infringement of the ’362 and ’764 patents.
    In April 2014, Asetek sent AVC a letter accusing AVC of
    infringing the ’362 and ’764 patents. That letter, howev-
    er, was based on Asetek’s mistaken belief that AVC
    manufactured a particular product, the Liqmax 120s. In
    the letter, Asetek specifically referenced the Liqmax 120s
    product and provided an exemplary infringement claim
    chart for that product.
    In response, AVC told Asetek that it did not manufac-
    ture the Liqmax 120s. Nonetheless, AVC requested a
    meeting with Asetek “to discuss various related matters,”
    ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.    v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S           3
    which AVC considered “of importance concerning future
    cooperation” with Asetek. J.A. 105. Asetek responded in
    an email dated August 2, 2014, that if AVC was not
    making the Liqmax 120s then there did not appear to be a
    reason to meet. Also in the email, Asetek referenced the
    fact that it had tried to cooperate with AVC previously
    “and the experience went very poorly and sowed distrust
    in Asetek for AVC.” J.A. 207. Asetek further noted that
    it does not license its patents and said that “although that
    option may have previously been available to AVC when
    it was manufacturing Asetek’s products, that option is no
    longer available to AVC (based in large part on AVC’s
    prior behavior toward Asetek).” 
    Id. Finally, Asetek
    stated,
    Please be advised that Asetek believes that AVC
    is likely selling other infringing products in the
    United States. We are sure you are aware that
    Asetek enforced its IP, as it has in pending litiga-
    tions against CoolIT and Cooler Master. Asetek
    has also been allowed a patent in the European
    Union with claims similar to the US ’362 and ’764
    patents, with priority in 2003, and also has simi-
    lar claims pending in China.
    
    Id. A meeting
    did ultimately take place between AVC and
    Asetek in August 2014. At the meeting, AVC expressed a
    desire to license the asserted patents, and Asetek initially
    declined. After further discussion, Asetek did offer AVC a
    license at a royalty rate of 16% or at a reduced rate if
    AVC would provide preferential pricing on components.
    AVC representatives at the meeting said they would
    consider that possibility and bring it to the attention of
    AVC management. There was no specific discussion of
    AVC products potentially infringing the asserted patents
    at the meeting.
    4         ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S
    On September 30, 2014, AVC filed a complaint
    against Asetek alleging that AVC had designed and built
    liquid cooling products, identified as the K7 and K9
    products, and seeking a declaration that its products did
    not infringe the ’362 and ’764 patents and that those
    patents are invalid. AVC contends that it had completed
    prototype products of the K7 and K9 products and that
    those products have a number of similarities to the CoolIT
    and Cooler Master products that Asetek did accuse of
    infringement. Asetek responds that it never accused the
    K7 or K9 products of infringement, and, in fact, contends
    it did not even know that those products existed before
    AVC’s complaint.
    The district court agreed with Asetek and dismissed
    the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
    district court held that the “complaint does not plead
    sufficient facts to show that there is a substantial contro-
    versy under the totality of the circumstances.” J.A. 2.
    The district court did not explain its reasons in the writ-
    ten decision, but instead referred to the reasons stated
    during a hearing the court held on the question of juris-
    diction. At the hearing, the district court emphasized
    that there was never any discussion between the parties
    as to whether AVC’s products were infringing and credit-
    ed Asetek’s declarations that it was unaware of the exist-
    ence of those products. AVC timely appealed to us. We
    have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction de novo. Powertech Tech. Inc. v.
    Tessera, Inc., 
    660 F.3d 1301
    , 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We
    review factual findings underlying the jurisdiction deter-
    mination for clear error. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroe-
    lecs., Inc., 
    480 F.3d 1372
    , 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The
    burden is on the party claiming declaratory judgment
    jurisdiction to establish that such jurisdiction existed at
    ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S          5
    the time the claim for declaratory relief was filed. Power-
    tech 
    Tech., 660 F.3d at 1306
    .
    The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “[i]n a
    case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any
    court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropri-
    ate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
    relations of any interested party seeking such declara-
    tion.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genen-
    tech, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that the test for
    whether an “actual controversy” exists is “whether the
    facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there
    is a substantial controversy, between parties having
    adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
    reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judg-
    ment.” 
    549 U.S. 118
    , 127 (2007) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). 1
    Although it relaxed the test for establishing jurisdic-
    tion, MedImmune “did not change the bedrock rule that a
    case or controversy must be based on a real and immedi-
    ate injury or threat of future injury that is caused by the
    defendants—an objective standard that cannot be met by
    a purely subjective or speculative fear of future harm.”
    Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 
    537 F.3d 1329
    , 1339
    1    In so doing, the Supreme Court in MedImmune
    disagreed with the stricter “reasonable apprehension of
    imminent suit” test that our court had previously applied
    and thus lowered the bar to establish jurisdiction. Teva
    Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 
    482 F.3d 1330
    , 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, the reasonable
    apprehension test is still a factor and “one of many ways a
    patentee can satisfy the Supreme Court’s more general
    all-the-circumstances test to establish that an action
    presents a justiciable Article III controversy.” Caraco
    Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 
    527 F.3d 1278
    ,
    1291 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
    6         ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S
    (Fed. Cir. 2008).      Thus, we have explained post-
    MedImmune that “jurisdiction generally will not arise
    merely on the basis that a party learns of the existence of
    a patent owned by another or even perceives such a
    patent to pose a risk of infringement, without some af-
    firmative act by the patentee.” 
    SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381
    . Instead, we have required “conduct that can be
    reasonably inferred as demonstrating intent to enforce a
    patent.” Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 
    587 F.3d 1358
    , 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
    Here, AVC alleges that, under the totality of circum-
    stances, a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy
    and reality exists between it and Asetek to warrant
    jurisdiction. It contends that the district court improperly
    focused on Asetek’s contention that it did not specifically
    accuse AVC’s K7 and K9 products of infringement in
    finding no jurisdiction. Asetek responds that, at most,
    AVC’s allegations amount to “a purely subjective appre-
    hension of a future infringement suit involving the K7
    and K9 prototypes” and thus are insufficient to satisfy the
    actual controversy test. Appellee’s Br. 11.
    We agree with AVC that the totality of circumstances
    indicates that an actual controversy existed between the
    parties at the time of the declaratory judgment complaint.
    Although the April 30, 2014 letter incorrectly accused
    AVC of manufacturing the Liqmax 120s, it was still a
    demand letter that referenced a product that AVC con-
    tends is similar to its own K7 and K9 products. Upon
    receiving the letter, AVC contacted Asetek, saying that it
    did not manufacture the Liqmax 120s, and then, in a
    follow-up email, AVC requested a meeting with Asetek “to
    discuss the related matter.” J.A. 105. Instead of simply
    responding that it had made a mistake with respect to the
    Liqmax 120s, Asetek’s August 2, 2014 email contained a
    number of statements that indicate that an actual contro-
    versy between the parties existed. For example, Asetek
    (1) rehashed the volatile relationship between the parties,
    ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S         7
    saying that poor experiences with AVC in the past have
    “sown distrust in Asetek for AVC”; (2) stated that it “does
    not license its patents” generally and, more specifically,
    that it would not license them to AVC due to the previous
    conflicts between the parties; (3) accused AVC of “likely
    selling other infringing products in the United States”; (4)
    warned AVC that it “enforced its IP” and noted its “pend-
    ing litigations against CoolIT and Cooler Master”—
    companies that AVC alleges sell products similar to the
    K7 and K9; and (5) emphasized that it has been allowed a
    patent in the European Union with claims similar to the
    asserted patents and also has similar claims pending in
    China. J.A. 207. Such a response by Asetek clearly
    “demonstrate[s] intent to enforce a patent,” Hewlett-
    
    Packard, 587 F.3d at 1363
    , and is thus sufficient to con-
    clude that a substantial controversy between the parties
    existed at the time of the complaint.
    The further interactions between the parties only con-
    firm our conclusion. Despite recognizing that AVC does
    not manufacture the Liqmax 120s, Asetek still agreed to a
    meeting with AVC where they discussed potential licens-
    ing of the asserted patents. Moreover, AVC alleges that
    Asetek made threats to its customers regarding AVC’s
    infringement of the asserted patents. Specifically, AVC
    alleges that “AVC’s customers for the K7 and K9 products
    have expressed concern that [they will be subject] to
    liability under the Asserted Patents and AVC has with-
    held accepting purchase order out of fear of possible
    liability based upon the Asserted Patents.” J.A. 67. To
    support its allegation, AVC submitted a declaration from
    its Chief Corporation Officer, David Wang, stating:
    From discussions with representatives of two AVC
    customers, these representatives informed AVC
    that Asetek has expressed to them that AVC has
    infringed Asetek’s U.S. Patents, and that if these
    customers use AVC’s products, then lawsuit will
    follow. These customers are: Thermaltake (a
    8          ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S
    Taiwanese company) and IBuyPower (a U.S. com-
    pany).
    J.A. 213. 2 Such threats constitute affirmative actions by
    Asetek to impede and frustrate AVC’s attempts to mean-
    ingfully participate in the liquid cooling market and
    further support our conclusion that a substantial contro-
    versy existed between the parties.
    Asetek relies heavily on the fact that it never refer-
    enced AVC’s particular products or product line as poten-
    tially infringing, and, in fact, did not even know of AVC’s
    products at the time of the complaint. But we have not
    required such specific facts to find jurisdiction. See ABB
    Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 
    635 F.3d 1345
    , 1348 (Fed. Cir.
    2011) (“[A] specific threat of infringement litigation by the
    patentee is not required to establish jurisdiction.”).
    Indeed, in Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem,
    2   Asetek contends that we should not look beyond
    the allegation in the complaint and thus should not
    consider the declaration. But we have said that “[i]n
    establishing the predicate jurisdictional facts, a court . . .
    may review evidence extrinsic to the pleadings, including
    affidavits and deposition testimony.” Cedars-Sinai Med.
    Ctr. v. Watkins, 
    11 F.3d 1573
    , 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
    Asetek also denies making any such threat to AVC’s
    customers and thus says that the disputed allegation is
    “subject to fact-finding by the district court.” 
    Id. Here, both
    the Wang declaration from AVC and Asetek’s decla-
    ration denying the allegation were before the district
    court and, although it did not make any explicit fact
    findings, the district court appears to have assumed that
    the allegation was true. We have no reason to conclude
    otherwise. Moreover, even if we were to discount the
    allegation, the August 2, 2014 email itself is sufficient to
    demonstrate that an actual controversy existed between
    the parties at the time of the complaint.
    ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S         9
    Inc., applying the stricter reasonable apprehension test,
    we stated that “a court may find a clear basis for a rea-
    sonable apprehension in all the circumstances, even when
    a patentee first learns of plaintiff’s conduct upon receipt
    of the complaint.” 
    846 F.2d 731
    , 738 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
    The question of jurisdiction does not turn on Asetek’s
    knowledge of the specific AVC products or whether Asetek
    specifically alleged that the K7 and K9 products infringed
    the asserted patents; instead, the question is whether,
    under all the circumstances, Asetek’s actions “can be
    reasonably inferred as demonstrating intent to enforce a
    patent.” Hewlett-
    Packard, 587 F.3d at 1363
    . We conclude
    that Asetek’s conduct demonstrates just that.
    In addition to an affirmative act by Asetek, AVC must
    also show that the threat of suit is real and immediate to
    establish jurisdiction. 
    MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127
    .
    “[A]lthough a party need not have engaged in the actual
    manufacture or sale of a potentially infringing product to
    obtain a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, there
    must be a showing of ‘meaningful preparation’ for making
    or using that product.” Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc.,
    
    528 F.3d 871
    , 881 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, AVC has made
    the requisite showing. AVC alleged that (1) it has com-
    pleted designs of the K7 and K9 products; (2) it has manu-
    factured sample prototype products of the K7 and K9 (as
    confirmed by photographs of the products presented to the
    district court below); (3) it intends to market and sell the
    products in the United States; and (4) its K7 and K9
    products “are positioned to directly compete in the market
    against Cooler Master, Coolit Systems and Enermax as
    well as the Asetek’s products.” J.A. 67. AVC’s allegation
    regarding the concerns of its customers and that it has
    “withheld accepting purchase order[s]” indicates that AVC
    has customers lined up for its products that have submit-
    ted, or, at the very least, are prepared to submit purchase
    orders for the products. 
    Id. 10 ASIA
    VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S
    Asetek does not dispute these allegations but instead
    contends that they do not demonstrate “concrete plans” to
    engage in potentially infringing activities. We disagree.
    This is not the type of case where, at the time the com-
    plaint was filed, the accused products were far from being
    complete or operational and were susceptible to design
    changes, making it impossible to compare them against
    the asserted patents. See, e.g., Sierra Applied Scis., Inc.
    v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 
    363 F.3d 1361
    , 1380
    (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding no real or immediate controversy
    where the alleged infringer testified that it had no intent
    to market the accused product and “the design [of the
    accused product] was fluid on the date the complaint was
    filed” making it “impossible to determine—on that date—
    whether any eventual design of the [accused product]
    would infringe [the asserted] patents”); Int’l Harvester Co.
    v. Deere & Co., 
    623 F.2d 1207
    , 1216 (7th Cir. 1980) (find-
    ing no real and immediate controversy where, as of the
    date of the complaint, the alleged infringer “anticipated
    further, fairly extensive testing of the [accused product]
    including construction of more test models, and anticipat-
    ed design changes where necessary in response to the
    testing”). This is also not a case like Lujan v. Defenders of
    Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    (1992), or Matthews International
    Corp. v. Biosafe Engineering, LLC, 
    695 F.3d 1322
    (Fed.
    Cir 2012), in which an intent to take action was unaccom-
    panied by any specific plans or steps that might satisfy
    the MedImmune “immediacy” requirement. 
    MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127
    . Instead, AVC provided undisputed
    allegations that it has manufactured prototypes, has
    potential customers, and has a sufficiently immediate
    interest to request a license to clear the path for its in-
    tended entrance into the U.S. market. That is sufficient
    to meet the real and immediate test.
    We similarly disagree with Asetek that AVC’s allega-
    tions provide insufficient information about whether the
    K7 and K9 products would infringe the asserted patents.
    ASIA VITAL COMPONENTS CO.   v. ASETEK DANMARK A/S        11
    AVC specifically stated that its products “may have a
    number of structural similarities to the accused products
    sold by Coolit Systems, Inc. and Cooler Master Co.,
    Ltd.”—products which Asetek has alleged infringe the
    asserted patents—and that its products “are positioned to
    directly compete in the market” against those of Cooler
    Master, Coolit Systems, Enermax, and even Asetek. J.A.
    67. Moreover, AVC provided photographs depicting the
    similarities between the K9 product and the Liqmax
    120s—the product that Asetek initially accused of in-
    fringement in its demand letter to AVC. AVC was not
    required, as Asetek contends, to specifically allege that
    the structural similarities between its products and the
    competitor products are relevant to the claims of the
    asserted patents; such an allegation is implicit in the
    complaint when read as a whole. Indeed, to require more
    from AVC would precipitate the anomalous result where-
    by a party seeking a declaration of noninfringement must
    show that its product is the same as the patented product
    in relevant respects. As is clear from our case law—and
    from common sense—that is not the test for jurisdiction.
    See 
    Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 738
    (“It is at best incongruous
    to require that one seeking a declaration of noninfringe-
    ment prove its process or product is the ‘same as’ or ‘iden-
    tical’ to the patented process or product.”).
    Thus, we conclude that AVC alleged sufficient facts
    that, “under all the circumstances, show that there is a
    substantial controversy, between parties having adverse
    legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to
    warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”
    
    MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127
    .
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ruling of the
    district court and remand for further proceedings.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED