Soler v. Department of the Treasury , 167 F. App'x 188 ( 2006 )


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  •                    NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition
    is not citable as precedent. It is a public record.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    05-3331
    RICHARD SOLER,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: February 9, 2006
    __________________________
    Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and LINN, Circuit
    Judge.
    PER CURIAM.
    Richard Soler (“Soler”) seeks review of the final decision of the Merit Systems
    Protection Board (“Board”) that denied his petition for enforcement of a settlement
    agreement with the Department of the Treasury (“agency”). See Richard Soler v. Dep’t
    of the Treasury, No. NY-0752-93-0562-C-3 (M.S.P.B. July 28, 2005) (“Final Decision”).
    Because the Board correctly concluded that Soler released the agency from the non-
    disclosure provisions of the settlement agreement, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    In 1993, the agency terminated Soler from his employment as a revenue agent
    based upon charges and findings that he filed a false income tax return and made false
    statements. Soler appealed his removal to the Board. Soler and the agency settled the
    action with an agreement that was made of record by the Board for enforcement
    purposes.   Under the settlement agreement, the agency agreed not to release the
    information about Soler’s removal unless he applied for a job with a taxing authority or
    applied to practice before the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Further, the agency
    agreed to give a neutral reference in response to inquiries from potential employers.
    More specifically, the settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that:
    2. The Agency agrees to rescind [Soler’s] termination,
    including the June 24, 1993 letter of proposed termination
    and the August 20, 1993 letter of decision. . . .
    4. The Agency agrees to remove from [Soler’s] Official
    Personnel Folder (OPF) any and all materials and
    reference(s) which document the termination action, the
    allegations, the charges and/or investigation into [Soler’s]
    activities; and to amend [Soler’s] OPF to reflect that he
    resigned voluntarily from his position for personal reasons,
    effective September 3, 1993, including any information on
    [Soler’s] Standard Form 50 and any other form in the OPF
    which recites the reasons for [Soler’s] leaving his
    employment with the Agency. . . .
    6. [Soler] agrees not to seek or apply for future employment
    with the Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue
    Service, or any other taxation authority, including, but not
    limited to, the New York State Department of Taxation and
    the New York City Department of Finance. In the event
    [Soler] does apply for employment with any taxation
    authority, the Agency will have the right to inform the
    prospective employer of the charges set forth in the June 24,
    1993 letter of proposed adverse action which formed the
    basis fo the Agency’s termination action against [Soler]. . . .
    05-3331                                      2
    8. [Soler] acknowledges that the Agency will maintain
    separate from Soler’s OPF, copies of the June 24, 1993
    letter of proposed adverse action, the August 20, 1993
    termination letter and the evidence supporting the charges in
    the June 24, 1993 letter for use in the event that [Soler]
    either applies for employment with any taxing authority or
    applies for enrollment to practice before the Internal
    Revenue Service as set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 of this
    Agreement.
    9. Except as specifically set forth in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8
    of this Agreement, the Agency agrees that responses to
    inquiries from potential employers, including other
    governmental agencies, which are directed to the Agency’s
    Personnel Office concerning [Soler’s] IRS employment, will
    be limited to Soler’s length of service, last job title, grade and
    salary, and that he voluntarily resigned effective September
    3, 1993 for personal reasons. [Soler] agrees to advise
    potential employers, other than those enumerated at
    paragraph 6 hererin, to contact the Personnel Office of the
    IRS Brooklyn District office for references.
    In 2003, Soler signed a SF-86 Form, including an Authorization For Release Of
    Information (“Release Authorization”), in connection with his application for employment
    as a customs inspector with the Department of Homeland Security.                   The Release
    Authorization provided, in relevant part, that:
    I Authorize custodians of such records and other sources of
    information pertaining to me to release such information
    upon request of the investigator, special agent, or other duly
    accredited representative of any Federal agency authorized
    above regardless of any previous agreement to the contrary.
    (emphasis added).
    In 2004, after having been found unsuitable for the customs inspector position by
    the Department of Homeland Security, Soler filed a petition to enforce the settlement
    agreement, alleging that the IRS did not purge his official personnel file and claiming
    that damaging information about him had reached federal agencies.                  In an initial
    05-3331                                       3
    decision, the Board denied Soler’s petition for enforcement without explictly addressing
    whether the IRS had failed to purge Soler’s personnel file, based upon its determination
    that he had waived the agency’s obligations under the settlement agreement by
    granting the Release Authorization. Richard Soler v. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. NY-
    0752-93-0562-C-3 (M.S.P.B. Nov. 24, 2004) (“Initial Decision”). The Initial Decision
    became the Final Decision of the Board on May 28, 2005, after the Board denied
    Soler’s petition for review for failure to meet the criteria for review set forth at 
    5 C.F.R. § 1201.115
    .
    Soler timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9).
    DISCUSSION
    A.     Standard of Review
    Pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c), this court must affirm the Board’s decision unless
    it is: (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
    with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule or regulation having
    been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence. Chase-Baker v. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    198 F.3d 843
    , 845 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Whether a waiver has occurred is a legal
    question based upon underlying facts. Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman Indus., Inc., 
    387 F.3d 1358
    , 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Sandler v. AII Acquisition Corp., 
    954 F.2d 382
    , 384 (6th
    Cir. 1992). The legal conclusions of the existence and scope of a waiver are reviewable
    de novo. Sandler, 
    954 F.2d at 384
    .
    05-3331                                       4
    B.     Analysis
    The question before us is whether Soler’s execution of the Release Authorization
    waived his right under the settlement agreement to prevent the agency from disclosing
    information concerning Soler’s prior employment.           A waiver is an “intentional
    relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 
    304 U.S. 458
    , 464 (1938). “A party may waive any provision, either of a contract or of a
    statute, intended for his benefit.” Shutte v. Thompson, 
    82 U.S. 151
    , 159 (1872); see
    also Millmaster Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 
    427 F.2d 811
    , 814 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
    Under the express terms of the settlement agreement, the agency contractually
    agreed to not divulge information about his removal unless he applied for a job with a
    taxing authority or applied to practice before the IRS and to give a neutral reference to
    prospective employers. It is undisputed that Soler signed the Release Authorization,
    the terms of which authorized the release of his prior employment records, “regardless
    of any previous agreement to the contrary.” Soler does not allege, and there is no
    evidence to suggest, that Soler did not enter into the Release Authorization freely and
    voluntarily or that the Release Authorization did not reflect his intent to free the
    government from the prior restriction on disclosure.         By executing the Release
    Authorization, Soler waived his contractual right under the settlement agreement to hold
    the agency to its prior undertaking not to disclose information concerning his removal.
    See Shutte, 82 U.S. at 159.
    For the foregoing reasons, we discern no error in the Board’s conclusion that the
    Release Authorization effected a waiver of the agency’s obligations regarding the non-
    05-3331                                     5
    disclosure of information concerning his removal from the agency.   We accordingly
    affirm.
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