MacLean v. Department of Homeland Security , 714 F.3d 1301 ( 2013 )


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  •   United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ROBERT J. MACLEAN,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2011-3231
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No. SF0752060611-I-2.
    ______________________
    Decided: April 26, 2013
    ______________________
    LAWRENCE BERGER, Mahon & Burger, of Glen Cove,
    New York, argued for petitioner. Of counsel on the brief
    was THOMAS M. DEVINE, Government Accountability
    Project, of Washington, DC.
    MICHAEL P. GOODMAN, Trial Attorney, Commercial
    Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Depart-
    ment of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respond-
    ent. With him on the brief were STUART F. DELERY,
    2                                            MACLEAN   v. DHS
    Acting Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON,
    Director, and TODD M. HUGHES, Deputy Director.
    DOUGLAS HARTNETT, Elitok & Hartnett at Law, P.
    L.L.C., of Washington, DC, for amici curiae Elijah E.
    Cummings, et al.
    DAVID B. NOLAN, Law Offices of David B. Nolan, Alex-
    andria, Virginia for amicus curiae Joseph P. Carson.
    ______________________
    Before PROST, MOORE, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge MOORE.
    Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALLACH.
    MOORE, Circuit Judge.
    Robert J. MacLean petitions for review of a final deci-
    sion of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board), which
    sustained the Transportation Security Administration’s
    (Agency’s) removal of Mr. MacLean from the position of
    Federal Air Marshal (Marshal). See MacLean v. Dep’t of
    Homeland Sec., 116 M.S.P.R. 562 (2011) (MacLean II).
    Because the Board incorrectly interpreted the Whistle-
    blower Protection Act (WPA), we vacate and remand.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. MacLean became a Marshal in 2001. In July
    2003, all Marshals received a briefing from the Agency
    that there was a “‘potential plot’ to hijack U.S. Airliners.”
    MacLean II, 116 M.S.P.R. at 564. Soon after that brief-
    ing, however, the Agency sent an unencrypted text mes-
    sage to the Marshals’ cell phones cancelling all missions
    on flights from Las Vegas until early August. After
    receiving this directive, Mr. MacLean became concerned
    that “suspension of overnight missions during a hijacking
    alert created a danger to the flying public.” 
    Id. He com- plained
    to his supervisor and to the Office of Inspector
    MACLEAN   v. DHS                                           3
    General, but they responded that nothing could be done.
    J.A. 212–13. Dissatisfied, Mr. MacLean told an MSNBC
    reporter about the directive so as to “create a controversy
    resulting in [its] rescission.” MacLean II, 116 M.S.P.R. at
    565. MSNBC published an article criticizing the di-
    rective, and the Agency withdrew it after several mem-
    bers of Congress joined in the criticism.
    In 2004, Mr. MacLean appeared on NBC Nightly
    News in disguise to criticize the Agency dress code, which
    he believed allowed Marshals to be easily identified.
    However, someone from the Agency recognized his voice.
    During the Agency’s subsequent investigation, Mr. Mac-
    Lean admitted that he revealed the cancellation directive
    to an MSNBC reporter in 2003. Eventually, Mr. MacLean
    was removed from his position because his contact with
    the MSNBC reporter constituted an unauthorized disclo-
    sure of sensitive security information (SSI). Although the
    Agency had not initially labeled the text message as SSI
    when it was sent, it subsequently issued an order stating
    that its content was SSI.
    Mr. MacLean challenged the SSI order in the Ninth
    Circuit as a violation of the Agency’s own regulations and
    as an impermissible retroactive action, but the court
    rejected Mr. MacLean’s challenges. MacLean v. Dep’t of
    Homeland Sec., 
    543 F.3d 1145
    , 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2008).
    It held that substantial evidence supported designating
    the text message as SSI under the applicable regulations,
    
    id. at 1150, and
    that the Agency did not engage in retro-
    active action because it “applied regulations . . . in force in
    2003” to determine that the text message was SSI, 
    id. at 1152. Mr.
    MacLean challenged his removal before the
    Board, arguing that his disclosure of the text message
    was protected whistleblowing activity. After an interlocu-
    tory appeal from the Administrative Judge (AJ), the full
    Board determined that Mr. MacLean’s disclosure fell
    4                                          MACLEAN   v. DHS
    outside the WPA because it was “specifically prohibited by
    law.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2008). The Board rea-
    soned that the regulation prohibiting disclosure of SSI,
    upon which the Agency relied when it removed Mr. Mac-
    Lean, had the force of law. MacLean v. Dep’t of Homeland
    Sec., 112 M.S.P.R. 4, 12–18 (2009) (MacLean I).
    The AJ then upheld Mr. MacLean’s removal and the
    Board affirmed in MacLean II, the decision now on ap-
    peal. Reconsidering MacLean I, the Board explained that
    a regulation is not a “law” within the meaning of the
    WPA. Instead, the Board held that the disclosure of the
    text message could not qualify for WPA protection be-
    cause it was directly prohibited by a statute, the Aviation
    and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). MacLean II,
    116 M.S.P.R. at 570–71.
    The Board also determined that the AJ applied the
    correct regulation in upholding the Agency’s removal of
    Mr. MacLean, and that the penalty of removal was rea-
    sonable. Moreover, the Board upheld the AJ’s finding
    that the Agency did not terminate Mr. MacLean in retali-
    ation for his activities on behalf of the Federal Law En-
    forcement Officers Association (FLEOA) because the
    unauthorized disclosure of SSI was a non-retaliatory
    reason for removal. Therefore, the Board sustained the
    removal.
    This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28
    U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1)
    arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
    not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without proce-
    dures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
    followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5
    U.S.C. § 7703(c) (2012). We review the Board’s legal
    MACLEAN   v. DHS                                       5
    determinations de novo. Welshans v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
    
    550 F.3d 1100
    , 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
    I. Application of Agency Regulations to Mr. MacLean’s
    Removal
    The Board explained that, “[u]nder the regulations in
    effect in July 2003, information relating to the deploy-
    ment of [Marshals] was included within the definition of
    SSI,” and concluded that, as a result, Mr. MacLean’s
    communication with a reporter constituted an unauthor-
    ized disclosure. MacLean II, 116 M.S.P.R. at 569. Mr.
    MacLean argues, however, that the Board erred by up-
    holding his removal because he was not charged under
    the right regulation. He explains that the regulation
    quoted in the initial charge, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii),
    was not in force in 2003 and only became codified in 2005.
    Mr. MacLean contends that the Board wrongly concluded
    that the regulation it ultimately relied on to uphold his
    removal, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j), which was in force in 2003,
    is the same as the 2005 regulation. Mr. MacLean argues
    that the Board violated the rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
    
    318 U.S. 80
    , 87 (1943), because the Board affirmed his
    removal on grounds different from those under which he
    was initially charged by the deciding official.
    Mr. MacLean also maintains that, although the Ninth
    Circuit upheld the Agency’s eventual designation of the
    text message as SSI, his removal violated his due process
    rights because the message was not labeled SSI when it
    was sent. He argues that the termination was improper
    because he did not know that he was violating any Agency
    rules by revealing the content of the text message. Mr.
    MacLean admits that he signed a nondisclosure agree-
    ment as a condition of his employment, which states that
    Marshals “may be removed” for “[u]nauthorized release of
    security-sensitive or classified information.” MacLean II,
    116 M.S.P.R. at 580. He argues, however, that he be-
    lieved that the message was not SSI and that, in any
    6                                             MACLEAN   v. DHS
    event, he was protected as a whistleblower. Repeating
    the argument rejected by the Board, Mr. MacLean thus
    insists that he tried in good faith to proceed within the
    law.
    We do not find Mr. MacLean’s arguments challenging
    the Agency’s charge to be persuasive. The regulation that
    the Board ultimately relied upon to uphold Mr. MacLean’s
    removal, 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7(j) (2002), is no different from
    the regulation under which he was initially charged, 49
    C.F.R. § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) (2005). The earlier regulation
    bars disclosing “[s]pecific details of aviation security
    measures,” including “information concerning specific
    numbers of [Marshals], deployments or missions,” while
    the latter prohibits revealing “specific details of aviation
    . . . security measures” and “[i]nformation concerning
    deployments.” In fact, the regulation’s history shows that
    § 1520.5(b)(8)(ii) is simply a recodified version § 1520.7(j).
    See J.A. 36. Because the Agency removed Mr. MacLean
    for revealing SSI, and the Board affirmed the termination
    for that same reason, the Board did not violate the
    Chenery doctrine.
    We likewise reject Mr. MacLean’s due process and
    “good faith” arguments. Both the applicable regulation
    and the nondisclosure agreement that Mr. MacLean
    signed put him on notice that revealing information
    concerning coverage of flights by Marshals could lead to
    termination. Thus, the Agency did not violate due process
    even though it formally designated the text message as
    SSI only after it was sent. Furthermore, we agree with
    the government that, because the regulation prohibiting
    disclosure of SSI does not include an intent element, Mr.
    MacLean cannot be exonerated by his subjective belief
    that the content of the text message was not SSI or that
    he was protected as a whistleblower.
    MACLEAN   v. DHS                                       7
    II. Reasonableness of Mr. MacLean’s Removal
    Mr. MacLean argues that the Board failed to ade-
    quately analyze the factors listed in Douglas v. Veterans
    Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305–06 (1981), for possi-
    ble mitigation of the penalty of removal. Mr. MacLean
    contends that the Board did not take into account the fact
    that he was a one-time offender and otherwise had an
    unblemished record. Mr. MacLean also argues that
    Douglas’s “comparative discipline” factor did not weigh in
    favor of removal because other Marshals were not termi-
    nated even though they disclosed SSI regarding specific
    flights. Mr. MacLean contends that the Board ignored the
    fact that other Marshals’ disclosures were for personal
    gain, while his disclosure exposed and led to correcting an
    Agency mistake. He thus argues that revealing the text
    message to a reporter served the public interest, and that
    his termination undermined the efficiency of the service.
    The government counters that the Board did not
    abuse its discretion when it determined that Mr. Mac-
    Lean’s termination promoted the efficiency of the service.
    The government argues that there is no evidence that Mr.
    MacLean’s actions made the flying public safer. The
    government contends that, because even a possibility that
    a Marshal may be onboard is an important deterrent to
    terrorist activity, Mr. MacLean’s disclosure compromised
    flight safety and forced the Agency to reallocate scarce
    resources to address this new vulnerability. The govern-
    ment explains that, although Mr. MacLean was a first-
    time offender with a clean record, he was properly re-
    moved because his disclosure could have had catastrophic
    consequences. The government argues that Mr. MacLean
    differs from the Marshals who kept their jobs in spite of
    SSI breaches because those Marshals compromised only
    individual flights and showed remorse.
    We agree with the government. The Board analyzed
    the relevant Douglas factors and did not abuse its discre-
    8                                            MACLEAN   v. DHS
    tion in concluding that Mr. MacLean’s removal was not a
    disparate penalty. MacLean II, 116 M.S.P.R. at 576, 580–
    81. Unlike other Marshals, Mr. MacLean revealed that
    multiple flights would be unprotected, and we cannot say
    that it was unreasonable for the Board to find that Mr.
    MacLean’s belief that he was doing the right thing was
    outweighed by the resulting threat to public safety.
    Moreover, it was not unreasonable for the Board to de-
    termine that Mr. MacLean’s conduct “caused the [A]gency
    to lose trust in him,” 
    id. at 579, because
    Mr. MacLean
    admitted that he has “no regrets” and “feel[s] no remorse
    for going to a credible and responsible media representa-
    tive,” 
    id. at 576. Given
    these circumstances, the Board
    did not abuse its discretion by upholding Mr. MacLean’s
    removal.
    III. Mr. MacLean’s Prohibited Personnel Practice Claim
    The Board rejected Mr. MacLean’s argument that the
    Agency violated the Civil Service Reform Act by investi-
    gating him in retaliation for his FLEOA activities. 1 The
    statute at issue prohibits individuals in positions of
    authority from discriminating against a government
    employee “on the basis of conduct which does not adverse-
    ly affect the performance of the employee . . . or the per-
    1  The government submitted a letter arguing that
    the Board lacked jurisdiction over Mr. MacLean’s prohib-
    ited personnel practice claim. The government’s argu-
    ment is unsupported by the applicable statutes. The
    Board has jurisdiction to entertain prohibited personnel
    practice claims under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2), which states
    that “the agency’s decision may not be sustained . . . if the
    employee . . . shows that the decision was based on any
    prohibited personnel practice described in section 2302(b)
    of this title.” Section 7701 applies to Agency employees by
    virtue of 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g)(2)(H).
    MACLEAN   v. DHS                                       9
    formance of others.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10)(A). The Board
    concluded that Mr. MacLean’s prohibited personnel
    practice challenge failed because he did not “meet his
    burden to establish that the reason articulated by the
    [A]gency was pretextual and that the real reason underly-
    ing that decision was his FLEOA activities.” MacLean II,
    116 M.S.P.R. at 575. Mr. MacLean reasserts his discrim-
    ination argument on appeal. He contends that the Agen-
    cy investigated him because of his 2004 appearance on
    NBC Nightly News, which he made as part of his advoca-
    cy on behalf of FLEOA.
    We agree with the government that substantial evi-
    dence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Agency did
    not discriminate against Mr. MacLean on the basis of his
    FLEOA activities. Agency Policy Directive ADM 3700
    “regulate[s] and prohibit[s] [Marshals’] unauthorized
    contact with the media,” and record evidence is consistent
    with the AJ’s determination that Mr. MacLean was
    initially investigated for his unauthorized media appear-
    ance, not for his FLEOA activities. J.A. 27. Indeed, it is
    undisputed that the Agency began to investigate Mr.
    MacLean “within days of his unauthorized appearance”
    on NBC Nightly News, which was “approximately 22
    months after he began organizing and leading the
    [FLEOA] chapter.” J.A. 55 (quotation marks omitted).
    Although the Agency ultimately did not pursue the media
    appearance charge and focused on the SSI disclosure
    charge, the initial investigation does not appear to be
    frivolous or pretextual because it was justified by Di-
    rective ADM 3700.
    IV. Mr. MacLean’s Affirmative Defense Under the WPA
    The WPA prohibits individuals in positions of authori-
    ty from taking a “personnel action” against a government
    employee in certain circumstances, particularly
    because of any disclosure of information by an
    employee . . . which the employee . . . reasonably
    10                                            MACLEAN   v. DHS
    believes evidences . . . a substantial and specific
    danger to public health or safety, if such disclo-
    sure is not specifically prohibited by law . . . . 2
    5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (emphasis added). The Board reject-
    ed Mr. MacLean’s affirmative defense that his disclosure
    of the text message was protected whistleblowing activity
    because it determined that the disclosure was “specifically
    prohibited by law” within the meaning of the WPA. The
    law that the Board relied upon is the ATSA, which states,
    in relevant part:
    Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 . . . , the
    Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe regu-
    lations prohibiting disclosure of information ob-
    tained or developed in ensuring security under
    this title if the Secretary of Transportation decides
    disclosing the information would . . . be detri-
    mental to transportation safety.
    49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1) (2009) (emphases added). Be-
    cause its conclusion that revealing the content of the text
    message was specifically prohibited by the ATSA made
    further WPA inquiry unnecessary, the Board did not
    reach the question of whether Mr. MacLean “reasonably
    believe[d]” that this information “evidence[d] . . . a sub-
    stantial and specific danger to public . . . safety.” 5 U.S.C.
    § 2302(b)(8); see MacLean II, 116 M.S.P.R. at 581.
    The parties do not dispute that, in order to fall under
    the WPA’s “specifically prohibited by law” proviso, the
    disclosure must be prohibited by a statute rather than by
    a regulation. Thus, the core of the disagreement is
    whether the ATSA “specifically prohibit[s]” disclosure of
    information concerning coverage of flights by Marshals
    within the meaning of the WPA.
    2  The WPA was recently amended by the Whistle-
    blower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA). Neither
    party argues that the WPEA applies to this appeal.
    MACLEAN   v. DHS                                        11
    Mr. MacLean and his amici (three members of Con-
    gress) argue that the Board erroneously concluded that
    the ATSA’s mandate to the Secretary of Transportation to
    “prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure” of certain
    kinds of information is a specific prohibition under the
    WPA. They contend that the phrase “specifically prohib-
    ited by law” in the WPA can only refer to explicit statuto-
    ry language that identifies specific classes of information.
    They argue that the ATSA’s “detrimental to transporta-
    tion safety” language does not establish particular criteria
    for withholding information and leaves a great deal of
    discretion to the Agency, which is inconsistent with the
    WPA’s requirement of specificity. They contrast the
    ATSA with the Trade Secrets Act, which directly author-
    izes removal of any federal employee who divulges infor-
    mation that falls into particular categories. 18 U.S.C. §
    1905 (2008); see also Kent v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 56
    M.S.P.R. 536, 540–46 (1993).
    The government counters that Mr. MacLean violated
    a regulation promulgated pursuant to an express legisla-
    tive directive in the ATSA, which made his disclosure
    “specifically prohibited” by a statute. It thus argues that
    Mr. MacLean’s disclosure does not qualify for WPA pro-
    tection. The government contends that Mr. MacLean’s
    reading of the WPA eviscerates laws that provide for any
    Agency discretion in classifying information as SSI, and
    thus disables Congress from directing agencies to pass
    nondisclosure regulations. Lastly, the government argues
    that it does not make sense for Congress to order an
    agency to promulgate nondisclosure regulations and at
    the same time prohibit that agency from disciplining an
    employee for violating those regulations by providing a
    defense under the WPA.
    We agree with Mr. MacLean that the ATSA does not
    “specifically prohibit” the disclosure at issue in this case.
    The ATSA’s plain language does not expressly prohibit
    employee disclosures, and only empowers the Agency to
    12                                           MACLEAN   v. DHS
    prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure of SSI “if the
    Secretary decides disclosing the information would . . . be
    detrimental to public safety.” 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b) (em-
    phasis added). Thus, the ultimate source of prohibition of
    Mr. MacLean’s disclosure is not a statute but a regula-
    tion, which the parties agree cannot be “law” under the
    WPA.
    Notably, Congress changed the language “specifically
    prohibited by law, rule, or regulation” in the statute’s
    draft version to simply “specifically prohibited by law.”
    Congress did so because it was concerned that the broader
    language “would encourage the adoption of internal
    procedural regulations against disclosure, and thereby
    enable an agency to discourage an employee from coming
    forward with allegations of wrongdoing.” S. Rep. No. 969,
    95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2743. Congress explained that only “a
    statute which requires that matters be withheld from the
    public as to leave no discretion on the issue, or . . . which
    establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to
    particular types of matters to be withheld” could qualify
    as a sufficiently specific prohibition. 
    Id. In contrast, the
    “detrimental to transportation safety” language of the
    ATSA does not describe specific matters to be withheld. It
    provides only general criteria for withholding information
    and gives some discretion to the Agency to fashion regula-
    tions for prohibiting disclosure. Thus, the ATSA does not
    “specifically prohibit” employee conduct within the mean-
    ing of the WPA.
    The ATSA’s insufficient specificity becomes even more
    apparent when it is contrasted with statutes that have
    been determined to fall under the WPA’s “specifically
    prohibited by law” proviso. For example, the Trade
    Secrets Act, which the Board in Kent held to qualify as a
    specific prohibition, is extremely detailed and comprehen-
    sive. 56 M.S.P.R. at 543–46. That statute penalizes
    federal employees who “divulge[ ] . . . any information
    MACLEAN   v. DHS                                         13
    coming to [them] in the course of [their] employment . . .
    which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets,
    processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to
    the identity, confidential statistical data, amount or
    source of any income, profits, losses, or expenditures of
    any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association
    . . . . ” 18 U.S.C. § 1905. The same is true of § 6013 of the
    Internal Revenue Code, which the Ninth Circuit in Coons
    v. Secretary of the Treasury, 
    383 F.3d 879
    , 890–91 (9th
    Cir. 2003), held to fall within the meaning of the WPA’s
    “specifically prohibited” language. That statute prohibits
    federal employees from “disclos[ing] any return or return
    information obtained by him in any manner in connection
    with his service,” 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a)(1), and then goes on
    to define “return” and “return information” in explicit
    detail, mentioning such things as “a taxpayer’s identity,
    the nature, source or amount of his income, payments,
    receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, overas-
    sessments, or tax payments . . . ,” 
    id. § 6013(b)(1), (2).
    Thus, when Congress seeks to prohibit disclosure of
    specific types of information, it has the ability to draft the
    statute accordingly.
    Nonetheless, we note that the ATSA’s charge to the
    Secretary of Transportation to prescribe regulations
    pursuant to specific criteria (i.e., only information that
    would be detrimental to transportation safety) makes this
    a very close case. Indeed, the ATSA appears to fall in the
    middle of the spectrum of statutes flanked at opposite
    ends by (a) those that fall squarely under the WPA’s
    “specifically prohibited by law” proviso, such as the Trade
    Secrets Act and § 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code, and
    (b) those in which Congress delegates legislative authority
    to an administrative agency without circumscribing the
    agency’s discretion. Regulations promulgated pursuant to
    Congress’s express instructions would qualify as specific
    legal prohibitions. In this case, given the clarity of the
    statutory language and legislative intent behind the
    14                                          MACLEAN   v. DHS
    WPA’s specificity requirement, the parameters set by
    Congress are not enough to push the ATSA over that
    threshold.
    We are similarly unpersuaded by the government’s
    argument that a parade of horribles necessarily follows
    our adoption of Mr. MacLean’s interpretation of the WPA.
    The government argues that, if Mr. MacLean is allowed to
    pursue his whistleblower defense, the WPA would in
    effect prohibit later Congresses from directing agencies to
    pass nondisclosure regulations. The government is con-
    cerned that, under Mr. MacLean’s reading, the WPA
    would prohibit agencies from disciplining employees for
    violating nondisclosure regulations and thereby prevent
    agencies from enforcing such regulations.
    The government is mistaken. In spite of the WPA,
    Congress remains free to enact statutes empowering
    agencies to promulgate and enforce nondisclosure regula-
    tions, and it has done so in the ATSA. The government
    ignores the fact that the ATSA covers a wide range of
    conduct that would not qualify as whistleblowing. For
    example, no one disputes that the ATSA empowers the
    Agency to promulgate regulations that enable it to disci-
    pline employees who reveal SSI for personal gain or due
    to negligence, or who disclose information that the em-
    ployee does not reasonably believe evidences a substantial
    and specific danger to public health or safety. The WPA
    also does not prohibit the Agency from following the
    ATSA’s mandate to regulate public access to information
    that the Agency might otherwise be forced to disclose
    under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Indeed, it
    appears that the paramount goal of the ATSA is to em-
    power the Agency to reject the public’s requests for Agen-
    cy intelligence because the statute recites that,
    “[n]otwithstanding [FOIA] . . . , the Secretary of Transpor-
    tation shall prescribe regulations prohibiting disclosure of
    information obtained or developed in ensuring security
    under this title.” 49 U.S.C. § 40119(b)(1); see also Public
    MACLEAN   v. DHS                                       15
    Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 
    988 F.2d 186
    , 194–96 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
    (analyzing the predecessor statute to the ATSA and
    explaining that Congress’s desire to enable the Agency to
    bar FOIA requests for information that qualifies as SSI
    was one of the driving forces behind the passage of that
    statute). Our interpretation of the WPA does not deprive
    the ATSA of meaning.
    CONCLUSION
    Because Mr. MacLean’s disclosure is not “specifically
    prohibited by law” within the meaning of the WPA, we
    vacate the Board’s decision and remand for a determina-
    tion whether Mr. MacLean’s disclosure qualifies for WPA
    protection. For example, it remains to be determined
    whether Mr. MacLean reasonably believed that the
    content of his disclosure evidenced a substantial and
    specific danger to public health or safety.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    ROBERT J. MACLEAN,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
    Respondent.
    ______________________
    2011-3231
    ______________________
    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
    Board in No SF0752060611-I-2.
    ______________________
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge, concurring.
    Mr. MacLean presented substantial evidence that he
    was not motivated by personal gain but by the desire to
    protect the public. He averred proof that he sought
    direction from his supervisors before making allegedly
    protected disclosures. While I join in the analysis and the
    result of the majority opinion, I concur to emphasize that
    the facts alleged, if proven, allege conduct at the core of
    the Whistleblower Protection Act.