Shelter Forest International Acquisition, Inc. v. United States ( 2022 )


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  • Case: 21-2281   Document: 69     Page: 1   Filed: 06/15/2022
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL
    ACQUISITION, INC., XUZHOU SHELTER IMPORT
    & EXPORT CO., LTD., SHANDONG SHELTER
    FOREST PRODUCTS CO., LTD., IKEA SUPPLY AG,
    TARACA PACIFIC, INC., PATRIOT TIMBER
    PRODUCTS, INC., SHANGHAI FUTUWOOD
    TRADING CO., LTD., LINYI GLARY PLYWOOD CO.,
    LTD., FAR EAST AMERICAN, INC.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees
    LIBERTY WOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., MJB
    WOOD GROUP, INC., AKA MJB WOOD GROUP,
    LLC,
    Plaintiffs
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant
    COALITION FOR FAIR TRADE IN HARDWOOD
    PLYWOOD,
    Defendant-Appellant
    ______________________
    2021-2281
    ______________________
    Case: 21-2281   Document: 69    Page: 2    Filed: 06/15/2022
    2     SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US
    Appeal from the United States Court of International
    Trade in No. 1:19-cv-00212-JAR, Senior Judge Jane A. Re-
    stani.
    ______________________
    Decided: June 15, 2022
    ______________________
    JAMES P. DURLING, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt &
    Mosle LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appel-
    lees Far East American, Inc., IKEA Supply AG, Linyi Glary
    Plywood Co., Ltd., Shandong Shelter Forest Products Co.,
    Ltd., Shanghai Futuwood Trading Co., Ltd., Shelter Forest
    International Acquisition, Inc., Xuzhou Shelter Import &
    Export Co., Ltd. Shandong Shelter Forest Products Co.,
    Ltd., Shelter Forest International Acquisition, Inc., and
    Xuzhou Shelter Import & Export Co., Ltd. also represented
    by JAMES BEATY, DANIEL L. PORTER.
    BRYAN PATRICK CENKO, Mowry & Grimson, PLLC,
    Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellees Patriot
    Timber Products, Inc., Taraca Pacific, Inc. Also repre-
    sented by JILL CRAMER, JEFFREY S. GRIMSON, WENHUI JI,
    YIXIN LI, KRISTIN HEIM MOWRY, SARAH WYSS.
    PATRICK D. GILL, Sandler Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.,
    New York, NY, for plaintiff-appellee IKEA Supply AG.
    Also represented by KRISTEN SUZANNE SMITH, Washington,
    DC.
    GREGORY S. MENEGAZ, DeKieffer & Horgan, PLLC,
    Washington, DC, for plaintiffs-appellees Far East Ameri-
    can, Inc., Linyi Glary Plywood Co., Ltd., Shanghai Fu-
    tuwood Trading Co., Ltd. Also represented by JAMES
    KEVIN HORGAN, ALEXANDRA H. SALZMAN.
    MAUREEN E. THORSON, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington,
    DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by
    Case: 21-2281     Document: 69     Page: 3    Filed: 06/15/2022
    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.    v. US     3
    TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL, TESSA V. CAPELOTO, ELIZABETH S.
    LEE, STEPHANIE MANAKER BELL, JOHN ALLEN RIGGINS.
    ______________________
    Before TARANTO, CLEVENGER, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
    CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant Coalition for Fair Trade in Hardwood Ply-
    wood (the “Coalition”) appeals the final decision of the
    United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) affirm-
    ing the May 10, 2021 remand determination of the United
    States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”). See Shelter
    Forest Int’l Acquisition, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-00212,
    
    2021 WL 3082407
    , at *7 (Ct. Int’l Trade July 21, 2021)
    (“Shelter Forest II”). In its remand determination, Com-
    merce found that certain hardwood plywood merchandise
    (“inquiry merchandise” 1) was commercially available prior
    to December 8, 2016 and therefore did not constitute later-
    developed merchandise that circumvented Commerce’s
    January 2018 antidumping and countervailing duty orders
    on certain hardwood plywood products from China (“Or-
    ders”). See id. at *3. This outcome differed from that of
    1   “Inquiry merchandise” is defined as certain ply-
    wood (1) “with face and back veneers made of radiata
    and/or agathis pine,” that (2) “[h]as a Toxic Substances
    Control Act (TSCA) or California Air Resources Board
    (CARB) label certifying that it is compliant with
    TSCA/CARB requirements,” and (3) “is made with a resin,
    the majority of which is comprised of one or more of the
    following three product types—urea formaldehyde, polyvi-
    nyl acetate, and/or soy.” Shelter Forest II, 
    2021 WL 3082407
    , at *2. The resin is used to glue, or otherwise bond,
    the veneers to the core of the plywood. See id. at *1. The
    parties used the term “resin” and “glue” interchangeably in
    their briefing, as well as in the proceedings below, and we
    do the same in this opinion.
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    4     SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.    v. US
    Commerce’s original November 2019 determination, in
    which it found that the inquiry merchandise was not com-
    mercially available prior to December 8, 2016 and therefore
    did constitute later-developed merchandise circumventing
    the Orders. See Shelter Forest Int’l Acquisition, Inc. v.
    United States, 
    497 F. Supp. 3d 1388
    , 1392 (Ct. Int’l Trade
    2021) (“Shelter Forest I”). Commerce’s change in position
    arose from the CIT’s decision in Shelter Forest I, which
    (among other things) required Commerce to consider infor-
    mation that it had previously declined to review. See Shel-
    ter Forest II, 
    2021 WL 3082407
    , at *2–3. Based on that
    information, as well as additional information solicited
    during the remand proceeding, Commerce reached its neg-
    ative anticircumvention determination. 
    Id.
     The CIT sus-
    tained this determination in Shelter Forest II, finding that
    it was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance
    with the law. Id. at *3. For the reasons stated below, we
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    I
    Commerce initiated the underlying antidumping and
    countervailing duty investigations on December 8, 2016.
    Following issuance of the Orders in January 2018, the Co-
    alition requested, and Commerce initiated, an anticircum-
    vention inquiry to determine whether the inquiry
    merchandise sold by foreign exporters constituted later-de-
    veloped merchandise that circumvented the Orders. 19
    U.S.C. § 1677j(d); 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.225
    (i); Shelter Forest II,
    
    2021 WL 3082407
    , at *2.
    As part of the anticircumvention inquiry, Commerce
    identified 43 Chinese exporters of inquiry merchandise.
    Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1394. In November
    2018, it limited individual examination to the three Chi-
    nese exporters of inquiry merchandise who accounted for
    the largest exports by volume. Id. Commerce did not select
    appellees Shelter Forest International Acquisition Inc. et
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    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US     5
    al. (“Shelter Forest”) as one of the mandatory respondents.
    Id. Shelter Forest, however, had previously participated in
    the proceeding, first through its July 16, 2018 comment in
    opposition to the Coalition’s request for an anticircumven-
    tion inquiry (“July 16, 2018 Opposition”) and its October
    11, 2018 response to Commerce’s quantity and valuation
    questionnaire (“October 11, 2018 Q&V Response”). See id.
    at 1393 & n.5; see also Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 865–1545;
    J.A. 1888–3468.
    On November 9, 2018, Commerce issued an identical
    initial inquiry questionnaire to each of the three manda-
    tory respondents. Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1394.
    In its initial questionnaire, Commerce requested that the
    mandatory respondents provide a description of “the pre-
    cise resin composition of the resin used in the production of
    inquiry merchandise” and an explanation of how that resin
    composition was developed. J.A. 3497; J.A. 3544; J.A. 3591.
    Each mandatory respondent provided a high-level sum-
    mary of the composition of its resin, but none of the re-
    sponses included a percentage breakdown of the resin
    components or any citation or reference to supporting doc-
    umentation. J.A. 3639; J.A. 3800; J.A. 4042. No other party
    submitted a response to the initial questionnaire. See Shel-
    ter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1394, 1401.
    Commerce then issued separate supplemental ques-
    tionnaires to the three mandatory respondents on Decem-
    ber 19, 2018. Commerce specifically directed two of the
    mandatory respondents to “identify the percentage of each
    component listed used to formulate the glue” and provide
    supporting documentation. J.A. 4236; J.A. 4245–46. In
    their respective February 12, 2019 responses, the two man-
    datory respondents provided the percentage breakdown of
    the resin components, but their supporting documentation
    only identified their respective resins as being a urea-for-
    maldehyde glue and did not mention any of the other com-
    ponents, let alone the specific percentages of each. See J.A.
    4271, 4355–62; J.A. 4005–16; J.A. 4457–58.
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    6       SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US
    Even though it was not selected as a mandatory re-
    spondent, Shelter Forest voluntarily elected to respond to
    some of the questions raised in Commerce’s supplemental
    questionnaires (“February 12, 2019 Partial Response”). 2
    Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1394. In its February
    12, 2019 Partial Response, Shelter Forest acknowledged
    that Commerce requested from two of the mandatory re-
    spondents “additional explanation on the composition of
    the resin used” in the inquiry merchandise. J.A. 4610. Shel-
    ter Forest did not submit new materials, but instead di-
    rected Commerce to materials, including employee
    declarations, it had previously submitted regarding the
    composition of its eZero (also referred to as “E0”) glue and
    the use of eZero glue in the inquiry merchandise. See J.A.
    4602–04, 4606, 4609–11; see also, e.g., J.A. 895–908, 925–
    26, 938–39, 941, 1484 (materials submitted in Shelter For-
    est’s July 16, 2018 Opposition); J.A. 1898–99, 1903–904,
    1906–13, 1915–16 (materials submitted in Shelter Forest’s
    October 11, 2018 Q&V Response). Those materials, accord-
    ing to Shelter Forest, demonstrated that the radiata pine,
    CARB-certified plywood merchandise sold by Shelter For-
    est prior to December 8, 2016 “was made with a resin the
    majority of which was urea formaldehyde.” J.A. 4610.
    On June 4, 2019, Commerce notified the parties of its
    preliminary finding that the inquiry merchandise consti-
    tutes later-developed merchandise circumventing the Or-
    ders. Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1394. Relevant to
    this appeal, Commerce noted that it was unable to deter-
    mine that the radiata pine, CARB-certified plywood mer-
    chandise sold by Shelter Forest prior to December 8, 2016
    2  As Shelter Forest did not respond to the initial
    questionnaire, the February 12, 2019 Partial Response was
    Shelter Forest’s first questionnaire response after Com-
    merce identified the mandatory respondents in November
    2018. See Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1394.
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    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US     7
    used a majority urea-formaldehyde resin, as Shelter Forest
    claimed. See Preliminary Decision Memorandum, Anti-Cir-
    cumvention Inquiry on the Antidumping and Countervail-
    ing Duty Orders on Certain Hardwood Plywood Products
    from the People’s Republic of China, Case Nos. A-570-051,
    C-570-052 (Dep’t Commerce June 4, 2019) (“PDM”), at 16–
    17. Specifically, Commerce asserted, “Shelter Forest did
    not provide any documentation to support its assertion
    that ‘eZero . . . is a glue made from a urea formaldehyde
    base.’” Id. at 17. Commerce had not requested additional
    documentation from Shelter Forest, let alone notified Shel-
    ter Forest of any deficiency in its submissions, prior to is-
    suing the PDM.
    On July 3, 2019, in response to Commerce’s prelimi-
    nary determination, Shelter Forest submitted additional
    information regarding the composition of its resin. Shelter
    Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1394–95; see also J.A. 5718–
    817. Commerce rejected this submission as untimely new
    factual information, but invited Shelter Forest to formally
    “request Commerce solicit such information in accordance
    with 19 CFR 351.301(a)” by July 16, 2019. J.A. 4926. Shel-
    ter Forest made that request within the stated deadline,
    but Commerce nonetheless declined it. Shelter Forest I, 497
    F. Supp. 3d at 1395; see also J.A. 4929–33; J.A. 4935–37.
    After receiving case briefs and rebuttal briefs from the par-
    ties, Commerce then issued its final affirmative determi-
    nation on November 22, 2019 confirming its preliminary
    finding. Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1395. In the
    accompanying Issues and Decisions Memorandum, Com-
    merce concluded that Shelter Forest’s glue did not meet the
    third criteria for inquiry merchandise because the em-
    ployee declarations described the glue as being made from
    an “urea formaldehyde base” instead of a “majority” of urea
    formaldehyde. Issues and Decision Memorandum for the
    Final Determination, Anti-Circumvention Inquiry on the
    Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders on Certain
    Hardwood Plywood Products from the People’s Republic of
    Case: 21-2281     Document: 69      Page: 8   Filed: 06/15/2022
    8       SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US
    China, Case Nos. A-570-051, C-570-052 (Dep’t Commerce
    Nov. 22, 2019) (“IDM”), at 24. Commerce also faulted Shel-
    ter Forest for not “identify[ing] the exact composition of its
    E0 glue,” id., even though Commerce had never requested
    such information from Shelter Forest and refused to accept
    that information when Shelter Forest attempted to provide
    it. See J.A. 4935–37.
    II
    Shelter Forest, Shanghai Futuwood Trading Co., Ltd.
    (“Futuwood”), IKEA Supply AG. et al. (“IKEA”), and Taraca
    Pacific Inc. et al. (“Taraca Pacific”) subsequently filed suit
    in the CIT challenging Commerce’s final determination.
    Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1392, 1395. Relevant to
    this appeal, the CIT concluded that substantial evidence
    did not support Commerce’s determination that no re-
    spondent met the glue criteria for inquiry merchandise,
    given the declarations Shelter Forest submitted as well as
    Commerce’s failure to seek or review supplemental infor-
    mation from Shelter Forest. Id. at 1397–98. The CIT addi-
    tionally concluded that “Commerce abused its discretion by
    rejecting Shelter Forest’s submission as untimely when it
    had not provided notice to Shelter Forest regarding any de-
    ficiencies [in Shelter Forest’s previous submissions], as re-
    quired by 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d).” 3 Id. at 1400. Any
    3    The statute states, in relevant part: “If the admin-
    istering authority or the Commission determines that a re-
    sponse to a request for information under this subtitle does
    not comply with the request, the administering authority
    or the Commission (as the case may be) shall promptly in-
    form the person submitting the response of the nature of
    the deficiency and shall, to the extent practicable, provide
    that person with an opportunity to remedy or explain the
    deficiency in light of the time limits established for the
    completion of investigations or reviews under this subti-
    tle.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d).
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    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US     9
    tardiness on the part of Shelter Forest, the CIT explained,
    “resulted from Commerce’s failure to notify Shelter Forest
    of any deficiencies in its submissions until Commerce re-
    leased its [PDM].” Id. at 1401. Accordingly, the CIT ordered
    Commerce to consider on remand Shelter Forest’s July 3,
    2019 submission and, as prescribed by 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677m(d), to notify Shelter Forest of any deficiencies and
    provide it with an opportunity to correct or explain such
    deficiencies. Id. at 1402.
    III
    On remand, Commerce concluded that Shelter Forest’s
    inquiry merchandise did not constitute later-developed
    merchandise that circumvented the Orders. Shelter Forest
    II, 
    2021 WL 3082407
    , at *3; see also Final Results of Rede-
    termination Pursuant to Court Remand, Anti-Circumven-
    tion Inquiry on the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
    Orders on Certain Hardwood Plywood Products from the
    People’s Republic of China, Case Nos. A-570-051, C-570-
    052 (Dep’t Commerce May 10, 2021) (“Final Remand De-
    termination”) at 9–10, 23, 31. Commerce reached this de-
    termination after reviewing Shelter Forest’s July 3, 2019
    submission and additional materials it solicited from Shel-
    ter Forest via a supplemental questionnaire. See Shelter
    Forest II, 
    2021 WL 3082407
    , at *3–4. In total, these mate-
    rials included details regarding the composition of Shelter
    Forest’s eZero glue and the later addition of melamine for
    purposes of waterproofing, as well as relevant production
    and sales documentation linking the use of the melamine-
    fortified eZero glue to the radiata pine, CARB-certified ply-
    wood Shelter Forest sold prior to December 8, 2016. 
    Id.
     at
    *3–4; see also Final Remand Determination at 11–14, 25–
    26. Commerce also engaged extensively with the criticisms
    raised by the Coalition regarding the sufficiency of and al-
    leged inconsistencies in Shelter Forest’s documentation.
    Final Remand Determination at 20–30. None of
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    10       SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US
    Commerce’s factual findings or subsequent negative re-
    mand determination were made under protest. 4
    IV
    The Coalition then filed suit before the CIT, arguing
    that Commerce’s remand determination is unsupported by
    substantial evidence. Shelter Forest II, 
    2021 WL 3082407
    ,
    at *3. The Coalition further argued that Commerce’s re-
    mand determination is not in accordance with the law,
    given that it found Shelter Forest’s merchandise to be com-
    mercially available prior to December 8, 2016 despite Shel-
    ter Forest’s position that the melamine fortification of its
    eZero glue was a trade secret at the time. 
    Id.
    The CIT disagreed, finding that the evidence supported
    both Commerce’s conclusion that Shelter Forest’s mer-
    chandise met the resin requirement for inquiry merchan-
    dise and Commerce’s reliance on Shelter Forest’s
    explanation as to why the eZero glue recipe did not include
    melamine as an ingredient. 
    Id.
     at *4–5. The CIT further
    determined that Commerce appropriately used production
    and sales documentation to link use of the eZero glue to
    specific radiata pine, CARB-certified plywood sales made
    prior to December 8, 2016. Id. at *5. Like Commerce, the
    CIT rejected the Coalition’s criticisms regarding the al-
    leged inconsistencies in Shelter Forest’s documentation,
    4  Generally speaking, Commerce will reach a re-
    mand determination under protest “where the CIT re-
    mands with instructions that dictate a certain outcome
    that is contrary to how Commerce would otherwise find.”
    Meridian Prods. v. United States, 
    890 F.3d 1272
    , 1276 n.3
    (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also Viraj Grp., Ltd. v. United States,
    
    343 F.3d 1371
    , 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (explaining that
    Commerce may “adopt[ ] under protest a contrary position
    forced upon it by the [CIT]” and subsequently appeal that
    position to this court).
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    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US    11
    noting that those criticisms “do not undermine the reason-
    ableness of Commerce’s factual findings, which are sup-
    ported by ample evidence on the record.” Id. at *6. Finally,
    the CIT held that Commerce’s determination was in ac-
    cordance with the law, as “[n]othing of record indicates that
    melamine is essential to the pertinent inquiry” and thus
    melamine’s “addition in the production process is not re-
    quired to be public knowledge for the merchandise to be
    found to be commercially available.” Id. at *7.
    The Coalition appeals, 5 arguing that Commerce
    properly exercised its discretion in rejecting Shelter For-
    est’s July 3, 2019 submission as untimely and did not vio-
    late its duty under 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d). See Appellant’s
    Br. at 13–14, 22–23. The Coalition further argues that
    Commerce’s remand determination is “inadequately ex-
    plained, unsupported by substantial record evidence, and
    otherwise unreasonable.” Id. at 26. We have jurisdiction
    over the CIT’s final decision in this case pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(5).
    DISCUSSION
    We review Commerce’s determinations using the same
    standard of review as the CIT, meaning we uphold those
    determinations if they are supported by substantial evi-
    dence and otherwise in accordance with the law. 19 U.S.C.
    § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i); SolarWorld Ams., Inc. v. United States,
    
    910 F.3d 1216
    , 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Downhole Pipe
    & Equip., L.P. v. United States, 
    776 F.3d 1369
    , 1373 (Fed.
    Cir. 2015)). “Substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than
    a mere scintilla,’ as well as evidence that a ‘reasonable
    mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”
    Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1374 (quoting Consol. Edison
    5   The government did not participate in this appeal.
    See Letter from United States re: Non-Participation in Ap-
    peal, Docket No. 2.
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    12    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.    v. US
    Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938)). In review-
    ing for substantial evidence, “[w]e look to ‘the record as a
    whole, including evidence that supports as well as evidence
    that fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evi-
    dence.’” SolarWorld, 910 F.3d at 1222 (quoting Zhejiang
    DunAn Hetian Metal Co. v. United States, 
    652 F.3d 1333
    ,
    1340 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). “Although we review the CIT’s deci-
    sion de novo, ‘we give great weight’ to the CIT’s ‘informed
    opinion,’ which ‘is nearly always the starting point of our
    analysis.’” Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, 
    23 F.4th 1372
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Nan Ya Plastics Corp.
    v. United States, 
    810 F.3d 1333
    , 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
    I
    We conclude that Commerce abused its discretion in
    the original proceeding by failing, as required by 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677m(d), to notify Shelter Forest of any deficiency in its
    February 12, 2019 Partial Response and to provide Shelter
    Forest with an opportunity to remedy or explain such defi-
    ciency.
    There does not appear to be any dispute that the stat-
    utory notice requirement applies equally to both manda-
    tory and voluntary respondents. The text of § 1677m as a
    whole supports this reading. Compare 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677m(a) (discussing treatment of voluntary responses
    from exporters or producers not initially selected for indi-
    vidual examination in proceedings where Commerce has
    limited the number of exporters and producers to be exam-
    ined), with id. § 1677m(d) (referring generally to “re-
    sponse[s] to a request for information” without
    distinguishing between mandatory and voluntary re-
    sponses). Indeed, the Coalition acknowledged during oral
    argument that its position “has never been that [section]
    1677m(d) can’t apply to a voluntary respondent.” See Oral
    Argument at 8:51–58; see also id. at 9:30–42 (noting belief
    that a voluntary respondent is generally “grandfathered
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    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.    v. US    13
    in[to section] 1677m(d)” by responding to questionnaires
    from Commerce “as they come along”).
    The Coalition’s contention that § 1677m(d) does not ap-
    ply to Commerce in this case is premised on the actions
    Shelter Forest took (or failed to take) in responding to the
    supplemental questionnaires. 6 Specifically, the Coalition
    argues, Shelter Forest intentionally did not provide the in-
    formation and materials Commerce had requested and in-
    stead referred Commerce back to its earlier, allegedly
    deficient filings. See Appellant’s Br. at 18–22. This behav-
    ior, in the Coalition’s view, brings this case within the pur-
    view of Papierfabrik August Koelher SE v. United States,
    in which we held that § 1677m(d) does not obligate Com-
    merce “to treat intentionally incomplete data as a ‘defi-
    ciency’ and then to give a party that has intentionally
    submitted incomplete data an opportunity to ‘remedy’ as
    well as to ‘explain’” that deficiency. 
    843 F.3d 1373
    , 1383–
    84 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
    6    We decline to address the Coalition’s argument
    that Shelter Forest forewent its rights under § 1677m(d) by
    responding only at the supplemental questionnaire stage.
    This argument, which was only briefly alluded to in the Co-
    alition’s reply brief, see Appellant’s Reply Br. at 15, was
    presented in full for the first time at oral argument and
    comes too late. See Henry v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    157 F.3d 863
    ,
    865 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (declining to consider argument raised
    for the first time at oral argument); SmithKline Beecham
    Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 
    439 F.3d 1312
    , 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
    (holding arguments insufficiently developed in briefing are
    forfeited); see also Oral Argument at 11:56–13:54. For sim-
    ilar reasons, we decline to address the Coalition’s underde-
    veloped argument that Shelter Forest forewent its rights
    under § 1677m(d) by failing to request voluntary respond-
    ent status under 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.204
    (d)(4). See Appellant’s
    Reply Br. at 7, 11 n.3.
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    14    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.      v. US
    This case, however, is not analogous to Papierfabrik.
    The “intentionally incomplete data” language from that
    case stems from the fact that the respondent there submit-
    ted fraudulent sales data to Commerce. Id. at 1383. The
    fraudulent nature of the respondent’s previous submission
    formed the underlying rationale for our decision that
    § 1677m(d) did not apply, as that statutory provision “is
    readily understood not to apply to the situation [t]here,
    where [the respondent] was already aware of and
    caused the ‘so-called deficiency.’” Id. at 1384 (emphasis
    added). Here, on the other hand, the Coalition does not al-
    lege that Shelter Forest submitted fraudulent information
    to Commerce.
    The Coalition instead argues that Commerce had no
    duty under § 1677m(d) in this case because Shelter Forest,
    through counsel, had access to the information and mate-
    rials contained in the exchanges between Commerce and
    the three mandatory respondents. Appellant’s Br. at 20–
    21. With those exchanges accessible, the Coalition con-
    tends Shelter Forest knew or should have known (1) that
    its previous submissions were deficient with respect to the
    glue criteria, and (2) the level of detail required to overcome
    that deficiency. Id. at 21–22. As such, in the Coalition’s
    view, there was no need for Commerce to identify any defi-
    ciency in Shelter Forest’s previous submissions or to pro-
    vide Shelter Forest with an opportunity to remedy or
    explain such deficiency. Id. But the Coalition cites no au-
    thority supporting its position that Commerce is relieved of
    its statutory duty by a voluntary respondent’s ability to
    puzzle out from the docket what information is deficient
    and what information would be sufficient.
    Even if the Coalition’s argument had merit, the partic-
    ular facts of this case undermine it. First, based on the rec-
    ord before us, Shelter Forest had provided by the initial
    questionnaire stage more information and supporting doc-
    umentation regarding the composition of its resin than the
    mandatory respondents. Compare J.A. 3639; J.A. 3800;
    Case: 21-2281    Document: 69      Page: 15     Filed: 06/15/2022
    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.     v. US    15
    J.A. 4042 (providing high-level summary of the mandatory
    respondents’ respective resin compositions, with no cita-
    tion or reference to supporting documentation), and J.A.
    4005–16 (CARB compliance certifications from one of the
    mandatory respondents for merchandise using urea for-
    maldehyde glue), with, e.g., J.A. 895, 901–905; J.A. 1907–
    1910 (Shelter Forest employee declarations), and J.A. 925–
    26, 938–39, 941, 1484; J.A. 1915–16 (supporting documen-
    tation), and J.A. 1898–99, 1903–904 (October 11, 2018
    Q&V Response). See also J.A. 4602–604, 4606, 4609–11 (di-
    recting Commerce to employee declarations and other ma-
    terials previously submitted by Shelter Forest in July and
    October 2018). This undercuts the notion that Shelter For-
    est should have known that its own materials were defi-
    cient based on Commerce’s reaction to what the mandatory
    respondents initially submitted. Second, Commerce did not
    appear to have a monolithic vision as to the type of infor-
    mation and materials needed to show the glue criteria was
    met, as evidenced by Commerce’s decision not to request a
    percentage breakdown of the third mandatory respondent’s
    resin composition. Compare J.A. 4250–52 (requesting third
    mandatory respondent explain how submitted documenta-
    tion “demonstrates that the merchandise sold meets the
    definition of inquiry merchandise”), with J.A. 4236; J.A.
    4245–46 (requesting other mandatory respondents “iden-
    tify the percentage of each component listed used to formu-
    late the glue” and provide supporting documentation). This
    undercuts the notion that Shelter Forest should have
    known how to remedy any deficiency in its own submis-
    sions based on Commerce’s supplemental requests to the
    mandatory respondents. Finally, to the extent the Coali-
    tion’s argument is one of harmless error, such argument
    fails: it is clear in this case that Commerce’s decision not to
    abide by § 1677m(d) was not harmless.
    For the reasons stated above, as the CIT properly con-
    cluded in Shelter Forest I, Commerce abused its discretion
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    16    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.    v. US
    in rejecting Shelter Forest’s July 3, 2019 submission as un-
    timely. Shelter Forest I, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 1400–401.
    II
    We conclude that substantial evidence supports Com-
    merce’s negative determination and reject the Coalition’s
    attempts to cast doubt on the agency’s conclusions.
    Commerce sufficiently and reasonably explained the
    bases for its negative remand determination. In particular,
    Commerce relied on the materials Shelter Forest submit-
    ted demonstrating (1) the composition of its eZero glue,
    which Shelter Forest explained was later fortified with
    melamine for purposes of waterproofing, and (2) the use of
    the melamine-fortified eZero glue in the radiata pine,
    CARB-certified plywood Shelter Forest marketed and sold
    prior to December 8, 2016. Final Remand Determination at
    11–14, 25–26. Substantial evidence supports these find-
    ings.
    For instance, the record contains documentation from
    Shelter Forest regarding certain shipments of radiata pine,
    CARB-certified plywood merchandise, including documen-
    tation indicating that this merchandise uses Shelter For-
    est’s eZero urea-formaldehyde glue. See, e.g., J.A. 895, 901–
    905; ; J.A. 925–26, 938–39, 941, 1484; J.A. 1898–99, 1903–
    904, 1907–1910; J.A. 1915–16; J.A. 5729–33; J.A. 5745–47,
    5750; J.A. 5757–59, 5764. The record also includes docu-
    mentation of the eZero glue formula, which confirms that
    the eZero glue is majority urea formaldehyde, J.A. 5738–
    39, as well as documentation explaining that melamine
    was added to the eZero glue for waterproofing purposes and
    that this addition occurs after the glue is already mixed,
    see, e.g., J.A. 5877–80; J.A. 5892–93; J.A. 5902; J.A. 5933–
    35.
    Commerce also adequately addressed the issues raised
    by the Coalition, which the Coalition repeats on appeal. See
    Final Remand Determination at 20–30. These arguments
    Case: 21-2281    Document: 69     Page: 17   Filed: 06/15/2022
    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US   17
    are insufficient because, as both Commerce and the CIT
    explained, they do not undermine Commerce’s factual find-
    ings or the evidence on which those findings rely, or be-
    cause they are otherwise irrelevant to the ultimate
    question of whether Shelter Forest sold inquiry merchan-
    dise prior to December 8, 2016. See Shelter Forest II, 
    2021 WL 3082407
    , at *5–6; Final Remand Determination at 20–
    30.
    For example, the Coalition points out that the eZero
    glue recipe does not refer to melamine. Appellant’s Reply
    Br. at 22. The Coalition also alleges that Shelter Forest’s
    documentation contains “inconsistent and contradictory in-
    formation” regarding how much melamine was added to
    the eZero glue; whether melamine-fortified eZero glue is
    waterproof or not; and whether the waterproof plywood
    merchandise sold by Shelter Forest used eZero glue, which
    itself is not waterproof. Appellant’s Br. at 27–29, 31; Ap-
    pellant’s Reply Br. at 21–22, 26, 28. But Commerce’s defi-
    nition of inquiry merchandise—the exact definition the
    Coalition proposed, see Shelter Forest II, 
    2021 WL 3082407
    ,
    at *3 n.5—says nothing about the presence (or absence) of
    melamine in the resin, the degree to which the resin is wa-
    terproof, or the degree to which the merchandise itself is
    waterproof. Thus, the alleged discrepancies the Coalition
    identifies are irrelevant and do not detract from the sub-
    stantial evidence supporting Commerce’s negative deter-
    mination. Even so, these alleged inconsistencies are
    resolved by Shelter Forest’s explanation that melamine
    was added after the eZero glue is already mixed, see, e.g.,
    J.A. 5877–80; J.A. 5892–93; J.A. 5902; J.A. 5933–35, and
    by evidence in the record implying a direct relationship be-
    tween the amount of melamine added and the degree to
    which the melamine-fortified glue (and thus the plywood
    merchandise) is waterproof, see, e.g., J.A. 938; J.A. 1692;
    J.A. 1908; J.A. 1915; J.A. 5876–77; J.A. 5892; J.A. 5935.
    For the reasons stated above, Commerce’s determina-
    tion that Shelter Forest sold inquiry merchandise prior to
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    18    SHELTER FOREST INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITION, INC.   v. US
    December 8, 2016 is both reasonable and supported by sub-
    stantial evidence.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered the Coalition’s remaining argu-
    ments and do not find them persuasive. For the foregoing
    reasons, we affirm the CIT’s final judgment.
    AFFIRMED