Ditzler v. Merit Systems Protection Board , 404 F. App'x 479 ( 2010 )


Menu:
  • NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the FederaI Circuit
    LARRY D. DITZLER,
    Petiti0n,er,
    V.
    MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOA=RD,~
    Resp0ndent, `
    AND
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
    Interven0r.
    2010-3148
    Petiti0n for review of the Merit Systems Pr0tecti0n
    i Board in case no. AT3330100136-I-1.
    ON MOTION
    0 R D E R
    Before LOURIE, MAYER, and DYK, Circu,r,`t Judges.
    DYK, Circuit Judge.
    The Department of Transp0rtati0n moves to summa-
    rily affirm the decision 0f the Merit Systems Pr0tecti0n
    DITZLER V. MSPB 2
    Board (Board) dismissing Larry D. Ditz1er’s appeal assert-
    ing a violation of veteran’s preference rights pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 3330
    .
    The jurisdiction of the Board is not plenary; rather it
    is limited to actions designated as appealable to the Board
    “under any law, rule, or regulation." Monasteri t). Merit
    Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    232 F.3d 1376
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quot-
    ing 5 U.S.C. § '7701(a)). Although 
    35 U.S.C. §§ 3308-20
    relating to veterans preference rights applies to Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA) applicants and employees
    
    35 U.S.C. § 3330
    (a), the section which would grant juris-
    diction to the B0ard, does not. That was recently made
    clear by this court’s decision in Morse v. Merit=Sys. Prot.
    Bd., 
    621 F.3d 1346
     (Fed. Cir. 2010), which held that §
    3330(a) was not one of the provisions specifically enumer-
    ated as applicable to the FAA personnel management
    system. »
    This petition for review arises out of Ditz1er’s allega-
    tion that his veteran’s preference rights were violated
    when he was not selected for the position of Air Traffic
    Control Specia1ist, a position that the petitioner conceded
    below was within the FAA. The Board dismissed his
    petition for lack of jurisdiction for the very reasons pro-
    vided in our decision in Morse. Summary affirmance is
    appropriate when the position of one party is so clearly
    correct as a matter of law that no substantial question
    regarding the outcome of the appeal eXists.” Joshua v.
    Umlted States, 
    17 F.3d 378
    , 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Because
    Morse controls this petition as a matter of law leaving no
    substantial question regarding its outcome, we agree with
    the Department that summary affirmance is warranted
    under the circumstances presented here
    Accordingly,
    lT lS ORDERED THATZ
    (1) The motion to summarily affirm is granted
    3
    DITZLER v . MSPB
    (2) All sides shall bear their own costs.
    _DEC_0_B_2l]lD__
    cc: Norman H. Jackman, Esq.
    Jeffrey A. Gauger, Esq.
    s19
    Date
    Jessica R. Toplin, Esq.
    FOR THE COURT
    /s/ J an Horbaly
    J an Horbaly
    Clerk
    -FlLED
    u.s. c0uRT .
    -HEFED€£ii"€.§thSrF°“
    UEC 0 8 2010
    JllN HORBALY
    CLERK
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2010-3148

Citation Numbers: 404 F. App'x 479

Judges: Dyk, Lourie, Mayer

Filed Date: 12/8/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023