McBeth v. Social Security Administration , 244 F. App'x 369 ( 2007 )


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  •                       NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2006-3289
    CANDACE N. MCBETH,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
    Respondent.
    Ethel L. Munson, Law Office of Ethel L. Munson, of Atlanta, Georgia, argued for
    petitioner.
    Sean B. McNamara, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With him
    on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and Deborah A. Bynum,
    Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief were James M. Flournoy, and Steven A.
    Collins, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, Region IV, Social
    Security Administration, of Atlanta, Georgia.
    Appealed From: United States Merit Systems Protection Board
    NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    2006-3289
    CANDACE N. MCBETH,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
    Respondent.
    __________________________
    DECIDED: July 17, 2007
    __________________________
    Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, GAJARSA, Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON, * District
    Judge.
    MICHEL, Chief Judge.
    Candace N. McBeth petitions for review of the final decision, on April 24, 2006, of
    the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) in AT-0752-06-0142-I-1 sustaining her
    removal by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) from the position of Claims
    Representative.    Because there are no contested issues of law or procedure,
    substantial evidence supports all four charges of misconduct, and removal was
    reasonable under the circumstances, we affirm.
    *
    Honorable Sue Robinson, District Judge, United States District Court for
    the District of Delaware, sitting by designation.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    The SSA first employed McBeth as a Service Representative in Louisiana in
    1997.    On April 17, 2002, however, McBeth was suspended for two days for
    unprofessional and inappropriate conduct, unauthorized search of a supervisor’s desk,
    failure to follow an office procedure, and unauthorized removal of signed documents
    from a claims file.   On April 30, 2002, the SSA proposed to suspend McBeth for
    fourteen days for failure to follow management instructions, failure to follow office
    procedures, and inappropriate service to the public. McBeth resigned from the SSA
    before serving the suspension.
    In 2004, McBeth was rehired in a Georgia SSA office as a Claims Representative
    under a temporary appointment that eventually became permanent. On August 19,
    2005, Elaine Press (McBeth’s first-level supervisor) sent her a proposed notice of
    removal containing the following four charges: (1) discourtesy to a fellow SSA
    employee; (2) demonstration of a lack of impartiality while performing official duties; (3)
    failure to follow supervisory directives; and (4) discourtesy to a member of the public.
    Letter from Elaine Press, Assistant District Manager, to Candace McBeth (Aug. 19,
    2005) (“Proposal Letter”).
    A.    Discourtesy to a Fellow SSA employee and Lack of Impartiality
    These two charges can be analyzed together because they both arise from
    events on the same day. On May 16, 2005, McBeth called Paul Stephens, a senior
    SSA attorney with the Office of Hearings and Appeals (“OHA”) at the Atlanta North
    Hearing Office, to get information on the status of a five-year old claim filed by Georgina
    Heard. Ms. Heard had come to see McBeth regarding her outstanding claim. Stephens
    2006-3289                                   2
    explained that OHA was in the process of reconstructing Ms. Heard’s file because it had
    been lost during her appeal of the denial of her social security benefits. 1      In the
    presence of Ms. Heard, McBeth (1) told Stephens that based on her review of the
    medical evidence, Ms. Heard’s claim should be approved, (2) demanded to know why
    approval of Ms. Heard’s claim was taking so long, and (3) criticized Stephens and the
    Administrative Law Judge for not doing their jobs. Stephens characterized McBeth’s
    tone as strident and hostile. On the same day, McBeth called Michael Gay, aide to
    Senator Johnny Isakson and former aide to Senator Zell Miller, describing the claimant
    as suicidal and in dire need of her benefits. 2 Mr. Gay, in turn, called Stephens, who
    marked the case as having Congressional interest.
    B.     Failure to Follow Directives
    There are three specifications for the charge that McBeth failed to follow
    supervisory directives.   First, on June 7, 2005, Shara Johnson, one of McBeth’s
    supervisors, assigned McBeth an End-Stage Renal Disease (“ESRD”) claim to process
    for a claimant who was in dire need of reimbursement so she could start dialysis. After
    receiving a guideline for processing the claim and despite repeated orders by various
    supervisors, McBeth failed to process the ESRD claim over the course of several
    weeks.
    1
    After an unfavorable decision on her benefits claim in 2003, Ms. Heard
    filed a request for review with the Appeals Council. When her file was lost on the way to
    the Appeals Council, the Council remanded the case with instructions for OHA to
    reconstruct the file and hold a new hearing.
    2
    Apparently, Ms. Heard told McBeth that Mr. Gay would have information
    about her from when he worked as an aide for Senator Zell Miller. See McBeth v. Soc.
    Sec. Admin., No. AT-0752-06-0142-I-1, slip op. at 4 n.2 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 20, 2006). Mr.
    Gay did not have any information on file concerning Ms. Heard.
    2006-3289                                   3
    Second, on July 28, 2005, Press and Janice Hutchinson (Operations Supervisor)
    encountered McBeth in a private interviewing room checking electronic mail and asked
    her to return to her work station. McBeth asked for a union representative, pulled a tape
    recorder out of her brassiere, and started recording. The supervisors asked McBeth to
    put away the recorder, but McBeth kept recording.
    Third, on August 8, 2005, Press, Union Representative Paul Coffey, and McBeth
    met to discuss the July 28, 2005 incident and a proposal to suspend her. McBeth
    sought permission to record the meeting.       Press gave McBeth a written directive
    instructing her not to bring a recording device to work. Press instructed McBeth not to
    record the discussion and instead to put the recording device in her vehicle. McBeth
    complied with this directive.
    C.     Discourtesy to a member of the public
    On July 7, 2005, Tim Autrey, a member of the public, inquired at the reception
    desk about bathroom access after discovering that the men’s restroom was inoperable
    and the women’s restroom was locked. Mr. Autrey reported that a SSA employee at the
    reception desk (not the security guard) told him to “go in his pants.” At the time of the
    incident, McBeth and Olivia Brown, the security guard, were the only two people at the
    reception desk. Mr. Autrey verbally complained about the incident to the Atlanta SSA
    office, to Press, and to Gary Epling (McBeth’s second-level supervisor). Mr. Autrey
    followed up his conversation with Epling with an unsigned, misdated letter 3 that
    summarized the incident.
    3
    The Autrey Letter was dated July 19, 2004, instead of 2005.
    2006-3289                                  4
    Returning to the history of the ensuing removal, on September 1, 2005, McBeth
    responded to the Proposal Letter. On October 21, 2005, Epling issued a letter effecting
    McBeth’s immediate removal from her position as a Claims Representative. Letter from
    Gary Epling, District Manager, to Candace McBeth (Oct. 21, 2005) (“Removal Letter”).
    McBeth filed a timely appeal to the Board on November 21, 2005. An Administrative
    Judge (“AJ”) conducted a hearing on February 7, 2006, and in an Initial Decision dated
    March 20, 2006, sustained McBeth’s removal.        McBeth v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
    AT-0752-06-0142-I-1, slip op. (M.S.P.B. Mar. 20, 2006) (“Initial Decision”). The Initial
    Decision became final on April 24, 2006, when McBeth failed to file a petition for full
    Board review.   This timely appeal followed.    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(9) because there was a final Board decision.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    Our review of MSPB decisions is limited by statute. In this case, we must affirm
    the Board’s decision unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence.         5 U.S.C
    § 7703(c); see also Chase-Baker v. Dep’t of Justice, 
    198 F.3d 843
    , 845 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
    (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 7703
    (c)).   On appeal, McBeth argues that the AJ’s findings with
    respect to the four charges and penalty are not supported by substantial evidence.
    A.     Proof of Misconduct
    The AJ found that the SSA had proven the charges of discourtesy to a fellow
    SSA employee and demonstration of a lack of impartiality while performing official
    duties by preponderant evidence. He based this finding on the testimony of Stephens,
    who characterized his conversation with McBeth as the “worse experience he had ever
    had with a federal employee during his approximately 25 years of service,” on a
    2006-3289                                  5
    contemporaneous memorandum Stephens had written to his supervisor summarizing
    his conversation with McBeth, and on Stephens’ testimony that McBeth stated that if
    she were the decision-maker, she would approve Ms. Heard’s claim. The AJ found
    Stephens’ testimony to be more credible than McBeth’s.
    On appeal, McBeth contends that under Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 
    768 F.2d 1325
    , 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 1985), an AJ must set forth all bases for his subsidiary findings
    that bear on credibility and argues that because the AJ did not give reasons why he
    discredited McBeth’s testimony, his credibility assessment was in error. Jackson, which
    holds that the full Board must provide sound reasons for rejecting the credibility
    determination of an AJ, 
    id. at 1331
    , does not support McBeth’s argument. Because
    there was no full Board review of the AJ’s Initial Decision in this case, Jackson is
    inapposite. Instead, Jackson affirms that we should give deference to the credibility
    determinations of an AJ who “was present to hear and observe the demeanor of the
    witnesses,” 
    id.
     at 1332 n.7 (internal citation omitted).
    Although it would have been more helpful to this court if the AJ had discussed
    the Hillen factors 4 and provided specific reasons for why he credited Stephens’
    testimony over that of McBeth, this court accords great deference to the AJ’s credibility
    determinations, Griessenauer v. Dep’t of Energy, 
    754 F.2d 361
    , 364 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
    unless they are “inherently improbable or discredited by undisputed evidence or
    4
    See Hillen v. Dep’t of the Army, 
    35 M.S.P.R. 453
    , 458 (M.S.P.B. 1987)
    (setting forth the following factors for resolving credibility issues: “(1) [t]he witness’s
    opportunity and capacity to observe the event or act in question; (2) the witness’s
    character; (3) any prior inconsistent statement by the witness; (4) a witness’s bias, or
    lack of bias; (5) the contradiction of the witness’s version of events by other evidence or
    its consistency with other evidence; (6) the inherent improbability of the witness’s
    version of events; and (7) the witness’s demeanor.”).
    2006-3289                                     6
    physical fact,” Hanratty v. Dep’t of Transp., 
    819 F.2d 286
    , 288 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (internal
    citation omitted). We will not reweigh the evidence, nor will we redo the AJ’s credibility
    determination, where, as here, there is substantial evidence to support the AJ’s findings
    and decision sustaining these charges of misconduct.
    With respect to the ESRD specification for the charge that McBeth failed to follow
    supervisory directives, the AJ based his finding on the testimony of McBeth’s
    supervisors (Johnson and Press) who testified that despite receiving a step-by-step
    guideline, McBeth failed to process the ESRD claim.        Over two weeks later, Press
    reassigned the claim to Kathy Pierce, who testified that she processed the claim within
    an hour using the same guideline McBeth had received. For the July 28, 2005 use of
    tape recorder specification, the AJ based his findings on the testimony of supervisors
    (Johnson, Press, and Hutchinson), who observed McBeth speaking into a tape recorder
    after Press had told McBeth to stop recording. There is therefore more than substantial
    evidence to support these two specifications of McBeth’s failure to follow supervisory
    directives. However, both parties agree that it was error for the AJ to find that on
    August 8, 2005, McBeth violated a prior written directive she was provided on July 28,
    2005, prohibiting recording devices on the premises, because McBeth did not receive
    the written directive on July 28, 2005. She received it on August 8, 2005. In fact, the
    evidence shows that when McBeth received the written directive on August 8, 2005, she
    put her recorder away.
    That the AJ’s finding regarding the August 8, 2005 incident is not supported by
    substantial evidence is not fatal to the decision, however, because the proven ESRD
    and July 28, 2005 specifications sustain the charge that McBeth failed to follow SSA’s
    2006-3289                                   7
    directives. See Burroughs v. Dep’t of Army, 
    918 F.2d 170
    , 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“If the
    agency fails to prove one of the elements of its charge, then the entire charge must fall.
    To be contrasted is the situation where more than one event or factual specification is
    set out to support a single charge. In that case, proof of one or more, but not all, of the
    supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge.”) (internal citation omitted).
    The AJ based his finding on the charge of discourtesy to a member of the public
    on the testimony of Press and Epling and the Autrey letter.             On appeal, McBeth
    dismisses the evidence as hearsay. However, there is no evidence that the person who
    told Mr. Autrey to urinate in his pants could have been someone other than McBeth.
    Mr. Autrey identified the culprit as a SSA employee at the reception desk who was not
    the security guard. Per Press, McBeth was the only SSA employee at the reception
    desk at the time of the incident.        Autrey’s letter summarizing the incident, albeit
    misdated and unsigned, corroborates Press and Epling’s consistent narrations of what
    Autrey told them.     We hold there is substantial evidence to support the charge of
    discourtesy to a member of the public. See Sanders v. United States Postal Serv., 
    801 F.2d 1328
    , 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“[H]earsay evidence may be substantial evidence in
    an administrative proceeding if there are circumstances which give it credibility and
    probative value to a reasonable mind.”).
    B.     Reasonableness of Penalty
    The AJ found that removal was well within the bounds of reasonableness based
    on the number and seriousness of the charges and McBeth’s prior disciplinary record,
    namely the two-day suspension in the Louisiana SSA Office on April 17, 2002 (cited in
    the Removal Letter) and the proposed fourteen-day suspension (not cited in the
    2006-3289                                     8
    Removal Letter). Thus, the AJ referred to past misconduct that was not included in the
    Removal Letter.
    However, the AJ’s possible reliance on the proposed suspension is harmless
    error because there is substantial evidence that (1) the SSA did not rely on the
    proposed suspension in its Proposal Letter or Removal Letter, see Proposal Letter at 3
    and Removal Letter at 5 (citing only the two-day suspension as a prior disciplinary
    action), and (2) McBeth responded to the Proposal Letter. Thus, the AJ’s decision did
    not deny McBeth any substantial rights or result in harmful error. See Brewer v. United
    States Postal Serv., 
    647 F.2d 1093
    , 1097 (Ct. Cl. 1981).         In any event, there is
    substantial evidence that the seriousness of the charges alone or in combination with
    the two-day suspension support a finding that the penalty of removal was reasonable.
    We will not interfere with the Board’s affirmance of the SSA’s discretion in choosing the
    penalty of removal, absent an abuse of that discretion. See Carosella v. United States
    Postal Serv., 
    816 F.2d 638
    , 643 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The Board’s affirmance of the
    agency’s choice of penalty will not be disturbed unless it is so harsh and inappropriate
    as to exceed the agency’s discretionary authority.”).
    2006-3289                                   9