Wwrd US, LLC v. United States , 886 F.3d 1228 ( 2018 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    WWRD US, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-1945
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of International
    Trade in No. 1:11-cv-00238-MAB, Judge Mark A. Barnett.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 2, 2018
    ______________________
    DANIEL J. GLUCK, Simon Gluck & Kane LLP, New
    York, NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represent-
    ed by CHRISTOPHER M. KANE, MARIANA DEL RIO
    KOSTENWEIN.
    BEVERLY A. FARRELL, International Trade Field
    Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    United States Department of Justice, New York, NY,
    argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CHAD
    A. READLER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., JEANNE E.
    DAVIDSON, AMY RUBIN; SHERYL FRENCH, Office of the
    Assistant Chief Counsel, United States Bureau of Cus-
    2                            WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES
    toms and Border Protection, United States Department of
    Homeland Security, New York, NY.
    ______________________
    Before TARANTO, CLEVENGER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
    CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge.
    WWRD US, LLC (“WWRD”) appeals the United
    States Court of International Trade’s (“CIT”) final deci-
    sion denying WWRD’s motion for summary judgment and
    granting the Government’s cross-motion for summary
    judgment. In doing so, the CIT agreed with the U.S.
    Customs and Border Patrol’s (“CBP”) classification of
    WWRD’s subject imports, finding the articles were not
    eligible for duty-free treatment. WWRD U.S., LLC v.
    United States, 
    211 F. Supp. 3d 1365
    (Ct. Int’l Trade 2017).
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Between October 2009 and February 2010, WWRD
    imported a series of decorative ceramic plates and mugs
    from its “Old Britain Castles” dinnerware collections;
    decorative ceramic plates and gravy boats from its “His
    Majesty” dinnerware collection; and crystal flutes, punch
    bowls, and hurricane lamps from its “12 Days of Christ-
    mas” collection. All of the subject imports had festive
    motifs, such as Christmas trees, hollies, or turkeys, and
    were intended to be used during Thanksgiving or Christ-
    mas dinner. Upon arrival in the United States, the CBP
    classified the articles based on their constituent materi-
    als, placing the various goods in subheadings 6912.00.39, 1
    1   All references to the HTSUS refer to the govern-
    ing provision determined by the date of importation. See
    LeMans Corp. v. United States, 
    660 F.3d 1311
    , 1314 n.2
    (Fed. Cir. 2011). Because there were no material changes
    WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES                              3
    7013.22.50, 7013.41.50, and 9405.50.40 of the Harmo-
    nized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”).
    WWRD filed multiple protests, arguing the articles should
    be classified in 9817.95.01, a duty-free subsection of the
    HTSUS covering certain festive goods. Specifically,
    HTSUS 9817.95.01 provides duty-free status for
    “[a]rticles classifiable in subheadings 3924.10, 3926.90,
    6307.90, 6911.10, 6912.00, 7013.22, 7013.28, 7013.41,
    7013.49, 9405.20, 9405.40, or 9405.50, the foregoing
    meeting the descriptions set forth below: Utilitarian
    articles of a kind used in the home in the performance of
    specific religious or cultural ritual celebrations for reli-
    gious or cultural holidays, or religious festive occasions,
    such as Seder plates, blessing cups, menorahs or kinaras.”
    After the CBP denied WWRD’s protests, WWRD filed a
    complaint with the CIT, challenging the denials. WWRD
    argued that Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners are
    specific cultural ritual celebrations, its articles are used in
    the performance of such celebrations, and thus its articles
    belong in HSTUS 9817.95.01.
    When presented with cross-motions for summary
    judgment, the trial court began by discussing the history
    of subheading 9817.95.01. Specifically, the court noted
    that, before the creation of subheading 9817.95.01, utili-
    tarian items associated with holiday or festive occasions
    were classified within Chapter 95, under heading 9505.
    This heading provided broad duty-free coverage for
    “[f]estive, carnival or other entertainment articles,” as
    interpreted by our line of cases beginning with Midwest of
    Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States, 
    122 F.3d 1423
    (Fed.
    Cir. 1997). However, in 2007, Chapter 95 was amended to
    add Note 1(v), which removed “[t]ableware, kitchenware,
    toilet articles, carpets, and other textile floor coverings,
    to the relevant 2009 and 2010 provisions here, we cite to
    the 2009 version for convenience.
    4                             WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES
    apparel, bed linen, table linen, toilet linen, kitchen linen
    and similar articles having a utilitarian function (classi-
    fied according to their constituent material)” from the
    scope of Chapter 95. But Note 1(v) also referred to sub-
    headings 9817.95.01 and 9817.95.05, 2 which provided
    duty-free status to a select subset of articles that would
    have lost such status under the Note. Thus, while many
    festive utilitarian articles are no longer eligible for duty-
    free status, those used “in the performance of specific
    religious or cultural ritual celebrations” are still eligible.
    The parties disputed only whether WWRD’s subject
    imports are used “in the performance of specific religious
    or cultural ritual celebrations,” and therefore the trial
    court set about defining the scope of this phrase in sub-
    heading 9817.95.01. In assessing the phrase, the CIT
    analyzed the text of the subheading using the General
    Rules of Interpretation (“GRI”). But because the section
    and chapter of the HTSUS did not assist in defining the
    phrase, the court gave the terms in the subheading their
    ordinary meaning, with specific focus on the word “ritual.”
    The court concluded that Thanksgiving and Christ-
    mas are cultural holidays, and the associated dinners are
    cultural celebrations, but not specific rituals. The court
    found that “rituals generally encompass specific scripted
    acts or series of acts that are customarily performed in an
    often formal or solemn manner.” 
    WWRD, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1375
    . While these dinners occur annually during
    religious or cultural holidays, that alone is not sufficient;
    the dinners themselves lack specific formal or solemn
    acts. See 
    id. (“[I]f subheading
    9817.95.01 was intended to
    2    Subheading 9817.95.05 covers “[u]tilitarian arti-
    cles in the form of a three-dimensional representation of a
    symbol or motif clearly associated with a specific holiday
    in the United States.” This subheading is not involved in
    this case.
    WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES                            5
    cover utilitarian items used in the home during religious
    or cultural celebrations, whenever they routinely occur,
    and whatever they might entail, the term ‘ritual’ could
    have been omitted altogether.”).
    The trial court then turned to the exemplars provided
    in the subheading – the Seder plates, blessing cups,
    menorahs or kinaras. Under the statutory construction
    rule of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”), the trial court
    reasoned that the subject imports must “possess the
    essential characteristics or purposes that unite the [ex-
    ample] articles enumerated . . . .” 
    Id. at 1376
    (quoting
    Sports Graphics, Inc. v. United States, 
    24 F.3d 1390
    , 1392
    (Fed. Cir. 1994)). The court distinguished the exemplars,
    which served specific purposes to advance their respective
    rituals, from the subject imports, which were “merely
    decorative items used to serve food and beverages or
    provide lighting.” 
    Id. According to
    the trial court, such
    general-purpose articles do not qualify as articles used in
    the performance of specific religious or cultural ritual
    celebrations.
    The court denied WWRD’s motion for summary judg-
    ment, and granted the Government’s cross-motion for
    summary judgment. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012).
    DISCUSSION
    “We review a grant of summary judgment by the
    [CIT] for correctness as a matter of law and decide de
    novo the proper interpretation of the tariff provisions as
    well as whether there are genuine issues of material fact
    to preclude summary judgment.” Millennium Lumber
    Distrib. Ltd. v. United States, 
    558 F.3d 1326
    , 1328 (Fed.
    Cir. 2009) (citing Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 
    282 F.3d 1349
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). CBP classifications are
    presumed correct, and an appellant bears the burden of
    proving otherwise. 
    Id. at 1330.
    6                             WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES
    Classifying articles under the HTSUS is a two-step
    process. The Court first determines the proper meaning
    of specific terms in the tariff provisions, which is a ques-
    tion of law. 
    Id. at 1328.
    Once the proper meaning of the
    tariff provisions are ascertained, the Court then deter-
    mines which HTSUS subheading the subject goods are
    most appropriately classified under, which is a question of
    fact. 
    Id. “If we
    determine that there is no dispute of
    material facts, our review of the classification of the goods
    collapses into a determination of the proper meaning and
    scope of the HTSUS terms that, as a matter of statutory
    construction, is a question of law.” Aves. in Leather, Inc.
    v. United States, 
    317 F.3d 1399
    , 1402 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    “The HTSUS is composed of classification headings,
    each of which has one or more subheadings.” 3 R.T. Foods,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    757 F.3d 1349
    , 1352–53 (Fed. Cir.
    2014). We construe the terms of a tariff provision by
    applying the GRI “in numerical order.” Wilton Indus.,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    741 F.3d 1263
    , 1266 (Fed. Cir.
    2013). Relevant here, the classification of subheadings is
    governed by GRI 6, which provides that “the classification
    of goods in the subheadings of a heading shall be deter-
    mined according to the terms of those subheadings and
    any related subheading notes and, mutatis mutandis, to
    the above [GRIs] on the understanding that only subhead-
    ings at the same level are comparable.” See Orlando Food
    Corp. v. United States, 
    140 F.3d 1437
    , 1442 (Fed. Cir.
    1998). GRI 1, in turn, provides that “classification shall
    be determined according to the terms of the headings and
    any relative section or chapter notes.” See Millenium
    
    Lumber, 558 F.3d at 1328
    –29. Terms in the HTSUS are
    3   “The first four digits of an HTSUS provision con-
    stitute the heading, whereas the remaining digits reflect
    subheadings.” Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States,
    
    845 F.3d 1158
    , 1163 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
    WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES                                7
    given “their common commercial meanings.” 
    Id. at 1329
    (citing Len-Ron Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
    334 F.3d 1304
    ,
    1309 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
    We begin our analysis by determining the proper
    meaning of the tariff provisions: what constitutes an
    article used “in the performance of specific religious or
    cultural ritual celebrations.” The trial court determined
    that the term “specific” modifies the term “ritual” (as
    opposed to “religious” or “cultural”), and that, consequent-
    ly, “rituals generally encompass specific scripted acts or
    series of acts that are customarily performed in an often
    formal or solemn manner.” 
    WWRD, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1375
    . We agree with the trial court that “specific” modi-
    fies the term “ritual,” but emphasize that formality and/or
    solemnity, while relevant, are not required characteristics
    of all specific religious or cultural ritual celebrations.
    WWRD attempts to distinguish “religious” from “cul-
    tural” rituals, arguing that a “cultural ritual” does not
    require the same “specific scripted acts or series of acts
    that are customarily performed in an often formal or
    solemn manner.” The Government, on the other hand,
    argued below for a much narrower definition: that “ritu-
    als” require “formal actions and words that are repeated
    every year in the same fashion by everyone who cele-
    brates these events.” We find neither of these interpreta-
    tions compelling.
    While the parties provided numerous definitions of
    “ritual” from a variety of sources, we can derive two
    underlying requirements for religious or cultural rituals.
    First, a ritual must have some prescribed acts or codes of
    behavior. See Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dic-
    tionary of the English Language 1661 (New rev. ed. 1996)
    (“Webster’s”) (defining “ritual” as: “1. an established or
    prescribed procedure . . . 2. a system or collection
    of . . . rites . . . 6. a prescribed or established rite, ceremo-
    ny, proceeding, or service . . . 7. prescribed, established, or
    8                             WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES
    ceremonial acts . . . 8. any practice or pattern of behavior
    regularly performed . . . 9. a prescribed code of behav-
    ior . . . ”); see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diction-
    ary 1011 (10th ed. 1993) (“Merriam”) (defining “ritual” as
    “1 : the established form for a ceremony; specf: the order
    of words prescribed . . . [2]b : a ceremonial act or action).
    Second, a ritual, in the context of this subheading, must
    have some cultural or religious meaning. See Webster’s
    (defining “ritual” as involving “[1.] a religious or other
    rite . . . [3.]   public   worship . . . [7.] religious   ser-
    vices . . . [9.] regulating social conduct . . . .”); see also
    Merriam (defining “ritual” as involving “religious law or
    social custom.”). The trial court may then weigh other
    suggestive but non-dispositive factors, such as whether
    the prescribed acts or codes of behavior are performed in a
    formal or solemn manner, how widely recognized the
    prescribed acts or underlying meanings are, how estab-
    lished the organization performing the ritual is, what
    purpose the prescribed acts have in serving the organiza-
    tion or representing the cultural or religious meaning,
    among other considerations.
    In this light, it appears WWRD presents a compelling
    argument that Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners are
    religious or cultural ritual celebrations, but that is not the
    end of our analysis. Subheading 9817.95.01 also requires
    “specific” ritual. “Specific” is defined as “free from ambi-
    guity,” Merriam, at 1128, or “[o]f, relating to, or designat-
    ing a particular or defined thing; explicit,” Black’s Law
    Dictionary 1616 (10th ed. 2014). Thus, the court must
    look for specific, well-defined prescribed acts or codes of
    behavior having an unambiguous cultural or religious
    meaning.
    Generally, WWRD argues that Thanksgiving and
    Christmas dinners involve “prescribed and specific acts
    and series of acts and their own particular cultural rituals
    and sub-rituals, which go beyond the gathering for and
    consumption of ordinary meals.” For specificity, WWRD
    WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES                             9
    argues the prescribed acts in Thanksgiving and Christ-
    mas dinner are: “gathering together at one location, not
    simply to enjoy a meal, but to celebrate in a traditional
    family or communal way; a holiday; the consumption of
    special food and drink . . . ; more formal table settings
    decorated with seasonable displays . . . ; and, at the heart
    of the event, the common, shared intent to continue to
    celebrate the particular holiday in a familiar and time
    honored way.” But the last item concerning “intent” is not
    an act at all. The correct focus is on the acts that WWRD
    uses to define the ritual, and as the trial court found,
    those acts do not rise to the level of specificity required by
    subheading 9817.95.01.
    The exemplars provided in the subheading illuminate
    what level of specificity is required. For instance, as the
    trial court noted in part, a Seder plate is used during
    Passover to hold six symbolic foods, where each food has a
    particular meaning and is generally accompanied by
    scripted prayer. In Christian teachings, a blessing cup
    holds wine that symbolizes or becomes the blood of Christ,
    and invokes scripted Communion liturgy. A menorah is a
    candelabrum having nine holders for nine symbolic can-
    dles, where a candle is lit for each night of Hanukkah,
    and is generally accompanied by scripted prayer. And
    finally, a kinara is a candelabrum having seven holders
    for seven symbolic candles: three green candles, three red
    candles, and one black candle. A candle is lit on each day
    of Kwanzaa, and each candle represents a particular
    “principle” of Kwanzaa.
    Based on the terms of the subheading and the exem-
    plars, we conclude that “gathering together” and “enjoying
    a meal” are too ambiguous. The proposed acts say noth-
    ing about the types of food or drink served, the types of
    settings or displays required, whether all families cele-
    brate in the same or similar way, or what underlying
    cultural or religious meaning the specific acts represent.
    Families celebrating Thanksgiving and Christmas din-
    10                           WWRD US, LLC   v. UNITED STATES
    ners do so in a variety of ways, using a variety of foods,
    and even at a variety of times in the day. The “prescribed
    and specific acts” promised by WWRD’s general descrip-
    tion of Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners are missing.
    But even if the acts were specific enough, there is one
    further requirement presented by subheading 9817.95.01:
    the subject import must be “used . . . in the performance”
    of the ritual. WWRD would have us hold that an article
    that is used only for its utilitarian purpose, but also adds
    to the ambience of the event, constitutes use in the per-
    formance of the ritual. But it is not enough that a utili-
    tarian article is merely used during the ritual. Instead,
    the use must advance or serve a particular purpose in the
    ritual. The exemplars make this clear: a Seder plate is
    used to present the six symbolic foods, a blessing cup
    holds the symbolic blood of Christ, a menorah is used to
    hold the nine symbolic candles, and a kinara is used to
    hold the seven symbolic candles. Assuming arguendo that
    Thanksgiving or Christmas dinners are specific rituals,
    the ritual of dinner will continue whether the serving
    trays and cups have festive motifs or not; the motifs
    themselves do nothing to further the ritual of dinner.
    Unless WWRD can point to specific prescribed acts having
    underlying religious or cultural meaning, where the
    subject imports are used in the performance of those acts,
    its imports are not eligible for duty-free status under
    subheading 9817.95.01.
    The legislative history supports our conclusion that
    WWRD’s subject imports do not fall within the scope of
    subheading 9817.95.01. This court’s decisions before 2007
    provided that similar utilitarian items associated with
    holiday or festive occasions would be classified as duty-
    free. See, e.g., Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United States, 
    347 F.3d 922
    , 928–29 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The addition of Note
    1(v) in February 2007 rejected that broad scope of duty-
    free treatment of utilitarian holiday items, choosing
    language that preserved duty-free status only for a subset
    WWRD US, LLC    v. UNITED STATES                          11
    of items that are used “in the performance of specific
    religious or cultural ritual celebrations.” WWRD’s inter-
    pretation of the new language would recreate much the
    same scope of duty-free treatment in this area that Con-
    gress abandoned in 2007.
    CONCLUSION
    While we adopt a more flexible definition of “ritual”
    than the trial court, the trial court correctly determined
    that WWRD’s subject imports do not fall within the scope
    of subheading 9817.95.01. Because WWRD failed to
    allege any disputes of material fact or dispositive errors of
    law, we affirm the trial court’s decisions to deny WWRD’s
    motion for summary judgment, and to grant the Govern-
    ment’s cross-motion.
    AFFIRMED
    COSTS
    No costs.