John B. Davis, Sr., as Administrator of the Estate of John B. Davis, Jr. v. Edgewater Systems for Balanced Living, Inc. , 42 N.E.3d 524 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                    Aug 25 2015, 8:56 am
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Steven J. Sersic                                           Michael G. Getty
    Kevin C. Smith                                             Brad R. Pero
    Smith Sersic                                               Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros, LLP
    Munster, Indiana                                           St. Joseph, Michigan
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    John B. Davis, Sr., as                                     August 25, 2015
    Administrator of the Estate of                             Court of Appeals Case No.
    John B. Davis, Jr., Deceased,                              45A05-1412-CT-588
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                      Appeal from the Lake Superior
    Court.
    v.                                                 The Honorable Elizabeth M.
    Bezak, Judge Pro Tempore.
    Edgewater Systems For                                      Trial Court Cause No.
    Balanced Living, Inc.,                                     45D11-1405-CT-81
    Appellee-Respondent.
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015               Page 1 of 10
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Petitioner, John B. Davis, Sr., as Administrator of the Estate of John
    B. Davis, Jr., Deceased (Davis), appeals the trial court’s grant of Appellee-
    Respondent’s, Edgewater Systems for Balanced Living, Inc. (Edgewater),
    motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(C).
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUES
    [3]   Davis raises three issues on appeal, of which we find two issues dispositive and
    which we restate as:
    (1)      Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted
    Edgewater’s motion on the pleadings pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule
    12(C); and
    (2)      Whether Davis should have been granted an opportunity to amend
    his Complaint.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   Edgewater is a community mental health center, specialized in dealing with
    psychiatric crises, including those involving patients with homicidal tendencies,
    acute psychotic symptoms, sudden changes in mental status, or other types of
    mental health issues. At all relevant times, Jamal Gore (Gore) was a patient at
    Edgewater, receiving medical health care. On May 17, 2010, Edgewater
    requested an emergency detention of Gore pursuant to I.C Art. 12-26, which
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 2 of 10
    was supported by a licensed physician. The emergency request averred that
    Gore was non-compliant with his medication, confrontational, aggressive,
    paranoid, “irritable and getting into fights with people.” (Appellant’s App. p.
    22). On May 17, 2010, at approximately 12:45 p.m., the emergency detention
    request was granted by the Gary City; Court. Edgewater sent the order to the
    Gary police department by facsimile, which was received by the department
    that same day at about 2:28 p.m. There is no evidence the detention order was
    executed. On May 24, 2010, Gore killed John Davis, Jr. Gore was prosecuted
    for murder and found guilty but mentally ill. On October 31, 2012, during the
    murder proceedings against Gore, Davis learned of the alleged negligence of
    Edgewater through the testimony of an Edgewater employee.
    [5]   On May 1, 2014, Davis filed his Complaint against Edgewater, alleging
    Edgewater “failed to exercise ordinary due diligence or care to follow up on the
    [emergency detention] order or secure or ensure its enforcements from the time
    the order was obtained up to and including the time, seven days later, on May
    24, 2010, when Gore killed John B. Davis, Jr.” (Appellant’s App. p. 8). On
    July 14, 2014, Edgewater filed its Answer, as well as a motion for judgment on
    the pleadings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(C). On September 12, 2014,
    Davis filed a response to Edgewater’s motion and requested, in the alternative,
    to convert Edgewater’s motion to a T.R. 12(B)(6) motion. On September 24,
    2014, Edgewater responded to Davis’ alternate request. On November 20,
    2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on Edgewater’s motion for judgment
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 3 of 10
    on the pleadings. The following day, the trial court entered an order, granting
    Edgewater’s motion.
    [6]   Davis now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Indiana Trial Rule 12(C)
    [7]   Davis contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Edgewater’s
    motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to T.R. 12(C). Specifically, he
    claims that Edgewater is not civilly immune from the lawsuit.
    [8]   We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a T.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on
    the pleadings. Bell v. Bryant, 
    2 N.E.3d 716
    , 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). When
    reviewing a T.R. 12(C) motion, we consider any facts of which we may take
    judicial notice. 
    Id. Also, we
    accept as true the well-pleaded material facts
    alleged in the complaint, and base our ruling solely on the pleadings. Murray v.
    City of Lawrenceburg, 
    925 N.E.2d 728
    , 731 (Ind. 2010). “The ‘pleadings’ consist
    of a complaint and an answer, a reply to any counterclaim, an answer to a
    cross-claim, a third-party complaint, and an answer to a third-party complaint.”
    Consol. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Water Servs. LLC, 
    994 N.E.2d 1192
    , 1196 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2013) (quoting Waldrip v. Waldrip, 
    976 N.E.2d 102
    , 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).
    “Pleadings” also consist of any written instruments attached to a pleading. See
    T.R. 10(C) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading
    is a part thereof for all purposes.”). A motion for judgment on the pleadings
    under T.R. 12(C) should be granted “only where it is clear from the face of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 4 of 10
    complaint that under no circumstances could relief be granted.” 
    Murray, 925 N.E.2d at 731
    .
    [9]   In its motion, Edgewater advanced that it was entitled to civil immunity for the
    claims asserted against it based upon two sub-sections of the mental health care
    provider immunity statute, included at I.C. §§ 34-30-16-1 & -2. As originally
    enacted in 1987, I.C. § 34-4-12.4-3 recognized the common law duty of a
    mental health service provider to warn potential victims of patient-inflicted
    violence. The statute also clarified the conditions a mental health service
    provider must satisfy to qualify for immunity from civil liability. In 1998, the
    statute was amended and recodified as Indiana Code section 34-30-16-1. The
    current version of the statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
    Sec. 1. A mental health service provider is immune from civil
    liability to persons other than the patient for failing to:
    (1) Predict; or
    (2) Warn or take precautions to protect from;
    a patient’s violent behavior unless the patient has communicated
    to the provider of mental health services an actual threat of
    physical violence or other means of harm against a reasonably
    identifiable victim or victims, or evidences conduct or makes
    statements indicating an imminent danger that the patient will
    use physical violence or use other means to cause serious
    personal injury or death to others.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 5 of 10
    [10]   Once a mental health service provider’s duty is triggered, the provider may
    discharge this duty in one of five ways. Specifically:
    Sec. 2. The duty to warn of or to take reasonable precautions to
    provide protection from violent behavior or other serious harm
    arises only under the limited circumstances specified in section 1
    of this chapter. The duty is discharged by a mental health service
    provider who takes one (1) or more of the following actions:
    (1) Makes reasonable attempts to communicate the threat to the
    victim or victims.
    (2) Makes reasonable efforts to notify a police department or
    other law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the
    patient’s or victim’s place of residence.
    (3) Seeks civil commitment of the patient under [I.C. Art.] 12-26.
    (4) Takes steps reasonably available to the provider to prevent the
    patient from using physical violence or other means of harm
    to others until the appropriate law enforcement agency can be
    summoned and takes custody of the patient.
    (5) Reports the threat of physical violence or other means of
    harm, within a reasonable period of time after receiving
    knowledge of the threat, to a physician or psychologist who is
    designated by the employer of a mental health service
    provider as an individual who has the responsibility to warn
    under this chapter.
    I.C. § 34-30-16-2.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 6 of 10
    [11]   Without having to decide whether the span of seven days between the trial
    court’s emergency detention order and the murder qualifies as an “imminent
    danger” under I.C. § 34-30-16-1, we conclude that Edgewater was discharged
    from its duty—assuming a duty arose under I.C. §34-30-16-1—to warn or to
    take reasonable precautions pursuant to I.C. § 34-30-16-2(2) & (3).
    [12]   First, under section 2 of the statute, the duty to warn or to take reasonable
    precautions created by section 1 is properly discharged by a mental health
    service provider if “reasonable efforts” were undertaken “to notify a police
    department or other law enforcement agency[.]” See I.C. § 34-30-16-2(2). Here,
    the trial court decided that “Edgewater’s conduct in faxing the Emergency
    Order constituted ‘reasonable effort.’” We agree, to a certain extent. By faxing
    the emergency order to the Gary police department and noting the
    Department’s receipt of the order, Edgewater’s actions went beyond a
    “reasonable effort” and rather constitute an actual and successful notification of
    the Gary police department.
    [13]   However, Davis now attempts to broaden the “reasonable effort” language of
    the statute by imposing a duty on Edgewater to follow up on the notification
    and to ensure that the police department took action. In construing a statute, it
    is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize
    what it does say. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steele, 
    622 N.E.2d 557
    , 561
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), reh’g denied. As such, “[w]e may not read into the statute
    that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature.” 
    Id. Because the
    statute only directs a mental health provider to undertake “reasonable efforts”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 7 of 10
    without more in order to be discharged of its duty and to be entitled to civil
    immunity, and is silent as to any further action on the part of the mental health
    provider, we decline to enlarge the statutory language to incorporate a duty as
    suggested by Davis.
    [14]   Furthermore, Edgewater sought and obtained an emergency detention order for
    Gore. Pursuant to I.C. § 34-30-16-2(3), a mental health provider’s duty to warn
    is discharged if a “civil commitment of the patient under [I.C. Art.] 12-26” is
    sought. In Indiana, an adult person may be civilly committed either voluntarily
    or involuntarily under carefully delineated statutory provisions. Indiana Article
    12-26 provides that involuntary commitment may occur under four
    circumstances: (1) Immediate Detention by law enforcement up to 24 hours, see
    I.C. Ch. 12-26-4 et seq.; (2) Emergency Detention for up to 72 hours, see I.C. Ch.
    12-26-5 et seq.; (3) Temporary Commitment for up to 90 days, see I.C. Ch. 12-
    26-6 et seq.; and (4) Regular Commitment for an indefinite period of time that
    may exceed 90 days, see I.C. Ch. 12-26-7 et seq. Thus, as Edgewater obtained an
    emergency detention order, it prevailed in seeking an involuntary civil
    commitment “under [I.C. Art.] 12-26” and properly discharged its duty to
    warn. See I.C. § 34-30-16-2(3). Assuming that Edgewater’s duty to warn had
    been triggered, Edgewater properly regained its immunity from civil liability by
    fulfilling its obligations of I.C. §§ 34-30-16-2(2); and -2(3). Concluding that no
    circumstances exist under which relief could be granted, we affirm the trial
    court’s grant of Edgewater’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
    II. Amendment of Complaint
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 8 of 10
    [15]   Davis contends that even if Edgewater’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
    is granted, he should be allowed ten days to amend his Complaint. In other
    words, Davis asserts that Edgewater’s motion pursuant to T.R. 12(C) is more
    properly characterized as a motion pursuant to T.R. 12(B) as the “real
    gravamen of the Order [] is whether the Complaint fails to state a claim.”
    (Appellant’s Br. p. 10).
    [16]   Even if we were to characterize Edgewater’s motion as a motion pursuant to
    T.R. 12(B), we note that “[a] [T.R.] 12(B)(6) motion filed after an answer will
    be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under [T.R.] 12(C).” Bell,
    2N.E.3d at 719 (quoting DeHart v. Anderson, 
    383 N.E.2d 431
    , 436 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1978)). Edgewater filed its motion after it filed its answer to Davis’ Complaint.
    As the requirements of T.R. 12(C) do not include an opportunity to amend the
    Complaint, we affirm the trial court.
    [17]   Moreover, as pointed out by Edgewater, “an attempted amendment of the
    Complaint would be waste of the parties’ time and judicial resources because
    [Davis] cannot change the facts that underlie his action—he cannot plead
    around Edgewater’s civil immunity defenses[.]” (Appellee’s Br. p. 12). Our
    supreme court has stated:
    The granting of a Rule 12(b) motion merely means that the
    plaintiff has failed to satisfy one of the procedural prerequisites
    for asserting his claim for relief. A motion for judgment on the
    pleadings, however, theoretically is directed towards a
    determination of the substantive merits of the controversy.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 9 of 10
    The mere fact that these procedural defects are raised in the guise
    of a Rule 12(c) motion should not affect the manner by which the
    court determines what essentially are Rule 12(b) matters. In this
    context, Rule 12(c) is merely serving as an auxiliary device that
    enables a party to assert certain procedural defenses after the
    close of the pleadings.
    Davis ex rel. Davis v. Ford Motor Co., 
    747 N.E.2d 1146
    , 1150 (Ind. 2001) (quoting
    Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1369, 1368). Thus,
    a T.R. 12(B) motion is essentially procedural, while a T.R. 12(C) motion is
    substantive unless it is brought on T.R. 12(B) grounds.
    [18]   Here, Edgewater asserted a civil immunity defense in its motion for judgment
    on the pleadings. By claiming immunity, Edgewater is not relying on a
    procedural defect in Davis’ Complaint, rather Edgewater is advancing a
    “determination of the substantive merits of the controversy.” See 
    id. Accordingly, any
    amendment of the Complaint will not alter the existence of
    Edgewater’s civil immunity defense.
    CONCLUSION
    [19]   Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s Order granting Edgewater’s
    motion for judgment on the pleadings, and we deny Davis’ request for an
    opportunity to amend his Complaint.
    [20]   Affirmed.
    [21]   Friedlander, J. and Brown, J. concur
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion | 45A05-1412-CT-588 | August 25, 2015   Page 10 of 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 45A05-1412-CT-588

Citation Numbers: 42 N.E.3d 524

Filed Date: 8/25/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023