Washington v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Co. , 847 F.3d 1192 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                     FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    February 6, 2017
    PUBLISH                Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    ROBERICK WASHINGTON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                             No. 15-3181
    UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF
    WYANDOTTE COUNTY, KANSAS;
    GARY ORTIZ, in his official and
    individual capacities, Assistant County
    Administrator; TERRY L. BROADUS,
    Administrator, in her official capacity,
    Wyandotte County Juvenile Detention
    Center; DONALD ASH, Sheriff, in his
    official and individual capacities,
    Wyandotte County Unified
    Government; DOUGLAS BACH, in
    his official and individual capacities,
    Assistant County Administrator,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
    (D.C. NO. 2:14-CV-02108-JTM)
    Michael J. Gallagher, Gallagher & Kaiser, LLP, Kansas City, Missouri, for
    Appellant.
    Henry E. Couchman Jr., Legal Department, Unified Government of Wyandotte
    County/Kansas City, Kansas, Kansas City, Kansas, for Appellees.
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
    TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge.
    Roberick Washington was employed as a lieutenant at the Wyandotte
    County Juvenile Detention Center in Kansas City, Kansas. After a random drug
    test, he was fired for testing positive for cocaine. Washington filed a civil rights
    action against the County and several of his co-workers, alleging that the drug
    test was an illegal search that violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
    rights, as well as breached his employment contract. The district court granted
    summary judgment for the defendants on all claims.
    We affirm because the County’s random drug test did not violate the Fourth
    Amendment, since the test furthered the County’s need to ensure the safety and
    welfare of the juvenile residents. Nor did his termination violate any other
    constitutional or statutory right.
    I. Background
    In 1995, Roberick Washington began working for Wyandotte County as a
    juvenile care worker in the Juvenile Detention Center, which houses juvenile
    offenders facing criminal charges and serves as an educational and development
    center for the residents. In 2002, Washington was promoted to juvenile
    lieutenant. In that position, his job duties included, among other things,
    classifying inmates based on their behavior. In 2005, while still holding the rank
    -2-
    of juvenile lieutenant, Washington assumed further responsibilities for training
    other personnel.
    After assuming his training responsibilities, Washington still interacted
    with residents. He continued to classify inmates and occasionally supervised
    juvenile detention officers, who oversee the residents on the “floor,” where
    residents stay. Washington also conducted disciplinary hearings for residents and
    filled in for absent floor lieutenants, earning overtime by working night and
    weekend shifts. Sometimes he would drive the County van to take juveniles to
    the intake assessment center. And whenever a fight broke out, he and “all
    employees under juvenile detention would have to go to the floor just for
    support.” App. at 105. Though Washington did not always go, he was supposed
    to be present.
    Wyandotte County has a comprehensive random drug testing policy that
    applies to employees in “safety sensitive positions.” 
    Id. at 142.
    Pertinently, the
    County’s Policy on Substance Abuse and Drug and Alcohol Testing lists “juvenile
    lieutenant”—Washington’s position—as a safety sensitive position. 
    Id. at 173.
    According to the Policy, “failure to pass a drug or alcohol test is just cause for
    discipline including discharge.” 
    Id. at 162.
    The Policy also provides that
    discipline must be administered in accordance with the Human Resources Guide,
    which permits suspension from work for a first-time drug offense. The HR
    Guide, however, expressly “does not modify the status of employees as
    -3-
    employees-at-will or in any way restrict the Unified Government’s right to bypass
    the disciplinary procedures suggested.” 
    Id. at 177.
    The Guide also specifies that
    “[a] more severe penalty than indicated may be imposed if warranted by the
    circumstances.” 
    Id. at 178.
    In 2012, Washington supplied a urine sample as part of this random drug
    testing policy, as he had several times in the past. But this time, he tested
    positive for cocaine. After a second test confirmed the result, Sheriff Donald Ash
    terminated Washington. Pursuant to the Grievance Procedure detailed in the HR
    Guide, 1 Washington appealed Ash’s decision to Terry Broadus, the administrator
    of the Juvenile Detention Center. Broadus denied Washington’s grievance, and
    Washington appealed to the County Administrator’s Office. After a hearing, Gary
    Ortiz, an assistant county administrator, upheld Washington’s termination. Doug
    Bach, the deputy county administrator, then wrote to Washington to inform him
    that after reviewing Ortiz’s findings of fact and recommendations, the County
    Administrator’s Office had decided to deny his appeal. Washington claims he
    sought an evidentiary hearing and a name-clearing hearing and requested
    reinstatement, but those requests were denied.
    Washington filed a four-count complaint in the District of Kansas, alleging
    that: (1) Sheriff Ash and the County conducted an unconstitutional search, in
    1
    The Grievance Procedure qualifies that “employees remain ‘at will’” and
    “the Unified Government may terminate an employee’s employment by the
    Unified Government at any time, for any reason.” App. at 397.
    -4-
    violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) all defendants deprived Washington of his
    property interest in continued employment without due process of law, in
    violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) all defendants failed to provide Washington a
    name-clearing hearing, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) the County
    breached an implied contract created by its written disciplinary policies, in
    violation of state contract law. The district court granted summary judgment for
    all defendants on all counts.
    II. Analysis
    Washington contends the district court erred in dismissing his federal and
    state claims. We consider each in turn.
    A. Section 1983 Claims
    “Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to a section 1983 action,
    providing immunity from suit from the outset.” DeSpain v. Uphoff, 
    264 F.3d 965
    ,
    971 (10th Cir. 2001) (alteration omitted). “We review a grant of summary
    judgment on the basis of qualified immunity de novo.” Harman v. Pollock, 
    586 F.3d 1254
    , 1260 (10th Cir. 2009). To survive summary judgment after a
    defendant has claimed qualified immunity, the plaintiff must establish (1) the
    defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established.
    Puller v. Baca, 
    781 F.3d 1190
    , 1196 (10th Cir. 2015). In this circuit, a right is
    clearly established “‘when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point,
    or if the clearly established weight of authority from other courts shows that the
    -5-
    right must be as the plaintiff maintains.’” Thomas v. Kaven, 
    765 F.3d 1183
    , 1194
    (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 
    603 F.3d 1182
    , 1196–97
    (10th Cir. 2010)). If the plaintiff meets this two-part test, then the usual analysis
    applies, with the defendant bearing the burden of showing he is entitled to
    summary judgment. Clark v. Edmunds, 
    513 F.3d 1219
    , 1222 (10th Cir. 2008).
    Unlike individuals, however, municipalities are not protected by qualified
    immunity. Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 
    448 F.3d 1214
    , 1223 (10th Cir.
    2006). Thus, granting summary judgment in favor of a municipality is
    appropriate where the pleadings and supporting materials establish there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986). We must view the evidence and resolve all inferences in the
    light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
    Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986).
    A municipality may be liable under § 1983 where the plaintiff identifies an
    unconstitutional policy that caused the claimed injury. Schneider v. City of
    Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 
    717 F.3d 760
    , 769–70 (10th Cir. 2013). But the
    plaintiff must establish that the municipal employees causing the harm violated
    the plaintiff’s constitutional rights; otherwise, the municipality cannot be held
    liable. Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 
    239 F.3d 1150
    , 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2001).
    -6-
    1. Unreasonable Search
    Washington first argues the district court erred in finding the County’s
    random drug test did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and
    warrant requirements. He claims there are genuine issues of material fact as to
    whether the County is entitled to an exemption from the probable cause
    requirement for employees in safety sensitive positions. We disagree.
    “When a government employer requires its employees to submit to a
    urinalysis test for the purpose of detecting illegal drug use, the test is a search
    subject to the Fourth Amendment and must be reasonable.” 19 Solid Waste Dep’t
    Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, 
    156 F.3d 1068
    , 1072 (10th Cir. 1998).
    Ordinarily, a search “must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”
    in order to meet the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Chandler
    v. Miller, 
    520 U.S. 305
    , 313 (1997). But when the government asserts a “special
    need” beyond ordinary crime detection, we have found suspicionless drug testing
    reasonable if the government’s interests outweigh the individual’s privacy
    interests. 19 Solid 
    Waste, 156 F.3d at 1072
    .
    Before we balance the interests on each side, however, “the government
    must . . . be able to show, as a threshold matter, that its case for suspicionless
    testing is legitimate.” 
    Id. at 1073.
    Thus, “the special need showing is best
    viewed as a preliminary examination of the government interests at stake.” 
    Id. Moreover, as
    we explained in Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,
    -7-
    the [special need] cases seem to share at least these
    features: (1) an exercise of governmental authority
    distinct from that of mere law enforcement such as the
    authority as employer, the in loco parentis authority of
    school officials, or the post-incarceration authority of
    probation officers; (2) lack of individualized suspicion
    of wrongdoing, and concomitant lack of individualized
    stigma based on such suspicion; and (3) an interest in
    preventing future harm, generally involving the health or
    safety of the person being searched or of other persons
    directly touched by that person’s conduct, rather than of
    deterrence or punishment for past wrongdoing.
    
    336 F.3d 1194
    , 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2003).
    In evaluating whether the government has demonstrated a legitimate special
    need, we examine (1) “whether the testing program was adopted in response to a
    documented drug abuse problem or whether drug abuse among the target group
    would pose a serious danger to the public”; and (2) whether the testing scheme
    would effectively detect and deter drug use. 19 Solid 
    Waste, 156 F.3d at 1073
    .
    In the absence of a documented drug problem among employees, courts
    have nevertheless concluded the government’s concerns are real if drug use
    among the tested individuals would threaten workplace or public safety. See, e.g.,
    Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 
    489 U.S. 656
    , 668–71 (1989)
    (concluding government had a compelling interest in preventing drug use among
    Customs employees charged with drug interdiction at the nation’s borders);
    19 Solid 
    Waste, 156 F.3d at 1074
    (determining government’s significant interest
    in preventing waste department mechanics from “operat[ing] heavy machinery in
    -8-
    a dangerous manner, endangering others in the shop, or conduct[ing] repairs
    improperly, [thus] imperiling individuals on the public streets” satisfied first part
    of special need showing). Cf. Neumeyer v. Beard, 
    421 F.3d 210
    , 214 (3d Cir.
    2005) (noting the “ready applicability of the special needs doctrine to the prison
    context” given the need “‘to safeguard institutional security’”) (quoting Hunter v.
    Auger, 
    672 F.2d 668
    , 674 (8th Cir.1982)).
    Further, courts have characterized random, rather than scheduled, drug tests
    as an effective method of detecting and deterring drug use. See Skinner v. Ry.
    Labor Exec. Ass’n, 
    489 U.S. 602
    , 630 (1989); Int’l Union v. Winters, 
    385 F.3d 1003
    , 1013 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting random drug tests are “more efficacious than
    one time tests at achieving their intended result”); 19 Solid 
    Waste, 156 F.3d at 1074
    (finding government failed to satisfy second part of special need showing in
    part because it administered drug tests in “predictable intervals”).
    Here, the County argues it administers random drug tests to juvenile
    lieutenants to “ensur[e] the safety and welfare of the children housed in the
    Juvenile Detention Center.” Aple. Br. 35. We find this special need is legitimate.
    First, Washington “perform[s] a job in which safety is an important concern.”
    See 19 Solid 
    Waste, 156 F.3d at 1074
    . The County serves as guardian to juveniles
    residing at the Juvenile Detention Center and has a significant interest in ensuring
    the safety of those under its full-time care—many of whom may have struggled
    with substance abuse, including use of illegal drugs. By preventing drug use
    -9-
    among its employees who have interaction with and access to residents, the
    County ensures that interaction with the youth are handled by non-impaired
    individuals, that drugs have a lower likelihood of finding their way into the
    facility, and that juvenile lieutenants serve as role models for the youth. Second,
    the County’s testing program is random, which minimizes the possibility
    employees will evade detection and maximizes the deterrent effect of the
    program.
    Having found a legitimate special need for the random drug testing policy,
    we balance Washington’s privacy interests against the County’s interests in safety
    and welfare to determine whether testing Washington was reasonable in these
    circumstances. See 19 Solid 
    Waste, 156 F.3d at 1072
    . First, we consider “the
    scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue” and “the character of the
    intrusion that is complained of.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
    515 U.S. 646
    ,
    658 (1995). As a correctional employee, Washington’s expectation of privacy
    was diminished. See, e.g., True v. Nebraska, 
    612 F.3d 676
    , 681 (8th Cir. 2010)
    (“While correction officers retain certain expectations of privacy, it is clear that,
    based upon their place of employment, their subjective expectations of privacy
    are diminished while they are within the confines of the prison.”). Moreover, the
    drug test was minimally invasive: Washington provided the urine sample in a
    restroom with the door closed, without a monitor. Cf. 
    Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658
    -10-
    (when urine samples are provided in an enclosed stall, “the privacy interests
    compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are . . . negligible”).
    Next, we consider whether the government has asserted an interest
    “important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors
    that show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of
    privacy.” 
    Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661
    (emphasis in original).
    Here, the County has identified two interests important enough to justify
    randomly testing Washington. The first involves the unique situation of working
    with juveniles in an educational setting. When an employee has an in loco
    parentis custodial and educational relationship with minors—especially at-risk
    minors—that employee’s illegal drug use presents a risk of harm to the minors.
    Cf. Knox Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 
    158 F.3d 361
    , 384 (6th Cir.
    1998) (finding a compelling government interest to drug test new teachers
    “considering their unique in loco parentis obligations and their immense
    influence over students”); Aubrey v. Sch. Bd. of Lafayette Par., 
    148 F.3d 559
    ,
    564–65 (5th Cir. 1998) (allowing suspicionless searches of school employees who
    interact regularly with students). And, in upholding a school district’s random
    drug-testing policy for student athletes, the Supreme Court has recognized there is
    a strong governmental interest in deterring drug use by adolescents, who are more
    susceptible to impairment and addiction. 
    Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661
    –62.
    -11-
    The County’s second interest involves the situation of working in a
    correctional facility. If an employee has law enforcement duties, access to and
    direct contact with inmates, or may be called on to secure a correctional facility,
    that employee’s illegal drug use presents a significant potential threat to the
    inmates and the security of the facility. See 
    Winters, 385 F.3d at 1012
    (recognizing state asserted legitimate special need to randomly drug test such
    employees, whose impairment “would pose a significant potential threat to the
    health and safety of themselves and others”).
    In balancing these interests, we note the Supreme Court has approved
    suspicionless drug testing of employees in certain safety sensitive positions. See
    
    Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620
    –21 (holding the government’s “interest in regulating the
    conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety, like its . . . operation of a
    government office, school, or prison[,]” justified subjecting employees engaged in
    safety-sensitive tasks to warrantless drug and alcohol testing). For these
    positions, the government interest in safety justifies suspicionless testing, because
    “even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences.” 
    Id. at 628.
    Here, though the County’s Policy on Substance Abuse and Drug and
    Alcohol Testing lists “juvenile lieutenant” as a safety sensitive position,
    Washington argues the County’s policy should not apply to him, because he
    primarily performed administrative tasks.
    -12-
    We reject Washington’s argument, because the undisputed material facts
    establish that the County’s safety interests apply to his position. 2 Perhaps if
    Washington’s job duties were entirely administrative, or if he were not employed
    in a juvenile correctional facility, he would have a point. But as Washington
    himself acknowledged, he was required to report to the floor whenever a fight
    broke out. The County has a strong interest in ensuring its employees are not
    impaired in case of an emergency situation. Moreover, Washington filled in for
    positions that are undeniably safety sensitive, such as driving juveniles to the
    intake assessment center and supervising juvenile officers on the floor.
    Washington took on these duties sporadically, such as when a floor lieutenant was
    running late or sick. Therefore, a random drug testing policy was just as
    applicable to Washington as it would have been to any full-time floor lieutenant.
    The frequency or regularity of Washington’s contact with residents thus does not
    affect our conclusion, since his on-call status made paramount his preparedness.
    Cf. AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 
    944 F.2d 503
    , 509 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding
    Navy’s random drug testing of civil employees with access to classified
    2
    The parties disagree about the nature of Washington’s interaction with
    residents at the Juvenile Detention Center. Compare, e.g., Aplt. Br. 28
    (“Washington had no unsupervised contact with those in detention in the
    facility.”), with Aple. Br. 10 (“Washington worked directly with residents on a
    regular basis.”). Washington argues there is a genuine dispute of material fact
    about whether his position was safety sensitive. But the undisputed facts relied
    on by the district court establish Washington had some interaction with and
    access to juvenile residents, thus implicating the County’s safety concerns.
    -13-
    information, noting “[c]onsiderations of other characteristics of the employees’
    jobs, including the frequency with which the employees are likely to be exposed
    to classified information, are irrelevant”).
    Washington also had access to the entire secured Juvenile Detention
    Center, creating a risk he could expose residents to illegal drugs. Cf. 
    Winters, 385 F.3d at 1010
    (“[T]he introduction of alcohol and drugs into correctional
    facilities, which prisoners could obtain possession of, presents a severe threat to
    security and to the safety of correctional employees and prisoners, since the use
    of drugs by prisoners can lead to disruptive behavior.”); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t
    Emps., AFL-CIO v. Roberts, 
    9 F.3d 1464
    , 1467 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Drugs can reach
    prisoners only by smuggling. . . . The employees have substantially greater
    opportunity to smuggle drugs than do the visitors.”).
    Even if access alone would not be sufficient to justify suspicionless testing,
    we consider all the factors and conclude the County’s interests are important
    enough to outweigh Washington’s diminished privacy interests, and thus the
    random drug test was reasonable. The balance we strike today is specific: the
    government’s interests, while important in this case, might not apply to all
    employees in a correctional facility. See, e.g., 
    Winters, 385 F.3d at 1010
    (allowing drug testing of non-custodial correctional facility employees who had
    unsupervised access to and direct contact with prisoners); Taylor v. O’Grady, 
    888 F.2d 1189
    , 1199 (7th Cir. 1989) (allowing drug testing of only those correctional
    -14-
    facility employees who had regular prisoner contact or had opportunities to
    smuggle drugs to prisoners).
    Because the County’s interests outweigh Washington’s privacy interests,
    Washington has not proven a constitutional violation, and neither Sheriff Ash nor
    the County can be subject to § 1983 liability. 3 Therefore, we affirm the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment on Washington’s Fourth Amendment claims.
    2. Deprivation of Property Without Due Process of Law
    Next, Washington contends the Sheriff’s practices and the County’s
    personnel policies establish he had a protected property interest in continued
    employment at the Juvenile Detention Center.
    The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
    government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due
    process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “To determine whether a plaintiff was
    denied procedural due process, we engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) Did the
    individual possess a protected interest to which due process protection was
    applicable? (2) Was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process?”
    Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 
    155 F.3d 1249
    , 1253 (10th Cir. 1998).
    3
    Even if Washington had established a constitutional violation, Sheriff
    Ash still would not be subject to § 1983 liability, because Washington fails to
    identify clearly established law from any jurisdiction that would have put Ash on
    notice his actions were unconstitutional.
    -15-
    We look to state law to determine whether Washington has a protected
    property interest. Darr v. Town of Telluride, 
    495 F.3d 1243
    , 1251 (10th Cir.
    2007). Under Kansas law, public employment is presumptively at-will. Robert v.
    Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Brown Cty., 
    691 F.3d 1211
    , 1220 (10th Cir. 2012). “To
    override this presumption, a written contract must expressly fix the duration of
    employment or otherwise limit the employer’s ability to discharge.” 
    Id. Washington argues
    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 19-805(d) requires the Sheriff to act
    in accordance with personnel policies and procedures, and the limitations outlined
    in the Policy on Substance Abuse and the HR Guide thus give rise to a property
    right. But none of the policies Washington identifies limited the Sheriff’s ability
    to discharge him. Although the HR Guide suggests suspension would have been
    appropriate for a first-time violation, the Guide is clear that its suggestions do not
    alter an employee’s at-will status, and it provides that other discipline is
    appropriate depending on the circumstances.
    “Absent an express agreement, Kansas law enforces an implied employment
    contract only when the circumstances demonstrate a mutual intent to contract.”
    
    Robert, 691 F.3d at 1220
    . Personnel policies alone are insufficient to create an
    implied employment contract. Farthing v. City of Shawnee, 
    39 F.3d 1131
    , 1138
    (10th Cir. 1994). Here, as explained above, the written policies do not
    demonstrate a mutual intent to modify Washington’s at-will status. And contrary
    to Washington’s argument, the existence of a grievance procedure also fails to
    -16-
    show such mutual intent. See Kingsford v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 
    247 F.3d 1123
    , 1129 (10th Cir. 2001) (“It is well established in this circuit, however, that
    procedural protections alone do not create a claim of entitlement to continued
    public employment. Rather, a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued public
    employment arises only when there are substantive restrictions on the ability of
    the employer to terminate the employee.”).
    Because Washington does not present “independent, probative evidence
    bearing on the issue of the defendant’s intent[,]” he cannot withstand summary
    judgment. 
    Farthing, 39 F.3d at 1139
    . “Absent a property interest, there can be
    no violation of Due Process.” 
    Id. at 1140.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment.
    3. Deprivation of Liberty Without Due Process of Law
    Third, Washington contends he is entitled to a name-clearing hearing,
    because he was deprived of a liberty interest.
    If a public employee can show that his liberty interest in “his good name
    and reputation as they relate to his continued employment” was damaged, due
    process affords an adequate name-clearing hearing. McDonald v. Wise, 
    769 F.3d 1202
    , 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2014). Here, in granting summary judgment for the
    defendants, the district court concluded Washington was not entitled to a name-
    clearing hearing, because the pre-trial order lacked any reference to a damaged
    liberty interest. Washington now argues the district court abused its discretion in
    -17-
    giving weight to the pre-trial order, where Washington mistakenly asserted a
    property interest in employment, rather than a liberty interest in his good name
    and reputation.
    “The pre-trial order supersedes the pleadings and becomes the governing
    pattern of the lawsuit.” Case v. Abrams, 
    352 F.2d 193
    , 195 (10th Cir. 1965).
    Thus, it is difficult to see how the district court abused its discretion in confining
    the issues to those in the pre-trial order. But even if the district court should have
    considered the merits of Washington’s claim, defendants would still be entitled to
    summary judgment. Washington makes only a conclusory allegation of a
    damaged liberty interest without factual or legal support, and without explaining
    why the post-termination process he received failed to satisfy due process. This
    is wholly insufficient to demonstrate a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Garrett
    v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 
    425 F.3d 836
    , 841 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding
    that “conclusory allegations with no citations to the record or any legal authority
    for support” disentitled plaintiff to review).
    Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
    Washington’s liberty interest claim.
    B. State Contract Law Claim
    Washington’s sole state law claim is that he is entitled to reinstatement
    with back pay, because the County breached an implied contract created by its
    written policies. Because we have already concluded Washington failed to
    -18-
    establish the County’s conduct or policies created an implied employment
    contract, 
    see supra
    Section II.A.2, we agree with the district court that the County
    is entitled to summary judgment on Washington’s breach of contract claim.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting
    the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims.
    -19-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-3181

Citation Numbers: 847 F.3d 1192

Filed Date: 2/6/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (29)

Harman v. Pollock , 586 F.3d 1254 ( 2009 )

Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque , 448 F.3d 1214 ( 2006 )

Darr v. Town of Telluride, Colo. , 495 F.3d 1243 ( 2007 )

W. C. Case v. Dan C. Abrams , 352 F.2d 193 ( 1965 )

Trigalet v. City of Tulsa , 239 F.3d 1150 ( 2001 )

Kingsford v. Salt Lake City School District , 247 F.3d 1123 ( 2001 )

No. 01-5098 , 336 F.3d 1194 ( 2003 )

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836 ( 2005 )

Clark v. Edmunds , 513 F.3d 1219 ( 2008 )

PJ Ex Rel. Jensen v. Wagner , 603 F.3d 1182 ( 2010 )

Thomas B. Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, Terry Powell, and ... , 155 F.3d 1249 ( 1998 )

James R. Farthing v. City of Shawnee, Kansas , 39 F.3d 1131 ( 1994 )

19-solid-waste-department-mechanics-sam-aguilar-rudy-archuleta-jr , 156 F.3d 1068 ( 1998 )

DeSpain v. Uphoff , 264 F.3d 965 ( 2001 )

True v. Nebraska , 612 F.3d 676 ( 2010 )

yvonne-taylor-individually-and-on-behalf-of-all-others-similarly-situated , 888 F.2d 1189 ( 1989 )

Knox County Education Association v. Knox County Board of ... , 158 F.3d 361 ( 1998 )

Aubrey v. School Board of Lafayette Parish , 148 F.3d 559 ( 1998 )

teresa-neumeyer-larry-neumeyer-v-jeffrey-beard-in-his-official-capacity , 421 F.3d 210 ( 2005 )

international-union-united-automobile-aerospace-and-agricultural-implement , 385 F.3d 1003 ( 2004 )

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