Winn v. Department of Homeland Security ( 2005 )


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  •              NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition is not
    citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    04-3468
    OSCAR R. WINN,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
    Respondent.
    _____________________
    DECIDED: May 9, 2005
    _____________________
    Before LOURIE, Circuit Judge, ARCHER, Senior Circuit Judge, and GAJARSA, Circuit
    Judge.
    PER CURIAM.
    DECISION
    Oscar R. Winn petitions for review of the decision of the Merit Systems
    Protection Board dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.     Winn v. Dep’t of
    Homeland Sec., No. DA-0752-03-0018-I-1 (M.S.P.B. July 15, 2004). We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Winn was hired in October 2000 by the Department of Agriculture as an
    agricultural technician at the GS-5 level. In May 2002, Winn applied for a GS-7 position
    as a Plant Protection and Quarantine Officer in the Department of Homeland Security,
    to which a section of the Department of Agriculture had transitioned. That position
    required that Winn undergo a one-year probationary period, achieve a minimum grade
    of eighty percent in the agency’s new officer training program, and demonstrate
    satisfactory performance and conduct during the probationary period.
    Winn was accepted for the officer position and, at the conclusion of his
    probationary period, was promoted to the GS-7 level.         However, he was unable to
    attend his training class until after the probationary period had already ended.
    Ultimately, Winn was unable to achieve a passing grade of eighty percent at officer
    training, and, as a result, the agency notified him that he could either resign or be fired.
    On November 3, 2003, Winn resigned from the agency. On November 14, 2003, he
    changed his mind and requested that his resignation be withdrawn. The agency denied
    that request.
    On November 25, 2003, Winn appealed to the Board, arguing that his resignation
    was involuntary because he had been coerced into resigning. In January 2004, the
    Administrative Judge (“AJ”) issued an initial decision. Winn v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
    No. DA-0752-04-0130-I-1, slip op. at 5, 8 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 21, 2004). The AJ noted
    Winn’s acknowledgement that the agency was firing him “because I failed the course
    and . . . I could not remain in the officer job.” Id., slip op. at 7. The AJ concluded that
    Winn had failed to present nonfrivolous allegations of fact that, even if proven, would
    establish that his resignation was involuntary, and she dismissed the case for lack of
    jurisdiction. Id., slip op. at 8.
    Winn filed a petition for review by the full Board, which was denied, making the
    initial decision of the AJ final. See Loui v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 
    25 F.3d 1011
    , 1013
    04-3468                                  2
    (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.113
    (b) (2004). Winn timely appealed to this court.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    The scope of our review in an appeal from a decision of the Board is limited. We
    must affirm the Board’s decision unless it was: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures
    required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
    substantial evidence.” 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c) (2000); see Briggs v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
    
    331 F.3d 1307
    , 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    On appeal, Winn argues that he presented nonfrivolous allegations of fact that
    his retirement was involuntary so that the Board did have jurisdiction. He asserts that
    the agency coerced him into resigning and that he should have been returned to his
    former position.   The government responds that Winn clearly did not satisfy the
    requirements of the officer position because he had failed the training class, an
    undisputed fact.   The government maintains that Winn had ample time to decide
    whether to resign and that resignation was not his only option.
    We agree with the government that the Board correctly dismissed Winn’s appeal
    for lack of jurisdiction. Our case law establishes that a decision to resign or retire is
    presumed to be voluntary, and an employee who retires voluntarily has no right to
    appeal to the Board. Staats v. United States Postal Serv., 
    99 F.3d 1120
    , 1123-24 (Fed.
    Cir. 1996).   The Board has jurisdiction over an appeal only if the employee can
    demonstrate that his resignation was involuntary. 
    Id. at 1124
    . We have stated that “[i]n
    order to establish involuntariness on the basis of coercion, an employee must show that
    04-3468                                 3
    the agency effectively imposed the terms of the employee’s resignation or retirement,
    that the employee had no realistic alternative but to resign or retire, and that the
    employee’s resignation or retirement was the result of improper acts by the agency.” 
    Id.
    Here, Winn failed to satisfy his burden to establish that his resignation was
    involuntary. The agency’s proposed removal action was seemingly justified because,
    as Winn conceded, he failed the training class, a requirement of the officer position.
    There is no indication in the record that Winn was forced to make an immediate
    decision whether to resign. Indeed, Winn does not even allege that he was required to
    make a decision by any specific deadline, and there were no impending removal
    proceedings by the agency that pressured Winn to resign. He could have declined to
    resign and challenged any subsequent dismissal. The uncontested facts thus indicate
    that Winn’s decision to resign was made with ample time and by his own choosing.
    Also, Winn’s argument that the agency should have returned him to his former position
    due to a purported agency policy is not supported by the record. He has not alleged
    that any particular agency regulation requires the rehiring of employees who fail training
    for a subsequent position.
    We have considered Winn’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
    and was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
    with law. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board.
    04-3468                                 4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2004-3468

Judges: Lourie, Archer, Gajarsa

Filed Date: 5/9/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/1/2024