Donoghue v. United States Postal Service , 167 F. App'x 172 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                  NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    05-3284
    BRIAN J. DONOGHUE
    Petitioner,
    v.
    UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: January 11, 2006
    __________________________
    Before GAJARSA, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM.
    DECISION
    Brian J. Donoghue petitions for review of the May 27, 2005 final decision of the
    Merit Systems Protection Board ("Board") adopting the initial decision of the
    administrative judge ("AJ"). On July 9, 2004, the AJ affirmed the United States Postal
    Service's ("USPS") removal of Donoghue for improper conduct. Donoghue v. United
    States Postal Service, No. CH-0752-04-0353-I-1 (M.S.P.B. July 9, 2004). Because the
    Board's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, is supported by
    substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with the law, we affirm the Board's
    decision and deny the petition.
    BACKGROUND
    Donoghue was the Postmaster for the USPS in Owensville, OH. On the day in
    question, May 13, 2003, Donoghue and a clerk, Angie Breving, were the only
    employees working at the Owensville Post Office.
    The day before, on May 12, 2003, Postal Inspector Gary Bishop mailed a test
    letter to a non-existent post office box at Owensville that offered a phony promotion to
    win Cincinnati Reds Baseball Tickets. Inspector Bishop testified that when he mailed
    the letter he affixed first-class postage.   The letter itself consisted of a folded card
    sealed with a sticker containing a detachable portion that could be filled out with the
    applicant's name and address and returned. Basically, the letter was undeliverable first-
    class mail.
    Postal employees are prohibited from opening first-class mail, 
    39 U.S.C. § 3623
    (d), and Postal regulations require that all undeliverable first-class mail be sent to
    the Mail Recovery Center in Atlanta, GA. The reply card from the test mailer sent to
    Owensville, however, was filled out and signed by Donoghue and sent back to the
    Inspection Service on May 13, 2003. Bishop received the reply card from Donoghue on
    May 14, 2003.
    Six months later, on November 20, 2003, Bishop and Postal Inspector Richard
    Dent interviewed Donoghue at the Owensville Post Office.            According to Bishop,
    Donoghue remembered sending the reply card using his name and personal address
    05-3284                                      2
    but could not remember how he got the card. Bishop's investigative memorandum
    indicated that Donoghue stated he never took undeliverable mail for his personal use
    and that undeliverable first-class mail was sent to the Mail Recovery Center.
    Joe Meimann, Manager of Post Office Operations, sent Donoghue a Notice of
    Proposed Removal on January 7, 2004 notifying him of his pending removal for
    improper conduct. Meimann's proposal noted that Donoghue's record had no elements
    of discipline.   Cincinnati District Postmaster Denise D. Porter heard Donoghue's
    response to the removal and issued a letter of decision removing Donoghue on March
    12, 2004. The letter of decision noted his 18 years of service and lack of disciplinary
    record but found that the seriousness of his actions outweighed this mitigating evidence.
    At the hearing before the AJ, Donoghue again admitted that he filled out the test
    mailer but did not remember how it arrived on his desk. He testified that he did not
    know it came from opened mail and that he never saw the outer portion of the test letter.
    He supposed that the letter may have been left by a clerk or a customer. Furthermore,
    in a pre-hearing statement, Donoghue explained that he would have checked to see if
    the card came out of the mail before filling it out, and therefore he must have been
    comfortable enough with his alleged inquiry that he filled out the card.
    Breving, the only other employee to work that day at the Owensville Post Office,
    testified that she did not know whether she placed the card on Donoghue's desk. She
    testified that her memory was poor and that if someone said she placed it there, she
    would believe them. Regardless, she also testified that she had never opened first-
    class mail even if undeliverable.
    The AJ's initial decision found that it was more likely than not that the test letter
    05-3284                                      3
    arrived undamaged at the Owensville Post Office on May 13, 2003 and that Breving and
    Donoghue were the only people with access to the undelivered mail that day. The AJ
    found Breving's testimony credible that she never opened first-class mail; therefore
    Donoghue was the only person with access to the test letter on May 13, 2003. Because
    there was no evidence to suggest the reply card was somehow separated from the test
    letter in the normal handling of the mail, the AJ concluded it was more likely true than
    not that Donoghue "opened the test letter and appropriated it for his personal use" and
    therefore sustained the USPS's charge of improper conduct. The AJ further held that
    the USPS action was taken to promote the efficiency of the service, pursuant to
    
    5 U.S.C. § 7513
    (a) and that the penalty of removal was not unreasonable.
    DISCUSSION
    We must affirm an MSPB decision unless it is "(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
    of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures
    required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by
    substantial evidence." 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c)(1)-(3) (1994); accord Hayes v. Dep't of the
    Navy, 
    727 F.2d 1535
    , 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A decision is supported by substantial
    evidence when "a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a
    conclusion." Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. United States, 
    750 F.2d 927
    , 933 (Fed.
    Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
    Donoghue makes two general arguments.            First, he argues that the USPS
    investigation is inadequate and there was insufficient evidence that he opened first-
    class mail. Second, he contends that the USPS committed harmful procedural error by
    waiting six months to investigate the incident and by not initially interviewing Breving.
    05-3284                                      4
    A.     Evidence of Misconduct
    The USPS has the burden of proving the improper conduct charge by a
    preponderance of the evidence. 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.56
    (a). This standard requires the
    USPS to prove that the charge is more likely true than not true. § 1201.56(c)(2).
    Donoghue seems to suggest that the agency must present direct evidence that
    he actually opened the mail knowing that it was undeliverable first-class mail. Instead,
    the USPS provided circumstantial evidence that the first-class letter was mailed to the
    Owensville Post Office, that it arrived on May 13, 2003, that the only persons with
    access to the undelivered first-class mail on May 13, 2004 were Donoghue and Breving,
    that Breving by her testimony never opened first-class mail, and that Donoghue filled
    out and returned the reply card on May 13, 2004. Donoghue in his testimony submitted
    that he did not know how the opened letter arrived on his desk but that it did and that he
    would never have completed the card unless he was comfortable it was not
    undeliverable first-class mail.
    It is not unreasonable to infer from such evidence that Donoghue opened first-
    class mail. "[D]irect evidence of a fact is not necessary. Circumstantial evidence is not
    only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct
    evidence." Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 
    394 F.3d 1368
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir.
    2005) (citation omitted). Here, the AJ simply chose to discredit Donoghue's testimony
    and give more weight to Breving's testimony that she had never opened undeliverable
    first-class mail.   Such witness credibility determinations are entitled to considerable
    deference by us and are "virtually unreviewable." See Blank v. Dep't of the Army,
    
    247 F.3d 1225
    , 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We see no error in the AJ's analysis of the facts
    05-3284                                     5
    and hold that there was substantial evidence of improper conduct.
    B.     Procedural Error
    Next, Donoghue argues that the USPS performed an improper investigation by
    waiting six months before interviewing him and never interviewing Breving.           He
    maintains that the error was harmful.
    The Board may overturn an agency decision if it "shows harmful error in the
    application of the agency's procedures in arriving at such decision." 
    5 U.S.C. §7701
    (c)(2)(A). Harmful error is defined by Board regulations as:
    Error by the agency in the application of its procedures that is likely to have
    caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have
    reached in the absence or cure of the error. The burden is upon the appellant to
    show that the error was harmful, i.e. that it caused substantial harm or prejudice
    to his rights.
    
    5 C.F.R. §1201.56
    (c)(3).      We have recognized that some amount of time for
    investigation is acceptable before bringing charges of improper conduct. See Shaw v.
    United States Postal Service, 
    697 F.2d 1078
    , 1080 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Moreover, even if
    the delay is erroneous the employee must demonstrate how it substantially harms him.
    
    Id.
    Donoghue's basic argument is that his and Breving's memories would have been
    better had the USPS interviewed them sooner.        However, the lack of interviewing
    Breving was cured by her own testimony at the hearing. The AJ found her testimony
    credible that she did not open first-class mail. Further, Donoghue has not indicated
    what he could have testified to that would indicate someone else opened the mail. The
    facts demonstrate that only he and Breving had access to the undelivered mail and that
    Breving never opened first-class mail. The actual controversy here is the credibility of
    the evidence; a decision we leave to the AJ unless the petitioner can show he abused
    05-3284                                    6
    his discretion.
    The Board's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, it is
    supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in accordance with the law.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Board's decision and deny the petition.
    Each side shall bear its own costs.
    05-3284                                      7